JUDGMENT Hon’ble Rajesh Tandon, J. Heard Mr. Lok Pal Singh, Advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Rajendra Dobhal, Advocate for the respondents. Factual Matrix of the Case 2. By the present writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for a writ of certiorari quashing the impugned orders dated 26.07.1999 and 05.09.2005 passed by the Prescribed Authority, Haridwar (appellate Authority) in R.C.A. No. 65 of 1999 respectively releasing the shop in dispute in favour of the landlords (respondents). Prescribed Authority, vide judgment dated 26.07.1999, allowed the release application of the landlords and the Appellate Court, on an appeal filed by the tenant (petitioner), dismissed the appeal and allowed the release application. Bonafide Need 3. Briefly stated, the respondents have filed a release application under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, which was registered as P.A. Case No. 32 of 1994 praying for the release of the shop, under the tenancy of the petitioner, situated at Kathara Bazar, Jwalapur. 4. Bonafide Need 3. Briefly stated, the respondents have filed a release application under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, which was registered as P.A. Case No. 32 of 1994 praying for the release of the shop, under the tenancy of the petitioner, situated at Kathara Bazar, Jwalapur. 4. Relevant paragraphs 8 and 10 of the release application are quoted below : ß8- ;g fd oknuh lk;yk uEcj 1 ds ifjokj esa oknuh lk;yk uEcj 1 Lo;a o oknuh lk;yk uEcj 1 dk ,d iq= vejukFk oknh uEcj 2 o oknuh lk;yk uEcj 1 ds iq= dh ifRu ;kfu oknuh lk;yk uEcj 1 dh iq=o/kw Jhefr “kdqUryk nsoh o oknuh lk;yk uEcj 1 ds bl iq= ds nks iq=x.k ;kfu oknuh lk;yk uEcj 1 ds iksrs Øe”k% izoh.k dqekj o uohu dqekj o oknuh lk;yk uEcj 1 ds bl iq= dh rhu iqf=;k¡ ;kfu oknuh lk;yk uEcj 1 dh iksfr;k¡ Øe”k% Jherh eUtw o dqekjh eerk o dqekjh uhye rFkk oknuh lk;yk uEcj 1 dk nwljk iq= “;ke lqUnj oknh uEcj 3 o oknuh lk;yk uEcj 1 ds bl iq= dh ifRu ;kfu oknuh lk;yk uEcj 1 dh iq=o/kw Jhefr “kkfUr nsoh o oknuh lk;yk uEcj 1 ds bl iq= ds nks iq=x.k ;kfu oknuh lk;yk uEcj 1 ds iksrs Øe”k% vt; dqekj o fot; dqekj rFkk oknuh lk;yk uEcj 1 ds rhljs iq= f”kodqekj oknh uEcj 4 o oknuh lk;yk uEcj 1 ds bl iq= dh ifRu ;kfu oknuh lk;yk uEcj 1 dh iq=o/kw Jhefr lquhrk o oknuh lk;yk uEcj 1 ds bl iq= ds nks iq=x.k ;kfu oknuh lk;yk uEcj 1 ds iksrs Øe”k% eksfgr mQZ eksuw o vadqj rFkk oknuh lk;yk uEcj 1 ds pkSFks iq= lrh”k dqekj oknh uEcj 5 o oknuh lk;yk uEcj 1 ds bl iq= dh ifRu ;kfu oknuh lk;yk uEcj 1 dh iq=o/kw Jhefr feFkys”k o oknuh lk;yk uEcj 1 ds bl iq= dk ,d iq= ;kfu oknuh lk;yk uEcj 1 dk iksrk xxu dqekj rFkk okfnuh lk;yk uEcj ds bl iq= dh nks iqf=;k¡ ;kfu oknuh lk;yk uEcj 1 dh iksfr;k¡ Øe”k% dqekjh nhik o dqekjh fjpk mQZ fpUdh rFkk oknuh lk;yk uEcj dh ,d fookfgrk iq=h Jhefr Å’kk jkuh oknuh uEcj 6 gSA 10- ;g fd oknhx.k nqdku fuEu of.kZr futkbZ esa mDr uohu dqekj iq= vejukFk rFkk mDr fot; dqekj iq= “;ke lqUnj dks gkStjh dk dkjksckj izkjEHk djkuk pkgrs gSa vkSj bl izdkj ls oknhx.k dks nqdku fuEu foof.kZr futkbZ dh mDr uohu dqekj iq= vejukFk rFkk fot; dqekj iq= “;ke lqUnj dks gkStjh dk dkjksckj izkjEHk djokus gsrq vfr rhoz tk;t] lgh ,oa ln~Hkkoh vko”;drk gSAÞ 5. As will appear from the aforesaid paragraphs, the shop in dispute is required for Naveen Kumar and Vijay Kumar for running their business. 6. The petitioner (tenant) has filed a written statement denying the averments made in the release application. 7. On behalf of the landlords, affidavit of one Lachhi Ram was filed (Annexure No. 1 to the counter affidavit), wherein the need of Naveen Kumar and Vijay Kumar was shown for doing the hojry business. Relevant paragraph No. 12 of this affidavit is quoted below : ß12- eSa ckgYQ c;ku djrk gw¡ fd mDr o.kZu vuqlkj oknh lk;y uañ 2 dk iq= uohu dqekj o oknh lk;y uañ 3 dk iq= fot; dqekj dks gkStjh dk dkjksckj djkus ds fy;s oknhx.k lk;yku dks iz”uxr nqdku futkbZ foof.kZr eqUntkZ fjyht okn i= gktk dh vfr rhoz] tk;t] lgh o ln~Hkkoh vko”;drk gS rFkk LFkkukHkko ds dkj.k mDr uohu dqekj o fot; dqekj csjkstxkj gS rFkk nwljh vksj f”kopj.k izfroknh] tks fd ,d dkQh /kukM~; O;fDr gS] mls crkSj okdk ds mDr o.kZu vuqlkj iz”uxr nqdku futkbZ foof.kZr eqUntkZ fjyht okn i= gktk dh dksbZ vko”;drk ugha jg x;h gS] ,slh n”kk esa f”kopj.k izfroknh dks iz”uxr nqdku futkbZ foof.kZr eqUntkZ fjyht okn i= gktk ls csn[ky gksus esa fdlh izdkj dh dksbZ dfBukbZ gksus dh lEHkkouk ugha gSAÞ 8. Another affidavit has been filed by Sri Shyam Sunder (Annexure No. 2 to the counter affidavit) in support of the landlords. Relevant paragraph 28 of the said affidavit is quoted below : ß28- eSa ckgYQ c;ku djrk gw¡ fd oknhx.k iz”unqdku futkbZ foof.kZr eqUntkZ fjyht okn i= gktk esa mDr uohu dqekj iq= vejukFk rFkk mDr fot; dqekj