Judgment : 1. The petitioner applied to the first respondent on 17. 2005 seeking recognition to start D.T.Ed. Course from the academic year 2005-2006 and the first respondent, pointing out two deficiencies, rejected the petitioner’s Application aggrieved by which the petitioner preferred an Appeal on 212. 2005 before the National Council for Teacher Education, New Delhi who is the Appellate Authority and the rejection order dated 211. 2005 passed by the first respondent was set aside and the Appeal stood allowed on 24. 2006. Pursuant to its success in the Appeal, the petitioner admitted students from 5. 2006 and also commenced the course from the same date. In deference to the order dated 18. 2006 passed this Court in W.P. No.6545 of 2006 filed by the petitioner seeking a Writ of Mandamus to direct the second respondent to approve its staff list, the second respondent, vide its order dated 20.8.2006 approved the staff list submitted by the petitioner. Having complied with all the requirements, the petitioner admitted 25 students under the Management quota and since the remaining 25 seats to be filled up by the second respondent through counselling remained unfilled, the petitioner admitted 25 students under the lapsed seat category after duly completing 150 days of attendance prescribed under the NCTE norms. Hence, the present Writ Petition for a direction to the respondents to approve the list of 50 students who have been admitted by the petitioner institution for Diploma in Teacher Education course for the academic year 2005-2006. 2. The second respondent has filed counter mainly contending that: .a. the first respondent’s recognition to the petitioner for the academic year 2005-2006 granted on 25. 2006 was on a condition that the staff list should be approved by the second respondent and when the second respondent had approved the staff list only on 20.8.2006, the petitioner ought not to have admitted students on 5. 2006 treating them as candidates for the academic year 2005-2006 in gross violation of the order of the first respondent; .b. other institutions offering D.T.Ed. 2006 treating them as candidates for the academic year 2005-2006 in gross violation of the order of the first respondent; .b. other institutions offering D.T.Ed. Course in Tamil Nadu have commenced their classes during October 2005 and completed their 95% of term days and their students will have to appear for the first year examinations shortly and according to the calendar of activities of the syllabus prescribed by the Government of Tamil Nadu, 220 days had been fixed as term days for an academic year, including 10 days for observation and 30 days for teaching practice in the nearby primary schools which is mandatory and this is inclusive of admission and examination process; whereas the NCTE has prescribed at least 150 teaching days in a year exclusive of admission, examination, etc. and in addition to this, every teacher-trainee shall be required to undergo internship in teaching at least for 30 days in nearby elementary schools and in total 180 days and since the petitioner institution is entitled to admit students only after 20.08.2006 which is the date of staff approval, it cannot fulfill the required term days; and .c. this Court, in earlier occasions, has directed the respondents to consider the case of the petitioners therein only if the list of students was forwarded on or before 22. 2006 taking into account the required term days to be completed and when the petitioner has obtained recognition from the first respondent only on 25. 2006, the admission made by the petitioner on 5. 2006, is against the NCTE norms. 3. Mr. A.L. Somayaji, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner has contended that the first respondent rejected grant of recognition to the petitioner only on two specific grounds and did not point out any deficiency on staff complement at the time of inspection and since the Appeal preferred by the petitioner was allowed on 24. 2006, the petitioner’s admitting students and commencing classes on 5. 2006 is in no way infirmed. 2006, the petitioner’s admitting students and commencing classes on 5. 2006 is in no way infirmed. In support of his contention that production of No Objection Certifi cate from the State Government is immaterial, he has relied on a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in the matter of State of Tamil Nadu, represented by its Secretary, Higher Education, Secretariat, Chennai and another v. V.S.B. Educational Trust, represented by its Chairman, Kangeyam, Erode District and others, 2006 (3) MLJ 1037 , and the relevant paragraphs read as under: “19. Coming to the two decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court viz. Government of A.P. v. J.B. Educational Society (supra) and State of Maharashtra v. S.D.S.S. Mahavidyalaya (supra), it has to be borne in mind that Their Lordships of the Apex Court are unanimous on the point that when there is a conflict between the Parliament and State Legislature and such conflict between the two enactments being irreconcilable, the parliamentary legislation would prevail notwithstanding the exclusive power of the State Legislature to make a law with respect to a matter enumerated in the State List. In that background, we gave our heedful attention to the issue before us. We see that Government of A.P. v. J.B. Educational Society was decided by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court on 22. 2005, and that, at the time of deciding the said case, Notification of the AICTE to the effect that NOC from the concerned State Government is not necessary, was not at all there, as it came into existence only on 211. 2005 i.e . nearly 10 months after the pronouncement of the judgment in the above case. Hence, by applying the latest decision rendered by a three Judges Bench of the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. S.D.S.S . Mahavidyala case , we hold that once recognition has been granted by the AICTE, the University is obliged to grant affiliation to the institutes concerned. 21. In the light of the above discussion, legal position and notification of AICTE dated 211. 