JUDGMENT Hon’ble Shri Narayan Shukla, J.—Heard Dr. L.P. Misra, learned Counsel for the petitioners and the learned Standing Counsel for the opposite parties 1 and 2 as well as Mr. Kapil Dev, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. R.K. Chaudhary, learned Counsel for the other respondents. 2. The advertisement dated 24.6.2006 (Annexure No. 1 to the writ petition), whereby the posts of Junior Engineers (Civil) have been advertised by the opposite party No. 3, is under challenge by the petitioners claiming their regularization against the said posts under the U.P. Regularization, of Ad hoc appointments (on posts within the purview of U.P. Cooperative Institutional Service Board) Regulations. 1985 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Regulations, 1985’). 3. Briefly the relevant facts of the case are that since 1994 to 1997 the petitioners were appointed on different dates on the post of Junior Engineers on daily wage basis and subsequently they were paid the consolidated salary approximately Rs. 3500/- per month. On 8.8.2002 an advertisement was issued for regular appointment on the post of Junior Engineers. Being aggrieved with which the petitioner Nos. 1 to 4 approached this Court through writ petition No. 4869 (SS) of 2002. This Court by an interim order dated 6.9.2002 restrained from proceeding with the selection in furtherance of the advertisement impugned therein and issued direction to allow the petitioners to continue on the posts so held by them. Likewise the petitioner Nos. 5, 6 and 7 also filed the writ petition No. 5357 (SS) of 2002. The petitioner No. 8 against the advertisement issued in the year of 1997 had already filed a writ petition No. 5612 (SS) of 1997 and subsequently through writ petition No. 1632 (SS) of 1999 alongwith others he approached this Court for regularization in service. 4. Being aggrieved with another advertisement dated 8.8.2002 the petitioner Nos. 9 and 10 also filed the writ petitions bearing No. 1008 (SS) of 2003 and writ petition No. 1005 (SS) of 2003. The petitioner Nos. 11 and 12 being aggrieved with the advertisement dated 8.8.2002 filed another writ petition No. 5200 (SS) of 2002. 5. The aforesaid writ petitions are still pending and the petitioners are enjoying their posting with salary and continuity of work on the posts of Junior Engineer (Civil). 6. The petitioner Nos. 11 and 12 being aggrieved with the advertisement dated 8.8.2002 filed another writ petition No. 5200 (SS) of 2002. 5. The aforesaid writ petitions are still pending and the petitioners are enjoying their posting with salary and continuity of work on the posts of Junior Engineer (Civil). 6. In light of the provisions of Regulation 103 of U.P. Co-operative Employees Service Regulations, 1975 the petitioners are claiming the protection of the provisions of Section 6Q of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which are quoted herein below : 7. Regulation 103 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Employees Service Regulations reads as under : “103. The provisions of these regulations to the extent of their inconsistency, with any of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, U.P. Dookan Aur Vanijya Adhisthan Adhiniyam, 1962, Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 and any other labour laws for the time being in force, if applicable to any co-operative society or class of co-operative societies, shall be deemed to be inoperative.” Section 6Q of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 reads as under : “6-Q. Re-employment of retrenched workmen.—Where any workmen are retrenched, and the employer proposes to take into his employ any person, he shall, in such manner as may be prescribed give an opportunity to the retrenched workmen to offer themselves for re-employment, and the retrenched workmen who offer themselves for re-employment shall have preference over other persons.” 8. Since the U.P. Cooperative Societies Employees Service Regulations, 1975 have not been certified under the Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act, 1947 and the petitioners are entitled to the protection of the provisions of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, they are claiming their regularization under Regulations, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the Regulations) on the basis of completion of three years continuous service. Under Regulation 3 (iv) of the Regulations 1985 the ‘employee’ has been defined as under : “(iv) “Employee” means a person in whole-time service of a Cooperative society, but does not include a casual worker employed on daily wages or a person in part-time service of a Cooperative Society.” 9. Under Regulation 3 (iv) of the Regulations 1985 the ‘employee’ has been defined as under : “(iv) “Employee” means a person in whole-time service of a Cooperative society, but does not include a casual worker employed on daily wages or a person in part-time service of a Cooperative Society.” 9. By way of second amendment of the Regulations made in the year of 1992 the term “employee” has been re-defined as under : “(iv) “Employee” means a person in whole-time service of a Cooperative Society but does not include a person in part-time service or a casual worker of Cooperative Society.” 10. According to the petitioners since they are not the casual workers but they are working continuously, may be in the capacity of Daily Wagers which does not find place in the exclusion clause of definition employee, they became eligible for regularization under the aforesaid Rules. The cut off date for appointment was earlier fixed as on or before May, 1983 under the Regulations 1985 and thereafter it was extended to 1986. By way of 3rd Amendment made in the year 2003 it has been extended to 30th June, 1998. The petitioners further submitted that the Regulations 1985 have overriding effect if anything is contrary to the provisions of U.P. Cooperative Societies Employees Service Regulations, 1975. Regulation 4 of the Regulations 1985, which contains the provisions for regularization of ad hoc appointment is reproduced hereunder : “4. Regularisation of ad hoc appointment.—(1) Any employee who- (i) was directly appointed on any post on ad hoc basis in any Co-operative Society falling within the purview of the Board on or before May 1983 and is continuing in service, as such, on the date of commencement of these regulations; (ii) possessed requisite qualifications prescribed for regular appointment the time of such ad hoc appointment; and (iii) has completed or, as the case may be, after he has completed three years continuous service, shall be considered for regular appointment in permanent or temporary vacancy as may be available on the basis of his record and suitability before any regular appointment is made in such vacancy in accordance with the relevant rules, regulations or orders.” 11. The petitioners claim that there is no dispute that even prior to the interim order passed by this Court in different writ petitions filed by them they had been appointed and since they are still working in the department, may be under the interim orders of this Court, but since they are entitled to the protection of the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act also, they have right of consideration for regularization. 12. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that though earlier the petitioners were engaged on daily wage basis, but since by way of subsequent amendment in the definition of employee they have been bracketed into the definition of the employee and have been termed as ad hoc employee, they are entitled for the benefit of regularization under the Regulations, 1985. In support of his contention the learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon some judgments, which are referred to hereunder : 1. Secretary, State of Karnataka and others v. Umadevi (3) and others, (2006) 4 SCC 1 . Relevant paragraphs 53 and 54 of which are quoted below : “53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V. Narayanappa, R.N. Nanjundappa and B.N. Nagarajan and referred to in para 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of the Courts or of tribunals. The question of regularization of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases above referred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State Government and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularize as a onetime measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned post but not under cover of orders of the Courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees of daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that regularization, if any already made, but not sub-judice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further bypassing of the constitutional requirement and regularizing or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme. 54. It is also clarified that those decisions which run counter to the principle settled in this decision, or in which directions running counter to what we have held herein, will stand denuded of their status as precedents.” 2. U.P. Rajkiya Auodyogik Prashikshan Sansthan Dainik Vetan Karmchari Kalyan Samiti, Lucknow and another v. State of U.P. and others, 2004 (22) LCD 809 : 2004(2) ESC 1273 (LB). Relvant paragraph 18 of which is quoted below : “18. In view of the plea taken in the counter-affidavit by the opposite parties it is clear that the appointment of the members of the petitioners was made against the post of Instructors but on daily wage basis and, therefore, appointments were made to meet the contingency arising on account of delay in completing the process of regular recruitment and it was not possible to leave the post vacant till regular selection. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rudra Kumar Sain (supra) has held that such appointment can appropriately be called as a “stopgap” arrangement and appointment in the posts as “ad hoc” appointment.” 3. Rudra Kumar Sain and others v. Union of India and others, (2000) 8 SCC 25 . Relevant paragraphs 19 and 20 of which are quoted below : “19. The meaning to be assigned to these terms while interpreting provisions of a service rule will depend on the provisions of that rule and the context in and the purpose for which the expressions are used. The meaning of any of these terms in the context of computation of inter se seniority of officers holding cadre post will depend on the facts and circumstances in which the appointment came to be made. For that purpose it will be necessary to look into the purpose for which the post was created and the nature of the appointment of the officer as stated in the appointment order. For that purpose it will be necessary to look into the purpose for which the post was created and the nature of the appointment of the officer as stated in the appointment order. If the appointment order itself indicates that the post is created to meet a particular temporary contingency and for a period specified in the order, then the appointment to such a post can be aptly described as “ad hoc” or “stopgap”. If a post is created to meet a situation which has suddenly arisen on account of happening of some event of a temporary nature then the appointment of such a post can aptly be described as “fortuitous” in nature. If an appointment is made to meet the contingency arising on account of delay in completing the process of regular recruitment to the post due to any reason and it is not possible to leave the post vacant till then, and to meet this contingency in appointment is made then it can appropriately be called as a “stopgap” arrangement and appointment in the post as “ad hoc” appointment. It is not possible to lay down any strait-jacket formula nor give an exhaustive list of circumstances and situation in which such an appointment (ad hoc, fortuitous or stopgap) can be made. As such, this discussion is not intended to enumerate the circumstances or situation in which appointments of officers can be said to come within the scope of any of these terms. It is only to indicate how the matter should be approached while dealing with the questions of inter se seniority of officers in the cadre. 20. In service jurisprudece, a person who possesses the requisite qualification for being appointed to a particular post and then he is appointed with the approval and consultation of the appropriate authority and continues in the post for a fairly long period, then such an appointment cannot be held to be “stopgap or fortuitous or purely ad hoc”. In this view of the matter, the reasoning and basis on which the appointment of the promotees in the Delhi Higher Judicial Service in the case in hand was held by the High Court to be “fortuitous/ad hoc/stopgap” are wholly erroneous and, therefore, exclusion of those appointees to have their continuous length of service for seniority is erroneous.” 4. In this view of the matter, the reasoning and basis on which the appointment of the promotees in the Delhi Higher Judicial Service in the case in hand was held by the High Court to be “fortuitous/ad hoc/stopgap” are wholly erroneous and, therefore, exclusion of those appointees to have their continuous length of service for seniority is erroneous.” 4. Vikramaditya Pandey v. Industrial Tribunal, Lucknow and another, (2001) 2 SCC 423 Relevant portion of paragraph 6 of which is quoted below : “6. …………. By a plain reading of the said Regulation it is clear that in case of inconsistency between the Regulations and the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the State Act, the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 and any other labour laws for the time being in force, if applicable to any cooperative society or class of cooperative societies, to that extent the Regulations shall be deemed to be inoperative. In other words, the inconsistent provisions contained in the Regulations shall be inoperative, not the provisions of the other statutes mentioned in Regulation 103. The Tribunal in this regard correctly understood the regulation but wrongly refused the relief on the ground that no reinstatement can be ordered on a regular employment in view of the provisions contained in the said Regulation. But the High Court read the regulation otherwise and plainly misunderstood it in saying that if there is any inconsistency between the Regulations and