JUDGMENT:- This writ petition is filed against the order of the School Tribunal, whereby respondent no.2's termination is set aside and direction to reinstate the respondent is given. 2. The facts, in short, are as follows- Respondent Sulkan belongs to Scheduled Tribe category. Against the post reserved for that category, she was appointed on probation of two years. It is her case that on 18-12-2000 she had made an application to the Education Officer making allegations that the headmaster of the school had obtained her signatures on the blank papers and her appointment was made after taking money from her; she submits that she rendered good services but inspite of her good performance, her services were terminated by order dated 20-11-2000 w.e.f. 27-12-2000. The respondent raised an objection to the termination order. Hence, another termination order was issued and the services were terminated w.e.f. 22-12-2000. 3. On appeal under Section 9 of the Employees Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Act by respondent, the learned judge found that the order was not sustainable in law. Holding so, he allowed the appeal and directed reinstatement. Hence, this writ petition. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners. None appears for the respondent, though respondent had sought early hearing of the matter. 5. The services of the respondent no.2 were terminated before expiry of two years of probation period is not disputed. The only ground upon which an employee, whose services are terminated during probation, can challenge the termination is if it is stigmatic. The question as to whether any order is stigmatic has to be decided on the basis of the contents of the order. The order in this case simply says that the Management has decided to terminate the services. It further says that after considering the record placed before the Management Committee, the Management has arrived at conclusion that the performance of the employee is not satisfactory. It cannot be disputed that the question of continuity of the employee in services beyond period of probation has to be determined on the basis of the performance of the candidate. The probation presupposes that the person would be under watch, his performance would be gauged and suitability would be determined during that period. The suitability may include temperament, ability to perform and sufficient knowledge of the subject. The probation presupposes that the person would be under watch, his performance would be gauged and suitability would be determined during that period. The suitability may include temperament, ability to perform and sufficient knowledge of the subject. If it is found that the employee does not have enough knowledge of the subject or is not able to impart properly to the pupils in the class that too would be enough to hold that the employee is not suitable for the job. In the context, if the submissions of the appellant/respondent before the School Tribunal are seen, it would be evident that the respondent was given memos to improve her performance and not to bring her child to school during working hours. It is contended that the appellant/respondent was given an opportunity to improve but did not and the students were not satisfied with the performance of the teacher and that was the reason why the respondent's services were required to be terminated. In fact, these are the grounds which need to be taken into account while deciding the question of completion of probation. If these things were taken into consideration for determination of her suitability then no fault can be found with the order. 6. This court in 2003(1) Mh.L.J.90 (Usha Mule Vs. Presiding Officer, Addl. School Tribunal), relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Pavanendra Narayan Verma Vs. Sanjay Gandhi P.G.I. of Medicial Sciences, 2002(1) ALL MR 302 (S.C.) made following observations. "It would be normal in the course of employment for an employer to put an employee on notice regarding the acts which are found to be unsatisfactory or which the employer prima facie may consider to be irregular or not in accordance with the rules of conduct. It is also normal for an employer to ask an employee for an explanation for the said acts. Merely because the employee gives an explanation which is not found satisfactory and thereupon the employer decides to terminate the services on the ground that the services are found to be unsatisfactory during the period of probation, that would not amount to causing a stigma. Properly speaking, the termination order can be stigmatic if it states that the employee has been found to be guilty of misconduct or dereliction of duty etc. This is something that must be looked into the termination order itself. Properly speaking, the termination order can be stigmatic if it states that the employee has been found to be guilty of misconduct or dereliction of duty etc. This is something that must be looked into the termination order itself. For this purpose, it is necessary to look to the termination order itself. Where the termination order aid not contain anything which imputes something over and above mere unsuitability for the job. To reiterate the statement in the termination order that the clarification given by the petitioner is not found to be satisfactory, does not cast a stigma." 7. In the case at hand, the order simply says that upon consideration of record, the services rendered by the respondent were not found satisfactory and as such were terminated. If this order is read, it is absolutely clear that there is not a single phrase or sentence which would make the order stigmatic. 8. The learned judge of the lower court found that the Management has played a foul play since it revoked the first order and issued second. There could be nothing foul in it. In fact, it is alleged by the respondent in her appeal to the School Tribunal, in para nos.4 and 5, that the first order was not according to Rule and, therefore, illegal. If the first order was defective, the Management was bound to issue the correct order. There could be nothing foul in it, particularly when the respondent herself has brought the defect to the notice of the Management. The setting aside of the order of termination by School Tribunal on this ground was certainly improper and the learned judge, in fact, did not consider the question as to whether order was stigmatic or otherwise. Without deciding that question, he could not set aside the order of the Management. He having done so, the order of the School Tribunal needs to be set aside. Hence, the order passed by the School Tribunal is quashed and set aside. The appeal before School Tribunal is dismissed. The rule is made absolute. Petition allowed.