2005, we hold that proviso to Section 5(ac) of the Anna University Act, 1978 would not apply to an institution covered by AICTE Act, 1987. As per the scheme of the Act, once recognition has been granted by AICTE, the University is obliged to grant affiliation to such institution and proviso to Section 5(ac) does not apply to such cases. 2005, we hold that proviso to Section 5(ac) of the Anna University Act, 1978 would not apply to an institution covered by AICTE Act, 1987. As per the scheme of the Act, once recognition has been granted by AICTE, the University is obliged to grant affiliation to such institution and proviso to Section 5(ac) does not apply to such cases. Writ Petitions are disposed of on the above terms. In view of the disposal of Writ Petitions, Writ Appeals filed by the Education Department against interim orders are dismissed. . . .” 4. In support of his contention that the petitioner has shown 194 days as against the required term of 180 days prescribed by the first respondent and as such, the term of 220 days prescribed by the State Government will not prevail over, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner has placed reliance on a Full Bench judgment of the Karnataka High Court reported in the matter of Govindanaik G. Kalaghatigi v. West Patent Press Co. Ltd. and another, AIR 1980 Kar. 92 (Full Bench), and the relevant paragraphs read as under: “11. But the difficulty may still arise for the High Court when confronted with two inconsistent decisions of the Supreme Court by Benches consisting of equal number of Judges. Both cannot be said to be binding on Courts. But the choice is still more difficult as there is no firm general rule on the principle of precedent. The learned Chief Justice has opined that in such a case the latter of the two decisions should be followed by the High Court and other Courts. This practice, according to us, is neither a rule of propriety nor a rule to promote justice. It may be a convenient rule to promote consistency and avoid uncertainty. If it is meant to promote consistency in the administration of justice, we may as well ask the question, why not the High Court follow the former of the two rulings when both of them are of equal sanctity. Why alone the latter carries the obligation and not the former ? The adherence to one practice would be as good or as bad as adherence to the other. Why alone the latter carries the obligation and not the former ? The adherence to one practice would be as good or as bad as adherence to the other. In our view, a conservative approach to any of these, may deny justice in a given case or series of cases and those clients may not be in a position to approach the Supreme Court for the redressal of their grievances. When confronted with two inconsistent coordinate authorities, Kay. J. in Miles v. Jarvis , (1883) 24 Ch D 633 at P.636 said: “. . . The question is which of these two decisions I should follow, and it seems to me that I ought to follow that of the Master of the Rolls as being the better in point of law”. Jessel M.R. in a like circumstance said in Baker v. White, 1877 (5) Ch D 183 at P.190 that he was left with liberty to say which was not sound law. It seems to us, therefore, the High Court would be well advised to consider which of two conflicting decisions it will follow in the interest of the administration of justice and it ought to follow that which is better in point of law than in point of time. Opinion of the Full Bench 12. In view of the majorityopinion, the answer to the question referred to this Full Bench, is as follows: “If two decisions of the Supreme Court on a question of law cannot be reconciled and one of them is by a larger Bench while the other is by a smaller Bench, the decision of the larger Bench, whether it is earlier or later in point of time, should be followed by High Courts and other Courts. However, if both such Benches of the Supreme Court consist of equal number of Judges, the latter of the two decisions should be followed by High Courts and other Courts”. 5. On the same aspect that the role of the State Government is demarcated and it is only the first respondent which plays a dominant role, strong reliance has been placed by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, on an unreported judgment of this Court in W.P. No.22161 of 2006, etc. batch in which a learned Single Judge of this Court has held as under: “21. batch in which a learned Single Judge of this Court has held as under: “21. The decisions in which the Supreme Court has held that the State has the power to lay down criteria so long as they do not in any way dilute or entrench upon the standards laid down by the Central Act, as in Dr. Preeti Srivasatava v. State of Madhya Pradesh , 1999 (7) SCC 120 , and State of Tamil Nadu v. S.V. Bratheep, 2004 (2) CTC 227, cannot help the respondents. The infrastructural facilities relate to standards of education and therefore, they come totally within Entry 66. In fact, the reason why the Supreme Court has held in both the above cases that the State cannot lower the eligibility criteria is because that would indirectly affect the standards of education, which comes totally under Entry 66. Any exercise of legislative or executive power which affects standards of education is to be done only by the Union, be it Entry 66 or Entry 25. It is, as observed in Sant Dnyaneshwar’s case (supra) totally and fully occupied. 25. In the year 2005, the Amended Regulations, viz. the National Council for Teacher Education (Recognition Norms & Procedure) Regulations, 2005 came into force and Regulation 7(3) thereof reads thus : “On receipt of the communication, the State Government/UT Administration concerned shall furnish its recommendations on the applications to the office of the Regional Committee concerned of the National Council for Teacher Education within 60 days from receipt. If the recommendation is negative, the State Government/UT Administration shall provide detailed reasons/grounds thereof, which could be taken into consideration by the Regional Committee concerned while deciding the application. If no communication is received from the State Government/UT Administration within the stipulated 60 days, it shall be presumed that the State Government/UT Administration concerned has no recommendation to make.” So, the role played by the State is really limited, and even this can be taken away if the Central Act is amended. 