JUDGMENT:- Rule. By consent heard forthwith. Heard Mr. Joshi, Advocate for the Applicant and Mrs. Wasnik, A.P.P. for the respondent no. 1 and Mr. Khapre, Advocate for respondent no.2. 2. By this application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "the Code" the applicants who are accused Nos. 1 to 3 in Regular Criminal Case No.1420/2003 filed by respondent no.2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate Akola seek quashing of order dated 25-8-2004 as well as Regular Criminal Case No. 1420/2003. Respondent no.2 filed the above case against the present applicants and two others alleging commission of offences punishable under Section 409, 420, 464, 466, 468, 470, 406, 471 and 120- B of the Indian Penal Code against them. The complainant examined himself. Thereafter on 25-8-2000 the learned Magistrate passed the following order: Heard. Read the contents and verification statements of complaint. In the facts and circumstances of the case I feel that it would be just and proper if the complaint is sent for investigation under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. Hence, the complaint he sent to the P.S.O. Old City Station Akola, with a direction to register the F.L.R. and investigate into the present crime and warranted file the charge-sheet or report as the case may be". 3. Taking exception to the said order as well as the criminal proceedings initiated against the applicants, the applicants have filed the present application. 4. Mr. Joshi, learned counsel appearing for the applicants submitted that after taking cognizance the learned Magistrate could not have sent the complaint for investigation with the direction to register the F.I.R. and investigate into the crime and file the chargesheet or report as the case may be. Mr. Joshi submitted that upon taking cognizance the Magistrate could not have directed the investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. In support of this submission, Mr. Joshi placed reliance upon the following authorities :(1) AIR 2001 SC 571 : [2001 ALL MR (Cri) 775 (S.C.)] (Suresh Chand Jain Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and another). (2) AIR 2006 SC 705 (Mohd. Yousuf Vs. Smt. Afaq Jahan & another). 5. Per contra, Mrs. Wasnik, learned A.P.P. appearing for respondent no. In support of this submission, Mr. Joshi placed reliance upon the following authorities :(1) AIR 2001 SC 571 : [2001 ALL MR (Cri) 775 (S.C.)] (Suresh Chand Jain Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and another). (2) AIR 2006 SC 705 (Mohd. Yousuf Vs. Smt. Afaq Jahan & another). 5. Per contra, Mrs. Wasnik, learned A.P.P. appearing for respondent no. 1 submitted that the Magistrate was justified in sending the complaint for the investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code but he could not have directed the registration of F.I.R. and the investigation into the crime. Mr. Khapre, learned counsel appearing for respondent no.2 fairly conceded that the Magistrate was not justified in sending the complaint for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. However, he submitted that the Magistrate could have ordered investigation under Section 202 of the Code and, therefore, mere mentioning of wrong section would not vitiate the order. In support of this submission, Mr. Khapre relied upon the following authorities : (1) 2003 Cr.L.J. 3953 (Jogendranath Gharel and another Vs. State of Orissa and another). (2) 2006(1) AIR Bom.R. 855 : [2006 ALL MR (Cri) 740 (F.B.)] (Ashok Gyanchand Vohra & etc. Vs. State of Maharashtra & another etc.). (3) Unreported judgment of this Court dated 4th May, 2005 passed in Criminal Application No.1253/2003, Kedarnath Gangadhar Agrawal Vs. State of Maharashtra (since reported in 2006 ALL MR (Cri) 519). 6. I have considered the submission made by learned counsel for the parties and learned A.P.P. I have perused the records. In Suresh Chand Jain's case [2001 ALL MR (Cri) 775 (S.C.)] (supra) the Apex Court has observed at para 10 of the judgment reads as thus :"The position is thus clear. Any judicial magistrate, before, taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register on FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. After all registration of an FIR involves only the process of entering the substance of the information relating to the commission of the cognizable offence in a book kept by the officer-in-charge of the police station as indicated in Section 154 of the Code. There is nothing illegal in doing so. After all registration of an FIR involves only the process of entering the substance of the information relating to the commission of the cognizable offence in a book kept by the officer-in-charge of the police station as indicated in Section 154 of the Code. Even if a Magistrate does not say in so many words while directing investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code that on FIR should be registered, it is the duty of the office-in-charge of the police station to register the FIR regarding the cognizable offence disclosed by the complaint because that police officer could take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII of the Code only thereafter." 