JUDGMENT By means of this writ petition, moved under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has sought writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 29.08.1987, passed by Additional District Judge, Saharanpur and the order dated 06.04.1987, passed by Prescribed Authority / Munsif, Roorkee. By the impugned order dated 06.04.1987, the Prescribed Authority allowed the release application (No. 10 of 1987) of the landlord, under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred as U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972). Vide impugned order dated 29.08.1987, Additional District Judge, Saharanpur, dismissed the Rent Control Appeal No. 92 of 1987, and affirmed the order passed by the Prescribed Authority. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 3. Brief facts of the case, as narrated in the writ petition are that petitioner is a tenant in House No. 123(4)-A, Civil Lines, Roorkee, on rent at the rate of Rs. 14/- per month. Respondents No. 3 to 10 are the owners/ landlords of the said accommodation. An application under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972, was moved by the respondents no. 3 to 10 before Prescribed Authority/Munsif, Roorkee, for release of said accommodation. It is alleged by the petitioner that entire proceedings before the Prescribed Authority were manipulated and tampering was done in the record. It is also stated in the petition that the petitioner was never served with the notices issued by the Prescribed Authority. One Shyam Lal Kapil (brother of the petitioner), an employee of the Civil Court, made a forged endorsement of witnessing the service of summon on the petitioner. It is alleged that said person was in collusion with the landlords. A short date was fixed in the proceedings and case proceeded ex-parte as against the petitioner. Vide order dated 06.04.1987, Prescribed Authority allowed the application and directed the petitioner to vacate the premises. Copy of the said order of the Prescribed Authority is annexed as Annexure 2 to the petition. Challenging said order, it is stated by the petitioner that Prescribed Authority committed error of law in accepting the need of the landlord for the reason that property belongs to trust (respondent no. 3) and respondents no. 4 to 10 were its beneficiaries. The trust cannot discriminate between its trustees. No trust deed was filed with the application. Challenging said order, it is stated by the petitioner that Prescribed Authority committed error of law in accepting the need of the landlord for the reason that property belongs to trust (respondent no. 3) and respondents no. 4 to 10 were its beneficiaries. The trust cannot discriminate between its trustees. No trust deed was filed with the application. The petitioner on coming to know of aforesaid order, passed by the Prescribed Authority, preferred an appeal (No. 92 of 1987). However, the Additional District judge, Saharanpur, after hearing the parties, dismissed the appeal. A copy of said order dated 29.08.1987 is annexed as Annexure 4 to the writ petition. The said order is challenged by the petitioner on the ground that the appellate authority did not record any finding on the point of bona fide need of the respondents for release of the accommodation. The proceedings before the authorities below are challenged, also on the ground that since the petitioner is a Government servant, as such proviso to Section 21(3) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 got attracted to it. But the respondents no. 1 and 2 did not afford any opportunity of hearing to the District Magistrate concerned. It is further alleged by the petitioner that for the mere reason that government accommodation could be available to the petitioner at Bahadrabad, where he was posted, it was not sufficient ground to give a finding on comparative hardship in favour of the landlords. It is further alleged that the release application was allowed for extraneous considerations by the authorities below. 4. Respondents No. 3 to 10 contested the petition and filed their counter affidavit. It is stated in Para 3 of the counter affidavit that Gyan Chand, who has filed the affidavit in support of the writ petition has never appeared as Pairokar of the petitioner in the proceedings before the authorities below. No application was ever made on his behalf to inspect the record. As such, the averments made by him in the affidavit deserve to be ignored. It is further stated in the counter affidavit that there was no manipulation done in the proceedings before Prescribed Authority. In this connection, it is further stated that Rakesh Kapoor, respondent No. 10, who is an Advocate, presented the application before the Prescribed Authority on 25.03.1987 at 3.00 P.M. It is wrong to say that presentation was ante dated. It is further stated in the counter affidavit that there was no manipulation done in the proceedings before Prescribed Authority. In this connection, it is further stated that Rakesh Kapoor, respondent No. 10, who is an Advocate, presented the application before the Prescribed Authority on 25.03.1987 at 3.00 P.M. It is wrong to say that presentation was ante dated. Denying all the allegations made in this regard in the writ petition, it is stated that no overwriting, as suggested