Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is the sole accused in S.C.No.1 of 1999, on the file of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai. The charges against him are under Sections 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter called “the Act”). He has filed the present criminal original petition seeking to quash the said proceedings. 2. Admittedly, the petitioner was working as a Superintending Engineer, Public Works Department, Madurai Circle. There is no dispute that he is a public servant. According to the final report, filed by the respondent, the pecuniary resources of the petitioner at the beginning of the check period namely, 01.01.1988 was Rs.2,08,659/-. Whereas, at the end of the check period, namely on 30.12.1995, he was found to have possessed the pecuniary resources and properties worth Rs.41,86,212/-. The total income during the check period was Rs.42,05,903/-. The savings of the petitioner would have been Rs.17,28,755/-, as on 30.12.1995. Thus, according to the final report, the petitioner was found to have been in possession of properties worth Rs.22,48,789/- at the end of the check period namely 31.12.1995, disproportionate to his income for which the petitioner has not satisfactorily offered any explanation. Thus, the petitioner has allegedly committed an offence punishable under Sections 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of the Act. The trial Court has already framed charges against the petitioner and already one witness has been examined. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the following grounds:- (i) The complainant himself has investigated the case and he has filed the final report which is illegal. (ii) The officers who have investigated the case were not empowered to investigate as required under Section 17 of the Act. There is clear violation of Section 18 of the Act, also. (iii) Registration of the case in a hasty manner without a preliminary enquiry is irregular and the same vitiates the entire case. (iv) There was inordinate unexplained delay in placing the report before the sanctioning authority for securing sanction and the sanctioning authority in turn had caused unnecessary delay in giving sanction and the said delay vitiates the sanction order. (v) The sanction order suffers from various defects, and it is void for want of application of mind. (iv) There was inordinate unexplained delay in placing the report before the sanctioning authority for securing sanction and the sanctioning authority in turn had caused unnecessary delay in giving sanction and the said delay vitiates the sanction order. (v) The sanction order suffers from various defects, and it is void for want of application of mind. (vi) A legal opinion given by one Mr.S.Venkatraman, Deputy Legal Advisor, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, Madurai, was not placed before the sanctioning authority and such withholding of vital document vitiates the sanction order. (vii) Though, according to the F.I.R., the check period was 01.01.1992 to 04.11.1993, the final report was filed erroneously taking the check period as 01.01.1988 to 31.12.1995 and the same is illegal. (viii) The explanation submitted by the petitioner/accused to the Investigating Officer, though was a satisfactory one, was not at all considered by the sanctioning authority which also vitiates the sanction order. 4. While concluding his argument, the learned counsel submitted that though the present petition before this Court was pending, the respondent has proceed with the trial of the case by examining P.W.1 which would amount to interference with the proceedings of this Court amounting to clear contempt warranting initiation of action against the Investigating Officer and the Public Prosecutor for punishment under the Contempt of Courts Act. 5. The learned counsel in support of his arguments, would rely on several judgments of the Honble Supreme Court as well as this Court which, I would refer to at the appropriate places of this order. 6. Mr. Siva Ayyappan, learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) appearing for the respondent would submit the following points:- (i) The grounds raised in this petition are all to be considered only by the trial Court during trial on evidence and this Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., cannot look into these grounds at this stage. (ii) The trial Court has considered all the materials available on record and has found prima facie case to frame charges against the petitioner under Sections 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) of the Act. The said charges are not challenged either by way of revision or by way of any petition before this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. When that be so, the petitioner is precluded from maintaining the present petition before this Court. The said charges are not challenged either by way of revision or by way of any petition before this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. When that be so, the petitioner is precluded from maintaining the present petition before this Court. (iii) There is no legal bar for the complainant to investigate the case and question of prejudice due to such investigation is to be considered only at the time of trial. (iv) The sanction order is valid and the same does not suffer from any infirmity. He would further submit that