31. The power to co-ordinate and determine standards in institutions of higher education is clearly covered by Entry 66 of List. 31. The power to co-ordinate and determine standards in institutions of higher education is clearly covered by Entry 66 of List. In Union of India v. Shah Goverdhan L.Kabra Teacher College, 2002 (8) SCC 228 , the question that arose for consideration was whether the impugned legislation can be held to be a law dealing with coordinated development of education system within Entry 66 of List I of the Seventh Schedule or it is a law dealing with the service conditions of an employee under the State Government. The fields of legislation under three wings of the Constitution are defined and the legislative power is engrafted under Article 246 and when a law is attacked as being ultra vires , what is required to be ascertained is the true character. The question of invasion in the other field is to be determined not by degree, but by substance. In this view, the Supreme Court held that the power to coordinate does not mean the power to evaluate, but it means to harmonise and secure relationship for concerted action. Therefore, when the NCTE Act is essentially a legislation by the Centre under Entry 66 for the purpose of coordination of standards of higher education, Section 17(4) only provides the consequences that would follow if an institution contravenes the Act, though the ultimate result may be that an unqualified teacher as per the Act will not get employment in such institution. The Supreme Court categorically held that by no stretch of imagination can the impugned Section be construed to mean a law dealing with employment. The Supreme Court observed thus : “In the aforesaid premises, the conclusion of the High Court that Section 17(4) is ultra vires being beyond the competence of the Union Legislature cannot be sustained and the said conclusion is accordingly set aside. On examining the statute as a whole and on scrutiny of the object and scope of the statute, we have no manner of doubt that even sub-section (4) of Section 17 is very much a law dealing with the coordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education coming within Entry 66 of List I of the Seventh Schedule and, thus, the Union Legislature did have the compe tence for enacting the said provision.” 33. Having said that, I would like to refer to the manner in which the NCTE is functioning. Having said that, I would like to refer to the manner in which the NCTE is functioning. Very often, institutes come before this Court praying for a mandamus only to direct the NCTE to pass orders on their proposals. It is difficult to understand why the NCTE is unable to process the applications within a reasonable time so that the institutions which comply with all the requirements are given recognition and they can admit students sufficiently early in the academic year, for which they seek the permission. When a batch of Writ Petitions praying for orders with regard to lapsed seats/approval of staff list came up for hearing, the learned Special Government Pleader submitted that it was not possible to approve the staff list in certain cases where two or three institutions had on their staff rolls, the same teachers. This is a grave irregularity. In yet another matter, recognition was given in March, 2006 for the Academic Year 2005-06. It is beyond comprehension how thereafter the institution can admit students and train them adequately so that these students, in turn, are able to teach children properly. Teacher Training Institutes train students to teach children and their training should have no deficiency. At a very tender age, children are entrusted to them, so not only the intellectual growth, but the psychological and emotional growth also depends on these teachers. The NCTE is entrusted with the responsible task of ensuring the standards of teacher teaching institutes. The Supreme Court dec isions cited above clearly show that the entire field is occupied by the Central Act, and the State’s role is clearly demarcated and only subject to the NCTE’s power. If the NCTE does not discharge its responsibility as it should, we would not only be letting loose inadequately trained teachers, but the formative years of the children of our country would be left in unsafe hands. The NCTE is probably burdened with more applications than it can cope. There is, no doubt, great pressure on the NCTE authorities. But, while the NCTE should not delay grant of recognition to a deserving institution, it should make sure that purely commercial adventurers do not come on to the scene, and the noble goal of training teachers to teach the young ones is not lost sight of. There is, no doubt, great pressure on the NCTE authorities. But, while the NCTE should not delay grant of recognition to a deserving institution, it should make sure that purely commercial adventurers do not come on to the scene, and the noble goal of training teachers to teach the young ones is not lost sight of. It is only because of what I have observed in many cases that have come up before me involving NCTE that I am compelled to make these comments, while upholding NCTE’s supremacy with regard to maintenance of standards in teaching institutes.” 6. To substantiate his argument that the State Act cannot be repugnant with the Central Act, reliance has been placed by the learned Senior Counsel on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Sant Dnyaneshwar Shikshan Shastra Mahavidyalaya, 2006 (9) SCC 1 , and the relevant portion for consideration is as under: “53. The Court then considered the argument put forward on behalf of the State that while it would be open for the Council to lay down minimum standards and requirements, it did not preclude the State from prescribing higher standards and requirements. 