by the petitioner, was made. In Para 11 of the counter affidavit, it is stated that notices issued by the Prescribed Authority were served on the petitioner personally and it is wrong to say that Shyam Lal Kapil had not witnessed the service. Rather, it is mentioned that Shyam Lal Kapil, brother of the petitioner, was his neighbour in the property in suit and as such since the service was affected in his presence, his signatures in the notices as witness are genuine. Denying that Shyam Lal Kapil was in collusion with the answering respondents, it is stated that the Prescribed Authority, after considering the bona fide need of the landlords and comparative hardship in their favour rightly allowed the release application, stating that respondent No. 3 is a private trust and has been created for the benefit of members of family of Rai Sahib Chandi Prasad Kapoor, as such, his family members as beneficiaries are entitled to the benefit. The accommodation in dispute was required, as stated in the release application, for being utilized for residential purpose of Secretary of the Trust. Defending the dismissal of the appeal by the appellate authority, it is stated that there was a categorical finding on bona fide need, recorded by the Prescribed Authority, which is affirmed by the appellate authority. It is alleged by the respondents that proviso to Section 21(3) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are not attracted to the present case. It is further alleged in the counter affidavit that the petitioner who was a Taquvi Clerk in block Bahadrabad, where large number of Government quarters are available to accommodate him. Lastly, it is alleged by the answering respondents that the writ petition has only been contested to delay the delivery of possession in pursuance of order passed by the authorities below. 5. In the rejoinder affidavit, the petitioner has reiterated the averments made in the writ petition. 6. Lastly, it is alleged by the answering respondents that the writ petition has only been contested to delay the delivery of possession in pursuance of order passed by the authorities below. 5. In the rejoinder affidavit, the petitioner has reiterated the averments made in the writ petition. 6. The first submission made on behalf of the petitioner (tenant) is that the proceedings under U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, against the petitioner are completed by the authorities below in a record time, which itself suggests that the proceedings are not conducted in a fair manner. I have gone through the copy of the order sheet filed with the writ petition, which is Annexure 1 to the petition. No doubt, the Prescribed Authority has completed the proceedings in a short time, but it does not create any doubt as to the fairness on the part of the Prescribed Authority. The proceedings under U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are summary in nature. Once the service was made on the petitioner (tenant) and he failed to appear on the date fixed, the Prescribed Authority had to proceed ex-parte, and ex-parte proceedings unlike the contested proceedings, take shorter time. It is true that respondent no. 10, Rakesh Kapopor (one of the landlords) was an Advocate, as such, it is possible that he might have pressed for a short date, but that by itself is no ground to quash the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority, unless there is something more to create doubt or to show that undue influence was exercised by such person. 7. Sri Sharad Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that benefit of a trustee cannot be said to be need of the trust. In this connection, it is further argued on behalf of the petitioner that from the application for release, it is apparent that release was sought on the ground that the accommodation in question is required for the residence of respondent No. 10, Rakesh Kapoor. I have gone through the Annexures filed with the affidavit, counter affidavit and rejoinder affidavit. It is true that if a trust is created for benefit of others, the personal need shown of a trustee can be questioned and cannot be said to be the need of the trust. But in the present case, the facts are different. The trust (respondent no. It is true that if a trust is created for benefit of others, the personal need shown of a trustee can be questioned and cannot be said to be the need of the trust. But in the present case, the facts are different. The trust (respondent no. 3), is a private trust, which is for benefit of the members of family of Rai Sahib Chandi Prasad Kapoor Trust. Apart from this, what has been mentioned in the application, is that respondent no. 10, Rakesh Kapoor, an Advocate, who is Secretary of the Trust is unable to look after the trust property, as he is residing far away from the property and he needs the accommodation in question for his own residence, so that he may look after and property manage the trust property. This cannot be said to be against the interest or object of the trust. Therefore, this Court finds little force in the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner. 8. The next contention of the petitioner is that the petitioner is a Government servant, as such the provision of sub-section (3) of Section 21 of U.P.Act No. 13 of 1972, are