7. Perusal of para 10 of the above judgment and the provisions of Chapter XV of the Code makes it clear that the Magistrate can direct the investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code only before taking cognizance. After taking cognizance the Magistrate can only order investigation in terms of Section 202(1) of the Code. In Mohd. Yousuf's case (supra) the Apex Court has considered the scope of the investigation under Section 156(3) and Section 202(1) of the Code and has held that the scope of investigation under two sections is entirely different. The investigation carried out by the police pursuant to the direction given by the Magistrate under Section 202(1) of the Code is of limited nature whereas the investigation carried out pursuant to the direction given under Section 156(3) of the Code is of wider nature in which the police have wide powers to investigate into the crime and even register the F.I.R. against an accused. Such powers are not vested in a Police Officer who has been directed to investigate under Section 202(1) of the Code. I am, therefore, unable to accept the submission of Mr. Khapre that this is a case of wrong mentioning of section in view of clear ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Yousuf's (supra). In view of the provisions of Chapter XV of the Code, the impugned order to the extent it directs investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code and registration of F.I.R. and the investigation thereafter cannot be sustained. 8. Yousuf's (supra). In view of the provisions of Chapter XV of the Code, the impugned order to the extent it directs investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code and registration of F.I.R. and the investigation thereafter cannot be sustained. 8. I am surprised that the learned A.P.P. appearing on behalf of the State Government has supported the first part of the order which is ex-facie contrary to the judgment of the Apex Court and the provisions of Chapter XV of the Code. 9. I have perused the judgments relied upon by Mr. Khapre in support of his submissions. I deem it not necessary to refer to them since the ratio laid down in all these judgments is not applicable in the present case and these authorities do not deal with the situation arising in the present case. 10. As stated above, the applicants have challenged in this application not only the order dated 25-8-2004 but also criminal proceedings in Regular Criminal Case No. 1420/ 2003 filed by respondent no. 2. Although the challenge to the order dated 25-8-2004 is well founded, I am unable to grant relief of quashing of criminal proceedings against the applicants inasmuch as it is for the Magistrate to satisfy himself whether there is a prima facie case against the applicants before issuing of process. In the present case a copy of the Roznama in the case has been made available to me. The same discloses that the learned Magistrate chose to pass the impugned order after complainant examined himself. It is an admitted position that the complainant has mentioned names of seven witnesses including himself in the list annexed to the complaint. It is an admitted position that the complainant is entitled to examine more witnesses in support of his case. Therefore, in my opinion, the proper course to be adopted in this case is to quash the impugned order dated 25-8-2004 and remand the matter back to the learned Magistrate with liberty to the complainant to examine more witnesses, if he so desires. It is made clear that the Magistrate may also choose to order investigation in terms of Section 202(1) of the Code if he thinks fit. The Magistrate shall follow the procedure laid down in Chapter XV of the Code and pass appropriate order in accordance with law. 11. In the result, therefore, the application is partly allowed. It is made clear that the Magistrate may also choose to order investigation in terms of Section 202(1) of the Code if he thinks fit. The Magistrate shall follow the procedure laid down in Chapter XV of the Code and pass appropriate order in accordance with law. 11. In the result, therefore, the application is partly allowed. The impugned order dated 25-8-2004 passed by Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.4, Akola in Regular Criminal Case No. 1420/2003 is hereby quashed and set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Magistrate to proceed with the case by following the provisions of Chapter XV of the Code and the observations made above. The prayer of the applicants to quash proceedings in Regular Criminal Case No. 142012003 is rejected. Interim relief granted by this Court on 6-4-2005 stands vacated. The parties shall appear before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Akola at 11.00 a.m. on 9-4-2007 for further directions. Application stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms. Application partly allowed.