Judgment : A. P. SHAH, C. J. These appeals are filed against a common order dated 7.3.2007 passed in W.P. Nos. 6264 of 2000 and 12261 of 1997. After scrutiny, the Registry had asked the counsel appearing for the appellants to explain how the writ appeals were in time when there was a delay of 126 days in filing the same. The learned counsel for the appellants filed a memo stating that the writ appeals have been filed by the third party appellants against the common order of the learned single Judge. In the writ petitions, the appellants were not a party. According to the appellants, they are the main objectors as far as the issues covered in the writ petitions are concerned, but they were not impleaded in the writ petitions. The appellants came to know about the order passed in the writ petitions only in the last week of July, 2007. There is no delay in filing the writ appeals since the appeals have been filed in time from the date of knowledge. The Registry has placed the matter before the Court since it entertains a doubt regarding limitation in filing the said writ appeals. 2. Mr. V. Raghavachari, learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that it is a well settled position of law that the period of limitation will not commence if the judgment is pronounced in the absence of parties and their counsel, of which they had no notice. He submitted that if the date on which the judgment was pronounced is taken into account for the purpose of computation of limitation, great injustice would be caused to the party concerned without any fault on its part. According to the learned counsel, in the absence of communication of the order, the right of the party concerned cannot be affected and limitation would commence only from the date of knowledge and not from the date of the order. He invited our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Harishchandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer AIR 1961 SC 1500 , wherein the Supreme Court considered the expression ‘the date of Collectors award’ as occurring in Section 18(2)(b) of the Land Acquisition Act and observed (at pp. He invited our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Harishchandra Raj Singh v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer AIR 1961 SC 1500 , wherein the Supreme Court considered the expression ‘the date of Collectors award’ as occurring in Section 18(2)(b) of the Land Acquisition Act and observed (at pp. 1504 and 1505): “Where the rights of a person are affected by any order and limitation is prescribed for the enforcement of the remedy by the person aggrieved against the said order by reference to the making of the said order, the making of the order roust mean either actual or constructive communication of the said order to the party concerned. So the knowledge of the party affected by the award made by the Collector under Section 12 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, either actual or constructive is an essential requirement of fairplay and natural justice. Therefore, the expression ‘the date of the award’ used in proviso (b) to Section 18(2) of the Act must mead the date when the award is known by him either actually or constructively. It will be unreasonable to construe the words from the date of the Collectors award used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.” 3. Mr. V. Raghavachari next cited the judgment in State of Punjab v. Quisar Jehan Begum , AIR 1963 SC 1604 , where considering a similar question in the context of the application made by the appellant under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act for determining compensation, on behalf of the State, an objection was raised that the reference was incompetent as the application was made beyond the period prescribed in Clause (b) of the proviso to Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The award was given by the Collector on 25.10.1953. The objector made the application for interim payment of compensation on 25.12.1954, but the requisite application for making reference to the civil Court was made on 30.9.1955 almost after a period of two years from the date of the award. The State raised the plea that the reference was incompetent as the application under Section 18 had been made beyond six months from the date of the award. The State raised the plea that the reference was incompetent as the application under Section 18 had been made beyond six months from the date of the award. The Supreme Court repelled the contention and observed (at p. 1604): “A literal and mechanical construction of the words ‘6 months from the date of the Collectors award’ occurring in the second part of clause (b) of the proviso would not be appropriate and the knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fairplay and natural justice, the expression used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. Whether the award was never communicated to the party the question is when did the party know the award either actually or constructively.” 4. Learned counsel also brought to our notice, the decision in Madan Lal v. State of U. P. , AIR 1975 SC 2085 : (1975) 2 SCC 779 . In that case, the Supreme Court construed the expression ‘date of order’ for the purpose of computing limitation for filing appeal under Section 17 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. Section 11 provided limitation of three months from the date of the order for filing appeal. The Supreme Court held that limitation would run from the date the aggrieved party came to know of the order and not from the date the order was actually passed. 5. Finally, the learned counsel relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in National Thermal power Corporation v. Raghunath Pd. , AIR 1981 All. 344 , where the Court held that for the purpose of filing the appeal, the party concerned must have full knowledge of the decree or order. A vague knowledge that some decree has been passed in proceedings against the party concerned is not sufficient. When the appellant for the first time got the full details of the order of the District Judge by the letter of the Special Land Acquisition Officer, the date of knowledge would be the date of receipt of that letter. 6. A vague knowledge that some decree has been passed in proceedings against the party concerned is not sufficient. When the appellant for the first time got the full details of the order of the District Judge by the letter of the Special Land Acquisition Officer, the date of knowledge would be the date of receipt of that letter. 6. In view of the pronouncement of law by the Supreme Court, it is amply clear that it is fundamental principle of justice that a party whose rights are affected must have notice of the Order and in the absence of such notice, his right to appeal cannot be taken away without there being any fault on his part. In the present case, the appellants were not impleaded as party to the writ petitions and they are stated to be aggrieved by the order passed by the learned single Judge and according to them, they came to know of the order only in July, 2007 and the present appeals, which were filed on 10.8.2007, were within the period of limitation. The Office objections are dispensed with.