Judgment: This writ petition has been preferred for issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari to quash the impugned order dated 31-7-2006 passed by the respondent no. 1 in Rent Control Case No.8 of 1999. The petitioner has further prayed for mandamus of this Court directing the respondent no. 1 to allow the application of the petitioner under Order 1, Rule 10 of the C.P.C. and to give him sufficient opportunity for contesting the case No.8 of 1999 Smt. Pramila Abraham Vs. Vijai Bhatt. 2. Relevant facts giving rise to the present petition are that the petitioner is one of the tenants of the disputed premises. The respondent no. 2 being the landlord of the suit property filed an application under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P.Act No. 13 of 1972 (for short the Act) for release of the accommodation on the ground of bona fide need. The application of the respondent-applicant was registered as PA Case NO.8 of 1999, Julien Abraham Vs. Sri Vijai Bhatt before the Prescribed Authority. The opposite party filed his written statement before the Prescribed Authority and in paragraph no. 19, it was mentioned to the effect "the application is bad for non joinder of the other heirs of Late Sri L.M. Bhatt the original tenant." It is alleged by the petitioner that when the petitioner came to know of the fact that he is a necessary party and he has not been impleaded in the proceeding as a defendant, the petitioner moved application under Order 1, Rule 10(2) of the C.PC. read with Section 3(a) and 3(g) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, copy of which is annexed as Annexure NO.3 to the writ petition. In this application, it was alleged that the original landlord had rented the suit premises to the father of the applicant Sri L.M. Bhatt and, after the death of his father, the applicant is also a legal tenant along with the legal heirs of the deceased tenant. The petitioner has also alleged that the landlord concealing the real facts moved the release application only against the O.P. Vijai Bhatt. The application of the petitioner was taken up for hearing on 6.7.2006. The application was taken on record. The opposite party sought adjournment of the case, which was allowed. The petitioner has also alleged that the landlord concealing the real facts moved the release application only against the O.P. Vijai Bhatt. The application of the petitioner was taken up for hearing on 6.7.2006. The application was taken on record. The opposite party sought adjournment of the case, which was allowed. The Prescribed Authority has fixed 14.7.2006 for disposal of the application as well as for arguments in the case and opportunity to file rejoinder was given to the landlord. Aggrieved by that order, the petitioner came up before this Court in Writ Petition No. 891 (MS) of 2006. The grievance of the petitioner was that the learned Prescribed Authority was not justified to fix the case for argument without disposing of the application for impleadment. This Court has however directed the Prescribed Authority to dispose of the application of the petitioner by a reasoned order vide order dated 13-07-2006. On 21-7-2006, the petitioner moved application before the Prescribed Authority (paper no. 87 -C) for adjournment on the ground that he could not produce the copy of the order passed by the High Court. The application was allowed and the case was fixed for 25-7 -2006. Again on that date, application for adjournment was moved by the petitioner, which was allowed on payment of costs of Rs. 2001- fixing 27-7-2006 in the case. The proposed applicant-petitioner and his counsel did not appear in the case, therefore, the Prescribed Authority passed order to proceed ex-parte against the petitioner. However, the petitioner filed the copy of the order dated 13-7-2006 passed by the High Court on 28-7-2006 and prayed for recall of the order dated 27-7-2006 vide application 89-C. The Prescribed Authority after hearing the landlord and petitioner recalled the order dated 27-7-2006 and after considering the material on record found that the petitioner had not mentioned anywhere in his application that he had been ordinarily living with his father at the time of his death. There is also no mention that the petitioner had ever paid the rent of the suit premises after the death of his father. The tenant Vijai Bhatt in his written statement paper no. 28-C had mentioned that he had sent money order to the landlord, but the same was refused therefore he used to make deposit under Section 30 of the Act. The tenant Vijai Bhatt in his written statement paper no. 28-C had mentioned that he had sent money order to the landlord, but the same was refused therefore he used to make deposit under Section 30 of the Act. The Prescribed Authority has relied upon the law laid down by the Apex Court in the Case of Harish Tandon Vs. Additional District Magistrate Allahabad and others [1995, Supreme Court &FB Rent Cases, Page 123J and ultimately dismissed the application of the petitioner for impleadment vide order dated 31-72006, impugned in this writ petition. 