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2007 DIGILAW 355 (ALL)

ADITYA NARAIN DUBEY v. STATE OF U P

2007-02-14

AMAR SARAN, R.N.MISRA

body2007
We have heard Shri Tej Pal, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Shri Kr. R. C. Singh, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 6 and learned AGA for the State. 2. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with a prayer to quash the FIR in case Crime No. C-32 of 2005, under Sections 302/203, IPC registered at Police Station Govind Nagar, District Kanpur Nagar. The charge-sheet dated 10-3-2006 was submitted by the police therein, on the basis of which, the Criminal Case No. 17209 of 2006, State v. Phool Kumar and Others is pending trial before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar. The petitioner has also prayed for quashing the proceeding of the aforesaid criminal case and directing the prosecution to get the case re-investigated by C. B. I. or any other agency. 3. One Vipin Kumar was the worker of M/s P. K. Casting Factory Dada Nagar, Kanpur. On 6-6-2005, he was murdered by the factory owners and partners, namely Phool Kumar, Brijesh Kumar, Aditya Kumar and Ramesh by throttling. The information on telephone was given to the father of the deceased, namely, Ram Chandra Tewari by the owner of the factory that Vipin Kumar died due to electric shock. The police reached the spot and prepared the inquest memo in the light of the said information. The police was working on the basis that deceased died due to electric shock as informed by the factory owners and the then Investigating Officer was verifying that fact in his own way. But later on the complainant/informant came to know that his son was killed by the accused persons. The motive behind the murder was that there was some arrears of the pay etc. of the deceased. His marriage was to be solemnized in the near future. He demanded the arrears and some dispute took place between them and consequently he was murdered. The complainant/informant approached the police but his F. I. R. was not registered. Later on he moved an application under Section 156 (3), Cr. P. C. before the Magistrate concerned, by whose order the F. I. R. was registered and after completing the investigation, the charge-sheet was submitted. Not only this, the Court took cognizance on the charge-sheet and the trial is pending. Later on he moved an application under Section 156 (3), Cr. P. C. before the Magistrate concerned, by whose order the F. I. R. was registered and after completing the investigation, the charge-sheet was submitted. Not only this, the Court took cognizance on the charge-sheet and the trial is pending. The Investigating Officer has collected evidence about the involvement of the petitioner as well as other persons in this murder. 4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has alleged that the petitioner is a Government servant and he is neither owner nor partner of the said factory. But in the counter-affidavit filed by the Investigating Officer it has been clearly mentioned that being a Government servant, the petitioner could not be a partner nor owner of the factory in black and white, but he has invested the huge amount in the said factory and manages the same. The Investigating Officer collected reliable evidence about the involvement of the petitioner in the crime and submitted a charge- sheet. 5. The plea of alibi was taken by the petitioner before this Court. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued about the plea of alibi but it is, a well-settled law that in the writ petition, the evidence cannot be recorded and finding cannot be giver. regarding the defence. 6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has cited AIR 2005 SC 268 , C. B. I. v. Akhilesh Singh and has argued that the discharge order can be passed in a writ petition but we see no force in this contention. A plain perusal of the facts of the aforesaid case show that in the said case the main accused had been discharged and that order was final. The respondent in that case had been assigned the role of hatching conspiracy. In such circumstances it was held that when the main accused had already been discharged there was no use to proceed further against the person hatching conspiracy. Moreover, that was a case under Section 482, Cr. P. C. 7. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has further cited 2005 (3) JIC 512 (All) : 2005 (53) ACC 595, Upendra Singh v. State of U. P. and Ors. , in which the Division Bench of this Court upheld the order of transferring the investigation from one agency to other. P. C. 7. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has further cited 2005 (3) JIC 512 (All) : 2005 (53) ACC 595, Upendra Singh v. State of U. P. and Ors. , in which the Division Bench of this Court upheld the order of transferring the investigation from one agency to other. But a plain perusal of the judgment of said case show that investigation had been transferred by the Government at the stage of investigation and not at the stage of trial. 