JUDGMENT A.B. Pal, J. 1. The petitioner Sri Biswapriya Bhuiya was married to the respondent Smt. Jhumi Banik on 11th May, 2004 by performing Hindu religious rites and rituals. The marital relation, however, suffered serious set-backs allegedly for mental and physical torture on the wife by the husband. The relation turned so bitter that at one stage she instituted a suit for divorce which was registered as T.S. (Divorce) Case No. 2005 in the Family Court, Agartala, West Tripura. The suit was finally disposed of by a consent decree for divorce on 23.9.2005. The compromise petition dated 19.8.2005 for mutual decree came to be the part of the decree. It is to be noticed that the compromise petition for mutual divorce was signed by the parties in presence of witnesses on 19.8.2005, wherein it was stipulated that the compromise for mutual decree between the parties would be unconditional. But, after a week, the respondent wife herein submitted a prayer that she had to agree to a mutual divorce without any condition under tremendous pressure. But now, after the matter was carefully reconsidered, she decided that she must claim monthly maintenance of Rs. 3000 (rupees three thousands) per month and return of all the gifts including ornaments given to her at the time of marriage, kept by her husband in his custody. On 25.8.2005 the husband raised a written objection to the above application of the respondent wife contending inter alia that the compromise was arrived at between the parties out of their free will and, therefore, the question of payment of maintenance to her did not arise. In the order dated 23.9.2005 disposing of the suit on compromise it has been observed by the Court that the respondent wife herein did not press her petition claiming maintenance. But after the decree of divorce was passed, the respondent wife instituted Misc. Case No. 51 of 2006 under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code claiming maintenance from her husband on the ground that she had no means of livelihood. But after the decree of divorce was passed, the respondent wife instituted Misc. Case No. 51 of 2006 under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code claiming maintenance from her husband on the ground that she had no means of livelihood. The said proceeding for maintenance came to be opposed by the husband on several grounds, the principal contention being that the decree of divorce having been passed unconditional on compromise, she was legally debarred from raising such a claim later in a proceeding under Section 125, Cr.P.C. The said proceeding came to be disposed of by the Family Court rejecting the contention of the former husband and declaring that the respondent wife herein is entitled to Rs. 1500 (rupees one thousand five hundred) per month as maintenance with effect from 1.5.2006. The said judgment dated 10.5.2006 passed in Misc. Case No. 51 of 2006 by the Family Court, Agartala, West Tripura has been put under challenge in the present revision petition. 2. It is not in dispute that at the time of settlement for mutual decree of divorce nothing was paid to the wife towards maintenance or no stipulation was made in the compromise petition for one time or periodical maintenance. Though it has been contended by the petitioner husband herein that the respondent wife is an educated woman, nothing has been said regarding her source of income. Mr. Talapatra, learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioner advanced a submission that in view of the unconditional compromise and the specific mention in the decree of divorce that she did not press her claim of maintenance, which she raised in her prayer dated 20.8.2005, her claim for maintenance at a later stage when the marriage did no longer subsist is not legally sustainable. Mr. P. Roy Barman, learned Counsel for the respondent wife on the other hand strongly argued that the law has come to be settled firmly that even after unconditional compromise for a decree of divorce between the parties, it is open to the wife to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code at any later stage if two conditions are fulfilled, namely (i) she has not re-married and (ii) she has no means to support herself. 3. 3. At the very outset it may be kept in view that the conditions disentitling a wife to claim maintenance imposed by Section 125(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code has no application in case of a divorcee wife. In Rohtash Singh v. Ramendri (Smt.) and Ors. 2000 CriLJ 1498, the Apex Court observed "the provision of Section 125(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code would be applicable where the marriage between the parties subsists and not where it has come to an end". That a wife after divorce is also entitled to claim maintenance from her former husband has also been firmly settled in a line of decisions of the Apex Court in view of the Explanation (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 125. According to that explanation 'wife' includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not remarried. It is obvious that the sweep of Section 125 has been widened by such definition of "wife" in order to advance social justice. In Capt. Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Veena Kaushal (1978) 4 SCC 70 , the Supreme Court observed in para 9 which reads as follows: 9. This provision is a measure of social justice and specially enacted to protect women and children and falls within the constitutional sweep of Article 15(3)reinforced by Article 39. We have no doubt that sections of statutes calling for construction by Courts are not petrified print but vibrant words with social functions to fulfil. The brooding presence of the constitutional empathy for the weaker sections like women and children must inform interpretation if it has to have social relevance. So viewed, it is possible to be selective in picking out that interpretation out of two alternatives which advance the cause the cause of the derelicts. 4. After the legal position that a divorcee wife is also entitled to claim maintenance from her former husband till she remarries and has no means of livelihood is settled, the next question to be adverted to is whether the fact that the wife did not claim any maintenance in the initial compromise petition and did not press her subsequent claim for maintenance at the time of disposal of the suit precludes her from raising a claim for maintenance at a subsequent period. The law of maintenance being a measure of social justice with its extended reach even to a divorcee wife it has to be held that an agreement to the contrary cannot claim legal sanction the same being against the public policy. In Haroon v. Sainabba Beevi Zeenath and Ors. II (1992) DMC 293 : 1992 Crl.L.J. 3275 (Ker) the relevant observation may be profitably quoted. 3. As the statutory obligation is there on the part of the petitioner to maintain his wife and minor son who are unable to maintain themselves he cannot be permitted to contract out of such an obligation. If he is allowed to do so, it would certainly defeat a legal right recognized by the Court under Section 125of the Cr.P.C. A similar view has been taken by this Court in Criminal Revision Petition No. 20 of 1997 of Agartala Bench between Animesh Bhattacharjee and Panchali Chakraborty disposed on 8.6.1998. The relevant observation appearing in para 5 of the judgment and order dated 8.6.1998 reads as follows: 5. Mr. A. Chakraborty, learned Senior Advocate further submits that she gave up the claim of maintenance in the divorce proceeding the same cannot be re-agitated by filing a fresh application under Section 125, Cr.P.C. This contention of Mr. Chakraborty cannot be accepted in view of the fact that a person may give up the claim for maintenance temporarily by that he or she does not forfeit that right for all times to come. 5. What has emerged from the above discussions is that a divorce wife even though did not claim maintenance at the time of the decree being passed continues to have a right to claim maintenance from her former husband till she re-marries and if she does not have means to support herself. There is no quarrel that she has not re-married or she falls within the mischief of Section 125(4) of the Cr.P.C. It has been seen above that even though compromise for mutual divorce was unconditional and her subsequent claim for maintenance was not pressed at the time of hearing of the divorce proceeding, she is legally entitled to maintenance. The only question now remains for adjudication is whether she has enough means to support herself or the husband has no sufficient means to provide the maintenance awarded. The only question now remains for adjudication is whether she has enough means to support herself or the husband has no sufficient means to provide the maintenance awarded. A careful perusal of the materials on record would show that no serious attempt has been made by the petitioner-husband at any stage of the proceeding to establish that she has sufficient means to support herself or that he has no means to provide any maintenance. The main thrust in the said proceeding has always been on the unconditional decree of divorce by mutual consent and her abdication of subsequent claim for maintenance. In her deposition as P.W. 1 she stated that she did not require any alimony at the time of divorce as she thought that she would be able to maintain herself. But when later she came to be unable to maintain herself she had to institute the proceeding for maintenance from her former husband. She claimed that her former husband is a businessman dealing with selling of motorbike at Khowai. On the other hand the petitioner husband herein in his deposition before the learned Family Court expressed his inability to provide maintenance on the ground that he was a student and had no business of his own. The learned Family Court recorded a clear finding that the husband is a businessman selling motorbike at Khowai and so he has sufficient income to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500 to his former wife. I do not find sufficient materials on record to reverse said finding in this revision proceeding. 6. For the reasons aforementioned the judgment and order impugned does not call for interference by this Court and, therefore, this criminal revision petition having no merit is liable to be dismissed, which I hereby do.