the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and other labour laws for the time being in force the Regulations will prevail and the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and other labour laws shall be deemed to be inoperative. This misreading and wrong approach- of the High Court resulted in the wrong conclusion. In the view it took as regards Regulation 103 the High Court proceeded to state that even if there was retrenchment in view of Regulation 5 of the Regulations the Labour Court was not competent to direct reinstatement of the appellant who was not recruited in terms of Regulation 5 because the Labour Court had to act within the ambit of law having regard to the Regulations by which the workman was governed. In this view the High Court declined relief to the appellant which in our view cannot be sustained. The Tribunal felt difficulty in ordering reinstatement as the appellant was not a regular employee. In this view the High Court declined relief to the appellant which in our view cannot be sustained. The Tribunal felt difficulty in ordering reinstatement as the appellant was not a regular employee. The appellant ought to have been ordered to be reinstated in service once it was found that his services were illegally terminated in the post he was holding including its nature. Thus in our opinion both the Tribunal as well as the High Court were not right and justified on facts and in law in refusing the relief of reinstatement of the appellant in service with back wages. But, however, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and taking note of the fact that the order of termination dates back to 19.7.1985 we think it just and appropriate in the interest of justice to grant back wages only to the extent of 50%. 5. Kanshi Ram Verma v. Municipal Committee, Mansa through its Executive Officer, Punjab and others. Relevant paragraph 5 of which is quoted below : “5. It appears from the judgment of the learned Single Judge that he entered into the evidence on the record and differed on questions of fact from the Labour Court. He omitted to consider that the Municipal Committee had been initially satisfied that the appellant had materially complied with the requirements for employment and had actually employed him. The order of the learned single Judge cannot be sustained and the award must be restored, the rights of the parties on the date of the award being those declared by the award. For the same reason, the order of the Division Bench summarily dismissing the appeal must be set aside.” 13. Though the petitioners have also referred some decisions on the point of estoppels, but I do not consider the same as relevant for the present matter, accordingly those are not considered by me. 14. The learned Counsel for the petitioners argued that though the petitioners were engaged as daily wagers, but against the sanctioned posts as is evident from the letters issued by the Managing Director of the Department i.e. U.P. Sahkari Vidhayan Evam Sheetgrah Sangh Limited. Those documents are not on record, but have been placed before me. I am taking those documents on record being Court of record. Those documents are not on record, but have been placed before me. I am taking those documents on record being Court of record. Those letters are letter No. 885-90 of 8th May, 1996 and letter No. 2488-93 dated 12th of August, 1996. 15. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of opposite parties 3 to 12, whereby the respondents have questioned on the validity of the appointments of the petitioners as they were appointed by the Executive Engineers of the concerned units of the U.P. Cooperative Processing and Cold Storage Federation (hereinafter referred to as the PACSFED), whereas the appointing authority of the Junior Engineers is the Managing Director of the Department as provided in the U.P. Cooperative Societies Employees Service Regulations, 1975 and further all the appointments are to be made through the Cooperative Institutional Service Board because the appointing authority can make the appointment only for three months without consultation of the Board. It has further been submitted that in similar circumstances some other Junior Engineers working in PACSFED challenged the earlier advertisement dated 8.8.2002 before this Court by filing a writ petition No. 5912 (SS) of 2002 claiming their regularization due to long standing in the department, but same was dismissed by this Court through judgment and order dated 11.10.2002. 16. From perusal of the order passed by this Court in the above noted matter, it is obvious that this Court has dismissed the writ petition in light of the order passed in writ petition No. 2361 (SS) of 2000, which was dismissed on the ground that the petitioners were engaged by the Executive Engineer without inviting any applications and that their engagement was dehors to the rules. The appointing authority of the Junior Engineer (Civil) is the Committee of Management, which has not made the appointment of the petitioner. This Court, however, provided that if there is any work and there is need for engagement of the Junior Engineer (Civil) in the Corporation on daily wage basis, the opposite parties may consider the petitioners’ engagement on the basis of their work and performance. 17. Against the aforesaid” judgment passed in writ petition No. 5912 (SS) of 2002 the petitioners preferred a special appeal No. 313 (SB) of 2002, which too was dismissed. In dismissing the special appeal the Division Bench of this Court justified the findings of the Hon’ble Single Judge given in the order. 17. Against the aforesaid” judgment passed in writ petition No. 5912 (SS) of 2002 the petitioners preferred a special appeal No. 313 (SB) of 2002, which too was dismissed. In dismissing the special appeal the Division Bench of this Court justified the findings of the Hon’ble Single Judge given in the order. The respondents have also given the reference of another writ petition No. 59684 of 2005 filed by the similarly situated Junior Engineers before this Court at Allahabad for regularization of their services, which has also been dismissed on 9.9.2005 providing therein that in case if there is any post which falls vacant of which the petitioner can be appointed and the respondent’s Federation advertise for filling up such posts, the petitioner, if otherwise found eligible, may also be considered for such appointment, if he is found suitable and is selected through the regular selection process. 18. Against the aforesaid judgment and order a special appeal was preferred, which has also been dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court providing therein that this Court can have sympathy with the writ petitioner but ordering regularization would not be right or proper. Regular posts have to be filled up in regular ways. Regularization through Court would encourage back door entries and favouritism. 19. Some other likewise Junior Engineers who were also appointed by the Executive Engineers filed writ petition No. 2361 (SS) of 2000 against the oral termination, which has also been dismissed by this Court on the ground that the appointments of the petitioners were dehors to the rules as the appointing authority of the Junior Engineers is the Managing Director, who never issued any letter of appointment in favour of the petitioners, as such the petitioners have no right to continue on their posts and also they have no right for regularization. 