54. Negativing the contention, the Court quoted with approval the following observations of B.N. Rau, J. in G.P. Stewart v . Brojendra Kishore Roy Chaudhury : ( AIR pp. 63233 ) “It is sometimes said that two laws cannot be said to be properly repugnant unless there is a direct conflict between them, as when one says ‘do’ and the other ‘don’t’, there is no true repugnancy, according to this view, if it is possible to obey both the laws. For reasons which we shall set forth presently, we think that this is too narrow a test: there may well be cases of repugnancy where both laws say ‘don’t’ but in different ways. For example, one law may say ‘no person shall sell liquor by retail, that is, in quantities of less than five gallons at a time’ and another law may say, ‘no person shall sell liquor by retail, that is, in quantities of less than ten gallons at a time’. For example, one law may say ‘no person shall sell liquor by retail, that is, in quantities of less than five gallons at a time’ and another law may say, ‘no person shall sell liquor by retail, that is, in quantities of less than ten gallons at a time’. Here, it is obviously possible to obey both laws, by obeying the more stringent of the two, namely, the second one; yet it is equally obvious that the two laws are repugnant, for to the extent to which a citizen is compelled to obey one of them, the other, though not actually disobeyed, is nullified.” 55. Reference was also made to a decision of this Court in Jaya Gokul Educational Trust. Relying on Adhiyaman and reiterating the principle laid down therein, the Court there held that once the field was occupied by an Act of Parliament, the State Legislature could not have made a statute inconsistent with the provisions of the Central legislation. The Court, therefore, held that even if there was a State law which required something to be done for the approval of the State Government for establishing a technical institution, such law, if it is inconsistent or repugnant with the Central law, it would be “void” to the extent of repugnancy to the Act of Parliament.” 7. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, while contending that the petitioner has applied to the second respondent as early as on 5. 2006 and it is only the second respondent which has delayed the grant of No Objection Certificate and this delay on the part of the second respondent cannot be put against the petitioner, has relied on a recent judgment of the Supreme Court reported in the matter of Ramdas and others v. State of Maharashtra, 2007 (2) SCC 170 , in which it was held in paragraph 24 as under: “. . .Different cases have different facts and it is the totality of evidence and the impact that it has on the mind of the Court that is important. No straitjacket formula can be evolved in such matters, and each case must rest on its own facts. It is settled law that however similar the circumstances, facts in one case cannot be used as a precedent to determine the conclusion on the facts in another. (See Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad ). No straitjacket formula can be evolved in such matters, and each case must rest on its own facts. It is settled law that however similar the circumstances, facts in one case cannot be used as a precedent to determine the conclusion on the facts in another. (See Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad ). Thus mere delay in lodging of the report may not by itself fatal to the case of the prosecution but the delay has to be considered in the background of the facts and circumstances in each case and is a matter of appreciation of evidence by the Court of fact.” 8. Per contra , the learned Advocate General arguing for the State has contended that the petitioner is entitled to admit students only from 20.8.2006 on which date the second respondent had approved the staff list in which case the petitioner will not be able to fulfil the required term days and this action of the petitioner in admitting students and starting the course in May 2006 itself unmindful of the possibility of completing the required term days has to be deprecated and if the teacher-trainees are trained inadequately for a period of less than 220 days, not adhering to the Calendar of Activities of the syllabus prescribed by the State Government, the training they undergo will be undoubtedly wanting in quality. 9. The learned Advocate General, while assailing the contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner that the grant of No Objection Certificate by the State Government is immaterial, has contended that the State too, for its part, is not prevented from laying down higher standards or qualifications than those laid down by the Centre or the Central authority to short-list the applicants and in this regard, reliance has been placed by him on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in the case of State of T.N. v. Adhiyaman Educational & Research Institute, 1995 (4) SCC 104 , and the relevant paragraph reads as below: 41. What emerges from the above discussion is as follows: .(i) The expression ‘coordination’ used in Entry 66 of the Union List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution does not merely mean evaluation. It means harmonisation with a view to forge a uniform pattern for a concerted action according to a certain design, scheme or plan of development. What emerges from the above discussion is as follows: .(i) The expression ‘coordination’ used in Entry 66 of the Union List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution does not merely mean evaluation. It means harmonisation with a view to forge a uniform pattern for a concerted action according to a certain design, scheme or plan of development. It, therefore, includes action not only for removal of disparities in standards but also for preventing the occurrence of such disparities. It would, therefore, also include power to do all things which are necessary to prevent what would make ‘co-ordination’ either impossible or difficult. This power is absolute and unconditional and in the absence of any valid compelling reasons, it must be given its full effect according to its plain and express intention. .