attracted to the present case. In this connection, it is further contended that the authorities below have erred in law in not affording the opportunity to the District Magistrate to contest the release application. It is pertinent to mention here the relevant provision of law on which the contention made on behalf of the petitioner, is based. Sub-section (3) of Section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 reads as under : “3. No order shall be made under sub-section (1) or sub-section (1-A) or sub-section (2), except after giving to the parties concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard : Provided that where the tenant being a servant of Government or of any local authority or any public sector corporation does not contest the application then a reasonable opportunity of being heard shall be given to the District Magistrate, who shall have the right to oppose the application.” From reading of aforesaid provision, it is clear that the intention of the Legislature is to discourage the collusive proceedings, particularly in respect of an accommodation occupied by a public servant. (Often it is seen that at the time of transfer of an employee to whom an accommodation is allotted under this Act, gets in collusion with the landlord to get vacated the premises, which deprives successor government servant of his right who desires to move an application to the District Magistrate for allotment under this Act). No doubt in the present case, the petitioner (tenant) did not contest the proceeding before the trial court, but he has contested the proceedings with tooth and nail before the appellate authority and also in this writ petition for last twenty years. As such, it cannot be said that in such a case the proceedings are collusive in nature. Therefore, this Court is of the view that merely for the reason that Prescribed Authority proceed ex-parte against tenant, the proceedings cannot be held to be illegal on the ground that proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was not complied with. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner drew attention of this Court to supplementary affidavit filed during pendency of this writ petition on behalf of the petitioner and Annexures filed therewith and it is argued that during the pendency of these proceedings, another accommodation in the same building has already been vacated, as such the need raised in the release application in question, has already stood satisfied. As such, it cannot be said that there is a bona fide need to the landlords of the accommodation in suit. In reply to this learned counsel for the respondents drew attention of this court to the fact that the accommodation vacated by another tenant Dhan Prakash, consisted of only one room in which office of the trust was opened, while the present accommodation is sought for the residence of the Secretary of the trust. In this connection, it is submitted on behalf of the respondents that the need of the landlords has not been satisfied by the developments pointed out by the petitioner. It is further submitted on behalf of the respondents that the accommodation occupied by one D.S. Bhatnagar was in a dilapidated condition and can neither be used for residence nor office. Having gone through the papers on record, I am satisfied with the explanation given by learned counsel for the respondents. 10. It is further submitted on behalf of the respondents that the accommodation occupied by one D.S. Bhatnagar was in a dilapidated condition and can neither be used for residence nor office. Having gone through the papers on record, I am satisfied with the explanation given by learned counsel for the respondents. 10. Lastly, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the appellate authority has not discussed the evidence on the bona fide need of the landlords, and as such the order passed by the appellate court (respondent no. 1) is liable to be quashed. I have carefully gone through the order passed by the Prescribed Authority and one passed by the appellate authority. The Prescribed Authority has discussed and given finding how he came to conclusion that the need of the landlords is genuine and bona fide. Whereafter he has discussed the comparative hardship. The respondent no. 1 (the appellate court) has also discussed the comparative hardship and have given the findings affirming the view of the Prescribed Authority that the need of the landlord is genuine and that comparative hardship is more to the landlords. It is true that discussion on the genuine need is not made at length by appellate court. But this Court cannot close its eyes to the fact that the proceedings before the Prescribed Authority were ex-parte and there was nothing much to be discussed about the same at the appellate stage, in view of the fact that there was not even written statement filed by the petitioner before the Prescribed Authority even after being personally served with the notices. 11. For the reasons, as discussed above, this writ petition is liable to be dismissed. The same is dismissed. The petitioner is allowed one month’s time from today to vacate the premises in question, failing which the landlords would be at liberty to get executed the order passed by the Prescribed Authority. No order as to costs.