under Section 19 of the Act, defects in the sanction order cannot be a ground even for acquittal and therefore, the same cannot be a ground for quashing the proceedings. (v) The delay in obtaining the sanction order and in filing the charge sheet are all explainable and on the ground of mere delay, the criminal proceedings cannot be quashed. (vi) The explanation offered by the petitioner was not satisfactory and therefore, charge sheet was laid. Whether the explanation offered is satisfactory or not is a matter to be considered only by the trial Court at the time of trial. (vii) The officers who investigated the case are empowered officers under Sections 17 and 18 of the Act. (viii) Regarding the request made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, to initiate proceedings for contempt, the learned Government Advocate would submit that mere pendency of the proceedings before this Court cannot be construed to be a bar for the prosecution to proceed with the trial in the criminal case. Examination of P.W.1 in the case would not amount to any illegality or irregularity and therefore, the said request made by the learned counsel for the petitioner for initiation of contempt proceedings is unwarranted and untenable. 7. The learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) would also rely on number of judgments of the Honble Supreme Court and about which, I will make reference at the appropriate stage of this order. 8. Now let me consider the rival contentions made by the learned counsel for both parties. 9. Before adverting to the rival contentions of the learned counsel for both parties, let me first analyse the scope of the power of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to quash the criminal case which is pending trial. 10. 8. Now let me consider the rival contentions made by the learned counsel for both parties. 9. Before adverting to the rival contentions of the learned counsel for both parties, let me first analyse the scope of the power of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to quash the criminal case which is pending trial. 10. The Honble Supreme Court has been repeatedly holding that the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., is an exceptional power and while exercising the said power, the Court does not function as a Court of appeal or as a Court of Revision. The inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. 11. Following the judgments in R.P.Kapoor v. State of Punjab (AIR 1960 866) and in State of Haryana v. Bhajaj Lal ( AIR 1992 SC 604 ) (Supp (1) SCC 335), the Honble Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Kasturi Lal (AIR 2004 SC 4087) in paragraph No.10 has held as follows:- “10. Exercise of power under S.482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of Court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the of the High Courts. All Courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice. All Courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice. While exercising powers under the section, the Court does not function as a Court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone Courts exist. Authority of the Court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the Court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers Court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of Court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complainant, the Court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.” 12. Keeping in mind the above position of law as declared by the Honble Supreme Court, let me now consider the points raised by the petitioner. 13. The first point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that in this case, the F.I.R., was registered by one Mr.R.Venugopal, the then Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, Madurai and he himself has done the investigation in this case. The learned counsel would submit that the said course adopted by him is irregular and on that ground, the case should be quashed. The learned counsel relies on two judgments of the Honble Supreme Court in Bhagwan Singh v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1976 SC 985 ) and in Megha Singh v. State of Haryana (1997 SCC (Cri) 267). 14. The learned counsel relies on two judgments of the Honble Supreme Court in Bhagwan Singh v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1976 SC 985 ) and in Megha Singh v. State of Haryana (1997 SCC (Cri) 267). 14. InBhagwan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (cited supra), bribe was offered to a Head Constable who later on registered the case and investigated. In the light of the said facts, the Honble Supreme Court has held that the investigation done by the said Head Constable is an infirmity which was bound to reflect on the credibility of the prosecution case. Whether the prosecution case is credible or not is a matter of appreciation of evidence which should be decided only during trial on evidence. Now, to allow the prosecution to go ahead with the trial, what is required of is only prima facie case. Even in that case, the Honble Supreme Court has not held that it vitiates the entire proceedings. 