JUDGMENT : RAKESH SHARMA, J. 1. Heard Sri R. S. Tripathi, advocate, learned Counsel for the Petitioner-tenants and Sri Anil Kumar, advocate, appearing for the Respondent No. 3 landlord. 2. Through the present writ petition, the Petitioners, who are tenants in House No. 266/343 situate in Mohalla Bhadewan, P.S. Bazarkhala, Lucknow, have assailed the judgment and order dated 18.10.2006, passed by the Additional District Judge, Lucknow in Rent Appeal No. 16 of 2002, Bewa Shakurey and Ors. v. Abdul Wali, thereby dismissing the appeal filed u/s 22 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (Act No. XIII of 1972), hereinafter referred to as the Act. The Petitioners have also assailed the order dated 4.2.2002 passed by the prescribed authority while disposing of the application for release u/s 21(1)(a) of the Act allowing the release of the premises in question in favour of the landlord. Both the courts below have recorded concurrent findings of facts and have allowed the release of the premises in favour of the landlord, Respondent No. 3. 3. It emerges from record that the above-indicated House No. 266/343, Mohalla Bhadewan was rented out to one late Shakurey in the year 1955 and after the death of said tenant, the Petitioners had inherited the tenancy and are tenants in common. 4. The landlord, Respondent No. 3 Sri Abdul Wali is a practising advocate in the city of Lucknow for the last more than 30 years. His wife is running a Montessori school. The landlord had purchased this house from one Smt. Khurshed Jahan through a registered sale-deed duly executed on 22.8.1995 for the purpose of his residence and to accommodate his family members, i.e., his wife, three sons and one daughter. The landlord thereafter submitted an application seeking release of the said premises before the prescribed authority on 18.12.1988. The landlord had indicated that although he possessed Houses Nos. 266/343, 266/345 and 266/346 Mohalla Bhadewan, P.S. Bazarkhala, Lucknow, but these accommodations were occupied by the tenants. He was residing in House No. 266/522 in Mohalla Bhadewan alongwith his elder brother's family. As far as bona fide need for the said house is concerned, the landlord had demonstrated that his family has grown up. 266/343, 266/345 and 266/346 Mohalla Bhadewan, P.S. Bazarkhala, Lucknow, but these accommodations were occupied by the tenants. He was residing in House No. 266/522 in Mohalla Bhadewan alongwith his elder brother's family. As far as bona fide need for the said house is concerned, the landlord had demonstrated that his family has grown up. It was further demonstrated before the Court below in the release application that the landlord was residing in a small house, jointly owned by himself and his elder brother Sri Abdul Wari Siddiqui, a retired school teacher. The elder brother's family was also facing immense difficulty in staying with the growing family of the younger brother, Respondent No. 3. One of the sons of the landlord had joined the legal profession and was practising in local courts at Lucknow. The three sons and one daughter of the landlord were of growing age and it had become immensely difficult to accommodate his family in House No. 266/522 alongwith his elder brother's family. The house was needed for residential purpose and to enable the landlord and one of his sons, a lawyer to carry on with their legal profession. The wife of the landlord was also running a Montessori school from the same house No. 266/522. This house was insufficient to accommodate a practising advocate having more than 25 years' practice at the time of seeking release of the premises in question. As per settled law of the Apex Court and this Court, a lawyer needs at least three rooms to accommodate his chamber, library, consultation room and clerk-clients room. Vide S. Mohan Lal Vs. R. Kondiah, Prem Nath Bhatia v. Munshi Lal Nigam 1984 (2) ARC 548 and Rishi Kumar Jalan and Another Vs. Lakshmendra Pal Gupta, (2006) 4 AWC 3386 . In addition to this, the landlord's son, lawyer also needed adequate accommodation to establish his legal practice. The other two sons, daughter and wife also required some space to live appropriately and pursue their education, etc. 5. The landlord had also highlighted in the application for release that he had already served legal notices on the tenants on 20.4.1998 and 16.5.1998 for vacating the premises in question, but they did not respond. The tenants could have easily taken another suitable accommodation in several housing schemes, which had come up in the city of Lucknow. 5. The landlord had also highlighted in the application for release that he had already served legal notices on the tenants on 20.4.1998 and 16.5.1998 for vacating the premises in question, but they did not respond. The tenants could have easily taken another suitable accommodation in several housing schemes, which had come up in the city of Lucknow. The tenants were occupied in running barber's shop, selling general merchandise goods, embroidery work and carpentry, etc. All of them were skilled workers and financially sound to manage for an alternative accommodation in various new localities of Lucknow city, set up by the U.P. Housing and Development Board, Lucknow Development Authority and other housing societies. In fact the tenants were not interested in vacating the premises for which they were paying a meagre sum of Rs. 5 per month as rent for the last more than fifty years. 