JUDGMENT Deepak Gupta, J.—This order shall dispose of all these connected matters since a common question of law is involved in all the petitions. 2. The only question raised in these 11 writ petitions is:— Whether "Timber" and "Converted Timber" are two separate commodities under the H.P Value Added Tax Act, 2005 ( H.P VAT Act). 3. To appreciate the contentions of the petitioners, it would be appropriate to refer to certain taxation provisions previously applicable in the State of H.P The H.P General Sales Tax Act, 1968 (H.P GST Act) came into force on 1st April, 1969. Section 2(11) was introduced in the Act on 2nd May, 1977 and was deemed to have been incorporated in the Act from its inception. Section 2(11) defines timber as follows:— “‘timber’ includes trees when they have fallen or have been felled or agreed to be felled and all wood whether cut up or fashioned or hollowed out for any purpose or not." 4. Section 6 of the Act provides for the various rates of Sales Tax which could be levied by the Government and it provided that normally the tax should not exceed 10%. However, the proviso to sub-section 6 provides that a higher rate not exceeding 15% may be levied on goods specified in Schedule-A except items No. 24 and 34 which were liable to pay tax at the rate of 30%. Items No. 34 and 35 of the Schedule-A read as follows:— "34. [Timber but not including converted Timber]. 35. [Converted Timber]." 5. It is not disputed that timber was taxed at the rate of 30% whereas converted timber was taxed at the rate of 12% as long as H.P GST Act remained in force in the State of H.P The H.P GST Act was repealed and replaced by the H.P VAT Act which came into force on 1st April, 2005. In this Act, the definition of timber in Section 2(zb) is identical to the definition given in the H.P GST Act quoted above. Under this Act, the State has the power to. levy tax at various rates on different goods as set out in the Schedule and also to exempt specified goods from payment of tax as per Schedule A, B, C and D. All other goods are liable to pay tax @ 12%. Under this Act, the State has the power to. levy tax at various rates on different goods as set out in the Schedule and also to exempt specified goods from payment of tax as per Schedule A, B, C and D. All other goods are liable to pay tax @ 12%. In Part V of Schedule A to the Act, which lists the goods taxable at 30%, item No. 2 is timber (excluding converted timber). Thus even after the VAT was imposed there were two different rates of tax on timber i.e. 12.5 % on converted timber and 30% on timber excluding converted timber. Thereafter Schedule to the Act was amended and timber was also made leviable to tax at the rate of 12.5%. As such, the distinction between timber and converted timber was removed and the same were both taxed at the same rate. This notification was issued on 21.6.2005. The State also amended the rules on 7.12.2005 and the Schedule of input tax restricted goods wag amended and the benefit of input tax was restricted to timber alone. Thereafter, respondent No. 3 issued notices under the VAT Act to the petitioners asking them to deposit the tax and denying them the benefit of credit claim of the input tax. 6. We have heard Shri M.M. Khanna; learned senior Counsel for the petitioners as well as Shri M.S.Chandel, learned Advocate General for the respondents. The main ground of attack is that unconverted timber and converted timber are two separate commodities and the State Government may be directed to treat the same as such with a further direction that the converted timber does not fall within the purview of Schedule-A of the Schedule of the restricted item and as such entitled for benefit of input tax credit under the Act. 7. The argument raised by the petitioners is without any merit. Both under the H.P. VAT Act and H.P. GST Act, timber has one single definition and includes converted timber. However, while fixing the rates of tax, two separate rates were provided for timber and converted timber. Higher incidence of tax was payable on timber (excluding converted timber) and a lower rate on converted timber. However, this does not mean that timber and converted timber were two separate commodities. It was only one commodity which had been divided in two categories for fixing the rate of tax. Higher incidence of tax was payable on timber (excluding converted timber) and a lower rate on converted timber. However, this does not mean that timber and converted timber were two separate commodities. It was only one commodity which had been divided in two categories for fixing the rate of tax. In any event, the difference, if any, between the two which existed prior to the amendment of the Act has totally ceased to exist. Now, there is only one definition of timber and one rate of tax. The legislature has the power to define different commodities and to levy different taxes. It cannot be said that the amendments are in any way illegal or violative of any law. In fact, no challenge to the same has been made on this count in these writ petitions. The respondent cannot be directed by this Court to treat timber and converted timber as different commodities especially when the definition of timber includes both timber and converted timber. 8. There can be many examples of the same commodity being divided into different categories for the purpose of levying tax. For example, steel strips are one commodity but the Government may levy tax on steel strips depending upon the thickness of the strips. Similarly, a cigarette is one commodity but the State can levy different rates of tax or excise duty on cigarettes depending upon the length of the cigarettes. The mere fact that the commodities have been sub-divided for the purpose of fixing the rate of tax into different categories does not mean that the single commodity becomes more than one commodity. In view of the above discussion, we are of the considered view that the contention of the petitioners that timber and converted timber are two separate commodities is devoid of any merit. There is no merit in these petitions and the same are accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. CMPs No. 2155, 2156, 2157, 2159, 2260, 2161, 2164 of 2006 and 143, 144, 145 and 146 of 2007 In view of the orders passed in the main matter, the stay order stands vacated. All the CMPs are disposed of. Petition dismissed. -