Judgment :- (Petition under Section 151 of CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed herein, the High Court may be pleased to restrain the 5th respondent from taking any coercive action including detention of the plant and machinery of phase-II of the unit, as contemplated vide letter dated 16-01-2007, duly directing the Respondents to maintain status quo as on date, pending WP No.17416/2006 on the file of the High Court.) G.S. SINGHVI, J. In the main petition, the petitioner has questioned the legality of order dated 17-5-2006, vide which the Central Board of Taxes and Customs (for short ‘the Board’) rejected its prayer for waiver of interest on the customs duty. In the miscellaneous petitions, the applicant-petitioner has prayed for restraining the respondents from taking any coercive action, including detention of plant and machinery, and also direct them to maintain status quo till the decision of the writ petition. In the affidavits filed in support of the applications, the representative of the petitioner, Sri Y. Jithin Kumar, has reiterated the factual matrix of the case and averred that rejection of the petitioner’s application for exemption/waiver of interest by the Board is vitiated by an error of law and is also contrary to the directions given by the High Court in Writ Petition Nos.5635 of 2004 and 7110 of 2005. Arguments on the applicant’s prayer for stay were heard on 30.03.2007 and the case was adjourned to today so as to enable the learned counsel for the petitioner to place on record copy of fresh policy decision issued by the Board. Simultaneously, the Chief Commissioner of Customs and Excise was directed to appear and assist the Court. By a separate order passed today in the main case, we may required the officer concerned to file affidavit to explain the delay for recovery of the public dues from the applicant-petitioner. Shri S. Ravi, learned counsel for the petitioner strongly relied on circulars dated 27-12-1993 and 16-2-2006 issued by the Board and argued that order dated 17-5-2006, which is subject matter of challenge in the writ petition is liable to be annulled on the ground of violation of the guidelines laid down by the Board for waiver of interest in terms of proviso to Section 61(2) of the Customs Act, 1962 (for short, ‘the Act’). Learned counsel also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pratibha Processors v. Union of India ( 1996 (88) ELT 12 ) and argued that the respondents cannot levy interest because the customs duty has not become payable by the petitioner. Shri Ravi emphasized that the petitioner had stored the goods in the private bonded warehouse and, therefore, there was no justification for declining its prayer for waiver of interest. He assailed the reasons recorded in the Board’s order and argued that the view taken by the latter on the issue of public interest is perverse. Shri A. Rajasekhar Reddy, learned Assistant Solicitor General argued that the duty on the goods imported by the petitioner became payable on the date of import and postponement of the payment of duty for a specified period does not entitle the petitioner to claim waiver of interest as of right. Shri Reddy emphasized that the petitioner has not paid customs duty on the goods on the pretext that the same were stored in the private warehouse and argued that after expiry of the time limit prescribed for keeping the goods in the bounded warehouse, the department is entitled to levy interest. Shri Reddy referred to Section 25 (2) of the Act and relied on the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in M. Jhangir Bhatusha v. Union of India (1989 Supp (2) SCC 201) and argued that in exercise of its power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot go into the adequacy or insufficiency of the reasons recorded by the Board for declining the petitioner’s prayer for waiver of interest. Learned counsel emphasized that the reasons assigned by the Board for declining the petitioner’s prayer for waiver of interest are legally correct and the mere fact that the Court has admitted the writ petition cannot justify grant of interim relief in terms of the prayer made. He submitted that the petitioner has used the Court mechanism for the last six years to avoid the payment of duty and interest and, therefore, its prayer for interim relief should be rejected. We have given serious thought to the entire matter. Since the rule nisi has already been issued, it is reasonable to take the view that the petitioner has been able to make out an arguable case. We have given serious thought to the entire matter. Since the rule nisi has already been issued, it is reasonable to take the view that the petitioner has been able to make out an arguable case. However, that by itself is not sufficient for entertaining the applicant’s pray for stay and restraining the respondents from taking action in accordance with law. It is trite to say that while deciding an application for stay, injunction or other interim relief, the court must feel convinced that the petitioner has been able to make out a prima facie case and the factors like balance of convenience, irreparable injury are in his favour. In cases involving adjudication of challenge to the vires of a statute relating the levy, collection or recovery of tax, fees, cess etc. and the decision taken by the public authorities declining the prayer for exemption/waiver from payment of tax etc., the Court has to satisfy itself not only about the existence of the above