6. The release application was contested by the tenants. It was admitted by the tenants that they were running barber's shop, selling general merchandise goods, embroidery and carpentry, etc. According to them, sufficient accommodation of six rooms in House No. 266/522, was available with the landlord. It was further indicated that the landlord had several other houses besides one at Haiderganj Lodhi Tola and another at Kursi Road. The tenants were engaged in petty jobs and were having large families, hence they could not afford to purchase some properties. Their need was genuine and they would suffer immense hardships in comparison to the landlord in case they are evicted from the premises in question. 7. Appreciating the contentions of rival parties, the prescribed authority allowed the release application vide order dated 4.2.2002. Against the said order of the prescribed authority, the tenants preferred an appeal, which was dismissed on 18.10.2006. At the appellate stage, the tenants had submitted that the landlord was having other houses Nos. 266/343, 266/345 and 266/346 in Mohalla Bhadewan, P.S. Bazarkhala, Lucknow besides one at Haiderganj Lodhi Tola and another at Kursi Road. They had also requested for issuance of a commission but their request was turned down by the appellate court. Sri R. S. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the Petitioners has laid much stress on this point that a commission ought to have been issued by the appellate court for proper adjudication of the case. 8. They had also requested for issuance of a commission but their request was turned down by the appellate court. Sri R. S. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the Petitioners has laid much stress on this point that a commission ought to have been issued by the appellate court for proper adjudication of the case. 8. Sri R. S. Tripathi while opening his arguments has drawn the attention of the Court to various provisions of the Constitution of India and the aims and object as indicated in the relevant Rent Control Laws in Uttar Pradesh. Sri Tripathi has read the Preamble of the Constitution of India alongwith Articles 14 and 16 as also Article 38 concerning Directive Principles of State Policy. According to him, both the courts below have not taken into account the provisions of Section 16 and proviso to Section 21(4) of the Act. He has reiterated the pleas taken in the written statement to the release application, the memo of appeal and the present writ petition. According to him, the landlord opposite party No. 3 was in fact guilty of concealing material fact in not disclosing the accommodations available with him, i.e., houses Nos. 266/343, 266/345 and 266/346 in Mohalla Bhadewan, P.S. Bazarkhala, Lucknow, another house at Kursi Road in the city of Lucknow and yet another house at Haiderganj, Lodhi Tola. It is further submitted that the landlord could have continued with his legal practice and fulfilled his residential need from his own house No. 266/522 at Bhadewan, Lucknow. His wife could not be permitted to carry on with commercial activities like running a Montessori school from the house rented out to the Petitioners. The lawyer's profession could be defined as 'business', vide S. Mohan Lal Vs. R. Kondiah, AIR 1979 SC 1132 For the purposes of business, like carrying on legal profession by the father and the son, lawyers, the house in question could not be released. The landlord was not having bona fide requirement of the house. There was sufficient accommodation available which could be used by him and his family. The courts below should have ascertained the accommodation in possession of the landlord. Both the courts below have misconstrued the provisions contained in Section 21(1)(a) and proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 21 and Rule 16 (1) of the Rules framed under the Act. There was sufficient accommodation available which could be used by him and his family. The courts below should have ascertained the accommodation in possession of the landlord. Both the courts below have misconstrued the provisions contained in Section 21(1)(a) and proviso to Sub-section (4) of Section 21 and Rule 16 (1) of the Rules framed under the Act. The appellate authority has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it in not considering the points raised in the memo of appeal which were read before this Court. The additional evidence must have been considered by the appellate court while deciding the appeal. As per learned Counsel for the Petitioners, the landlord has failed to establish his bona fide requirement of the premises. The Petitioners deserve to be allowed to continue in the house in question. In support of his above submissions, Sri Tripathi has placed reliance on following judgments: 1. Dr. Pritam Kaur v. A.D.J. Dehradun 1980 ARC 207; 2. M.M. Quasim Vs. Manohar Lal Sharma and others, AIR 1981 SC 1113 3. Jagat Narain Jain v. A.D.J (1982) 1 ARC 296; 4. Jeet Singh v. District Judge, Dehradun 1987 (2) ARC 463; 5. Dr. Basiruddin v. District Judge Bulandshahr 1978 ARC 62; 6. Mattulal Vs. Radhe Lal, AIR 1974 SC 1596 7. Smt. Tara Devi v. District Judge and Ors. 1979 ARC 382; and 8. Nathu v. Amar Nath Agrawal (1995) 1 ARC 494 . 