20. One Mr. Ajay Kumar who was also working in the PACSFED on daily wage basis as Assistant Engineer claiming his regularization filed writ petition No. 14711 of 2003, which has also been dismissed with the observation that it is difficult to hold that the petitioner has a right to claim regularization. 21. 20. One Mr. Ajay Kumar who was also working in the PACSFED on daily wage basis as Assistant Engineer claiming his regularization filed writ petition No. 14711 of 2003, which has also been dismissed with the observation that it is difficult to hold that the petitioner has a right to claim regularization. 21. It has also been submitted that against the same advertisement dated 18.5.2006 the other petitioners filed the writ petition No. 32783 of 2006, in which by means of order dated 21.6.2006 the Hon’ble Single Judge stayed the regular selection till the consideration of the petitioner for regularization. Against which special appeal No. 737 of 2006 was filed. The Division Bench stayed the interim order passed by the Honble Single Judge in view of the law laid down in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and others v. Umadevi (3) and others, (2006) 4 SCC 1 . 22. The respondents have also submitted that Section 135 of the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 speaks that the provisions contained in Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are not applicable to the Cooperative Societies and, therefore, Regulation 103 of U.P. Cooperative Societies Employees Service Regulations 1975 is not applicable in the present case as the provisions of Regulation, 103 of Regulations 1975 are repugnant with the provisions of Section 135 of the Act, 1965 and it is settled law that if there is any repugnancy or inconsistency in between the provisions of Regulations and the Act in that circumstances the provisions of the Act will prevail and therefore, in view of Section 135 of the Act, 1965 neither the provisos of Regulation 103 of the Regulations, 1975 nor the provisions of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 will be applicable in the present matter as the PACSFEO is a Cooperative Society registered under the U.P. Cooperative Societies Act. 23. In support of his contention the learned Counsel for the respondents has further relied upon some decisions, which are referred to hereunder : (i) Mahendra L. Jain and others v. Indore Development Authority and others, (2005) 1 SCC 639 . The relevant paragraphs 18 and 19 of which ape reproduced hereunder : 18. The posts of Sub-Engineers in which the appellants were appointed, it is no body’s case, were sanctioned ones. The relevant paragraphs 18 and 19 of which ape reproduced hereunder : 18. The posts of Sub-Engineers in which the appellants were appointed, it is no body’s case, were sanctioned ones. Concededly, the respondent Authority before making any appointment neither intimated the employment exchange about the existing vacancies, if any, nor issued any advertisement in relation thereto. Indisputably, the conditions precedent for appointment of the Officers and servants of the Authority, as contained in the Service Rules had void ab initio being opposed to public policy as also vioiative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 19. The question, therefore which arises for consideration is as to whether they could lay a valid claim for regularization of their services. The answer thereto must be rendered in the negative. Regularization cannot be claimed as a matter of right. An illegal appointment cannot be legalized by taking recourse to regularization. What can be regularized is an irregularity and not an illegality. The constitutional scheme which the country has adopted does not contemplate any back door appointment. A State before offering public service to a person must comply with the constitutional requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. All actions of the State must conform to the constitutional requirements. A daily-wager in the absence of a statutory provision in this behalf would not be entitled to regularization. [See State of U.P. v. Ajay Kumar, (1997) 4 SCC 88 and Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwa Vidyalaya v. Bal Kishan Soni, (1997) 5 SCC 86 ]. (ii) A. Umarani v. Registrar Cooperative Societies and others, (2004) 7 SCC 112 . Relevant paragraphs 39, 40, 41 and 45 are reproduced hereunder : 39. Regularization, in our considered opinion, is not and cannot be the mode of recruitment by any “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India or any body or authority governed by a statutory Act or the Rules framed thereunder. It is also now well settled that an appointment made in violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute and in particular, ignoring the minimum educational qualification and other essential qualification would be wholly illegal. Such illegality cannot be cured by taking recourse to regularization (See State of H.P. v. Suresh Kumar Verma, (1996) 7 SCC 562 ). 40. It is equally well settled that those who come by back door should go through that door. Such illegality cannot be cured by taking recourse to regularization (See State of H.P. v. Suresh Kumar Verma, (1996) 7 SCC 562 ). 40. It is equally well settled that those who come by back door should go through that door. [See State of U.P. v. U.P. State Law Officers Assn., (1994) 2 SCC 204 ]. 41. Regularization furthermore cannot give permanence to an employee whose service are ad hoc in nature. 45. No regularization is, thus, permissible in exercise of the statutory power conferred under Article 162 of the Constitution if the appointments have been made in contravention of the statutory rules. (iii) State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi and others, (2006) 1 SCC 667 . Paragraphs 53, 62 and 75 of which are reproduced hereunder : 53. An attempt to induct an employee without following the procedure would be a back door appointment. Such back door appointments have been deprecated by this Court times without number. (See for example Delhi Development Horticulture Employees’ Union v. Delhi Administration, (1992) 4 SCC 99 . 62. In any event, no temporary or permanent status can be granted to an employee by way of regularization. [See Union of India v. Gagan Kumar, (2005) 6 SCC 70 and State of Maharashtra v. R.S. Bhonde, (2005) 6 SCC 751 ]. 