noted three factors, but also that it will be in public interest to restrain the authority concerned from enforcing the provisions of law and/or effecting recovery of tax, fees, cess etc. Only in very exceptional cases, the court would be justified in passing an interlocutory order, which may have the effect of postponing the implementation of the law enacted by the legislature or its delegate. Likewise, in very exceptional circumstances, the court would be justified in stalling the recovery of public dues/revenue in the form of tax, cess etc. or preventing an authority from doing its duty to the public at large by effectively implementing the law relating to levy, collection and recovery of tax etc. In such cases, the elements of balance of convenience and irreparable injury are against the grant of stay. We shall now consider whether the petitioner has been able to make out a case of exceptional nature for restraining the respondents from taking steps to recover the public dues. A perusal of the record shows that the present writ petition is the third round of litigation by the petitioner in the matter of its claim for waiver of interest in terms of proviso to Section 61(2). A perusal of the record shows that the present writ petition is the third round of litigation by the petitioner in the matter of its claim for waiver of interest in terms of proviso to Section 61(2). The question whether the reasons assigned by the Board in its order dated 17-5-2006 are legally tenable or whether the order under challenge suffers from an error of law, will be decided at the time of final adjudication of the writ petition. If the writ petition is finally allowed, the Court may quash the Board’s decision and direct re-consideration of the petitioner’s prayer for waiver of interest. In that event, the Board will have to reconsider the entire matter and decide the issue of waiver of interest afresh. Even if the Court, instead of remanding the case to the Board, accepts the petitioner’s plea for waiver of interest, it is quite possible that direction may be given for adjustment of the amount of interest against other dues payable by the petitioner. It is also possible that after hearing the parties, the Court may dismiss the writ petition. All this lies in the realm of speculation. At the cost of repetition, we deem it proper to observe that admission of the writ petition is sufficiently indicative of the existence of prima facie case in favour of the petitioner. However, we are convinced that the elements of irreparable injury and balance of convenience are clearly against the grant of stay. If the petitioner is required to pay interest of amount of customs duty, it can be adequately compensated at the time of final adjudication. Therefore, the injury, if any, caused to the petitioner by refusal of stay cannot be treated as an irreparable injury. As against this, if the respondents are further prevented from enforcing the provisions of law, the revenue will not only suffer irreparable injury, but this will also be against the public interest. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that in business parlance, the manufacturer always passes on the burden of taxes to the wholesaler and wholesaler passes the burden of tax to the retailer. In turn, the retailer passes the burden on the consumer. Therefore, elements of irreparable injury and balance of convenience are clearly against the grant of stay. The element of public interest also is not in favour of staying the action initiated by the respondents. In turn, the retailer passes the burden on the consumer. Therefore, elements of irreparable injury and balance of convenience are clearly against the grant of stay. The element of public interest also is not in favour of staying the action initiated by the respondents. An order of injunction by the Court, which has the effect of stultifying recovery of public dues by taking coercive action, otherwise will be highly detrimental to the interest of the public at large. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Pratibha Processors v. Union of India (supra) is clearly distinguishable because in that case, the Supreme Court found that the duty had not become payable and held that in such situation interest cannot be levied. In the case before us, the customs duty became payable as soon as the goods entered the territory of India and the payment was only postponed for the specified period. In M. Jhangir Bhatusha v. Union of India (supra), the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court interpreted Section 25(2) of the Act, which is somewhat similar to the proviso to Section 61(2) and held: “The power conferred on the Central Government under Section 25(2) of the Act is to be exercised by it in its subjective satisfaction. The government must be satisfied that it is necessary in the public interest to pass a special exemption order. The exercise of the power is controlled by the requirement in sub-section (2) that the exemption order must contain a statement stating the circumstances of an exceptional nature under which the special exemption order has been considered necessary. The requirement is intended by the statute to ensure that the satisfaction of the Central Government concerning the necessity of the order is not reached arbitrarily but flows from material relevant to the object for which the power has been conferred.” For the reasons stated above, the petitioner’s prayer for stay is declined and the WPMPs. Are dismissed.