15. It is needless to say that the object of investigation is to find out the truth and to place all the materials before the Court of law. In the reported case, since the complaint itself was made by the Head Constable alleging that the accused in that case offered bribe to him, to test the veracity of the said allegation made by the Head Constable, according to the Honble Supreme Court, the investigation should have been done by some other independent officer. But in the case on hand, the Investigating Officer collected information from other sources and he registered the case on the basis of the same. Though technically, he is the complainant, he cannot be equated to the Head Constable mentioned in the reported case, whose position as I have referred above is totally different. Therefore, the view expressed in the said judgment is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 16. The other judgment in Megha Singh v. State of Haryana (cited supra), also is not applicable to the facts of the present case since, in that case also, the police officer who lodged the complaint and investigated the case himself happened to be an eye witness and also a victim of the terrorists activities of the accused. 17. 16. The other judgment in Megha Singh v. State of Haryana (cited supra), also is not applicable to the facts of the present case since, in that case also, the police officer who lodged the complaint and investigated the case himself happened to be an eye witness and also a victim of the terrorists activities of the accused. 17. In State v. V.Jayapaul ( 2004 (5) SCC 223 ), while dealing with a case under the Act, the the Honble Supreme Court in paragraph No.4 has held as follows:- “There is nothing in the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code which precluded the appellant from taking up the investigation. The fact that the said police officer prepared the FIR on the basis of the information received by him and registered the suspected crime does not disqualify him from taking up the investigation of the cognisable offence. A suo motu move on the part of the police officer to investigate a cognizable offence impelled by the information received from some sources is not outside the purview of the provisions contained in Sections 154 to 157 of the Code or any other provisions of the Code.” 18. In the instant case also, the police officer namely, Mr.Venugopal, received certain informations and formally prepared F.I.R., and then started the investigation. As held by the Honble Supreme Court, there is no illegality on the part of Mr.Venugopal, and he did not stand disqualified to investigate and also to submit the final report to the Court. In view of the settled position of law, the first ground raised by the petitioner is not tenable and the same is rejected. 19. The next ground raised by the petitioner is that, the investigation was not done by the officer duly authorised under Section 17 of the Act. But, the learned Government Advocate (Crl side) would submit that under Section 17 of the Act, the Government has issued an Order in G.O.Ms.No.269/1990 dated 04.06.1990 authorising all the Inspectors of Police of the Directorate Vigilance and Anti-Corruption to exercise the power of investigation including the power of arrest. The said G.O., came to be considered by this Court in Sebastin, R. v. State ( 2002 (4) CTC 200 ). In the said judgment, the power of the Inspector of Police attached to Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption to investigate the case has been upheld in view of G.O.Ms.No.269/1990. 20. The said G.O., came to be considered by this Court in Sebastin, R. v. State ( 2002 (4) CTC 200 ). In the said judgment, the power of the Inspector of Police attached to Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption to investigate the case has been upheld in view of G.O.Ms.No.269/1990. 20. Under the second proviso to Section 17(c) of the Act, of course an offence under Section 13(1) (e) of the Act, can not be investigated by any other without the order of a police officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police. In the case on hand, the then Superintendent of Police has duly authorised Mr.Venugopal to investigate the case. Thus, the second ground raised by the petitioner is also not tenable and therefore, the same is rejected. 21. The next ground of attack is with reference to Section 18 of the Act. According to the learned counsel, the then Superintendent of Police had authorised the Inspector of Police Mr.Venugopal to inspect the bankers books in respect of the accounts of the accused, which according to the learned counsel for the petitioner is illegal. But, in my considered opinion, the said argument is not acceptable for the simple reason that such an inspection of bankers books could be undertaken by any officer, who has been authorised under Section 17 of the Act, and such officer does not require any more authorisation from any other authority. In this case, since as per the G.O., cited above, the Inspector of Police has been authorised and in respect of the offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act, the then Superintendent of Police had authorised Mr.Venugopal under Section 18 of the Act, to inspect the bankers books. Thus, he was well within his competence to inspect the bankers books in respect of the accounts of the accused. 