8. In the case of Prakash Singh Badal and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Ors. , 2006 (8) Supreme To-day 964, the Honble Apex Court has clearly opined that at the stage of framing the charge, the plea that no offence is made out can be urged because the report under Section 173, Cr. P. C becomes the opinion of the Investigating Agency but it does not require elaborate details. 9. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has further relied on the case of Vidya Prakash Pandey v. State of U. P. , 2006 (2) JIC 545 (SC) : 2006 (56) ACC 281, decided by the Division Bench of this Court. In this case the investigation was ordered to be made by C. B. I, because the local police has submitted final report. The facts and circumstances of that case were different. In that case, the Investigating Officer and Doctor both had colluded with the accused and held that the murder of the deceased was caused due to heart attack, though in the post-mortem report the injuries were found on the person of the deceased. Hence the facts of that case were not similar to the present case before us. 10. In the case of Kari Choudhary v. Mst. Sita Devi and Ors. , 2002 (1) JIC 248 (SC) : AIR 2002 SC 441 , the Honble Apex Court has clearly held that the F. I. R. Cannot be quashed only on the basis that the police registered two F. I. Rs and filed two final reports. This was a too technical ground to quash the charge- sheet. 11. In the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. Thirukkural Perumal, 1995 (1) JIC 713 (SC) : 1995 (2) SCC 449 , it has been held that it is not permissible to quash the criminal proceedings based on evidence collected by the Investigating Officer during investigation. This was a too technical ground to quash the charge- sheet. 11. In the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. Thirukkural Perumal, 1995 (1) JIC 713 (SC) : 1995 (2) SCC 449 , it has been held that it is not permissible to quash the criminal proceedings based on evidence collected by the Investigating Officer during investigation. The normal process of criminal trial cannot be cut-short in a rather casual manner. The Court is not justified in embarking upon an inquiry as to the reliability or the defence of the allegations made in the F. I. R or the complaint, on the basis of evidence collected by the Investigating Officer during investigation. The defence and investigational material cannot be considered at this stage. 12. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that there were two FIRs and on the basis of first FIR, the then Investigating Officer found at the time of preparing inquest memo that the death was caused due to electric shock therefore, on the basis of second FIR the collection of evidence by the second Investigating Officer was apparently barred under Section 162, Cr. P. C. But we see no force in this contention because at the initial stage the factory owner who were involved in the murder of the deceased informed the police and the complainant/informant, that the death was caused due to electric shock and wanted to mould the direction of the investigation but as soon as the complainant/informant came to know about the reality, he lodged the FIR on the basis of which the police proceeded further and collected evidence and after collecting reliable evidence against the petitioner and other co-accused persons submitted the charge-sheet and on that basis the Court took cognizance. 13. In the case of Ram Singh Bavaji Jadege v. State of Gujarat, 1994 (2) SCC 685 , the Honble Apex Court has held that if there is a cryptic telephonic message about the crime and in-charge of the police station proceeds the place of occurrence to find out the details, it cannot be said that the said information was to be treated as an FIR. The object of that information is not to lodge the FIR but to request the police to reach the place of occurrence. 14. The object of that information is not to lodge the FIR but to request the police to reach the place of occurrence. 14. In the case of S. M. Datta v. State of Gujarat, 2001 (2) JIC 845 (SC) : 2001 (7) SCC 659 , it has been observed that criminal proceedings, in the normal course of events ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage, unless the same amounts to an abuse of the process of law. In the normal course of events thus, quashing of a complaint should rather be an exception and a rarity than an ordinary rule. The genuineness of the averments in the FIR cannot possibly be gone into and the document shall have to be read as a whole so as to decipher the indent of the maker thereof. It is not a document which requires decision with exactitude, neither is it a document which requires mathematical accuracy and nicety, but the same should be able to communicate or indicative of disclosure of an offence broadly and in the event the said test stands satisfied, the question relating to the quashing of a complaint would not arise. 15. Not only this the latest judgment of the Honble Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Devendra Nath Padhi, 2005 (1) JIC 289 (SC) : AIR 2005 SC 359 , is that ever, at the stage of framing the charge the prosecution evidence is to be looked into and not the defence evidence. 16. In view of our above discussions, this writ petition is devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed. 17. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed. .