iq= “;ke lqUnj dks gkStjh dk dkjksckj izkjEHk djokuk pkgrs gSa vkSj bl izdkj ls oknhx.k dks iz”uxr nqdku futkbZ foof.kZr eqUntkZ fjyht okn i= gktk dh mDr uohu dqekj iq= vejukFk rFkk mDr fot; dqekj iq= “;ke lqUnj dks gkStjh dk dkjksckj izkjEHk djokus gsrq vfr rhoz] tk;t] lgh ,oa ln~Hkkoh vko”;drk gSAÞ 9. One another affidavit has been filed by Sri Shyam Sunder (Annexure No. 3 to the counter affidavit) in support of the landlords. One another affidavit has been filed by Sri Shyam Sunder (Annexure No. 3 to the counter affidavit) in support of the landlords. Relevant paragraph 12 of the said affidavit is quoted below : ß12- eSa ckgYQ c;ku djrk gw¡ fd mDr o.kZu vuqlkj oknh lk;y uañ 2 dk iq= uohu dqekj o oknh lk;y uañ 3 dk iq= fot; dqekj dks gkStjh dk dkjksckj djkus ds fy;s oknhx.k lk;yku dks iz”uxr nqdku futkbZ foof.kZr eqUntkZ fjyht okn i= gktk dh vfr rhoz] tk;t] lgh o ln~Hkkoh vko”;drk gS rFkk LFkkukHkko ds dkj.k mDr uohu dqekj o fot; dqekj csjkstxkj gSa rFkk nwljh vksj f”kopj.k izfroknh tks fd ,d dkQh /kukM~; O;fDr gS] mls crkSj okdk ds mDr o.kZu vuqlkj iz”uxr nqdku futkbZ foof.kZr eqUntkZ fjyht okn i= gktk dh dksbZ vko”;drk ugha jg xbZ gS] ,slh n”kk esa f”kopj.k izfroknh dks iz”uxr nqdku futkbZ foof.kZr eqUntkZ fjyht okn i= gktk ls csn[ky gksus esa fdlh izdkj dh dksbZ dfBukbZ gksus dh lEHkkouk ugha gSAÞ 10. The Prescribed Authority vide order dated 26.07.1999, has allowed the release application and released the accommodation in favour of the respondents (landlords). 11. Aggrieved by the said order of the Prescribed Authority, the petitioner went in appeal. The Appellate Court vide Judgment dated 05.09.2005 has confirmed the findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority and dismissed the petitioner’s appeal. 12. Relevant findings recorded by the Appellate Authority regarding the bonafide need and comparative hardship are quoted below : ßmijksDr fopkj foe”kZ ds vk/kkj ij eSa bl fu’d’kZ ij igq¡pk gw¡ fd orZeku esa Hkw&Lokeh ;g fl) djus esa lQy jgk fd fooknxzLr nqdku esa Jh fot; iq= “;kelqUnj dks O;kikj djus dh vko”;drk gS] tks ln~Hkkfod gSA tgk¡ rd uohu dqekj dh vko”;drk dk iz”u gS] dsl dh cnyh ifjfLFkfr;ksa esa Jh uohu dqekj dh vko”;drk fl) ugha gksrh gSA mijksDr fopkj foe”kZ ds vk/kkj ij eSa bl fu’d’kZ ij igq¡pk gw¡ fd vkosndx.k ;g fl) djus esa lQy jgs gSa fd mUgsa Jh “;kelqUnj ds iq= fot; dqekj dks LorU= :i ls gkStjh dk O;kikj djus ds fy;s fooknxzLr lEifÙk dh ln~Hkkoh ,oa okLrfod vko”;drk gS vkSj rqyukRed dfBukbZ Hkh izkFkZuk i= Lohdkj gksus dh fLFkfr esa fdjk;snkj dks HkwLokeh ls de gS D;ksafd fooknxzLr lEifÙk ls fdjk;snkj dh dksbZ xqM&foy ugha ca/kh gS vkSj fdjk;snkj ds }kjk dksbZ vU;= nqdku ryk”k djus dk bl e/; iz;kl ugha fd;k x;kAÞ 13. So far as the Bonafide Need is concerned, it has been held that landlord is the best judge of his requirement. In the case of Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery & Co. (2000) 1 Supreme Court Cases 67, it has been held :- “It is settled position of law that the landlord is best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter. [See-Prativa Devi (Smt.) v. T.V. Krishnan]. In the case in hand the plaintiff landlord wanted eviction of the tenant from the suit premises for starting his business as it was suitable and it cannot be faulted. 14. Following the decision of Bega Begum (supra), the case of Joginder Pal vs. Naval Kishore Behal, 2002 SC & FB, Rent Cases, 388, the Apex Court has held as under :- “5. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. V. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (1998) 2 SCC 1) this Court emphasized the need of social legislations like the Rent Control Act striking a balance between rival interests so as to be just to law. “The law ought not to be unjust to one and give a disproportionate benefit or protection to another section of the society”. While the shortage of accommodation makes it necessary to protect the tenants to save them from exploitation but at the same time the need to protect tenant is coupled with an obligation to ensure that the tenants are not conferred with a benefit disproportionately larger than the one needed. Socially progressive legislation must have a holistic perception and not a shortsighted parochial approach. Power to legislate socially progressive legislation is coupled with a responsibility to avoid arbitrariness and unreasonability. A legislation impregnated with tendency to give undue preference to one section, at the cost of constraints by placing shackles on the other section, not only entails miscarriage of justice but may also in constitutional invalidity. 