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2007 DIGILAW 339 (MAD)

N. Gani & Others v. K. P. Ranganathan & Others

2007-01-29

S.ASHOK KUMAR

body2007
Judgment :- Aggrieved over the order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Athur, by which the revision petitioners were evicted from the tenanted premises, who were tenants inducted by the Advocate Receiver appointed by the Court pending the suit, this revision has been preferred. 2. Originally, the suit was filed in O.S.No.716 of 1973 on the file of the Sub Court, Salem, by the legal representatives of one Late Kandasamy Pillai for partition and separate possession in respect of the estate of Kandasamy Pillai. Pending the suit, an Advocate Receiver was appointed to manage the estate of late Kandasamy Pillai. The said Receiver let out various portions of the suit properties to the revision petitioners. The revision petitioners 1,8,9, 12 and 14 became tenants of portions of suit properties from some of the co-owners of the suit properties even prior to the suit. 3. A preliminary decree was passed in the said suit. An appeal challenging the same in AS.No:114 of 1984 before this Court came to be dismissed on 20.12.1994. Thereafter the suit was transferred to the Sub Court of Authur and renumbered as O.S.No:344 of 1997. In the said suit, I.A.208 of 1997 was filed by the plaintiffs for passing of a final decree. Pending the same, the parties to the suit entered into a compromise ad pursuant to the compromise three I.As were filed. I.A.No.371 of 2005 was filed praying to issue directions directing the Advocate Receiver to render proper accounts. I.A.No.372 of 2005 to terminate the receivership and I.A.No:373 of 2005 was file seeking direction to the Advocate Receiver to take steps to vacate the tenants from their respective occupations. In I.A.No:374 of 2005 a compromise final decree was passed on 10. 2005. The Advocate Commissioner took steps to vacate the tenants with the help of police. 4. The revision petitioners filed Rent Control Petitions for permission to deposit the rents which were allowed and they are paying the rents without any arrears. They also filed suits on the file of the District Munsif, Athur seeking injunction against the respondents/plaintiffs in the present suit from forcibly evicting them except by due process of law. 5. Thereafter by a consent order dated 9. 2005 made in I.A.No:373 of 2005 a direction was given to the Advocate Receiver to take steps to vacate the tenants/revision petitioners from their respective occupations with police aid. 5. Thereafter by a consent order dated 9. 2005 made in I.A.No:373 of 2005 a direction was given to the Advocate Receiver to take steps to vacate the tenants/revision petitioners from their respective occupations with police aid. It is as against the said order, the present revisions have been filed by the tenants. 6. Learned counsels appearing for the revision petitioners contended that the petitioners who are tenants from the Advocate Receiver are statutory tenants entitled to the benefits of Rent Control Act. The definition landlord as defined in Section 2(6) of the Rent control Act recognises a receiver also as a landlord. Therefore the revision petitioners being statutory tenants and there being no arrears of rent, they cannot be evicted except by due process of law. It is contended that the decree holders can only take symbolical possession only and the revision petitioners cannot be evicted without due process of law. 7. A perusal of the proceedings which started from the year 1973 would go to show that the present proceedings instituted by the revision petitioners are not maintainable in law as admittedly the revision petitioners after appointment of Advocate Receiver have entered into separate lease agreements with him with a condition to abide by the outcome of the result of the pending suit and therefore they are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Advocate Receiver from discharging his official functions and executing the order of the court. 8. Pending the final decree proceedings, the parties to the suit have compromised the issues among themselves and based on the compromise between the parties to the suit, the I.A.No:373 of 2005 was allowed granting final decree. Thus the main suit itself came to an end after three decades of legal battle. Therefore, the Advocate Receiver, who was appointed pending the suit as custodia legis of the suit properties for proper administration has been discharged with a direction to take steps to hand over vacant possession to the decree holders on the direction of the Court by evicting the tenants who were inducted by him or some of whom continued with the tenancy by executing separate lease deeds. 9. The contention of the revision petitioners is that they can be evicted only by due process of law. What does it mean? It means eviction through Court. 9. The contention of the revision petitioners is that they can be evicted only by due process of law. What does it mean? It means eviction through Court. "Except due process of law" is a word very often quoted by litigants who seek bare injunction. What s due process of law is a n order of the Court. Here, in this case, only in pursuance of the order of the Court, the Advocate Receiver was appointed with whom the revision petitioners executed lease deeds agreeing to vacate the premises subject to the result of the pending suit O.S.No:344 of 1997. But, now after a compromise entered between the parties final decree has been passed and the court has directed the Advocate Receiver to evict all the tenants appointed by him to execute the decree viz., to partition the suit properties as per the compromise and to deliver possession to the parties. This is an order of the court and only in pursuance of the order of the court, the Advocate Receiver has given notice to the revision petitioners/tenants to vacate. This is the usual procedure which can be termed as due process of law. The prayer of the revision petitioners is not to evict them without due process of law. What else "due process of law" could not be explained by the revision petitioners. Does the revision petitioners want that the RCOPs must be filed by the Receiver or the persons to whom the property is delivered after partition and the revision petitioners must be given an opportunity to contest the RCOPs? When the revision petitioners have executed documents once in 11 months in favour of the Advocate Receiver agreeing to vacate the premises subject to the result of the pending suit, nothing more is required as an order of the court than this order to evict the petitioners. Therefore even the suits said to have been filed on the file of the District Munsif, Athur, seeking injunction against the decree holders from forcibly evicting them except by due process of law is an abuse of process of the court. 