75. The fact that all appointments have been made without following the procedure, or services of some persons appointed have been regularized in the past, in our opinion, cannot be said to be a normal mode which must receive the seal of the Court. Past practice is not always the best practice. If illegality has been committed in the past, it is beyond comprehensions as to how such illegality can be allowed to perpetuate. The State and the Board were bound to take steps in accordance with law. Even in this behalf Article 14 of the Constitution will have no application. Article 14 has a positive concept. No equality can be claimed in illegality is now well settled. [See State of A.P. v. S.B.P.V. Chalapathi Rao, (1995) 1 SCC 724 para 8, Jalandhar Improvement Trust v. Sampuran Singh, (1999) 3 SCC 494 para 13 and State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh, (2000) 9 SCC 94 para 30]. (iv) Secretary State of Karnataka and others v. Uma Devi (3) and others, (2006) 4 SCC 1 . [See State of A.P. v. S.B.P.V. Chalapathi Rao, (1995) 1 SCC 724 para 8, Jalandhar Improvement Trust v. Sampuran Singh, (1999) 3 SCC 494 para 13 and State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh, (2000) 9 SCC 94 para 30]. (iv) Secretary State of Karnataka and others v. Uma Devi (3) and others, (2006) 4 SCC 1 . The relevant paragraphs 47, 48 and 49 of which are reproduced hereunder : 47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognized by the relevant ruled or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation from being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in cases concerned, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, .contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post. 48. It was then contended that the rights of the employees thus appointed, under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, are violated. It is stated that the State has treated the employees unfairly by employing them on less than minimum wages and extracting work from them for a pretty long period in comparison with those directly recruited who are getting more wages or salaries for doing similar work. The employees before us were engaged on daily wages in the department concerned on a wage that was made known to them. There is no case that the wage agreed upon was not being paid. Those who are working on daily wages formed a class by themselves, they cannot claim that they are discriminated as against those who have been regularly recruited on the basis of the relevant rules. There is no case that the wage agreed upon was not being paid. Those who are working on daily wages formed a class by themselves, they cannot claim that they are discriminated as against those who have been regularly recruited on the basis of the relevant rules. No right can be founded on an employment on daily wages to claim that such employee should be treated on a par with a regularly recruited candidate, and make permanent in employment, even assuming that the principle could be invoked for claiming equal wages for equal work. There is no fundamental right in those who have been employed on daily wages or temporarily or on contractual basis, to claim that they have a right to be absorbed in service. As has been held by this Court, they cannot be said to be holders of a post, since, a regular appointment could be made only by making appointments consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The right to be treated equally with the other employees employed on daily wages, cannot be extended to a claim for equal treatment with those who were regularly employed. That would be treating unequals as equals. It cannot also be relied onto claim a right to be absorbed in service even though they have been selected in terms of the relevant recruitment rules. The arguments based on Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution are therefore overruled. 49. It is contended that the State action in not regularizing the employees was not fair within the framework of the Rule of law. The rule of law compels the State to make appointments as envisaged by the Constitution and in the manner we have indicated earlier. In most of these cases, no doubt, the employees had worked for some length of time but this has also been brought about by the pendency of proceedings in tribunals and Courts initiated at the instance of the employees. Moreover, accepting an argument of this nature would mean that the State would be permitted to perpetuate an illegality in the matter of public employment and that would be a negation of the constitutional scheme adopted by us, the people of India. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the argument that there must be a direction to make permanent all the persons employed on daily wages. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the argument that there must be a direction to make permanent all the persons employed on daily wages. When the Court is approached for relief by way of a writ, the Court has necessarily to ask itself whether the person before it had any legal right to be enforced. Considered in the light of the very clear constitutional scheme, it cannot be said that the employees have been able to establish a legal right to be made permanent even though they have never been appointed in terms of the relevant rules or inadvertence of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. (v) National Fertilizers Ltd. and others v. Somvir Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 493 . Relevant paragraphs 20, 22, and 28 of which are reproduced hereunder : 20. The Constitution Bench opined that any appointment made in violation of the Recruitment Rules as also in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution would be nullity. The contention raised on behalf of the employees that those temporary or ad hoc employees who had continued for a fairly long spell, the authorities must consider their cases for regularization was answered, thus : (i) Secretary State of Karnataka and others v. Uma Devi (3) and others, (2006) 4 SCC 1 , para 26. 26. With respect, why should the State be allowed to department from the normal rule and indulge in temporary employment in permanent posts? This Court, in our view, is bound to insist on the State making regular and proper recruitments and is bound not to encourage or shut its eyes to the persistent transgression of the Rules of regular recruitment. The direction to make permanent—the distinction between regularization and making permanent, was not emphasized here—can only encourage the State, the model employer, to flout its own rules and would confer undue benefits on a few at the cost of many waiting to compete. With respect, the direction made in para 50 (of SCC) of Piara Singh (State of Haryana v. Piara Singh, (1992) 4 SCC 118 ) is to some extent inconsistent with the conclusion in para 45 (of SCC) therein. With great respect, it appears to us that the last of the directions clearly runs counter to the constitutional scheme of employment recognized in the earlier part of the decision. With great respect, it appears to us that the last of the directions clearly runs counter to the constitutional scheme of employment recognized in the earlier part of the decision. Really, it cannot be said that this decision has laid down the law that all ad hoc, temporary or casual employees engaged without following the regular recruitment procedure should be made permanent. 