8. The need for reasonable interpretation of rent control legislations was emphasized by this Court in Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahmad Khan 1979 A.I.R. SC page 272. Speaking in the context of reasonable requirement of landlord as a ground for eviction, the Court guarded against any artificial extension entailing stretching or straining of language so as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for eviction. Speaking in the context of reasonable requirement of landlord as a ground for eviction, the Court guarded against any artificial extension entailing stretching or straining of language so as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for eviction. The Court warned that such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. In Kewal Singh v. Lajwanti this Court has observed, while the rent control legislation has given a number of facilities to the tenants, it should not be construed so as to destroy the limited relief which it seeks to give to the landlord also. For instance, one of the grounds for eviction which is contained in almost all the Rent Control Acts in the country is the question of landlord’s bonafide personal necessity. The concept of bonafide necessity should be meaningfully construed so as to make the relief granted to the landlord real and practical. Recently in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta the Court has held that the concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. An approach either too liberal or too conservative or pedantic must be guarded against. 9. The rent control legislations are heavily loaded in favour of the tenants treating them as weaker sections of the society requiring legislative protection against them exploitation and unscrupulous devices of greedy landlords. The legislative intent has to be respected by the courts while interpreting the laws. But it is being uncharitable to legislatures if they are attributed with an intention that they lean only in favour of the tenants and while being fair to the tenants, go to the extent of being unfair to the landlords. The legislature is fair to the tenants and to the landlords- both. The courts have to adopt a reasonable and balanced approach while interpreting rent control legislations starting with an assumption that an equal treatment has been meted out to both the sections of the society. In spite of the overall balance tilting in favour of the tenants, while interpreting such of the provisions as take care of the interest of the land lord the court should not hesitate in leaning in favour of the landlords. In spite of the overall balance tilting in favour of the tenants, while interpreting such of the provisions as take care of the interest of the land lord the court should not hesitate in leaning in favour of the landlords. Such provisions are engrafted in rent control legislations to take care of those situations where the landlords too are weak and feeble and feel humble. 30. In providing key to the meaning of any word or expression the context in which it is set has significance. Colour and content emanating from context may permit sense being preferred to mere meaning depending on what is sought to be achieved and what is sought to be prevented by the legislative scheme surrounding the expression. Requirement of landlord for his own use, is an expression capable for attributing an intention to the legislative that what was intended to be fulfilled is such requirement as would persuade the landlord to have the premises vacated by the tenant, to forgo the rental income, and to put the premises to such use as the landlord would deem to be his own use and in the given facts and circumstances of a case and Court too would hold it to be so in contradistinction with a mere ruse to evict the tenant. The legislature intending to protect the tenant the also intends to lift the protection when it is the requirement of landlord to put the accommodation to such use as he intends away from leasing it out. 31. If we do not meaningly construe the concept of requirement the provision may suffer from the risk of being branded as unreasonable, arbitrary or as placing uncalled for and unreasonable restrictions on the right of the owner to hold and use his property. We cannot place a construction on the expression ‘for his own use’ in such a way as to deny the landlord a right to evict his tenant when he needs the accommodation for his own son to give colour and content to the expression and provide the skin of a living thought to the skeleton of the words, which the legislature has not itself chosen to define. The Indian society its customs and requirements and the context where the provisions is set in the legislation are the guides leading to acceptance of the meaning which we have chosen to assign to the words ‘for his own use’ in Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the act. 32.