(ii) To the extent that the State legislation is in conflict with the Central legislation though the former is purported to have been made under Entry 25 of the Concurrent List but in effect encroaches upon legislation including subordinate legislation made by the Centre under Entry 25 of the Concurrent List or to give effect to Entry 66 of the Union List, it would be void and inoperative. (iii) If there is a conflict between the two legislations, unless the State legislation is saved by the provisions of the main part of Clause (2) of Article 254, the State legislation being repugnant to the Central legislation, the same would be inoperative. .(iv) Whether the State law encroaches upon Entry 66 of the Union List or is repugnant to the law made by the Centre under Entry 25 of the Concurrent List, will have to be determined by the examination of the two laws and will depend upon the facts of each case. (v) When there are more applicants than the available situations/seats, the State authority is not prevented from laying down higher standards or qualifications than those laid down by the Centre or the Central authority to short-list the applicants. When the State authority does so, it does not encroach upon Entry 66 of the Union List or make a law which is repugnant to the Central law. When the State authority does so, it does not encroach upon Entry 66 of the Union List or make a law which is repugnant to the Central law. .(vi) However, when the situations/seats are available and the State authorities deny an applicant the same on the ground that the applicant is not qualified according to its standards or qualifications, as the case may be, although the applicant satisfies the standards or qualifications laid down by the Central law, they act unconstitutionally. So also when the State authorities de-recognise or disaffiliate an institution for not satisfying the standards or requirement laid down by them, although it satisfied the norms and requirements laid down by the Central authority, the State authorities act illegally. 10. While contending that the State Government does have its say in the matter of education under Entry 25 of List III of Schedule VII to the Constitution and the petitioner ought not to have admitted the students and started to run the course and that too, in violation of the NCTE norms, the learned Advocate General has relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in the matter of State of Maharashtra v. Sant Dnyaneshwar Shikshan Shastra Mahavidyalaya , 2006 (9) SCC 1 , in which it was held as under: 62. From the above decisions, in our judgment, the law appears to be very well settled. So far as coordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research, scientific and technical institutions are concerned, the subject is exclusively covered by Entry 66 of List I of Schedule VII to the Constitution and the State has no power to encroach upon the legislative power of Parliament. It is only when the subject is covered by Entry 25 of List III of Schedule VII to the Constitution that there is a concurrent power of Parliament as well as the State Legislatures and appropriate Act can be made by the State Legislature subject to limitations and restrictions under the Constitution. 63. In the instant case, admittedly, Parliament has enacted the 1993 Act, which is in force. The preamble of the Act provides for establishment of National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) with a view to achieving planned and coordinated development of the teacher-education system throughout the country, the regulation and proper maintenance of norms and standards in the teacher-education system and for matters connected therewith. The preamble of the Act provides for establishment of National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) with a view to achieving planned and coordinated development of the teacher-education system throughout the country, the regulation and proper maintenance of norms and standards in the teacher-education system and for matters connected therewith. With a view to achieving that object, the National Council for Teacher Education has been established at four places by the Central Government. It is thus clear that the field is fully and completely occupied by an Act of Parliament and covered by Entry 66 of List I of Schedule VII. It is, therefore, not open to the State Legislature to encroach upon the said field. Parliament alone could have exercised the power by making appropriate law. In the circumstances, it is not open to the State Government to refuse permission relying on a State Act or on “policy consideration”. 11. Further reliance has been placed by the learned Advocate General on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Preeti Srivastava (Dr.) v. State of Madhya Pradesh , 1999 (7) SCC 120 , and the relevant paragraphs read as under: 35. The legislative competence of Parliament and the legislatures of the States to make laws under Article 246 is regulated by the VIIth Schedule to the Constitution. In the VIIth Schedule as originally in force, Entry 11 of List II gave to the State an exclusive power to legislate on “education including universities, subject to the provisions of Entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I and Entry 25 of List III”. Entry 11 of List II was deleted and Entry 25 of List III was amended with effect from 1. 1976 as a result of the Constitution 42nd Amendment Act of 1976. The present Entry 25 in the Concurrent List is as follows: “25. Education, including technical education, medical education and universities, subject to the provisions of Entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I; vocational and technical training of labour.” Entry 25 is subject, inter alia, to Entry 66 of List I. Entry 66 of List I is as follows: “66. Education, including technical education, medical education and universities, subject to the provisions of Entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I; vocational and technical training of labour.” Entry 25 is subject, inter alia, to Entry 66 of List I. Entry 66 of List I is as follows: “66. Coordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions.” Both the Union as well as the States have the power to legislate on education including medical education, subject, inter alia , to Entry 66 of