Judgment :- S.J. Mukhopadhaya, J. The respondent claimed refund of rebate amount to the tune of Rs.6,84,590/=. The Revenue, by their order dated 30th Oct., 2003, rejected such prayer. The prayer of the respondent having been allowed by learned single Judge, the present appeal has been preferred. 2. The case of the respondent (hereinafter referred to as the Company) before the writ court was that the company cleared 2000 Kgs., of Cresol Chloride on 29th Dec., 1990, on payment of duty of Rs.5,35,500/= in GPI No.20 to one M/s. Colour Chem Ltd. The said M/s. Colour Chem Ltd., took credit in their RG 23-A Part II account as an input and resold the entire quantity on 11th Dec., 1992 to the company by paying in terms with Rule 57 F (1) (ii) of the Central Excise Rules. In this background, the company requested the Assistant Commissioner, Pondicherry Division for re-entry of Cresol Chloride for reprocessing the same. It filed necessary D3 intimation under Rule 173-H, wherein after the Assistant Commissioner, vide communication dated 30th Dec., 1992, granted permission under Rule 173-H for re-entry and reprocessing. The company exported the material with additional quantity of 5000 Kgs., of Cresol Chloride under AR4 No.30. Though duty was paid with regard to others, no duty was paid on 2000 Kgs. of Cresol Chloride on which duty was earlier paid and was returned by M/s. Colour Chem Ltd., after reprocessing. The company filed a claim under Rule 12 on 11th Jan., 1993 for rebate of Rs.6,84,590/=, i.e., the duty as was payable on 2000 Kgs., of Cresol Chloride and was paid by M/s.Colour Chem at the time of clearance of the said goods. However, no intimation was issued till a show cause notice was issued on 21st Sept., 1993, asking the company as to why the claim for rebate of Rs.6,84,590/= be not rejected. The following grounds for rejection were cited in the show cause notice: - i) The company was not eligible to bring back 2000 Kgs. However, no intimation was issued till a show cause notice was issued on 21st Sept., 1993, asking the company as to why the claim for rebate of Rs.6,84,590/= be not rejected. The following grounds for rejection were cited in the show cause notice: - i) The company was not eligible to bring back 2000 Kgs. to its factory under Rule 173-H (2); ii) The description given in the delivery challan No.3025 dated 11th Sept., 1992, under which goods were sent to the company by M/s.Colour Chem and the description given in the AR-4 No.30 dated 26th Nov., 1992, under which the goods were exported do not tally ; and iii) Goods exported were not in the original packing in which they were received in the factory. 2000 Kgs. received in the factory were packed in 200 bags of 10 Kgs. each, while 7000 Kgs., i.e., 5000 + 2000 Kgs., were exported in 140 drums of 50 Kgs. Each. 3. On receipt of reply, the Maritime Collector, Chennai, rejected the claim of rebate by order dated 20th Dec., 1993 in Original No.V/32/18/1/93 EC as communicated vide order dated 30th Oct., 2003. Against the said order, the company preferred appeal before the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) u/s 35 F of the Central Excise Act. The appellate authority, vide order No.133/94 M dated 16th May, 1994, allowed the appeal and granted consequential relief. Against the said order, the Collector, Central Excise, Madras, filed appeal before the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, Madras (hereinafter referred to as CEGAT) on 12th Aug., 1994, but it was rejected by order No.495/96 dated 9th April, 1996, on the ground that the said appeal was not competent. In the meantime, the Collector of Central Excise, Madras, also filed a revision application u/s 35 EE on 6/10th Oct., 1994, against the decision of the appellate authority. The revision was so preferred after delay of about 51 days, but no application for condonation of delay was filed. The revisional authority, vide order No.27/95 dated 9th Aug., 1995, allowed the revision application and set aside the appellate order. The claim of the company for refund was disallowed. The company, thereafter, moved before this Court in a writ petition - W.P. No.16769/95. The revisional authority, vide order No.27/95 dated 9th Aug., 1995, allowed the revision application and set aside the appellate order. The claim of the company for refund was disallowed. The company, thereafter, moved before this Court in a writ petition - W.P. No.16769/95. The case was heard by this Court, but without deciding the claim and counter-claim on merits, vide judgment dated 23rd Feb., 1996, this Court set aside the order and remitted the matter to the revisional authority with the following observations: - “19. This apart, it is also contended that the revision can only be on question of law and not on questions of fact. No reasons have been given by the first respondent to differ from the appellate authoritys view. Therefore, I set aside the order impugned in toto and remit the matter to the 1st respondent for fresh consideration on the question of maintainability of the revision application and also on merits. The first respondent shall return the papers filed in the form of revision to the 3rd respondent with liberty to represent the same with an application under the Proviso to Section 35EE (2) of the Act. On receipt of such application, the 1st respondent shall give an opportunity to the petitioner to put forth their objections on the question of delay and then decide the matter after affording sufficient opportunity to both the parties either to appear in person or through their counsel. The writ petition is allowed as indicated above. No costs.” From the aforesaid order, it will be evident that the revisional authority was to return the paper books to the Collector, Central Excise, who was given liberty to re-present the revision application along with an application for condonation of delay for hearing the appeal after giving opportunity to the parties. 