ORDER In this petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the order passed by the learned VIII Additional City Municipal Magistrate, Bangalore City taking cognizance and directing issue of summons to the petitioner is called in question. 2. The brief facts necessary for the present purpose are to the effect that the petitioner, who is the sitting MLA of Channapatna Constituency, furnished his statement of assets and liabilities for the years 2004-05 and 2005-06 to the respondent-Lokayukta and one Ravindra Beleyur filed a complaint before the respondent-Lokayukta alleging that the above stated petitioner has furnished false information while submitting his assets and liabilities for the years mentioned above. The respondent-Lokayukta, after investigation and after due notice to the petitioner, came to the conclusion that the petitioner had furnished certain false information while submitting his assets and liabilities statement for the above mentioned years and thus committed the offence punishable under Section 177 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. A complaint was lodged under Section 200 of the Cr. P.C. by the respondent herein before the Trial Court and the Trial Court upon submission of the complaint, passed an order on 3-3-2007 and the said order reads as under: "Presented on 3-3-2007 at 2.10 p.m. by the Hon'ble Registrar, Lokayukta. Heard. As the complainant is the Government Servant, he is exempted from examining. Hence cognizance taken. Register as case. Issue Summons to accused by 7-4-2007". 3. This order of issuance of process is called in question by the petitioner and among the several grounds urged in the petition, the main grievance of the petitioner is that while taking cognizance and issuing process the Trial Court has not mentioned the offences in respect of which the Court had taken cognizance and therefore the procedure followed by the Trial Court is contrary to the provisions of Cr. P.C. and in the absence of mentioning the offences in the impugned order, the petitioner is at a loss to know the offences alleged against him. One other ground urged in the petition is that the complaint of Ravindra Beleyur was filed before the Lokayukta with a mala fide intention to take revenge against the petitioner. For all these reasons, the impugned order passed by the Trial Court is liable to be quashed by this Court under its inherent power under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. 4. For all these reasons, the impugned order passed by the Trial Court is liable to be quashed by this Court under its inherent power under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. 4. I have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner Sri R.S. Ravi and Sri S.S. Koti, learned Counsel for the respondent. The respondent has also filed objections to the petition under consideration. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order cannot be sustained in law because a mere looking at the order passed by the Trial Court would make it clear that the said order was passed without application of mind inasmuch as the offence for which the cognizance has been taken has not been mentioned in the impugned order and secondly, no sworn statement was also recorded. In support of his submissions, learned Counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the decision of this Court in Paravatagouda v Revanashiddayya to drive home the point that it is essential for the learned Magistrate to say in the order what offences are made out and for which particular offence the accused needs to be proceeded against. Therefore, referring to the above decision it is contended that the impugned order passed by the Trial Court is contrary to the procedure established by law. 6. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondent Sri S.S. Koti, referring to the objections filed, submitted that the impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity and the complaint was filed by a Government servant and as such the requirement of sworn statement does not arise in view of the proviso (a) of Section 200 of the Cr. P.C. secondly, it was submitted that the very act of the learned Magistrate in taking cognizance and ordering issue of process itself is an indication of application of mind by the Trial Court. In this connection, learned Counsel also referred to sub-section (3) of Section 204 to submit that it is clear from the said sub-section that where the complaint is in writing, the summons issued should be accompanied with a copy of the complaint. In the instant case, a copy of the complaint has been enclosed to the summons issued on to the petitioner and therefore, the said procedure prescribed by the Cr. In the instant case, a copy of the complaint has been enclosed to the summons issued on to the petitioner and therefore, the said procedure prescribed by the Cr. P.C. provides an opportunity to know the nature of offence alleged against the petitioner and the offence for which cognizance has been taken. Even otherwise in the alternative, it is submitted by the learned Counsel for the respondent that the petitioner will have opportunity at the later stage to make his submissions regarding the offence alleged against him. For all these reasons the impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity so as to warrant quashing of the proceedings. Reference was also made to the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana v Ch. Bajan Lal and Others and Others cases as regards the power of this Court under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. 7. Having thus heard both the sides and after going through the petition averments and the materials placed and also the objections filed by the respondent, the only point for consideration is whether the impugned order of the learned Magistrate suffers from any infirmity so as to warrant interference at this stage by this Court. 8. It is not in dispute that the complaint was lodged by the Registrar of the Lokayukta. Reading together Section 200, proviso (a), along with Section 190(1), it becomes clear that where the complaint is made in writing and if the said complaint is by a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duties, the Magistrate need not examine the complainant and the witnesses. Therefore, the above provision answers the first ground urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner and therefore non-recording of the sworn statement of the complainant is not an infirmity in the instant case. 9. As far as the ground urged concerning non-mentioning of the offence in the impugned order is concerned, it is necessary to refer to the position in law as laid down by the Supreme Court. 