3. I have heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused the material on record including the counter affidavit and the rejoinder affidavit field by the parties. 4. The main grounds on which the impugned order has been assailed are that the application of the respondent no. 2 for release of the accommodation is not maintainable for non-joinder of necessary party and that under the definition given in Section 3(a) and 3(g) of the said Act, the petitioner had a right to contest the proceedings and he ought to have been impleaded as an opposite party to the case. 5. Counter affidavit has been filed by the landlady through her Power of Attorney Holder Smt. Saroj Shipley and therein it has been stated that the application for impleadment was filed in collusion with his brother the opposite party-respondent no. 3 only to delay the proceedings. 6. In the rejoinder affidavit in paragraph no. 6 it has been stated that the petitioner was expecting that he will be impleaded as defendant. The stand raised in the rejoinder affidavit is that the petitioner was residing in the disputed accommodation with his father and also along with the other family members. It may be noted that in the application, paper no. 82-C the petitioner has raised a general plea that after the death of their father, his legal hears, who are family members, were residing with the original tenant and have become tenants. The petitioner could not dare state in the application as to how he used to reside with the original tenant in the disputed accommodation and as to how and in what manner he is in occupation of the disputed premises after the death of his father. The petitioner could not dare state in the application as to how he used to reside with the original tenant in the disputed accommodation and as to how and in what manner he is in occupation of the disputed premises after the death of his father. Even the Opposite Party-Vijay Bhatt has no where stated• in the written statement that he used to deposit the rent of the disputed accommodation under Section 30 of the Act in the joint capacity of all the legal heirs of deceased tenant L.M. Bhatt. The petitioner could not make any reference regarding the payment of rent by Vijai Bhatt on behalf of all the joint tenants. It is significant to mention that in para no. 14 of the application for release, allegation was made by the landlady that the opposite party is not residing in the said disputed house of the applicant, instead he used to allow students as well as visitors in season. A as such he has no need of the house let out to him. The tenant Vijai Bhatt in reply to 14 has stated in the written statement that the O.P. has his chamber in the premises in dispute and also his residence and he resides there and does his practice from the premises in suit. No where it has been indicated that besides the Opposite Party Vijai Bhatt any other member legal heir of the deceased tenant used to reside in the disputed premises at any point of time. Moreover, there is no reference at all of the applicant Pankaj Bhatt in the written statement filed by the tenant Vijai Bhatt. Therefore, on the face of record, it cannot be said that the applicant Pankaj Bhatt had been normally residing with the deceased tenant at the time of his death. 7. The most relevant aspect of this case which goes to the root of the matter is that from a bare perusal of the record it is evident that the application for release of accommodation was filed by the respondent no. 2 against the tenant Vijai Bhatt in the year 1999, which was registered as Rent Control Case No.8 of 1999 and ever since its inception, the proceedings of the case were going on. 2 against the tenant Vijai Bhatt in the year 1999, which was registered as Rent Control Case No.8 of 1999 and ever since its inception, the proceedings of the case were going on. Admittedly the written statement was filed in the case by the tenant Vijai Bhatt as back as 3-6-2002 and in paragraph 19, the tenant had stated that "application is bad for non-joinder of the other heirs of late Sri L.M. Bhatt the original tenant." It is very interesting that the tenant- O.P. had taken this stand in the additional pleas of the written statement but he never thought it necessary to disclose the details of other heirs of Late Sri L.M. Bhatt and as to how they were on the same footing as the O.P. tenant. Not only this, the petitioner had disclosed in his application that his brother Vijai Bhatt had taken a plea in paragraph no. 19 of his written statement that the suit is bad for non-joinder of other heirs of late Sri L.M. Bhatt, but what has prevented the petitioner to come forward before the Court for such a long time from 3-6-2002 till 6-7-2006. Thus, the petitioner had kept silence for more that four years in the matter and he came before the Court when the case was at the stage of arguments. 