22. Taking note of some recent decisions of this Court, it was held that the State does not enjoy a power to make appointments in terms of Article 162 of the Constitution. It further quoted with approval a decision of this Court in Union Public Service Commission v. Girish Jayanti Lal Vaghela (2006) 2 SCC 482 para 12. “The appointment to any under the State can only be made after a proper advertisement has been made inviting applications from eligible candidates and holding of selection by a body of experts or a specially constituted committee whose members are fair and impartial through a written examination or interview or some other rational criteria for judging the inter se merit of candidates who have applied in response to the advertisement made. A regular appointment to a post under the State or Union cannot be made without issuing advertisement in the prescribed manner which may in some cases include inviting applications from the employments exchange where eligible candidates get their names registered. Any regular appointment made on a post under the State or Union without issuing advertisement inviting applications from eligible candidates and without holding a proper selection where all eligible candidates get a fair chance to compete would violate the guarantee enshrined under Article 16 of the Constitution.” It was clearly held : (Umadevi (3) case (supra). “These binding decisions are clear imperatives that adherence to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution is a must in the process of public employment.” 28. “S/Shri Somvir Singh, Hansraj Benewal, Malkiat Singh and Ranjit Singh are said to be working. They may be relieved of their posts. We may, however, observe that their cases may be considered for future appointment and age bar, if any, in view of the policy decision of the appellant itself may be relaxed to the extent they had worked. The salary or any remuneration paid to them, however, may not be recovered. They may be relieved of their posts. We may, however, observe that their cases may be considered for future appointment and age bar, if any, in view of the policy decision of the appellant itself may be relaxed to the extent they had worked. The salary or any remuneration paid to them, however, may not be recovered. This order, however, is being passed in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India keeping in view the principles embodied in Section 70 of the Contract Act. The appeals are allowed. No costs.” (vi) Principal Maher Chandra Polytechnic and another v. Anulamba and others, (2006) 7 SCC 161 . Relevant paragraphs 35, 36, 37 are reproduced hereunder : 35. The respondents did not have legal right to be absorbed in service. They were appointed purely on temporary basis. It has not been shown by them that prior to their appointments, the requirements of the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution had been complied with. Admittedly, there did not exist any sanctioned post. The Project undertaken by the Union of India although continued for some time was initially intended to be a time bound one. It was not meant for generating employment. It was meant for providing technical education to the agriculturists. In the absence of any legal right in the respondents, the High Court, thus in our considered view, could not have issued a writ of or in the nature of mandamus. 36. In Secretary State of Karnataka and others v. Uma Devi (3) and others, (2006) 4 SCC 1 , in para 39 it was stated : “There have been decisions which have taken the cue from Dharwad case (Dharwad District PWD Literate Daily Wage Employees Association v. State of Karnataka, (1990) 3 SCC 396 ) and given directions for regularisation, absorption or making permanent, employees engaged or appointed without following the due process or the rules for appointment. The philosophy behind this approach is seen set out in the recent decision in Workmen v. Bhurkunda Colliery of Central Coalfields Ltd., (2006) 3 SCC 297 , though the legality or validity of such an approach has not been independently examined. The philosophy behind this approach is seen set out in the recent decision in Workmen v. Bhurkunda Colliery of Central Coalfields Ltd., (2006) 3 SCC 297 , though the legality or validity of such an approach has not been independently examined. But on a survey of authorities, the predominant view is seen to be that such appointments did not confer any right on the appointees and that the Court cannot direct their absorption or regularisation or re-engagement or making them permanent.” See also State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi, (2006) 1 SCC 667 . 37. Yet again in National Fertilizers Ltd. v. Somvir Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 493 it was held : (SCC p.498 para 18) “18. Regularisation, furthermore, is not a mode of appointment. If appointment is made without following the rules, the same being a nullity the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of the purported period of probation would not arise.” (vii) Surinder Prasad Tiwari v. U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parisad and others, (2006) 5 SCC 684. Relevant paragraph 38 of which is reproduced hereunder : 38. In view of the clear and unambiguous constitutional scheme, the Courts cannot countenance appointments to public office which have been made against the constitutional scheme. In the backdrop of constitutional philosophy, it would be improper for the Courts to give directions for regularization of services of the person who is working either as daily wager, ad hoc employee, probationer, temporary or contractual employee, not appointed following the procedure laid down under Articles 14, 16 and 309 of the Constitution. In our constitutional scheme, there is no room for back door entry in the matter of public employment. (viii) State of M.P. and others v. Yogesh Chandra Dubey and others, (2006) 8 SCC 67. Relevant paragraph 15 of which is respondent hereunder : 15. However, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we may observe that the State should take steps to fill up the vacant posts, if any, as expeditiously as possible, in which event, the cases of the respondents may be considered together with other eligible candidates. However, age bar, if any, to the extent they had worked with the appellants may be relaxed. (ix) State of U.P. and others v. Suresh and others, 2006(2) ESC 1476. Relevant paragraph 27 of which is reproduced hereunder : 27. However, age bar, if any, to the extent they had worked with the appellants may be relaxed. (ix) State of U.P. and others v. Suresh and others, 2006(2) ESC 1476. Relevant paragraph 27 of which is reproduced hereunder : 27. In the present case the petitioners are not appointed against any substantive posts. They were appointed on daily wage basis and subsequently without passage of time have been placed on temporary and permanent muster rolls. The length of service according to the case of the petitioners themselves is not equal to the regular employees as they would be getting chance to become regular upon vacancies being available and further that regular employees have also passed through the same channel as the petitioners are passing through. The manner/mode of selection/appointed in the two categories is also different as regular appointments are made on the recommendation of the Selection Committee as stated in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the affidavit filed by the appellant State. In the