9. Sri Anil Kumar, learned Counsel for Respondent No. 3, landlord has resisted the writ petition. He has taken the Court to his release application and the judgments passed by the prescribed authority and the appellate court. The landlord had categorically denied at the time of submission of the release application, i.e., on 18.12.1998 that he was having any vacant house in Bhadewan locality of the city of Lucknow. The landlord had not concealed any fact from the courts below or this Court. In paras 1 to 4 of the release application, he had categorically and in so many words submitted that he was owner/landlord of houses Nos. 266/343, 266/345 and 266/346 Mohalla Bhadewan. These facts have been admitted by the tenants in their written statement filed sometime in December, 1999. The written statement filed before the prescribed authority was read in Court. In paras 1 to 4 of the release application, he had categorically and in so many words submitted that he was owner/landlord of houses Nos. 266/343, 266/345 and 266/346 Mohalla Bhadewan. These facts have been admitted by the tenants in their written statement filed sometime in December, 1999. The written statement filed before the prescribed authority was read in Court. As far as having a building at Kursi Road or other places is concerned, the landlord had always been denying this fact before the courts below. Since the landlord had denied of being owner in possession of the houses as averred by the tenants, it was incumbent upon them to have proved this fact by placing cogent and reliable evidence before the prescribed authority or the appellate court. The tenants had merely made some suggestions before the appellate court without filing any documentary evidence giving description of such property, house numbers and other details, etc. They had manufactured these pleas just to avoid their eviction from the premises in question, and to drag the landlord to litigation and continue to enjoy the benefit of such a huge accommodation centrally located in the city of Lucknow on a meagre rent of Rs. 5 per month. The landlord had demonstrated in the release application and the counter-affidavit filed in the present writ petition that the present accommodation, i.e., house No. 266/522 Bhadewan, jointly occupied by the landlord and his elder brother, was insufficient for his wife, three sons and one daughter. The details of the property have been indicated in para 11 of the counter-affidavit. As per learned Counsel for the landlord, the tenants had themselves admitted in their written statement filed on 21.12.1999 before the prescribed authority that the landlord was residing in House No. 266/522 and that he was a practising lawyer and his wife was running a Montessori school for imparting education to small children of the locality. The pleadings and averments made by the tenants were vague and bald. The landlord placed each and every document, like sale-deed of the house and details of the property before the prescribed authority, the appellate court and this Court also. In fact the tenants have not come with clean hands and they have tried to mislead this Court regarding purchase of some property at Kursi Road. The landlord placed each and every document, like sale-deed of the house and details of the property before the prescribed authority, the appellate court and this Court also. In fact the tenants have not come with clean hands and they have tried to mislead this Court regarding purchase of some property at Kursi Road. It was categorically submitted in paras 7, 8 and 9 of the counter-affidavit that no house at Kursi Road, Lucknow was purchased by the landlord. The averments made in this regard are imaginary. The landlord himself had indicated in the release application that three small quarters/houses bearing Nos. 266/343, 266/345 and 266/346 in Mohalla Bhadewan were purchased by him through registered sale-deed executed on 21.8.1995. The details of family members were already placed before the prescribed authority and this Court to justify the release of the premises for residential purposes only. 10. As far as the issuance of commission at appellate stage is concerned, Sri Anil Kumar, learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 3 landlord has submitted that detailed objections were submitted by the landlord on 5.4.2003. The appellate court had appreciated the objections filed by the landlord that some of the tenants had handed over the vacant possession of some tenanted accommodations to the landlord on 10.4.2002 and thereafter. The roofs of said tenanted accommodations had fallen down. These quarters were to be reconstructed in order to make them inhabitable. 11. Sri Anil Kumar, learned Counsel for the landlord has further submitted that this Court may look into the present size of the growing family of the landlord. Now the landlord has 30 years' legal practice to his credit. His son Mohammad Talha Siddiqui, enrolled as an advocate, is also practising. He also requires adequate accommodation to establish his legal practice in the city of Lucknow. Thus, father and son both require separate chambers to carry on with their legal profession. The other son Ahmad Miyan is a student of Bachelor of Architecture in Integral University, Lucknow and the third one is a student of M.A. Part II in Lucknow University and his daughter is studying in Class XII. All these grown up children of the landlord require adequate space for their studies. The other son Ahmad Miyan is a student of Bachelor of Architecture in Integral University, Lucknow and the third one is a student of M.A. Part II in Lucknow University and his daughter is studying in Class XII. All these grown up children of the landlord require adequate space for their studies. In addition to this, both the courts below have appreciated the fact and this Court may also appreciate that the landlord's wife is running a Montessori school to impart nursery education to small children of the locality. 12. Learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 3, landlord has further submitted that the application for issuing commission was rightly rejected by the appellate court on 13.5.2003. All the details of the properties possessed by the landlord were already available before the Court. The landlord has a right to use the accommodation in possession for any legal purpose ; there is no legal prohibition if he resides in it and he or his son carries on with legal profession and his wife runs a Montessori school in it. The landlord had already indicated before the courts below that after vacation of the house in question, he would use it for residential purpose (not for commercial or business purpose) to accommodate himself and his family members after raising a new construction, for which finances are being arranged. This Court may also see the subsequent events, which go in favour of the landlord in getting the house vacated. The need of the landlord was genuine and bona fide and he would suffer greater hardships in case the house in question is not vacated in his favour. 13. Sri Anil Kumar, learned Counsel for the landlord has further submitted that the need of each of the members of the landlord's family is to be considered. Young members or children of the family are also not to be ignored. A practising advocate also requires at least three rooms for his use and for maintaining his status in the society. To take care of convenience or luxury of tenant is not the policy behind comparison of hardships. Every landlord has a right to expand his business and establish his family members in business, occupation or profession. The landlord is the best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter. To take care of convenience or luxury of tenant is not the policy behind comparison of hardships. Every landlord has a right to expand his business and establish his family members in business, occupation or profession. The landlord is the best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter. Sri Anil Kumar has placed reliance on the following judgments in support of his above submissions: 1. Bhushan v. District JudgeGhaziabad 1983 (2) ARC 79; 2. Prem Nath Bhatia v. Munshi Lal Nigam 1984 (2) ARC 548; 3. Vishnu Kant Goswami v. IInd A.D.J Allahabad 2006 (1) ARC 282; 4. Ranjeet Singh v. Ravi Prakash 2004 (1) ARC 613 (SC) : 2004 (2) AWC 1721 (SC) ; 5. Mukesh Kumar Gupta v.I Ind A.D.J. Udham Singh Nagar 2006 (3) ARC 572 ; 6. Mohd. Siddiq Vs. Km. Hanni Varshaney and Others, (2006) 4 AWC 3943 . 14. Sri Anil Kumar has also highlighted that both the learned courts below have held that the tenants had not made sincere efforts to find out alternative accommodation for them in the growing city of Lucknow. Even after the release application was submitted, they did not approach the Rent Control Officer/District Collector to allot them any other accommodation as per Rule 10 of the Rules made under the Act. In support of his submissions, Sri Anil Kumar has placed reliance on the following judgments: 1. B.C. Bhutada v. G.R. Mundada 2005 (2) ARC 899 (SC) ; 2. Smt. Vidyawati v. Sri Ram Agarwal, 2006 (4) AWC 3596 (SC) ; 3. Sarju Prasad Vs. VIIIth Additional District Judge and Others, (2007) 2 AWC 1068 4. Hashmat Ali v. VIth A.D.J. Kanpur 2006 (1) ARC 65 ; and 5. Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. Vs. Federal Motors Pvt. Ltd., (2005) 1 SCC 705 15. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. Here is a case where both the parties, i.e., the landlord and the tenants had adduced their oral and documentary evidence before the prescribed authority while considering the application for release made by the landlord. The prescribed authority after considering the entire oral and documentary evidence available on record had arrived at the conclusion that the need of the landlord was bona fide. The prescribed authority after considering the entire oral and documentary evidence available on record had arrived at the conclusion that the need of the landlord was bona fide. The learned prescribed authority had also applied the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and this Court. The need for carrying on legal practice by the lawyer and his son and for accommodating himself and his family members including wife, an educated lady imparting nursery education to small children of the locality was found to be bona fide and genuine. It was established before the prescribed authority and the appellate court that the landlord, who was a lawyer having about 30 years legal practice to his credit had sought release of the premises in question for residential purposes. He wanted to use the accommodation, house No. 266/522 in his occupation, for the purposes of carrying on with legal profession by him and his son and for carrying on a Montessori school by his