List I which deals with laying down standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions as also coordination of such standards. A State has, therefore, the right to control education including medical education so long as the field is not occupied by any Union legislation. Secondly, the State cannot, while controlling education in the State, impinge on standards in institutions for higher education. Because this is exclusively within the purview of the Union Government. Therefore, while prescribing the criteria for admission to the institutions for higher education including higher medical education, the State cannot adversely affect the standards laid down by the Union of India under Entry 66 of List I. Secondly, while considering the cases on the subject it is also necessary to remember that from 1977, education, including, inter alia, medical and university education, is now in the Concurrent List so that the Union can legislate on admission criteria also. If it does so, the State will not be able to legislate in this field, except as provided in Article 254. 36. It would not be correct to say that the norms for admission have no connection with the standard of education, or that the rules for admission are covered only by Entry 25 of List III. Norms of admission can have a direct impact on the standards of education. Of course, there can be rules for admission which are consistent with or do not affect adversely the standards of education prescribed by the Union in exercise of powers under Entry 66 of List I. For example, a State may, for admission to the postgraduate medical courses, lay down qualifications in addition to those prescribed under Entry 66 of List I. This would be consistent with promoting higher standards for admission to the higher educational courses. But any lowering of the norms laid down can and does have an adverse effect on the standards of education in the institutes of higher education. Standards of education in an institution or college depend on various factors. Some of these are: .(1) the calibre of the teaching staff; .(2) a proper syllabus designed to achieve a high level of education in the given span of time; .(3) the student-teacher ratio; .(4) the ratio between the students and the hospital beds available to each student; .(5) the calibre of the students admitted to the institution; .(6) equipment and laboratory facilities, or hospital facilities for training in the case of medical colleges; .(7) adequate accommodation for the college and the attached hospital; and (8) the standard of examinations held including the manner in which the papers are set and examined and the clinical performance is judged. 12. Attacking the reliance placed by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner on the unreported decision of this Court, the learned Advocate General has pointed out that the said decision is distinguishable on facts and hence, cannot be made applicable to the case on hand. 13. I have given my heedful attention to the arguments put forward by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, the learned Advocate General and the learned Standing Counsel for the first respondent. 14. The questions which emerge for consideration in this case are as follows: .a. Whether the petitioner can admit students under the lapsed seats category even before the approval of its staff list by the second respondent; and .b. Whether the norms fixed by the NCTE prescribing 180 days of minimum attendance including 30 days of internship in teaching in nearby elementary schools will prevail over the norms fixed by the State Government prescribing 220 days, to consider the petitioner’s claim for approval; in other words, whether it is the Central Act or the State Act which will have the upper hand when there is repugnancy between these two. 15. It is seen that the petitioner applied to the first respondent on 17. 2005 seeking recognition to start D.T.Ed. course from the academic year 2005-2006; two deficiencies were pointed out by the first respondent and the petitioner’s Application was rejected on 211. 2005; aggrieved by the rejection order, the petitioner preferred an Appeal on 212. 15. It is seen that the petitioner applied to the first respondent on 17. 2005 seeking recognition to start D.T.Ed. course from the academic year 2005-2006; two deficiencies were pointed out by the first respondent and the petitioner’s Application was rejected on 211. 2005; aggrieved by the rejection order, the petitioner preferred an Appeal on 212. 2005 before the National Council for Teacher Education, New Delhi who is the appellate authority and the rejection order dated 211. 2005 passed by the first respondent was set aside and the Appeal was allowed on 24. 2006; thereafter, the petitioner admitted students from 5. 2006 and commenced the course from the same day; however, the first respondent granted recognition on 25. 2006 for the academic year 2005-2006 on condition that the petitioner should get its staff list approved by the second respondent and it was only on 20.8.2006 that the petitioner’s staff list came to be approved by the second respondent. .16. It is further seen that, earlier, the petitioner had approached this Court in W.P. No.6545 of 2006 seeking a Writ of Mandamus directing the second respondent to approve its staff list and this Court, by its order dated 18. 