circumstances the law as laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of State of Haryana v. Jasmer Singh, JT 1996 (10) SC 796 and State of Haryana v. Tilak Raj, 2003 (6) SCC 123 will squarely apply in the present case. 24. In reply to the counter-affidavit of the respondents, the petitioner has filed the rejoinder affidavit, stating therein that the nature of employment of the petitioners continuing in the establishment of the opposite parties since last 10-13 years on consolidated salary increased from time to time cannot be termed as employment of the petitioners on daily wage basis. On the question of jurisdiction of Executive Engineer for appointment of the petitioners they have submitted that their appointments have already been approved by the competent authority, i.e. Managing Director and after approval of the competent authority it is not permissible for the respondents to take a plea that their appointments are without jurisdiction. The petitioners have also tried to distinguish their case with the case of Mr. Ashutosh Dwivedi in light of the facts that he was neither appointed by Executive Engineer followed by approval of Managing Director nor was appointed by means of appointment letter. He is also not entitled for regularization under the Regulation, 1985. The respondents have submitted that case of Mr. Ashutosh Dwivedi in light of the facts that he was neither appointed by Executive Engineer followed by approval of Managing Director nor was appointed by means of appointment letter. He is also not entitled for regularization under the Regulation, 1985. The respondents have submitted that case of Mr. Ajay Kumar is also altogether different to their case as he was appointed on the post of Assistant Engineer which is class II post whereas the appointments of the petitioners were made on the post of Junior Engineer, i.e. Class III post and the Regulation, 1985 is applicable only for class III post. He has also submitted that in W.P. No. 32783 of 2006 there was no plea for regularization under Regulation, 1985 as amended in the year 2003. 25. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has also submitted that the provision of Section 135 of the U.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 still has not been enforced as the whole Act was enforced with effect from 26.1.1968 vide notification No. 9171-CA/10.9.62 dated 30.12.1967 except Section 135. Under the circumstances the Regulation 103 of Regulations 1975 still prevails in light of which the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are very much applicable in the petitioners’ matter. It has further been submitted in that exercise of power provided under the Regulation, 1985 the respondents have regularized the services of daily wagers, namely, Sri Veer Pal Singh, Sri Haridwari Lal, Smt. Krishna Kumari and Sri Lal Bahadur, who were appointed on daily wage basis and were working on daily wage at the relevant cut-off-date prescribed for regularisation. 26. In support of the aforesaid contentions, the learned Counsel for the petitioners invited the attention of this Court towards the minutes of the meeting dated 5.6.1999 of the PACSFED wherein the regularization of the petitioners of W.P. No. 12212 of 1999 and W.P. No. 9660 of 1999 was considered in the light of the directions of this Court and who were found to have been appointed prior to cut-off-date their services have been regularized and who were appointed after the cut-off-date their cases have been rejected on the ground that they do not come within the cut-off-date fixed for regularization but the regularization have not been rejected on the ground that they are daily wagers. 27. 27. Through the rejoinder affidavit the petitioners have also brought on record the appointment letter of one of the petitioners, i.e. petitioner No. 8, namely, Mr. Sanjeev Saxena, who was appointed on 9.2.1995 by Executive Engineer on ad hoc basis against consolidated pay of Rs. 1500/- per month for 89 days but the same has been extended from time to time. 28. From the pleadings of the case it is obvious that the petitioners are claiming their regularization under the Uttar Pradesh Regularization of Ad Hoc Appointments (on Posts within the Purview of the Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Institutional Service Board) Regulations, 1985. The petitioners claim that in light of their appointment orders as well as the amendments made under the Rules from time to time the petitioners are covered under the definition of “Employee” as neither they are casual workers nor in part time service of the Cooperative Society. The existence of the Rules and the amendment made therein are not disputed. Rule 4(1) provides that any employee who was directly appointed on any post on ad hoc basis in any Co-operative Society falling within the purview of the Board on or before May 1983 and is continuing in service, as such, on the date of commencement of these regulations; possessed requisite qualifications prescribed for regular appointment the time of such ad hoc appointment; and has completed or, as the case may be, after he has completed three years continuous service, shall be considered for regular appointment in permanent or temporary vacancy as may be available on the basis of his record and suitability before any regular appointment is made in such vacancy in accordance with the relevant rules, regulations or orders. 29. The cut off date fixed as May, 1983 has been extended from time to time and accordingly the case of the petitioners are covered within the cut off date fixed by the Regulations. However, for appointment on ad hoc basis under sub Regulation (3) of Regulation 4 it has been provided that for the purpose of sub-regulation (1), a Selection Committee shall be constituted. However, for appointment on ad hoc basis under sub Regulation (3) of Regulation 4 it has been provided that for the purpose of sub-regulation (1), a Selection Committee shall be constituted. The sub-Regulation (3) of Regulation 4 is reproduced hereunder : “(3) For the purpose of sub-regulation (1), a Selection Committee shall be constituted as under : (a) in case of Apex Co-operative Societies— (i) Chairman of the Board or a Member of the Board Chairman nominated by him (ii) An Officer not below the rank of Deputy Registrar Member to be nominated by the Registrar (iii) Managing Director or the Secretary of the Member/Convener Society (b) in case of other Co-operative Societies— (i) Chairman of the Board or a Member of the Board Chairman nominated by him (ii) District Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies Member (iii) Secretary of the Society Member/Convener” 30. Sub-Regulation (4) of Regulation 4 provides that the appointing authority shall prepare an eligibility list of the candidates, arranged in order of seniority as determined from the date of order of their initial appointment and if two or more persons are appointed together, from the order in which their names are arranged in the said appointment order. The list shall be placed before the Selection Committee alongwith their character rolls, if any, and such other records pertaining to them, as may be considered necessary to judge their suitability. 31. Sub-Regulation (5) of Regulation 4 provides that the Selection Committee shall consider the cases of the candidates on the basis of their records referred to in sub-regulation (4). 32. Sub-Regulation (6) of Regulation 4 provides that the Selection Committee shall prepare a list of selected candidates, the names in the list being arranged in order of seniority, and forward it to the appointing authority. 33. Regulation 5 provides that the appointing authority shall, subject to the provisions of sub-regulation (2) of Regulation 4, make appointments from the list prepared under sub-regulation (6) of Regulation 4 in the order in which their names stand in the list. 34. Regulation 6 provides that the appointments made under these regulations shall be deemed to be appointments under the relevant service rules, regulations or orders, if any. 35. 34. Regulation 6 provides that the appointments made under these regulations shall be deemed to be appointments under the relevant service rules, regulations or orders, if any. 35. After going through the whole Regulations, I do not find anywhere that any procedure is provided for ad hoc appointments, but Regulation 4 only speaks that any employee who was directly appointed on any post on ad hoc basis in any Co-operative Society falling within the purview of the Board on or before May 1983 and is continuing in service, as such, on the date of commencement of these regulations, possessed requisite qualifications prescribed for regular appointment at the time of such ad hoc appointment; and has completed or, as the case may be, after he has completed three years continuous service, shall be considered for regular appointment in permanent or temporary vacancy as may be available on the basis of his record and suitability before any regular appointment is made in such vacancy in accordance with the relevant rules, regulations or orders. 36. The word “employee” has been defined under the Rules. From the appointment letters issued in favour of the petitioners it is obvious that firstly they were appointed for 89 days on daily wage basis and subsequently the period of appointment was extended from time to time. 37. The respondents have claimed that since the petitioners have been continuing under the strength of the interim order passed by this Court, which does not comfer any right upon them for the purpose of regularization, under the circumstances the period of duty under the strength of the interim order passed by this Court may not be calculated for the purpose of regularization. 38. In reply of which the learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that though the petitioners challenge the advertisement issued by the respondents for direct recruitment, but since their services had not been dispensed with, they have been continuing under the strength of their appointment letters and not under the strength of the interim order passed by this Court as this Court has been pleased to stay the proceedings of the selection. 39. 39. From perusal of the record I find force in the submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that they have been continuing in service under the terms of the appointment orders, it may be that the respondents have not proceeded to dispense with their services in light of the pendency of the case before this Court. So far as the appointments made by the incompetent authority is concerned, it is very much evident that the same has been approved subsequently by the competent authority. From perusal of the several orders placed before me passed by this Court on the matter of regularization of likewise persons, I find that no rules under which the petitioners claiming their regularization have been considered and it has also not been considered as to how their appointments have not been in accordance with law. For the purpose of ad hoc appointment, I do not find any procedure laid down under the Rules and under the amendment made in the Rules. 40. Further for regular appointment they had to undergo with the procedures provided finder Regulation 4. Though the learned Counsel for the petitioners Dr. L.P. Mishra submits that the petitioners are not liable to be subjected under any proceeding of regularization, in light of the provisions provided under the regulations, I do not find any reason to bypass the same and certainly they have to face the proceedings provided under Regulation 4 for regular appointment. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in its decisions as has been referred to hereinabove also permits the regularization, but only under the Rules. Accordingly for the purpose of regular appointment the procedure provided under the regulations cannot be bypassed. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has also cited the cases, namely, H.M. Rizvi and others v. Rural Engineering Services, U.P. and others, 1993 HVD (Alld) Vol. IV, Page 69 and Munishwar Dutt Pandey v. Ranjeet Tiwari and others, 1997 (1) UPLBEC 199, in support of his contention. In light of the recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as referred to hereinabove in Uma Devi’s Case (supra), I arrive at conclusion that the petitioners have to face the proceedings provided under the regulations for regular appointment. IV, Page 69 and Munishwar Dutt Pandey v. Ranjeet Tiwari and others, 1997 (1) UPLBEC 199, in support of his contention. In light of the recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as referred to hereinabove in Uma Devi’s Case (supra), I arrive at conclusion that the petitioners have to face the proceedings provided under the regulations for regular appointment. Since the respondents have not been able to establish that the petitioners are covered under the exclusion clause of the definition of “employee” I, in view of the nature of their appointments, hold that they are covered under the definition of “employee” and in light of the extended cut off date for the purpose of consideration of regularization by way of amendment made in Rules on 26th March, 2003 they are liable to be considered for regularization under the Rules. The facts that the services of some of the similarly situated Junior Engineers (Civil) have been regularized are undisputed. 41. From the advertisements issued from time to time, it is apparent that posts of Junior Engineers (Civil) are there, upon which the petitioners are claiming their regularization. Under the circumstances I hereby quash the advertisements issued by the respondents inviting applications for direct appointment and issue a writ of mandamus to the opposite parties to consider the petitioners’ case for regularization under the Uttar Prades. Regularization of ad hoc Appointments (on the posts within the purview of the Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Institutional Service Board) Regulations, 1985 in accordance with law and take appropriate decision on the matter of the petitioners regularization and only thereafter it will be open for the respondents to proceed with the fresh advertisement for direct recruitment on the posts in question. 42. With the aforesaid observations and directions the writ petitions are allowed. No order as to costs. ————