22. The learned counsel submitted that F.I.R., in this case had been registered in hasty without any preliminary enquiry and so the prosecution is irregular and thus vitiated. The learned counsel would rely on the judgment in P.Srirajuddin v. State of Madras ( AIR 1971 SC 520 ) wherein, the Honble Supreme Court has held that, normally before lodging F.I.R., against any public servant under the Act, there has to be a preliminary enquiry held by the authorities. The learned counsel would rely on the judgment in P.Srirajuddin v. State of Madras ( AIR 1971 SC 520 ) wherein, the Honble Supreme Court has held that, normally before lodging F.I.R., against any public servant under the Act, there has to be a preliminary enquiry held by the authorities. However, in the case on hand, a perusal of the records would show that preliminary enquiry was infact held before lodging the F.I.R., which revealed commission of offence by the accused and the subsequent investigation also confirmed the same. On the said report, the trial Court has found prima facie case against the petitioner to take cognizance. When that be so, the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner that, for want of preliminary enquiry, the criminal proceedings are to be quashed cannot be accepted. 23. The next ground is in respect of the sanction order. According to the petitioner, the sanction order was issued by causing inordinate and unexplained delay. The Investigation Report was issued on 09.09.1998 and the same was placed before the sanctioning authority only on 25.09.1998. However, the sanction order was issued belatedly on 25.03.1999 with a delay of about 6 months. The learned counsel would rely on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Ramanand Chaudhary v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1994 SC 948 ) wherein the Honble Supreme Court has held that the delay in taking action for 13 years was an infirmity. The other judgment relied on by the learned counsel is in P.Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka (2002 SCC (Cri) 830), wherein the Honble Supreme Court has held that inordinate delay is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. But in our case, as stated above, there is no such enormous delay so as to hold that the fundamental rights of the accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India have been violated. 24. Yet another judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner is in V. Venugopal & others v. State, by Inspector of Police, Vellore (1991 L.W. (Cri) 516). That is also a case where the delay was inordinate. 25. The Honble Supreme Court in Seetha Hemachandra Shashittal v. State of Maharashtra ( 2001 (4) SCC 525 ) has held as follows:- “The delay of two years taken for obtaining sanction from the Government cannot be attributed to the investigating officers. That is also a case where the delay was inordinate. 25. The Honble Supreme Court in Seetha Hemachandra Shashittal v. State of Maharashtra ( 2001 (4) SCC 525 ) has held as follows:- “The delay of two years taken for obtaining sanction from the Government cannot be attributed to the investigating officers. Though the said time of two years for the Government to decide the question of giving sanction cannot be approved, but considering the number of desks over which the matter had to pass and the voluminous records to be studied at all levels, the said interval cannot be said to be so unreasonably long as to affect the fundamental right of the appellants. The charge-sheet was laid within a few days of obtaining the sanction. Therefore, the criminal prosecution cannot be quashed merely on the ground of delay highlighted by the appellants.” (Emphasis supplied) In view of the said legal position, merely on the ground of delay as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the proceedings cannot be quashed. 26. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, a reading of the sanction order would show total non application of mind on the part of the sanctioning authority. During argument, the learned counsel has taken me through the entire sanction order and he has pointed out certain defects. The question now is whether the criminal prosecution can be quashed on the ground of certain defects in the sanction order reflecting non application of mind on the part of the sanctioning authority. 27. The learned counsel relies on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat ( AIR 1997 SC 3400 ) and in Charles Waker Devadas v. State by the Inspector of Police, etc., (1993 L.W. (cri) 346). In those two judgments on the ground of defects in the sanction order, reflecting non application of mind on the part of the sanctioning authority, the Honble Supreme Court as well as this Court have held that the sanction order is vitiated. But it is to be remembered that in those two cases, the trial went on during which, the sanctioning authority was examined. But it is to be remembered that in those two cases, the trial went on during which, the sanctioning authority was examined. From the evidence of sanctioning authority, and by reading the sanction order, the Courts have found that there was non application of mind on the part of the sanctioning authority and on that ground acquitted the accused. But, in the instant case, there is no such evidence let in so far. By merely reading the sanction order, it cannot be now concluded that it is defective for want of application of mind. 28. In state v. T. Venkatesh Murthy ( 2004 (7) SCC 763 ) the Honble Supreme Court has held as follows:- “Clause (b) of sub-section (3) shows that no court shall stay the proceedings under the Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted a failure of justice. Sub-section (4) postulates that in determining under sub-section (3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice, the court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings.” 29. Similar view has been expressed by the Honble Supreme Court in C.S. Krishnamurthy v. State of Karnataka ( 2005 (4) SCC 81 ) wherein, it has been held as follows:- “The sanction order should speak for itself and in case the facts do not so appear, it should be proved by leading evidence that all the particulars were placed before the sanctioning authority for due application of mind. But, when the sanction order itself is eloquent enough, then in that case only formal evidence has to be produced by the sanctioning authority or by any other evidence that the sanction was accorded by a competent person with due application of mind in case the sanction speaks for itself then the satisfaction of the sanctioning authority is apparent by reading the order. When the sanction itself is very expressive, then in that case, the argument that particular material was not properly placed before the sanctioning authority for according sanction and the sanctioning authority has not applied its mind becomes unsustainable.” 30. When the sanction itself is very expressive, then in that case, the argument that particular material was not properly placed before the sanctioning authority for according sanction and the sanctioning authority has not applied its mind becomes unsustainable.” 30. A close scrutiny of the above two judgments of the Honble Supreme Court would make it abundantly clear that normally, the sanction order should be so exhaustive to reflect the application of mind on the part of the sanctioning authority. If it is not so exhaustive, to indicate the application of mind, even then the sanctioning authority, as a witness can speak about the materials placed before him and about the satisfaction arrived at by him. Therefore, simply by reading the sanctioning order, one cannot say that the sanctioning authority had non-application of mind while issuing sanction order. Thus, the prosecution cannot be quashed at its threshold itself on the ground of defects in the sanction order without affording opportunity to the sanctioning authority to let in oral evidence. 31. The next point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is also in respect of the sanction order. According to him, on completing investigation, the papers were placed before one Mr.S.Venkataraman, the then Legal Advisor, Vigilance and Anti Corruption Department. On perusing the records, Mr.S.Venkataraman had opined that it is not a fit case for prosecution and had further opined that the officers could be dealt with departmentally. A copy of the said opinion has been duly furnished to the petitioner under Section 207 Cr.P.C. Relying on the said document, the learned counsel would submit that had the said document been placed before the sanctioning authority, the sanctioning authority would have taken a different view of the matter and would have refrained from giving sanction. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, withholding such a vital document vitiates the sanction order and therefore, the prosecution case should be quashed. 32. The learned counsel would rely on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in R. Sarala v. T.S.Velu (2000 SCC (Cri) 823), in support of the said contention. I have carefully gone through the said judgment. In my considered opinion, at this stage, I cannot hold that the sanctioning authority would have declined to grant sanction had the legal opinion been placed before him. I have carefully gone through the said judgment. In my considered opinion, at this stage, I cannot hold that the sanctioning authority would have declined to grant sanction had the legal opinion been placed before him. Even after looking into the said document, there is possibility that the sanctioning authority would have granted sanction. Therefore, to test the satisfaction of the sanctioning authority, in my considered opinion, the sanctioning authority is to be examined before the Court as a witness so as to afford an opportunity to explain to the Court as to how he got satisfied and on what materials he has given sanction. 33. The next contention is that according to the F.I.R., the check period was from 01.01.1992 to 04.11.1993. But as per the final report, the check period was 01.01.1988 to 31.12.1995. According to the learned counsel, there is thus a vital difference in respect of the check period which is detrimental to the prosecution case. In my considered opinion, it may be true that the check period as per the F.I.R., was 01.10.1992 to 04.11.1993, but it does not mean that the said check period cannot be extended during investigation. Therefore, this also cannot be a valid ground to quash the proceedings. 34. The last contention of the learned counsel would be that the explanation offered by the petitioner was not seriously considered by the Investigating Officer. Had he given a serious look into the same, he would have accepted the explanation. In my considered opinion, as per Section 13 of the Act, explanation requires to be offered only to the satisfaction of the Court. If it is the case of the petitioner that he has got materials to explain to the Court that he has not committed any offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act, he can do well before the trial Court at the time of trial. This cannot be a valid ground to quash the proceedings. 