(v) In the present case, the requirement of landlord of the suit premises for user as office of his chartered accountant son is the requirement of landlord ‘for his own use’ within the meaning of Section 13(3)(a)(ii). 15. In the case of Prem Prakash Gupta and others Vs. Second Additional District judge, Allahabad and others – Allahabad Rent Cases 1993 (1) page 77, it has been held that no doubt true that the tenant will have to be ousted from a house, if a decree of eviction has been passed, yet such an event by itself will not be a valid ground for refusing a decree for eviction. The observation in the case of Prem Prakash Gupta (supra) is quoted as below : “As observed by this Court in its decision in the case of Rajeshwari Prasad Vs. Fateh Bahadur Charutvedi and others reported in 1984 (1) A.R.C. 387, the bona fide need is the foundation of application for eviction of a tenant without which it cannot be allowed. Hardship is relative word”......... 16. The Apex Court in G.C. Kapoor v. Nand Kumar Bhasin, 2001 (2) Allahabad Rent Cases Page No. 603 has relied upon the judgment of Datta Laxman as well as Raghunath Pale and has come to the conclusion as under :- “9. It is settled position of law that bona fide requirement means that requirement must be honest and not tainted with any oblique motive and is not a mere desire or wish. In Dattaraya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde and Another, [1999 (4) SCC 1], this Court while considering the bona fide need of the landlord was of the view that when a landlord says that he needs the building for his own occupation, he has to prove it but there is no warrant for ‘presuming that his need is not bona fide’. It was also held that while deciding this question, court would look into the broad aspects and if the Court feels any doubt about bona fide requirement, it is for the landlord to clear such doubt. 10. In Raghunath G. Panhale (D) By. LRs. It was also held that while deciding this question, court would look into the broad aspects and if the Court feels any doubt about bona fide requirement, it is for the landlord to clear such doubt. 10. In Raghunath G. Panhale (D) By. LRs. V. Chaganlal Sundarji and Co. [1999(8) SCC 1] this Court inter alia held that it was not necessary for landlord to prove that he had money to invest in the new business contemplated not that he had experience of it. It was a case for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord for non-residential purpose, as he wanted to start a grocery business in the suit premises to improve his livelihood.” 17. In the case of Gaya Prasad V. Pradeep Shrivastava reported in AIR 2001 SC 803, the Apex Court has observed in para 15 as under : “15. The judicial tardiness, for which unfortunately our system has acquired notoriety, causes the lis to creep through the line for long long years from the start to the ultimate termini, is a malady afflicting the system. During this long interval many many events are bound to take place which might happen in relation to the parties as well as the subject-matter of the lis. If the cause of action is to be submerged in such subsequent events on account of the malady of the system it shatters the confidence of the litigant, despite the impairment already caused.” 18. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstance, I decide this point in favour of the landlords. The need is bonafide. Comparative Hardship 19. So far as the Comparative Hardship is concerned, the petitioner has failed to show that he has made any efforts to search out any accommodation. Both the courts below having recorded the findings of fact, no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be made. 20. In the case of Shushila v. IInd Additional District Judge, Banda and others reported in 2003 (1) A.I.R. Page 256, it has been held as under :- “A bare perusal of rule 16 of the U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972, makes it clear that the rule only prescribes certain factors which have also to be taken into account while considering the application for eviction of a tenant on the ground of bonafide need. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 quoted earlier relates to the cases of eviction from the accommodation for business use. Clause (1) of sub-rule (2) provides greater the period of tenancy less the justification for allowing the application; where as according to Clause (b) in case tenant has a suitable accommodation available to him to shift his business. Greater the justification to allow the application. Availability of another suitable accommodation to the tenant, waters down the weight attached to the longer period of tenancy as a factor to be considered as provided under clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 16. Yet another factor which may in some cases be relevant under clause (c) is where the existing business of the landlord is quite huge and extensive leaving aside the proposed business to be set up, there would be lesser justification to allow the application. The idea behind sub-clause (c) is apparent i.e. where the landlord runs a huge business eviction may not be resorted to for expansion or diversification of the business by uprooting a tenant having a small business for a very period of time. In such a situation if eviction is ordered it is definitely bound to cause greater hardship to the tenant.” 21. In the case of Bhagwan Das v. Smt. Jiley Kaur and others reported in 1991 (1) A.R.C. Page 377, the Apex Court has held as under :- “Thirdly, it was a case where was even this additional circumstance that the appellant had brought no material on record to indicate that at any time during the pendency of this long drawn out litigation he made any attempt to seek an alternative accommodation and was unable to get. In Mst. Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan, (1999) 1 SCC 273; 1986 SCFBRC 346 (SC), it was held that in deciding the extent of the hardship that may be caused to one party or the other, in case a decree for eviction is passed or is refused, each party has to prove its relative advantages or disadvantages and the entire onus cannot thrown on the plaintiffs to prove that lesser disadvantages will be suffered by the defendants and that they were remediable.” 22. Rule 16 of the Act No. XIII of 1972 has been interpreted in the case of Munni Lal Gupta Vs. 7th Additional District and Sessions judge, Aligarh reported in 1997 (1) A.R.C. 301. Rule 16 of the Act No. XIII of 1972 has been interpreted in the case of Munni Lal Gupta Vs. 7th Additional District and Sessions judge, Aligarh reported in 1997 (1) A.R.C. 301. After relying upon the judgment of Rajendra Kumar Gupta Vs. Gopal Krishan and other, A.I.R. 1995 Allahabad 82, it has been held that suitable alternative accommodation, which may become available on an effort being made in that direction is also a factor to be considered and want or earnest efforts in looking for suitable alternative accommodation, disentitles protection given to the tenant while considering the comparative hardship of the parties. The observations in the decision of Munni Lal Gupta (supra) are quoted below :- “A suitable alternative accommodation which may become available on an effort being made in that direction is also in the comprehension of the expression and in the facts and circumstances of the case, it has been held that the petitioner was wanting in earnest efforts in looking for suitable alternative accommodation, notwithstanding the fact that the litigation between the parties had protracted to considerable stretched. In Rajendra Kumar Gupta Vs. Gopal Kishan and Others, AIR 1995 Alld. 82: 1994 ARC 11, it has been held by Sudhir Narain, J. and I concur with the view taken therein that “one of the principles for considering comparative hardship of the parties is to find out as to whether the tenant had made a sincere efforts to find out alternative accommodation and had placed materials before the authorities to come to their conclusions that he made such an effort.” The fact that earlier application for release, met the fact of rejection some 10 years ago, could not be projected backward to operate as an obstacle in the way of the release application being allowed as with the passage of time, the situation has undergone considerable change. Indubitable, landlord Sanjai Gupta did his M.A. after rejection of the earlier applications and his failure to secure employment for himself, lends congency to his moving the present application.” 23. Further there being no material on record to indicate that the petitioner has made any efforts to search out the accommodation during the pendency of the case, this factor also goes against the petitioner. 24. In view of the above, the comparative hardship lies in favour of the landlords. Findings of Fact 25. In Surya Dev Rai Vs. Further there being no material on record to indicate that the petitioner has made any efforts to search out the accommodation during the pendency of the case, this factor also goes against the petitioner. 