8. A part from above, the contesting tenant-opposite party Vijai Bhatt has not come up before this Court in Writ Petition having been aggrieved by the impugned order dated 31-7-2006 because the learned Prescribed Authority has held that there is no need to array all the joint tenants as party to the proceedings. Moreover, from a complete reading of the application for impleadment moved by the petitioner, it is clear that the applicant has no where stated that the application for release had been filed by the landlady with collusion with his brother and that could have been a ground for moving the impleadment application, but no such plea had been raised worth the name in the application paper no. 82-C. 9. 82-C. 9. Definition of the word "tenant" is given in Section 3(a) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 as under: "tenant" in relation to a building, means a person by whom rent is payable, and on the tenant's death: (1) in the case of a residential building, such only of his heirs as normally resided with him in the building at the time of his death; (2) in the case of a non-residential building, his heirs." 10. Admittedly, in the instant case the disputed premises is a residential building. It is also not under challenge that the rent is being deposited by the tenant Vijai Bhatt under Section 30 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 in his personal capacity. 11 . The first point for determination is as to what would be status of the heirs of tenant who have been residing with the tenant at the time of his death and would they be termed as tenants in common or their status would be that of joint tenants? The second point to be considered is as to what would be the fate of decree obtained in an eviction suit in which only some of the heirs of deceased tenants have been made party and whether such decree shall have binding effect upon the other heirs of the deceased tenant who were not impleaded in the suit? In the instant case, during the course of trial, one of the heirs of the deceased tenant had filed application for impleadment, therefore, the above questions are to be determined in this premises. 12. In the case of Mohd. Azeem Vs. District Judge, ALigarh and others [1985(2) A.R. C. 85 (Supreme Court), it was held that "all the heirs as normally reside with the deceased tenant in the building at the time of his death become tenants. The definition does not warrant the view that all the heirs will become a body of tenants to give rise to the concept of joint tenancy. Each heir satisfying the further qualification in Section 3(a) (1) of the Act in his own right becomes a tenant and when we come to Section 12(3) of the Act, the words "the tenant or any member of his family" will refer to the heir who has become a tenant under the statutory definition and members of his family." 13. Each heir satisfying the further qualification in Section 3(a) (1) of the Act in his own right becomes a tenant and when we come to Section 12(3) of the Act, the words "the tenant or any member of his family" will refer to the heir who has become a tenant under the statutory definition and members of his family." 13. However, in the case of H. C. Pandey Vs. G. C. Paul [1989(2) ARC 26 (SC)J, it was held that "it is now well settled that on the death of the original tenant, subject to any provision to the contrary either negativing or limiting the succession, the tenancy rights devolve on the heirs of the deceased tenant. The incidence of the tenancy are the same as those enjoyed by the original tenant. It is a single tenancy, which devolves on the heirs. There is no division of the premises or of the rent payable therefore. That is the position as between the landlord and the heirs of the deceased tenant. In other words, the heirs succeed to the tenancy as joint tenants". 14. Further in the case of Harish Tandon Vs. Additional District Magistrate, Allahabad, U.P. and others [AIR 1995, Supreme Court, Page 676J, the Apex Court has approved the principles of law as laid down in the case of H. C. Pandey (supra) and it was held that "the framers of the Act have clearly expressed their intention in Sections 12, 20 and 25 while protecting the tenant from eviction except on the grounds mentioned in Section 20, that after the death of the original tenant his heirs will be deemed to be holding premises as joint tenants and for any breach committed by any of such joint tenants, all the heirs of the original tenant have to suffer. They cannot take a plea that unless the grounds for eviction mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 20 are established individually against each one of them, they cannot be evicted from the premises in question." 