2006, had directed the second respondent to consider the case of the petitioner. Thereafter, the second respondent has approved the petitioner’s staff list 20.8.2006. Accordingly, the petitioner has admitted 25 students under the Management quota and since the remaining 25 seats to b e filled by the second respondent through counselling remained unfilled, the petitioner admitted 25 students under the lapsed category after completing the 150 days of attendance prescribed under the NCTE norms. The admission of 50 students since made by the petitioner has to be approved by the second respondent and it is not approved for the reason that the norms fixed by the State Government prescribing minimum attendance of 220 days has not been complied with. Further, as already stated, the petition er even before the staff approval, has admitted 50 students. Therefore, petitioner’s admission of students has not been approved by the second respondent and aggrieved by this, the petitioner has moved this Court with the present Writ Petition. .17. It is strongly pleaded by the petitioner that it has shown 194 days as against the required norms of 180 days prescribed by NCTE. Therefore, petitioner’s admission of students has not been approved by the second respondent and aggrieved by this, the petitioner has moved this Court with the present Writ Petition. .17. It is strongly pleaded by the petitioner that it has shown 194 days as against the required norms of 180 days prescribed by NCTE. However, the second respondent has insisted the petitioner to satisfy the minimum attendance of 220 days fixed by the State Government. It is also seen that earlier, this Court had directed the respondent to consider the case of the petitioners therein only if the list of students was forwarded on or before 22. 2006, taking into account the required term days to be completed . As the recognition was granted only on 25. 2006, the petitioner ought not to have admitted the students on 5. 2006 and that too even before its staff list was approved by the second respondent. It is further seen that the Appeal preferred by the petitioner before the NCTE, New Delhi was allowed on 24. 2006. Since the petitioner got its Appeal allowed, it proceeded to admit the students on 5. 2006. But, it has to be remembered that NCTE’s recognition was subject to the petitioner obtaining staff approval from the second respondent. However, the second respondent, despite the fact that the petitioner’s Appeal was allowed on 24. 2006, has not taken immediate steps to approve the petitioner’s staff list and took time till 20.8.2006. It is seen from the counter of the second respondent that according to the calendar of activities of the syllabus prescribed by the Government of Tamil Nadu, a period of 220 days has been fixed as term days for an academic year, including 10 days for observation and 30 days for teaching practice in the nearby primary schools which is mandatory and this is inclusive of admission and examination process. It is the further case of the second respondent as stated in its counter that though NCTE has prescribed at least 150 teaching days in a year inclusive of admission, examination, etc., in addition to that, every teacher-trainee shall be required to undergo internship in teaching at least for 30 days in nearby Elementary Schools and in total 180 days and since the petitioner institution is entitled to admit the students only after 20.8.2006, i.e. the date of staff approval, it cannot fulfill the required term days as prescribed by the State Government. 18. In respect of the first point for consideration as to whether the petitioner is entitled to approval of its students as it has admitted students even before its staff list being approved by the second respondent without complying with the conditional order of recognition granted by the first respondent, the petitioner cannot succeed and it should have admitted students only after its staff list was approved by the second respondent on 20.8.2006. 19. In the absence of any challenge made in this Petition with regard to the delay of nearly four months caused by the second respondent in approving the petitioner’s staff list and also in the absence of any proper explanation by the second respondent as to why such a long time was taken to approve the petitioner’s staff list, this Court is not inclined to dwell upon that aspect of the matter. .20. As far as the second point for consideration is concerned, the i.e. determination of standards in institution for higher education, the subject is exclusively covered by Entry 66 of List I of Schedule VII to the Constitution of India and the State has no power to encroach upon the legislative power of Parliament. If the subject is covered by Entry 25 of List III of Schedule VII to the Constitution, there is a concurrent power of Parliament as well as the State Legislatures and an appropriate Act can be made by the State Legislature subject to limitations and restrictions under the Constitution. Both the Union as well as the State have the power to legislate on education, including medical education, subject, inter alia, to Entry 66 of List I which deals with laying down standards in institutions for higher education. Both the Union as well as the State have the power to legislate on education, including medical education, subject, inter alia, to Entry 66 of List I which deals with laying down standards in institutions for higher education. A State, has, therefore, the right to control education, including medical education, so long as the field is not occupied by any Union legislation. Also, the State cannot, while controlling education in the State, impinge on standards in institutions for higher education as this is exclusively within the purview of the Union Government. Therefore, while prescribing the criteria for admission to the institutions for higher education including higher medical education, the State cannot adversely affect the standards laid down by the Union of India. Norms of admission can have a direct impact on the standards of education. Of course, there can be rules for admission which are consistent with or do not affect adversely the standards of education prescribed by the Union in exercise of powers under Entry 66 of List I. Any standard fixed by the State would be consistent with promoting higher standards for admission to the higher educational courses. But, any lowering of the norms laid down can and does have an adverse effect on the standards of education in the institutes of higher education. It depends on the calibre of the teaching staff, a proper syllabus designed to achieve a high level of education in the given span of time, the student-teacher ratio, etc. .21. The decisions of the Supreme Court, as discussed earlier in Sant Dnyaneshwar , Preeti Srivastava (Dr.) and Jaya Gokul Educational Trust cases and also a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in State of Tamil Nadu, represented by its Secretary, Higher Education, Secretariat, Chennai and