35. Lastly, the learned counsel submitted that though the present original petition has been pending, before this Court, the trial Court proceeded with the trial and has examined the first witness as P.W.1 which according to him, amounts to an interference with the proceedings of this Court and the same amounts to clear contempt warranting initiation of action against the Investigating Officer and the Public Prosecutor. 36. 36. In my considered opinion, the said request is for fetched. Section 19 of the Act, makes it very clear that the stay of the proceedings can be granted only in very exceptional cases and in general, there shall not be any stay of proceedings. When that be so, in my considered opinion, proceeding with the trial of the case by the trial Court would not amount to any interference to the proceedings of this Court. 37. In State of M.P v. Ram Singh ( 2000 (5) SCC 88 ) while dealing with a case under Section 13(1) (e) and 13 (2) of the Act, the Honble Supreme Court has issued guidelines as to how the provisions of the Act, are to be dealt with and as to how the cases are to be decided. In paragraph Nos.10 and 11 of the judgment, the Honble Supreme Court has held as follows:- “The Act was intended to make effective provisions for the prevention of bribery and corruption rampant amongst the public servants. It is a social legislation intended to curb illegal activities of the public servants and is designed to be liberally construed so as to advance its object. Procedural delays and technicalities of law should not be permitted to defeat the object sought to be achieved by the Act. The overall public interest and the social object is required to be kept in mind while interpreting various provisions of the Act and deciding cases under it.” 38. In the case on hand, as narrated above, the grounds raised are either on procedural delay or on technicalities of law. As held by the Honble Supreme Court, such procedural delay and technicalities of law should not be permitted to defeat the object sought to be achieved by the said Act. In paragraph No.15 of the said judgment, the Honble Supreme Court has made the following observations:- “The High Court was not right in holding that merely because the order of the Superintendent of Police was in typed proforma that showed the non-application of mind or could be held to have been passed in a mechanical and casual manner. The order rather clearly indicates the name of the accused, the number of the F.I.R., the nature of the offence and power of the Superintendent of Police permitting him to authorise a junior officer to investigate. The order rather clearly indicates the name of the accused, the number of the F.I.R., the nature of the offence and power of the Superintendent of Police permitting him to authorise a junior officer to investigate. The time between the registration of the F.I.R., and authorisation in terms of the second proviso to Section 17 shows further the application of mind and the circumstances which weighed with the Superintendent of Police to pass the order.” 39. In the instant case also, the sanction order contains all these details and therefore, it cannot be held at the preliminary stage itself that the sanction order was issued in a mechanical and casual manner reflecting the total non application of mind. In paragraph No.8 of the said judgment, the Honble Supreme Court has held as follows:- “Corruption in a civilised society is a disease like cancer, which if not detected in time, is sure to maliganise (sic) the polity of the country leading to disastrous consequences. It is termed as a plague which is not only contagious but if not controlled spreads like a fire in a jungle. Its virus is compared with HIV leading to AIDS, being incurable. It has also been termed as royal thievery. The socio-political system exposed to such a dreaded communicable disease is likely to crumble under its own weight. Corruption is opposed to democracy and social order, being not only anti-people, but aimed and targeted against them. It affects the economy and destroys the cultural heritage. Unless nipped in the bud at the earliest, it is likely to cause turbulence – shaking of the socio-economic-political system in an otherwise healthy, wealthy, effective and vibrating society.” 40. Keeping all the above guiding principles and the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court, having considered all the points raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, I am of the clear view that this is not a fit case to quash the proceedings. However, the petitioner is at liberty to raise all the points raised in this petition before the trial Court at the appropriate stage of the trial of the case. 41. In the result, the criminal original petition is dismissed. It is made clear that the trial Court should not get influenced by any of the observations made in this order while deciding the case on trial. 41. In the result, the criminal original petition is dismissed. It is made clear that the trial Court should not get influenced by any of the observations made in this order while deciding the case on trial. The trial Court shall dispose of the case strictly in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible.