Chidananda Ullal, J. JUDGMENT This writ appeal is directed against the order dated 11-11-2005 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition No. 20439 of 2005 (L-WC) (Hayath Khan v Deputy Labour Commissioner, Regional Office, Belgaum and Others). In doing that, the learned Single Judge of this Court had dismissed the writ petition of the appellant. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the appellant-petitioner was running a motor-cycle repair shop under the name and style 'Best Service Centre'. The respondent 2 inspected the shop of the appellant on 18-7-2003 and reported that the appellant did employ a child labour in his shop and hence, he had registered a case for contravention of Section 3 of the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986 and issued a show-cause notice to the appellant calling upon him to show cause as to why compensation should not be recovered from him. He had also registered a criminal case against him. Before the respondent 1, the appellant had also filed an application seeking permission of the respondent 1 to cross-examine the respondent 2 with regard to his report. That application was allowed and the appellant had filed his written argument before the respondent 1. 3. That the respondent 1 had passed an order imposing compensation of Rs. 20,000/- as against the appellant and further directed him to deposit the said sum with the District Child Labour Rehabilitation and Welfare Fund vide order dated 31-3-2005, copy at Annexure-G to writ petition. Furthermore, a recovery notice dated 30-7-2005 was also issued to the appellant by the respondent 3 notifying him that a sum of Rs. 20,000/- would be recovered by way of land revenue since the appellant did not pay the same. 4. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the respondent 1 dated 31-3-2005 and the recovery notice issued by the respondent 3 dated 30-7 -2005 the petitioner-appellant filed writ petition before this Court. 5. Since the writ petition of the appellant-petitioner came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge of this Court as stated above, he is in appeal before us challenging the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 6. 5. Since the writ petition of the appellant-petitioner came to be dismissed by the learned Single Judge of this Court as stated above, he is in appeal before us challenging the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 6. The learned Counsel for the appellant (petitioner in the W.PJ Sri Sheelvant had addressed argument as hereunder: (1) At the outset he argued that under the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986, there is no provision to hold an enquiry and award compensation of Rs. 20,000/- to be paid and deposited in District Child Rehabilitation Welfare Fund; (2) The learned Counsel had also argued that the learned Single Judge had failed to notice that the respondent 1 did not follow principles of natural justice to pass the order to say that the appellant has to pay a fat compensation of Rs. 20,000/- to be deposited with the District Child Rehabilitation Welfare Fund, for the respondent 2 did not submit himself for cross-examination despite the application thereto filed by the appellant was allowed by the respondent 1. 7. Therefore, according to Sri Sheelvant, the proceedings before the respondent 1 ought to have culminated in a favourable order in favour of the appellant. To conclude, Sri Sheelvant had also argued rather vehemently that until and unless the appellant is held guilty of the offence by the jurisdictional Magistrate, fixing the liability to pay the compensation would not have been passed as against the appellant-petitioner. 8. In this appeal, the earlier Division Bench of this Court presided by Hon'ble HLDJ and Hon'ble HLDJ had directed Prof. Ravivarma Kumar, learned Senior Counsel to take notice in the appeal and to assist the Court as Amicus Curiae. In view of the above, we also heard the learned Amicus Curiae, Sri Ravivarma Kumar. He made the following submissions: (1) That the original order passed by the respondent 1 is in compliance with the direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M. C. Mehta v State of Tamil Nadu and Others. He had pointedly drawn our attention to para 27 of the said judgment, which reads as follows.- "It may be that the problem would be taken care of to some extent by insisting on compulsory education. Indeed, Neera thinks that if there is at all a blue print for tackling the problem of child labour, it is education. He had pointedly drawn our attention to para 27 of the said judgment, which reads as follows.- "It may be that the problem would be taken care of to some extent by insisting on compulsory education. Indeed, Neera thinks that if there is at all a blue print for tackling the problem of child labour, it is education. Even if it were to be so, the child of a poor parent would not receive education, if per force it has to earn to make the family meet both the ends. Therefore, unless the family is assured of income aliunde, problem of child labour would hardly get solved; and it is this vital question which has remained almost unattended. We are, however, of the view that till an alternative income is assured to the family, the question of abolition of child labour would really remain a will-o-the wisp. Now, if employment of child below that age of 14 is a constitutional induction insofar as work in any factory or mine or engagement in other hazardous work, and if it has to be seen that all children are given education till the age of 14 r years in view of this being a fundamental right now, and if the wish embodied in Article 39(e) that the tender age of children is not abused and citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter avocation unsuited to their age, and, if children are to be given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and childhood is to be protected against exploitation as visualised by Article 39(f), it seems to us that the least we ought to do is see to the fulfilment of legislative intendment behind enactment of the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986. Taking guidance therefrom, we are of the view that the offending employer must be asked to pay compensation for every child employed in contravention of the provisions of the Act a sum of Rs, 20,000/-; and the Inspectors, whose appointment is visualised by Section 17 to secure compliance with the provisions of the Act, should do this job. The inspectors appointed under Section 17 would see that for each child employed in violation of the provisions of the Act, the concerned employer pays Rs. 20,000/- which sum could be deposited in a fund to be known as Child Labour Rehabilitation-cum-Welfare Fund. The inspectors appointed under Section 17 would see that for each child employed in violation of the provisions of the Act, the concerned employer pays Rs. 20,000/- which sum could be deposited in a fund to be known as Child Labour Rehabilitation-cum-Welfare Fund. The liability of the employer would not cease even if he would desire to disengage the child presently employed. It would perhaps be appropriate to have such a fund district wise or area wise. The fund so generated shall form corpus whose income shall be used only for the concerned child. The quantum could be the income earned on the corpus deposited qua the child. To generate greater income, fund can be deposited in high yielding scheme of any nationalised Bank or other public body". (2) That conviction of an employer under the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986 is not a precondition for enforcing civil liability; to buttress that limb of his argument, Sri Ravivarma Kumar had relied upon the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Anil Kumar Agarwal v Assistant Labour Commissioner, Mathura and Others. He had drawn our attention to para 7 thereof. We extract para 7 thereof and the same is as hereunder: "7. Right against exploitation is guaranteed by Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution. Article 39(f) casts a duty upon the State to direct its policy towards securing that children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner and conditions of freedom and dignity and that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment. Infringement of fundamental right guaranteed by Article 24, it seems, is a tort which is actionable per se, that is without proof of actual damage and consent by the child and/or his parents is no defence and if right to education is a fundamental right, State is equally liable to pay compensation for not providing free education to children, upto the age of 14 years belonging to weaker section of society. There is no denying the fact that the laudable constitutional objectives aforestated were sought to be achieved by the Supreme Court in the manner indicated in the case of M.C. Mehta v State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1997 SC 699 , but the principle of law well-settled is that no man should be condemned unheard and therefore, it follows that before, an employer is asked to pay compensation, he must be given reasonable opportunity of being heard as against the report submitted by the Inspector for realisation of the compensation at the rate of Rs. 20,000/- per child. The objections if any, filed by the employer on receipt of the show-cause notice must also be reckoned with analytically in a lawful and adjudicatory manner before proceeding to realise the amount of compensation. The imperative function of the Inspector appointed under Section 17 of the Act, is to secure compliance with the provisions of the Act, and see that for each child employed in antagonism of the provisions of the Act, the employer concerned pays Rs. 20,000/-. The position of the Inspector qua the provisions encapsulated in the Act is that of a Prosecutor and it must not be expected of him to discharge the adjudicatory functions. It would have been ideal, if the "appropriate Government" had been proactive in framing the rules and procedure for the enforcement of rights and liabilities arising from large scale infringement of fundamental rights of the children below the age of 14 years as a result of failure to perform public law duty under the Constitution which is sue generis i.e., a class in itself as recognised by the Supreme Court in its judgment in M. C. Mehta's case. In the absence of rules, I find no other judicial alternative forum for adjudication of any dispute arising out of inspection report except the authorities empowered to issue recovery certificates for realisation of the amount of compensation vide G.O. dated 5-6-1998, namely, the Addl./Deputy/Assistant Labour Commissioner who are well-equipped to perform adjudicatory function after notice to the employer to show cause why the recovery certificate for realisation of the amount of compensation at the rate of Rs. 20,000/- per child be not issued. 20,000/- per child be not issued. It cannot be repudiated that Additional/Deputy/Assistant Labour Commissioner appointed for issuance of recovery certificates are independent authorities and being connected with adjudication of labour disputes, it would be within their briefs to decide any controversy such as the controversy whether the child labour is below 14 years and whether the child labour said to have been engaged is pursuing any employment of hazardous nature. In Seth Banarasi Das (deceased) by L.Rs v District Magistrate and Collector Meerut and Others, AIR 1996 SC 2311 : (1996)2 SCC 689 , the Supreme Court held that proceedings for recovery are like execution proceedings and Recovery Officer/Collector too can examine all questions going to the root of liability but since the Government have appointed Additional/Assistant Labour Commissioner to issue recovery certificates, propriety dictates that disputes, if any going to the root of liability be resolved by such officer before issuing the recovery certificates" . 9. Basing his argument on the above said judgment, Sri Ravivarma Kumar had also argued that the respondent 1 had the jurisdiction and competence to pass the order impugned by the appellant before the learned Single Judge. Sri Ravivarma Kumar had also submitted that strict rules of evidence are not applicable for the cases 'pertaining to child labour. He had also argued that the show-cause notice was rightly issued to the appellant by the respondent 1 and therefore it could not be argued by the Counsel for the appellant that no opportunity for filing objections before the respondent 1 was afforded to the appellant and further that no detailed enquiry was necessary before the respondent 1. In support of that submission of his, Sri Ravivanna Kumar had relied on the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Raja Homes Private Limited v State of Madhya Pradesh and Another. The relevant para is para 8 of that judgment which reads as hereunder: "8. .... Considering the nature of the objection raised by the petitioner, no detailed enquiry was necessary as report of the Inspector is prima facie evidence of the facts so found with respect to age if that is disputed of a child labour, then the matter has to be dealt in accordance with Section 10 which situation is not available in the instant case". 10. We have carefully perused the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge. 10. We have carefully perused the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge. The reasons thereto can be culled out as hereunder: (i) That various legislations have been brought into force to arrest child exploitation. That the order imposing payment of compensation of Rs. 20,000/- is in consonance with the decision of the Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta's case'. As we see, the learned Single Judge appears to have drawn inspiration from what came to be ruled by the Supreme Court in para 27 of the judgment extracted by us at para 8 supra. To reiterate the relevant part, the same reads as hereunder: ".... we are of the view that the offending employer must be asked to pay compensation for every child employed in contravention of the provisions of the Act a sum of Rs. 20,000/-; and the Inspectors, whose appointment is visualised by Section 17 to secure compliance with the provisions of the Act, should do this job. The Inspectors appointed under Section 17 would see that for each child employed in violation of the provisions of the Act, the concerned employer pays Rs. 20,000/- which sum could be deposited in a fund to be known as Child Labour Rehabilitation-cum-Welfare Fund". 11. As we noticed, the learned Single Judge had also placed reliance on the reported judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Anil Kumar Agarwal, referred by us at para 6 supra. 12. In this connection it is relevant to observe that under Article 141 of the Constitution of India the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all Courts in India. If that be so, then the learned Single Judge who had passed the orders in the writ petition and we the Judges, now in the Division Bench have to bow our head to the law declared by the Supreme Court and in doing that we are of the considered view that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge hereunder challenge is perfectly in order and in consonance with law declared by the Supreme Court and as such, the same cannot be' interfered with by us in the appeal. 13. In the result, we dismiss this appeal. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we do not want to order costs in the appeal. 14. 13. In the result, we dismiss this appeal. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we do not want to order costs in the appeal. 14. Before concluding, we have to fix the fee of the Amicus Curiae; we fix the same at Rs. 10,000/-. The Registry is directed to cause for payment of the said fee to the Amicus Curiae, at the earliest. 15. In the result, this appeal fails and accordingly is dismissed, with no order as to cost.