15. In the case Mohammad Parvez and others Vs. VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate/Prescribed Authority, Kanpur Nagar and others [1996 (1 ) AR.C. Page 439] it was held that after the death of tenant, his heirs would be joint tenants. The same view was taken in the case of Smt. Anju Sharma Vs. In the case Mohammad Parvez and others Vs. VII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate/Prescribed Authority, Kanpur Nagar and others [1996 (1 ) AR.C. Page 439] it was held that after the death of tenant, his heirs would be joint tenants. The same view was taken in the case of Smt. Anju Sharma Vs. Suresh Chand Jain and other, [1993 (1) ARC 291] and Smt. Usha Rani Vs. Prescribed Authority/Munsif, Roorkee, District Haridwar and others [1998 (16) LCD, Page 1169].- 16. Thus, from the above discussion, it is clear that after the death of tenant, his heir gets the status of joint tenants and not tenants in common. First Point is answered accordingly. 17. So far as the second point whether the suit decreed against some of the joint tenants would be binding upon other joints is concerned, it was held in the case Harish Tandon (supra) that for any breach committed by any joint tenant, all the heirs of the original• tenant have to suffer. It was held in the case of Anju Sharma (supra) that the decree passed against joint tenant cannot be challenged by other heirs of deceased tenant on the ground that they were not impleaded in the suit. In the case of Mohammad Parvez and others (supra), it was held by the Aliahabad High Court that "in any proceeding when a joint tenant is impleaded as a party in the case, he represents the interest of all the joint tenants unless it is shown that such joint tenant colluded with the landlord or such other person who contested the matter. There is a presumption that a joint tenant represents the interest of all other tenants." 18. From the aforesaid propositions of law, it can safely be inferred that the decree passed against joint tenant, would bind other heirs of the deceased tenant, though they were not impleaded in the suit. Now, it has to be considered whether the impleadment application filed by one other joint tenants, who is heir of the deceased tenant, should be rejected merely on the ground that the decree passed against other joint tenants would be binding on him or such application for impleadment would be liable to be allowed on the ground of property party to the suit? 19. In Surayya Begum (Mst) Vs. Mohd. Usman and others with Renu Sharma & another Vs. 19. In Surayya Begum (Mst) Vs. Mohd. Usman and others with Renu Sharma & another Vs. Raghbir Kaur Bhatia (Mrs.) and others [(1991) 3 SCC 114] a similar controversy was considered by the Apex Court. In Renu Sharma's case, after death of tenant, a suit for eviction was filed by the landlord against some of the joint tenants and decree for eviction was passed. In execution, rest of the joint tenants, who were not impleaded in the suit, filed objection, inter alia, on the grounds that they have independent title in the tenancy and the decree obtained against the other members of family would not be binding on them. It was held that the principle of representation of the interest of a person, not impleaded by name in a judicial proceeding, through a named party is not unknown. It was further held that "this, of course, is subject to the essential condition that interest of a person concerned has really been represented by the others; in other words, his interest has been looked after in a bona fide manner. If there be any clash of interests between the person concerned and his assumed representative or if the latter due to collusion or for any other reason, mala fide neglects to defend the case, he cannot be considered to be a representative. The issue, when it becomes relevant, has, therefore, to be answered with reference to the facts and circumstances of the individual case. There may be instances in which the position is absolutely clear beyond any reasonable doubt one way or the other and the question can be settled without any difficulty; but in other cases the" issue may have to be decided with reference to relevant evidence to be led by the parties. Surayya Begum's case is of this class while Renu Sharma's appeal belongs to the first category.'" 20. It was held that the joint tenants, who were not impleaded as a party in the eviction suit, were effectively represented by the named judgment debtor. It is note worthy to mention that the law laid down in the case Textile Association (India) Bombay Unit V. Balmohan Gopal Kurup [AIR, 1990, Supreme Court, 2053Jwas relied upon by the landlord in the case of Renu Sharma (supra). 21. In the case of Shkuntala Vasant Pahadi and others Vs. It is note worthy to mention that the law laid down in the case Textile Association (India) Bombay Unit V. Balmohan Gopal Kurup [AIR, 1990, Supreme Court, 2053Jwas relied upon by the landlord in the case of Renu Sharma (supra). 