9. As far as the ground urged concerning non-mentioning of the offence in the impugned order is concerned, it is necessary to refer to the position in law as laid down by the Supreme Court. In the case of Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports v Roshanlal Agarwal and Others, the Apex Court has held that the Magistrate is not required to record the reasons at the stage of issuing of process to the accused and in the said case on facts, the Court found that the learned Magistrate had passed an order stating "Cognizance taken. Register the case. Issue summons to the accused". The High Court had taken the view that the order passed by the Special Court taking cognizance of the offence did not show that the learned Magistrate had even perused the complaint or that he had applied his judicial mind before taking cognizance of the offences. Disagreeing with the said view of the High Court, the Apex Court held thus: "In determining the question whether any process is to be issued or not, what the Magistrate has to be satisfied is whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not, whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of inquiry. At the stage of issuing the process to the accused, the Magistrate is not required to record reasons". Referring to the law laid down in the case of Uttar Pradesh Pollution Control Board v M/s. Mohan Meakins Limited, the Apex Court quoted the principles laid down in the said case thus: "The Legislature has stressed the need to record reasons in certain situations such as dismissal of a complaint without issuing process. There is no such legal requirement imposed on a Magistrate for passing detailed order while issuing summons. The process issued to accused cannot be quashed merely on the ground that the Magistrate had not passed a speaking order". "This is the settled legal position". 10. There is no such legal requirement imposed on a Magistrate for passing detailed order while issuing summons. The process issued to accused cannot be quashed merely on the ground that the Magistrate had not passed a speaking order". "This is the settled legal position". 10. As far as the submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is not in the know-how of the nature of the offences alleged against him is concerned in the case of Adalat Prasad v Rooplal Jindal and Others, the Supreme Court has held that "there is no requirement of hearing the summoned accused at the stage of issue of process. The Court also held that a condition precedent for issuing process under Section 204 is the satisfaction of the Magistrate, either by examination of the complainant and the witnesses or by the inquiry contemplated under Section 202 that there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the complaint. In none of these stages, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has provided for hearing the summoned accused, because this is only a preliminary stage and the stage of hearing of the accused would only arise at a subsequent stage provided for in the latter provisions in the Code". 11. Coming to the petition ground that the complaint was lodged against this petitioner with a mala fide intention, a reference to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Jagdish Ram v State of Rajasthan and Another:\ will not be out of place. 12. In the aforesaid case, the Apex Court has held that the plea that complaint was filed as a result of vindictiveness is not relevant to be considered by the Supreme Court because the accused can raise all such pleas before the Trial Court at an appropriate stage. Therefore, by the very same analogy in the case on hand also the ground of mala fide or otherwise can be raised at the appropriate stage of the case before the Trial Court. 13. Last of the decision to be referred is, the case of Ajay Mehra and Another v Durgesh Babu and Others4. Therefore, by the very same analogy in the case on hand also the ground of mala fide or otherwise can be raised at the appropriate stage of the case before the Trial Court. 13. Last of the decision to be referred is, the case of Ajay Mehra and Another v Durgesh Babu and Others4. In the said case, the Court held that at the stage of taking cognizance what is relevant is whether the statement made in the complaint as well as the statement made under Section 202, if taken on their face value, an offence can be said to have been made out. 14. In the light of the foregoing settled position in law, in the case on hand, the impugned order passed by the Trial Court therefore, does not appear to be contrary to the provisions of law. The fact that the Court had taken cognizance, itself is an act of application of mind. There is also some force in the submission made by the learned Counsel for the respondent or that by virtue of Section 460(e) of the Cr. P.C. irregularity on the part of the Magistrate insofar as the things mentioned in the said section are concerned, the said act if done erroneously but in good faith, is protected and the proceedings shall not be set aside on the score that the Magistrate is not empowered to do it. 15. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the view that the decision cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner has no application to the case on hand as the facts and circumstances with which we are concerned are entirely different. 16. Dealing with the power of this Court under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., the Apex Court in the case of Central Bureau of Investigation v Ravi Shankar Srivastava, IAS and Another, has laid down the following propositions of law: "Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of Court; and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. The Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High Court. While exercising powers under the section, the Court does not function as a Court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitia to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the Courts exist. In exercise of the powers the Court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of Court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the Court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. It is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, mayor may not support the accusations. It is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, mayor may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the Trial Judge. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage". 17. Thus, having considered the grounds urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner; in the light of the aforesaid principles laid down by the Apex Court, in my considered opinion the impugned order passed by the learned Magistrate cannot be construed as contrary to the procedure prescribed in the Cr. P.C. and hence, the said order does not call for interference as it suffers from no infirmity. 18. In the result, the petition stands dismissed. 19. At this juncture, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner be given liberty to urge the other grounds before the Trial Court. The said request made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is accepted and the petitioner is at liberty to urge the other grounds available to him in law, before the Trial Court.