24. In view of the above, the comparative hardship lies in favour of the landlords. Findings of Fact 25. In Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander SCC 2003 Vol. 6 675, the Apex Court has held as under :- “Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirement are satisfied : (i) The error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent. The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings is an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and or early disposal of the suit of proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that every moment, may become incapable of correction at a letter stage and refused to intervene would result in stravesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis.” The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character.” 26. Relying upon the Judgment of Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chandra 2003 (6) SCC 675, the Apex Court in Ranjeet Singh Vs. Ravi Prakash 2004 (3) SCC 682, has held as under :- “As to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India also, it has been held in Surya Dev Rai that the jurisdiction was not available to be exercised for indulging in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correcting the errors in drawing inferences like a court of appeal.” 27. In view of the judgment of Apex Court reported in 2004 ARC (3) 6892, Ranjeet Singh V. Ravi Prakash, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is limited to the extent that the finding of fact recorded by the court below cannot be interfered. The two courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact and High Court cannot act like an appellate Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 28. In the case of M/s India Pipe Fitting Co. The two courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact and High Court cannot act like an appellate Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 28. In the case of M/s India Pipe Fitting Co. V. Fakruddin M.A. Baker and another reported in 1978 A.I.R. (S.C.) Page 45, the Apex Court has held as under :- “The limitation of the High Court while exercising power under Art. 227 of the Constitution is well settled. Power under Art. 227 is one of judicial superintendence and cannot be exercised to upset conclusions of facts however, errorneous those may be. It is well settled and perhaps too late in the day to refer to the decisions of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath 1954 SCR 565; (AIR 1954 SC 215) where the principles have been clearly laid down as follows :- (at p. 217 of AIR). “The power of superintendence conferred by Art. 227 is. As pointed out by Harries C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. V. Sukumar Mukherjee AIR 1951 Cal 193 (SB) to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep to Subordinate Courts within the boundary of their authority and not for correcting mere errors.” 29. In Piper V. Harvey (1985) 1 All E.R. Page 454, it has been held as under :- “I have in mind what this court has said in Coplans v. King (1) [1947] 2 All E.R. 393) to the effect that the decision of the county court judge, when considering the balance of hardship, is to all intents and purposes final. It is not for the Court of Appeal to interfere when there is evidence on which the judge can reasonably come to the conclusion which he did.” 30. In Whitley v. Whitley 1946 (2) All England law Reports Annoted 726, it has been held as under :- “In the present case the judge decided in favour of the land, and I can see no ground for saying that he did not arrive at his conclusion on the issue raised under para (h) on ample evidence. If there was any evidence to support his decision we cannot interfere with it. It is most important in these cases that this court should not interfere with findings of fact where there is evidence to support them.” Conclusions : 31. If there was any evidence to support his decision we cannot interfere with it. It is most important in these cases that this court should not interfere with findings of fact where there is evidence to support them.” Conclusions : 31. In view of the aforesaid, I find no reason to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the courts below either on the point of Bonafide Need or on the point of Comparative Hardship. Both lies in favour of the Landlords-respondents. 32. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed. 33. However, the petitioner has prayed for some time to vacate the shop in dispute. Therefore, the petitioner is allowed time up to 31st May, 2007 to vacate the shop in question provided : a. he gives the undertaking by 28th February, 2007 to vacate the premises on or before 31st May, 2007. b. the petitioner pays the entire rent and damages due up to date by 28th February, 2007 along with the undertaking. c. the petitioner pays regularly the damages by first week of every month. d. in case of failure of the aforesaid conditions, the respondents Landlords shall be at liberty to execute the decree forthwith.