21. In the case of Shkuntala Vasant Pahadi and others Vs. Purushottam Vasant Pethe and others [(2007) 3 Supreme Court Cases, 123] a similar controversy came up for consideration. The appellants before the Apex Court filed a suit in the year 1977 for eviction impleading therein wife of one Vasant Pethe, who was the original tenant and had died prior to filing of the suit. The suit was decreed against the wife of Vasant Pethe and decree passed by the trial court was confirmed and the same attained finality. The decree holder moved execution application. During pendency of execution proceeding, children of Vas ant Pethe filed another suit in the year 1987, challenging the validity or otherwise of the decree passed in eviction suit filed in the year 1977 on the ground that at the time of death of their father who was the original tenant, they were minors and they along with their mother were residing in the rented premises, as such were necessary parties in the said eviction suit and they having not been made parties, the decree of such suit was not binding upon them. The said suit was dismissed by the trial court and the decree of the trial court was confirmed in appeal. The plaintiffs filed writ petition in the High Court challenging the judgments rendered by the two courts below. By the impugned order, the High Court allowed the writ petition and set aside the judgments rendered by the trial court as well as the appellate court and decreed the suit on the sole ground that the plaintiffs who were some of the heirs of the original tenant Vasant Pethe, were not impleaded in the eviction suit along with their mother. The High Court further held that the eviction decree passed therein was not binding upon them. The High Court further held that the eviction decree passed therein was not binding upon them. Relying on the Surayya Begum (supra), the Apex Court has held that "in the absence of any allegation and proof against the mother, showing collusion with the landlord or mala fide neglecting the interest of her sons i.e. the plaintiffs, present case is squarely covered by the aforesaid decision of this Court, as such the High Court was not justified in decreeing the suit." 22. Point No.2 is therefore answered accordingly. 23. In the case at hand, the stand of the petitioner for his impleadment in the case is that after the death of his father, he being legal heir of the deceased has become a legal tenant and he may be impleaded as a party and for want of impleadment of all the legal heirs of the deceased, release application filed by the landlady against one of the joint tenants is not maintainable. The petitioner has nowhere in his application filed before the trial court stated that he was ordinarily residing with the deceased tenant at the time of his death. In absence of such plea it could not be presumed that he was so residing with the deceased tenant and thereby it can not be presumed that he became joint tenant after the death of the original tenant. Moreover, it is not the case of the petitioner that he ever paid rent to the landlord. A prudent person will give definite statement of the manner in which he had been in occupation of the premises with regard to his education, profession, training, etc. Petitioner could not dispose anywhere in the application as to what he had been doing while normally residing with his father and after his death in the disputed premises. In the application (paper no. 82-C) the petitioner did not think it proper to disclose his profession while giving his address. Since the release application was filed against Sri Vijai Bhatt, he has been contesting the application. It is also not the allegation of the petitioner that Sri Vijai Bhatt has colluded with the landlord or Sri Vijai Bhatt is guilty of mala fide neglecting his interest as a tenant. Since the release application was filed against Sri Vijai Bhatt, he has been contesting the application. It is also not the allegation of the petitioner that Sri Vijai Bhatt has colluded with the landlord or Sri Vijai Bhatt is guilty of mala fide neglecting his interest as a tenant. In the absence of such a case, even if for the sake of argument it is presumed that the petitioner is a joint tenant, (although as stated it is not mentioned in his application for impleadment before the trial court that he was ordinarily residing with the deceased tenant at the time of his death), the petitioner may not be allowed to be impleaded as a party to the suit at the fag end of trial. 24. It is true that the release application under Section 21 (1)(a) of the Act is still pending, but one of the essential attribute of joint tenancy is that a joint represents the interest of other joint tenants. As stated earlier, neither there is any averment of collusion between the landlord and Sri Vijai Bhatt nor it has been alleged that Sri Vijai Bhatt is mala fidely negligent in protecting the interest of the petitioner, therefore the petitioner cannot be impleaded as party to the proceedings. Prescribed Authority has rightly rejected the application for impleadment moved by the petitioner by the impugned order. There is no perversity or infirmity in the impugned order passed by the Prescribed Authority. The order under challenge, therefore, does not call for any interference by this Court in this writ petition. 25. The writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. 26. The interim order dated 5-8-2006 is vacated.