wife. The house sought to be vacated was to be used for residential purposes after getting it reconstructed according to the needs of the practising advocates. Both the courts below have found that the house occupied by the Respondent No. 3 landlord, a practising lawyer and his elder brother, a retired school teacher and their family was insufficient. Both the brothers were having grown up children. It is now well settled by the Apex Court and this Court that a practising advocate requires at least three rooms for carrying on with legal profession and for maintaining his status in the society. Recently this Court while deciding a Writ Petition No. 21 of 1999 (R/C), Bata Shoe Company and Anr. v. VI Ith Additional District Judge, Faizabad and Ors. duly affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has held that a practising advocate does need adequate accommodation, i.e., at least three rooms for carrying on with the legal profession, to have an office, consultation room, library, clients and clerk's room, etc. It is also well-settled that every landlord has a right to expand his business and this Court cannot be persuaded to act like appellate court to go into the disputed questions of facts and substitute its own opinion. The landlord is the best judge of his requirement for residential or business purposes and he should get complete freedom in the matter. The landlord is the best judge of his requirement for residential or business purposes and he should get complete freedom in the matter. This Court has held in several judgments that bona fide personal need is a pure question of facts and the findings of the courts below on the point cannot be interfered with vide E. Parashuraman's case 2006 SCFBRC 167. 16. So far as question of comparative hardships is concerned, the prescribed authority after considering the evidence on record arrived at the conclusion that the tilt of the comparative hardships is in favour of the landlord. Admittedly the tenants have not approached the Rent Control Officer/District Collector, Lucknow to allot them any other accommodation as per Rule 10 of the Rules framed under the Act. The city of Lucknow is expanding in all directions. Several urban housing societies with housing schemes have come up. The U.P. Housing and Development Board and the Lucknow Development Authority have floated various housing schemes calling applications from the citizens to allot suitable quarters to economically weaker sections of the society. Soft loans are available for the needy persons. Various multi-storeyed complexes are available to provide accommodation to economically weaker sections of the society. Skilled and semi-skilled workers like barbers, carpenters and persons involved in embroidery and selling merchandise goods etc. can afford to buy plots/houses according to their choice in these complexes. It is noteworthy that since the submission of the release application on 18.12.1998, more than eight years have passed. On being asked Sri R. S. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the Petitioners has failed to put forth genuine and bona fide efforts were made by the tenants in finding out an alternative accommodation. Here was a case where the Petitioners are enjoying the house, which is centrally located in the city of Lucknow and rented out to them on a meagre rent of Rs. 5 per month which was in fact no rent in the eye of law as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and this Court in various judgments. If a person comes to a nearby cycle-stand or scooter stand, he has to pay Rs. 2 to 5 per hour to park a cycle or scooter. Sri R. S. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the Petitioners has tried to defend the inaction on the part of the tenants. If a person comes to a nearby cycle-stand or scooter stand, he has to pay Rs. 2 to 5 per hour to park a cycle or scooter. Sri R. S. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the Petitioners has tried to defend the inaction on the part of the tenants. He started lecturing the Court and delivering sermons on the salient features of the Constitution of India, right to live, principle of live and let live, Preamble and Directive principles of State Policy, and aims and objects of various rent control laws in India. This cannot be permitted. After hearing learned Counsel for the parties, this Court had given the option to Sri R. S. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the Petitioners that appropriate time can be given to the tenants to vacate the premises in question, but he did not agree to it and insisted that he may be heard on merit and the case may be dealt with and viewed with a particular angle only as desired by him. This Court is guided by the settled legal principles of law as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and the relevant legal precedents and not by any personal particular view or angle. 17. The appellate court after considering the submissions made before it and appreciating the evidence on record, had arrived at a definite conclusion that the findings recorded by the prescribed authority with regard to the bona fide need and comparative hardships did not warrant any interference. The appellate authority while dismissing the appeal filed by the tenants had affirmed the findings recorded by the prescribed authority. The judgment and order passed by the appellate authority is a detailed, well considered, reasoned and speaking order. The appellate court has appreciated the law laid down by the Apex Court and this Court. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners has failed to demonstrate as to how the concurrent findings of facts arrived at by the prescribed authority and affirmed by the appellate authority are perverse or improper. It is settled view of laws that this Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will not sit in appeal over the findings arrived at by the prescribed authority and affirmed by the appellate authority. Vide Apex Court's decision in Ranjeet Singh Vs. Ravi Prakash, AIR 2004 SC 3892 . It is settled view of laws that this Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will not sit in appeal over the findings arrived at by the prescribed authority and affirmed by the appellate authority. Vide Apex Court's decision in Ranjeet Singh Vs. Ravi Prakash, AIR 2004 SC 3892 . In this view of the matter, I find no ground for interference by this Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 18. There is force in the submissions of the learned Counsel for Respondent No. 3, landlord that the need of the landlord was bona fide and on the point of comparative hardships, the evidence, material on record weighed in favour of the landlord in allowing the release application. I am of the opinion that having regard to the merits, which have been concurrently found in favour of the Respondent No. 3, landlord by the prescribed authority and the appellate court, I should decline to interfere. Substantial justice has been done. The tenants have been using and occupying the building for a meagre amount of Rs. 5 per month as rent for the last more than 51 years and even after the filing of release application and its disposal on 4.2.2002, they had not made efforts to search any alternative accommodation in the growing/expanding city of Lucknow. They cannot be permitted to reside in the house in question forever. 19. The case law cited by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners are not applicable in the present set of circumstances. In the present case, the house in dispute was required for residential purposes only to accommodate the family members of the landlord. Both the courts below have found that the house was bona fidely required for residential purposes and was to be used for this purpose alone. As far as carrying on legal profession and Montessori school is concerned, the landlord had categorically submitted that for the said purpose, house No. 266/522 (already in his occupation) was to be used. In such circumstances, the finding recorded by both the learned courts below that the house in question was needed for residential purposes, cannot be said to be perverse or improper. The case laws cited by the learned Counsel for the tenants, therefore, have no relevance. 20. In such circumstances, the finding recorded by both the learned courts below that the house in question was needed for residential purposes, cannot be said to be perverse or improper. The case laws cited by the learned Counsel for the tenants, therefore, have no relevance. 20. In the present case, both the courts below in respect of comparative hardships have found that the tenants did not make any effort to search an alternative accommodation, hence the balance of hardship laid in favour of the landlord. This finding is in accordance with the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of B.C. Bhutada v. G.R. Mundada 2005 (2) ARC 899. There is no error in the judgments and orders passed by the learned courts below. 21. As far as the submissions of learned Counsel for the Petitioners in respect of requirement of members of the family of landlord is concerned, this Court finds strength from the recent judgments of the Apex Court as in Kailash Chand and Another Vs. Dharam Das, AIR 2005 SC 2362 and Rakesh Vij v. Dr. Raminder Pal Singh Sethi and Ors. (2005) 8 SCC 504 (Three-Judge Bench decisions). The Apex Court in Kailash Chand's case (supra) held as under: Life is not static and so the law cannot afford to be static. The third proviso cannot be so interpreted as to restrict the right conferred by Sub-section (3) (a) (i) on the landlord to be exercisable only "once in a lifetime". The proviso has to be read as providing a statutory expression of a situation which would otherwise have been held to be mala fides of a requirement. A landlord, having obtained possession of any building to satisfy a requirement, cannot again and again plead the same set of circumstances or similar circumstances for evicting tenants one after the other. That is what the third proviso aims at providing. The proviso cannot be interpreted to mean that in spite of the requirement having undergone a change or a new requirement unrelated to the previous one having come into existence, the landlord would yet be denied relief under Sub-section (3) (a) (i) merely because at some point of time in the past he had resorted to this provision for seeking an eviction. Such an interpretation is too rigid an interpretation and would cause such hardship to the landlord as the Legislature cannot be said to have intended. The examples are available in decided cases and two such are Jagir Singh v. Jagdish Pal Sagar (1980) 1 Ren CR 494 (P&H) and Brij Lal Puri and