JUDGMENT J.M. Malik, J.- The short question involved hereinwith is what is the meaning of expression "Sufficient means" occurring in suits and appeals by indigent persons in Order 33 Rule 1 and Order 44. It is pointed out that the appellant is a poor person having no sufficient means to pay the Court fee. She does not have any movable or immovable propel1y except the suit property in question. Her husband had left the house five years back and his whereabouts are not known. The appellant has two school going children. She has undertaken to pay the requisite Court fee whenever she acquires any sufficient means to pay the same. 2. Report of SDM was called. It reveals the following facts. The appellant is working us n domestic servant and earns about Rs. 1,600/- per month. She has got a plot of 45 square metres duly constructed, having one room with attached bathroom. The approximate cost of the same is about Rs.5 lacs. The appellant has no other assets. Her husband visits her occasionally. She has got two children i.e. daughter aged about 15 years and son aged about 13 years. He further reported that financial position of Smt. Sarla Devi is not sound. 3. Order 33 clearly and specifically states that a person is an indigent person - (a) if he is not possessed of sufficient means (other than propel1y exempt from attachment in execution of a decree and the subject-matter of the suit) to enable him to pay the fee prescribed by law for the plaint in such suit, or (b) where no such fee is prescribed, if he is not entitled to property worth one thousand rupees other than the property exempt from attachment in execution of a decree, and the subject-matter of the suit. Further Section 60, CPC provides that certain properties shall not be liable to attachment, e.g. Section 60(l)(c) lays down - (c) houses and other buildings (with materials and the sites thereof and the land immediately appurtenant thereto and necessary for their enjoyment) belonging to an agriculturist (or a labourer or a domestic servant) and occupied by him; Section 60(1)(h) lays down - (h) the wages of labourers and domestic servants, whether payable in money or in kind. 4. 4. 1n Devamma v. Chief Secretary, Government of Karnataka, 2000 AIHC 3380 (Kant.), it was held that the expression "Sufficient means" to enable a person to pay the Court fee excludes from its scope or cluthes (sic. excludes) the properties that are exempt from attachment in execution of a decree. 5. Harrison J. in Lalchand v. Mt. Pisto, AIR 1928 Lahore 271, was pleased to observe, "the very use of the word "means" shows that it was intended to cover and include all forms of realisable assets which can be converted into cash and as such can be used for financing the litigation." 6. In the case of Prabhakaran Nair v. K.P. Neelakantan Pillai, AIR 1988 Kerala 267, it was held: "The benefit of Order 33, CPC is conferred on persons without sufficient means and not without any means at all. Pauperism is not a pre-requisite for the leave. What is contemplated is not possession of property but sufficient means. Capacity to raise money and not actual possession of property alone is what the Court has to look into. What is intended is not capacity to raise funds by any means whatsoever by begging, borrowing or stealing or by any other hook or crook, but by normal and available lawful means. It is not essentially that one should deprive himself of the sole means of livelihood or alienate all his assets to seek justice in penury. This itself is the object of exclusion of property exempt from attachment in execution of a decree and the subject matter of the suit from sufficient means. A debt that has yet to be realised or an asset which is not within the immediate reach of the plaintiff to be converted into cash for payment of Court fee cannot be taken into account in calculating sufficient means. " 7. This view stands fortified by the observations made in cases reported in Rambhai v. Gujarat State Road & Co., AIR 1975 Gujarat 94, and O.P. Neelam Hosiery Works v. State Bank of India, AIR 1994 HP 1 . The learned Counsel for the appellant also drew the attention of this Court towards another case reported in T. Jayamma v. Bangalore University 2000 AIHA 2459 Karnataka. It further goes to embolden this view. The learned Counsel for the appellant also drew the attention of this Court towards another case reported in T. Jayamma v. Bangalore University 2000 AIHA 2459 Karnataka. It further goes to embolden this view. Further, in a latest case reported in Smt. Manjulata v. Sidhkaran, AIR 2005 Rajasthan 32, it was held that: "The expression not possessed of sufficient means mentioned in Explanation I to Order 33 Rule 1, CPC while defining the word pauper refers to plaintiffs capacity to pay the Court fee prescribed by law for the plaint in such a suit What is contemplated is not possession of the property but sufficient means with capacity to raise money to pay the Court fee. Mere possession of ornaments or a plot is not sufficient. If the property in possession of the appellant is not sufficient enough to raise money to pay the requisite Court fee, he or she should not be deemed to be possessing sufficient means to pay the Court fee and, hence, the Court can take her as ‘pauper under this rule," 8. The contrary view taken in Hari Singh v. Chanda Singh. AIR 1968 Bombay 380, I regret, that is unpalatable. 9. In the light of discussion of the above said facts, I allow the application. Trial Court record be requisitioned for the date fixed. The case is fixed• for arguments on admission of this case on 19.3.2007 moved by the applicant under Order 44 read with Order 33. Application allowed.