4. What happened was that the Collector of Central Excise, after taking return of the revision application, filed a revision application with a petition for condonation of delay on 13th May, 1996. The said application was contested by the company on the ground that the application was a fresh application and so it was barred by limitation. 5. A revision can be preferred u/s 35 EE of the Act. Under sub-section (2) to Section 35 EE, limitation has been prescribed with further prescription of period for condonation of delay, as quoted hereunder:- “35-EE. Revision by Central Government. 5. A revision can be preferred u/s 35 EE of the Act. Under sub-section (2) to Section 35 EE, limitation has been prescribed with further prescription of period for condonation of delay, as quoted hereunder:- “35-EE. Revision by Central Government. - (1) The Central Government may, on the application of any person aggrieved by any order passed under section 35-A, where the order is of the nature referred to in the first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 35-B, annul or modify such order: * * * * * * * * (2) An application under sub-section (1) shall be made within three months from the date of the communication to the applicant of the order against which the application is being made: Provided that the Central Government may, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the application within the aforesaid period of three months, allow it to be presented within a further period of three months. * * * * * * * *” 6. After the High Courts judgment, as the revision application was preferred by the Revenue on 13th May, 1996, the company opposed the revision application on the ground that the application was barred by limitation. It was submitted that the revision application was filed after about 200 days, though three months period prescribed under sub-section (2) and the authority could allow at best, if it would have been preferred within further period of three months, i.e., total 180 days. While the Revenue took plea that the revision application was re-presented in view of the order of the High Court, the company took plea that it was a fresh revision application. According to the company, earlier revision application, which was returned, was not re-presented. It was also submitted on behalf of the company that a fresh show cause notice having been issued on 12th June, 1996, it cannot be presumed that the earlier revision application was re-presented. Thereafter, the revision application having been allowed by order No.147/96, dated 4th Nov., 1996, the company preferred the writ petition in question (W.P. No.2368/97). Again the same ground was taken that the revision application so filed was a fresh revision application preferred after delay of more than 200 days and, thereby, it was barred by limitation. 7. Thereafter, the revision application having been allowed by order No.147/96, dated 4th Nov., 1996, the company preferred the writ petition in question (W.P. No.2368/97). Again the same ground was taken that the revision application so filed was a fresh revision application preferred after delay of more than 200 days and, thereby, it was barred by limitation. 7. At this stage, it is pertinent to mention that the revisional authority, while passing the order, unfortunately made certain comment with regard to the earlier judgment of the High Court. Learned single Judge, while noticed such unwarranted remark, initiated contempt proceeding by impugned judgment dated 30th Oct., 2003, and allowed the writ petition in favour of the company. 8. Similar plea has also been taken by the parties before this Court. According to the counsel for the Revenue, in view of the High Courts observation and remand made in W.P. No.16769/95, on re-presentation of the revision application it should be presumed that the revision application was preferred after delay of 51 days and, thereby, the revisional authority had jurisdiction to condone the delay. On the other, according to the counsel for the company, a fresh revision application having been preferred after 200 days, such delay cannot be condoned under the law. 9. We have heard the parties and noticed the relevant facts as discussed above. 10. Learned counsel for the Revenue referred to Supreme Court decision in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. - Vs - Union of India reported in (1997) 5 SCC 536 , wherein the following observation was made by the Supreme Court: - “108. ............ (iii) A claim for refund, whether made under the provisions of the Act as contemplated in Proposition (i) above or in a suit or writ petition in the situations contemplated by Proposition (ii) above, can succeed only if the petitioner/plaintiff alleges and establishes that he has not passed on the burden of duty to another person/other persons. His refund claim shall be allowed/decreed only when he establishes that he has not passed on the burden of the duty or to the extent he has not so passed on, as the case may be. ............. The doctrine of unjust enrichment is a just and salutary doctrine. No person can seek to collect the duty from both ends. His refund claim shall be allowed/decreed only when he establishes that he has not passed on the burden of the duty or to the extent he has not so passed on, as the case may be. ............. The doctrine of unjust enrichment is a just and salutary doctrine. No person can seek to collect the duty from both ends. In other words, he cannot collect the duty from his purchaser at one end and also collect the same duty from the State on the ground that it has been collected from him contrary to law. The power of the Court is not meant to be exercised for unjustly enriching a person. The doctrine of unjust enrichment is, however, inapplicable to the State. State represents the people of the country. No one can speak of the people being unjustly enriched.” It was further submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, learned single Judge should not have exercised his discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the respondent having failed to establish that he had not passed on the burden of duty to other persons. Reliance was placed on the following observation made by the Supreme Court in the case of Mafatlal Industries Ltd., (supra): - “(x) ....... So far as the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution - or of this Court under Article 32 - is concerned, it remains unaffected by the provisions of the Act. Even so, the Court would, while exercising the jurisdiction under the said articles, have due regard to the legislative intent manifested by the provisions of the Act. The writ petition would naturally be considered and disposed of in the light of and in accordance with the provisions of Section 11-B. This is for the reason that the power under Article 226 has to be exercised to effectuate the regime of law and not for abrogating it. Even while acting in exercise of the said constitutional power, the High Court cannot ignore the law nor can it override it. The power under Article 226 is conceived to serve the ends of law and not to transfers them.” 11. Even while acting in exercise of the said constitutional power, the High Court cannot ignore the law nor can it override it. The power under Article 226 is conceived to serve the ends of law and not to transfers them.” 11. From Section 35 EE, it will be evident that the application under sub-section (1) has to be made in such form and verified in such manner as specified by rules made in that behalf accompanied by fees, etc. For the purpose of condonation of delay, a petition for condonation of delay was required to be filed. Such procedural law having not been followed, this Court in W.P. No.16769/95, while set aside the earlier revisional order and remitted the case to the revisional authority for fresh consideration on the question of maintainability of the revision application as also on merits. The revision application was to be returned for re-presentation of the revision application along with petition for condonation of delay. Admittedly, the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable for filing of revision application, but it is guided by the rules framed thereunder. In this background, it cannot be construed that after return of the revision application, the very same paper book was to be presented along with a petition as per the provisions for condonation of delay. From the decision of this Court, it will be evident that the Revenue was allowed to take back the revision application for filing a proper revision application along with a petition for condonation of delay, and for the said reason the matter was remitted to the revisional authority for determination of the application. 12. In view of the aforesaid factual position and in the writ petition the company having not satisfied the Court that the amount so claimed, for that the burden has not been passed on any other person, it was not open to learned single Judge to interfere with the order passed by the revisional authority. We, accordingly, set aside the order dated 30th Oct., 2003, passed by learned single Judge and dismiss the writ petition as was preferred by the company. However, the suo motu contempt proceeding as initiated by this Court shall continue as we have not interfered with such part of the order of learned single Judge. The writ appeal is allowed with the aforesaid observation. However, the suo motu contempt proceeding as initiated by this Court shall continue as we have not interfered with such part of the order of learned single Judge. The writ appeal is allowed with the aforesaid observation. However, there shall be no order as to costs.