Another Vs. Muni Tandon, AIR 1979 P&H 132 . In Jagir Singh's case, there were five tenants on the ground floor of the premises in dispute and the Respondent filed applications for ejectment against all the tenants simultaneously. Orders of ejectment were passed against all the tenants. Four tenants vacated: the fifth one took his battle to the appellate court. The premises got vacated from the four tenants consisted of five rooms out of which two were very small rooms which could be used only as stores. The entire construction of the house lay in two hundred square yards. The requirement of the landlord was of the ground floor in its entirety and was found to be bona fide as a matter of fact. The contention that the landlord having evicted four other tenants cannot evict the fifth tenant in spite of the proven requirement was rejected by the High Court. 22. The Apex Court in the aforesaid decision has further held that the expression "his own occupation" as occurring in Sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of Sub-section (3) is not to be assigned a narrow meaning. It has to be read liberally and given a practical meaning. "His own occupation" does not mean occupation by the landlord alone and as an individual. The expressions "for his own use" and "for occupation by himself" as occurring in two other Rent Control Acts, have come up for the consideration of this Court in Joginder Pal Vs. Naval Kishore Behal, AIR 2002 SC 2256 and Dwarkaprasad Vs. Niranjan and Another, AIR 2003 SC 2024 . It was held that the requirement of members of the family of the landlord or of the one who is dependent on the landlord, is the landlord's own requirement. Regard will be had to the social or socio-religious milieu and practices prevalent in a particular section of society or a particular region to which the landlord belongs, while interpreting such expressions. The requirement of the family members for residence is certainly the requirement by the landlord for "his own occupation". 23. Regard will be had to the social or socio-religious milieu and practices prevalent in a particular section of society or a particular region to which the landlord belongs, while interpreting such expressions. The requirement of the family members for residence is certainly the requirement by the landlord for "his own occupation". 23. It was further held that the provisions like Section 14(3)(a)(i) of the Act should be so interpreted as to advance the cause of justice instructed by the realities of life and practical wisdom. While the tenants need to be protected, the Courts would not ordinarily deny the relief to the landlord, who genuinely and bona fidely requires the premises in occupation of the tenant for occupation by himself or for the members of his family. 24. The requirement of the members of the family of the landlord or of the one who is dependent on the landlord is the landlord's own requirement. The requirement of an adult son, who has become a practising lawyer and the other grown up children of the landlord, who need adequate space to pursue their studies, cannot be ignored or excluded from consideration. The courts below have rightly appreciated their requirement. 25. For reasons stated hereinabove, this Court is of the opinion that the writ petition is devoid of merit and the same is dismissed. The Petitioner-tenants are directed to vacate the premises in question and hand over its vacant and peaceful possession to the landlord Respondent No. 3 within six weeks from today. An affidavit in respect of the compliance of this order shall be filed by the Petitioners in the Registry of this Court within a month, so that the same may be placed on record. 26. As far as the use and occupation of the premises in question is concerned, the Court has taken note of the fact that the Petitioners were inducted as tenants in 1955 on a monthly rent of Rs. 5, which is no rent in the eye of law in view of Apex Court's decision in Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. Vs. Federal Motors Pvt. Ltd., (2005) 1 SCC 705 . The release application was allowed by the prescribed authority on 4.2.2002 granting one month's time to the tenants to vacate the premises. The litigation is going on for the last five years. Federal Motors Pvt. Ltd., (2005) 1 SCC 705 . The release application was allowed by the prescribed authority on 4.2.2002 granting one month's time to the tenants to vacate the premises. The litigation is going on for the last five years. The premises in question is situate in Bhadewan, a central locality of the city of Lucknow, which would have fetched rent of Rs. 500 to Rs. 1,000 per month had it been rented out in February 2002. In view of this, I direct the Petitioners to pay Rs. 60,000 as arrears of rent to the landlord Respondent No. 3 plus Rs. 25,000 as costs of litigation for dragging the landlord to litigation in the trial court as well as in the appellate court and this Court. Thus a total sum of Rs. 85,000 shall be paid by the Petitioner-tenants to the Respondent No. 3 within two months from today. 27. The operative portion of this judgment and order has already been dictated and passed in open Court in the presence of Sri R. S. Tripathi, learned Counsel for the Petitioner-tenants and Sri Anil Kumar, learned Counsel for landlord-Respondent No. 3, which shall be complied with within the stipulated period.