10. In 1995 (1) LW 445 (Ponnammal (dead) by LRs Vs. Therefore even the suits said to have been filed on the file of the District Munsif, Athur, seeking injunction against the decree holders from forcibly evicting them except by due process of law is an abuse of process of the court. 10. In 1995 (1) LW 445 (Ponnammal (dead) by LRs Vs. N.Muthuswamy Chettiar) the Apex Court held as follows:- "The point involved in this case is whether a tenant inducted into possession by a court Receiver could claim the benefit of the statutory protection even after he discharge of the Receiver? We need not labour much in view of the decision of this Court in Krishna Kumar Khemka Vs. Grindlays Bank PLC & Others (1990 (3) SCC 699. We are aware that was a case where the Receiver leased out the property in the teeth of an injunction order. Nevertheless, this court approved the Full Bench judgment of the Madras High Court above referred to. In fact, in para 16 it is stated thus:-"Similarly as observed in Arumugha Gounder case any such act of the receiver done on behalf of the court pendente lite and anyone who gets possession through such an act could only do so subject to the directions and orders of the court". Therefore, we hold that a Receiver when he leases out property does so as an agent of the Court. After all, what is the object of appointment of a receiver? To bring the property under custodia legis, once the receiver is discharged, the tenancy also must come to an end. There is great reason and justice in holding so. As was pointed out by Justice Venkatraman in the impugned judgment that if the object of appointment of Receiver is to preserve the property by fastening a tenancy on the successful party, it will be detrimental to the ultimate person who succeeds to the property." 11. In Shyam Sunder Dutta Vs. Baikuntha Nath Banerjee (dead) by LRs and others reported in 1994 (6) SCC 545 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court again reiterated as follows:- "A Receiver when appointed to manage the suit property acts as an officer of the Court. In Shyam Sunder Dutta Vs. Baikuntha Nath Banerjee (dead) by LRs and others reported in 1994 (6) SCC 545 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court again reiterated as follows:- "A Receiver when appointed to manage the suit property acts as an officer of the Court. Unless the court grants permission to induct any third party into the possession as a tenant in accordance with the directions contained in the order or as per the law then prevailing, the person inducted by the Receiver into possession would remain only as a licensee under the Receiver. AS soon as the Receiver is discharged, the possession of the licensee being a limited right to remain in possession during the period when the Receiver was in management of the suit property, it comes to an end. On the discharge of the Receiver, the licensee has no right to remain in possession either as a tenant or as a licensee. Therefore the period of his possession cannot be treated or tagged for the purpose of claiming adverse possession. The possession of the Receiver is possession on behalf of the Court and a party cannot claim any title adverse to the opposite party when the Receiver remained in possession. The respondent in this case was inducted into possession by the Receiver in 1933 and he remained in possession till 1945. During that period, such possession cannot be treated to be adverse to the real owner of the property. Consequently, the declaration given by the High Court that the respondents had acquired the tenancy rights by prescription is clearly illegal. 12. The above two decisions of the Apex Court squarely applies to the facts of the present case which only makes the position of law very clear that the revision petitioners have no statutory rights of tenancy by virtue of their induction into the premises by the Advocate Receiver who is appointed only to manage the suit properties and acts as an officer of the court. The possession of the tenants is only as a licensee and as soon as the Receiver is discharged, the possession of the licensee being a limited right to remain in possession during the period when the receiver was in management of the suit property comes to an end. 13. The possession of the tenants is only as a licensee and as soon as the Receiver is discharged, the possession of the licensee being a limited right to remain in possession during the period when the receiver was in management of the suit property comes to an end. 13. In view of the latter judgments referred to above, which are directly on the point of issue in question in these CRPs, the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the revision petitioners which are anterior in point of time may not be relevant. The decision relied upon reported in AIR 1997 SC 173 is distinguishable on facts, because the party in possession in that case was not a tenant who has executed a lease deed to the Receiver agreeing to vacate the premises subject to the result of the suit. So also the decision reported in 2004 (3) L.W.143 (Rame Gowda (D) by LRs Vs. M.Vadarappa Naidu (D) by LRs is not useful to the facts of the case as in the said case a three Judges Bench of the Honble Supreme Court only laid down that "no one, including the true owner, has a right to dispossess the trespasser by force if the trespasser is in settled possession of the land viz., settled possession must be effective, undisturbed and to the knowledge of the owner and in such a case unless he is evicted in the due course of law, he is entitled to defend his possession even against the rightful owner. The above case arose between a trespasser and the rightful owner of the land in a suit for title which went upto the Apex Court. As already stated the eviction notice issued by the Advocate Receiver in the present case is due process of law on the settlement of the issues between the parties to the main suit and therefore the act of the Advocate Receiver to evict the petitioners who have already executed Lease Deeds to remain in tenancy only subject to the outcome of the main suit, have no legal right to challenge the same. 14. In the result, both the CRPs are dismissed with costs. Consequently, connected CMPs are also dismissed. No costs.