A. K. GANGULY, C. J. ( 1 ) THIS Letters Patent Appeal has been filed challenging the judgment dated 4-9-200q passed by a learned Judge of the writ Court. While delivering the said judgment, the learned judge of the writ Court was pleased to upheld the order passed by the State Education Tribunal whereby the appeals filed by the present respondents 6 to 9 against the order of termination of their services, were allowed setting aside the order of termination. Against the said order of the Tribunal, a writ petition was filed by the Secretary of the Managing Committee of Shri Aurobindo institute of Integral Education and Research (hereinafter referred to as "the said institution") and the respondents 6 to 9 were the private Opp. Parties to the said writ application. Before the writ Court the said institution claimed the status of a minority institution. Before us the said point of minority status was not pressed by the learned counsel for the appellant in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of s. P. Mittal v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 1 . ( 2 ) THE case of the respondents whose services were terminated was that the said institution became eligible to receive grant-in-aid which is covered by the definition of section 3 (b) of the Orissa Education Act, 1969. It is also contended that since the institution is covered under Section 3 (b), it cannot dispense with the services of the respondents without obtaining prior approval of the State Government as per the requirement of Section 10-A of the Act. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the said institution is not an institution which can be called as one which has received grant-in-aid. It was submitted before us that the said institution received grant-in-aid that too Block-grant to the tune of Rs. 87,242/-only once and thereafter, it had not received any grant. Therefore, the said institution cannot be treated as covered by the definition of section 3 (b) of the said Act. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the appellant relied upon two decisions of this Court; one of them was rendered by a division Bench of this Court in the case of assistant Personnel Manager (G) Hindustan steel Ltd. v. Elias Minz, 1987 (1) OLR 645. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the appellant relied upon two decisions of this Court; one of them was rendered by a division Bench of this Court in the case of assistant Personnel Manager (G) Hindustan steel Ltd. v. Elias Minz, 1987 (1) OLR 645. In the said judgment, the learned Judges of the Division Bench held that unless grant-in-aid is received continuously, casual ex gratia grant cannot bring the institution within the scope of aided institution under the said Act. A subsequent judgment of this court in the case of The Managing Committee of Gangapur high Schools v. The Presiding Officer, Orissa State Education tribunal, 1989 (1) OLR 42, following the previous judgment in the case of Hindustan Steel ltd. (supra) also came to the same conclusion i. e. unless receipt of grant is continuous, mere intermittent grant on one or two occasions cannot bring the institution within the meaning of aided educational institution under Section 3 (b)of the said Act. Placing reliance on the said judgment, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in the instant case, the appellant's institution received grant-in-aid only once. Therefore, it is not an aided institution as held by the writ Court and as such, the order of the writ Court may be quashed. ( 3 ) COMING to the definition of "aided educational institution" under the Orissa Education Act, 1969, this Court finds that the aforesaid contention raised by the learned counsel for "the appellant possibly cannot be sustained. The definition of "aided educational institution" under Section 3 (b) of the said Act suffered an amendment in the year 1994. Now after amendment the definition of "aided educational institution" under Section 3 (b) of the Act is as follows : "aided Educational institution means private educational institution which is eligible to, and is receiving grant-in-aid from the State Government, and, includes an educational institution which has been notified by the State Government to receive grant-in-aid. " ( 4 ) THE previous definition of "aided educational institution" which was considered in the aforesaid two Division Bench judgments of this Court was as follows : ". . . . . . . . . . . . Aided Educational Institution means a private educational institution which is recognized by and is receiving aid from the State Government. " ( 4 ) THE previous definition of "aided educational institution" which was considered in the aforesaid two Division Bench judgments of this Court was as follows : ". . . . . . . . . . . . Aided Educational Institution means a private educational institution which is recognized by and is receiving aid from the State Government. " ( 5 ) A comparison between the two definitions i. e. the definition in 1969 and which has been amended in the year 1994 makes it clear that after amendment the words "includes an educational institution which has been notified by the State Government to receive grant-in-aid" have been added to the definition. It is not in dispute that the institution in question has been notified as an institution which is entitled to receive grant-in-aid. The Notification bringing the school in question within the fold of grant-in-aid was placed before the writ Court as Annexure-A/8 and in the "list of newly recognized non-Govt. Boy's High Schools eligible to receive minimum grant-in-aid during 1988-89" appended to Annexure-A/8, the name of the school in question appears at serial no. 88. The correctness of the said Notification was not disputed before the writ Court nor is it disputed before us. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that unless there is an Gazette Notification, the said Notification cannot be taken into consideration. We think that there is no requirement of any Gazette Notification under Section 3 (b) of the said Act. Since the genuineness of the Notification is not an issue before us, we accept the said notification as valid. ( 6 ) IT is not disputed that the services of the private respondents were terminated without prior approval of the State Government and as such, the said termination was contrary to the provisions of Section 10-A of the Act. The only question is whether under the amended definition of "aided educational institution" the institution in question can be considered to be included within Section 3 (b) of the said Act. ( 7 ) WE have also referred to the amended provision and also the Notification. Now the question is what is the purport of such amendment. It is one of the cardinal principles of statutory interpretation when the definition clause use the expression "includes" such expression is used to mean an expansion of the definition in question. ( 7 ) WE have also referred to the amended provision and also the Notification. Now the question is what is the purport of such amendment. It is one of the cardinal principles of statutory interpretation when the definition clause use the expression "includes" such expression is used to mean an expansion of the definition in question. In this connection reference may be made to the judgment of Earl of Halsbury in the case of Corporation of Glasgow v. Glasgow Tramway and Omnibus Co. Ltd. , 1898 AC 631. At page 634 of the report the learned Judge observed as follows : "the words 'fee from all expenses whatever in connection with the said tramways', appear to me to be so wide in their application that I should have thought it impossible to qualify or cut them down by their being associated with other words on the principle of their being ejusdem generis with the previous words enumerated. " ( 8 ) THE aforesaid doctrine has been quoted with approval by Justice Gajendragadkar as his Lordship then was in the case of The State of Bombay v. The Hospital mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1960 SC 610 . At page 614 of the report his Lordship after referring to Stround's "judicial Dictionary" held that "it is obvious that the words used in an inclusive definition denote extension and cannot be treated as restricted in any sense. " it was also observed that where "we are dealing with an inclusive definition it would be inappropriate to put a restrictive interpretation upon terms of wider denotation". A similar view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of the Commissioner of Income-tax, Andhra Pradesh v. Tajmahal Hotel, Secunderabad, AIR 1972 SC 168 . In paragraph 6 of the said judgment, the learned Judge held as follows : "the word 'includes' is often used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the 'statute'. When it is so used, these words and phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their nature and import but also those things, which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. The word 'include' is also susceptible of other constructions which it is unnecessary to go into. When it is so used, these words and phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their nature and import but also those things, which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. The word 'include' is also susceptible of other constructions which it is unnecessary to go into. " ( 9 ) THAT being the considered judicial opinion we are applying the same for interpreting the word 'includes' in Section 3 (b) of the said Act and hold the same is used for expansion. Therefore, Shri Aurobindo Institute of Integral Education and Research is a notified institution entitled to receive grants-in-aid and is included within the definition of Section 3 (b) of the Education Act irrespective of the fact that the said institution received grant-in-aid only once. ( 10 ) FOLLOWING the aforesaid reasons, we are inclined to hold that there is no error in the judgment passed by the writ Court and we confirm the same. The A. H. O. is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed. .