another v. V.S.B. Educational Trust, represented by its Chairman, Kangeyam, Erode District and others, 2006 (3) MLJ 1037 , make it clear that while prescribing criteria for admission to the institution for higher education including higher medical education, the State cannot adversely affect the standards laid down by the Union of India under Entry 66 of List I. While considering the case on hand, it is necessary to remember that from 1977, education, including, inter alia, medical and university education, is now in the Concurrent List so that the Union can legislate on admission criteria also. If it does so, the State will not be able to legislate in this field, except as provided in Article 254. The norms of admission can have a direct impact on the standards of education. Of course, there can be rules for admission which are consistent with or do not affect adversely the standards of education prescribed by the Union in exercise of powers under Entry 66 of List I. The preamble of the NCTE Act provides for establishment of a National Council for Teacher Education with a view to achieving planned and coordinated development of the teacher-education system throughout the country, the regulation and proper maintenance of norms and standards in the teacher-education system and for matters connected therewith. With a view to achieving that object, the National Council for Teacher Education has been established at four places by the Central Government. Therefore, it is clear that the field is fully and completely occupied by an Act of Parliament and covered by Entry 66 of List I of Schedule VII. It is, therefore, not open to the State Legislature to encroach upon the said field and Parliament alone could have exercised the power by making appropriate law. In the circumstances, it is not open to the State Government to refuse approval to the admission of students made by the petitioner on a policy consideration. In the instant case, NCTE has already prescribed the norms fixing 150 days in addition to 30 days for internship in teaching in the nearby elementary schools totalling 180 days. That being the case, the State cannot and could not make another norms contrary to the object of the Central legislation, namely, the NCTE Act. Therefore, the stand of the second respondent as could be seen from the counter that minimum of 220 days of attendance is necessary for approval, cannot be acceptable, especially in view of the proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases referred to above as well as the Division Bench decision of this Court reported in State of Tamil Nadu, represented by its Secretary, Higher Education, Secretariat, Chennai and another v. V.S.B. Educational Trust, represented by its Chairman, Kangeyam, Erode District and others, 2006 (3) MLJ 1037 , that prescribing different norms contrary to the norms prescribed by NCTE cannot be sustained and the respondent cannot refuse the approval on that ground. 22. 22. When there is repugnancy between the Central norms and State norms, the law is settled now that the Central norms alone will prevail over the norms prescribed by the State and it is not open to the State Government to prescribe different norms contrary to the norms already fixed by the Central legislation. If it does so, the State will not be able to legislate in this field contrary to the Central legislation. Therefore, the second respondent cannot cite the norms prescribed by the State Government as a ground for not according its approval for the admission of students made by the petitioner. If that is done, it will go against the very object and reasoning of the Central Act, namely, the NCTE Act. Of course, it can be done without any conflict or any repugnancy with the NCTE Act. .23. The learned Advocate General harped on the view of the Supreme Court in Adhiyaman’s case which states that when there are more applicants than the available situations/seats, the State authority is not prevented from laying down higher standards or qualifications than those laid down by the Centre or the Central authority to short-list the applicants and when the State authority does so, it does not encroach upon Entry 66 of the Union List or make a law which is repugnant to the Central law. This proposition as relied on by the learned Advocate General cannot have application to the case on hand as the facts in this case are neither same nor identical as those in Adhiyaman’s case . Further, I find a force in the reliance made by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner on a Full Bench decision of the High Court of Karnataka reported in Govindanaik G. Kalaghatigi v. West Patent Press Co. Ltd. and another, AIR 1980 Kar. 92 , which rules that when there are two decisions by Benches of equal strength, then the latter judgment would prevail over the earlier one. In that view of the matter, the proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in Sant Dnyaneshwar case which is a recent one will prevail over its decision in Adhiyaman’s case and as such, the reliance made by the learned Advocate General on the decision in Adhiyaman case does not hold good. Thus, the second point for consideration is answered accordingly. 24. Thus, the second point for consideration is answered accordingly. 24. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, this Writ Petition is disposed of with the following directions: .(i) The petitioner shall submit its explanation to the second respondent for admitting the students even before its staff list got approved and the various circumstances under which it admitted those students, within a period of one week from the date of receipt of a copy of this order; and .(ii) upon receipt of such explanation from the petitioner, the second respondent shall consider the petitioner’s claim for approval of students admitted in the lapsed seats category based on the norms prescribed by NCTE without insisting on the State Government norms prescribed in this regard, taking note of the proposition laid down by the Supreme Court as well as this Court, as discussed above and pass appropriate orders within a period of four weeks. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.