JUDGMENT 1. This revision application has been filed by the non-applicant No.1 against the order dated 5.5.2005 passed by First Additional District Judge, Gwalior in MJC No. 3/2004 whereby learned Additional District Judge allowed the application filed by respondent No. 1 under Order 9 Rule 9 read with section 15i of CPC set-aside the orders dated 16.12.2003, 23.8.2001 and restored the Civil Suit No. 3A/96 which was dismissed as withdrawn on 28.2.1997. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the father of respondent No. 1- Late Shri Shankar Lal filed a suit for partition in the year 1955 vide Civil Suit No. 11/55 which was decreed on 10.7.1978. In First Appeal No. 60/78, judgment and decree of the trial Court was set aside and suit was remanded back to the trial Court by order dated 30.9.1991. Agaisnt the order of remand LPA No. 32/91 was filed by the father of respondent No. 1. On 24.2.1997 an application was filed on behalf of Shankar Lal for withdrawal of LPA No. 32/91. The LPA was dismissed as withdrawn on the same date i.e. 24.2.1997. On 28.2.1997 another application was filed for withdrawal of civil suit by the father of respondent No. 1 (Shankar Lal). Civil Suit No. 3A/76 was dismissed as withdrawn on the same date i.e. 8.2.1997. On 11.8.1998 father of respondent No.1 Shankar Lal died. 3. The respondent No.1 on 2.9.1998 filed an application for recalling the order dated 24.2.1997 passed in LPA No. 32/91. It is alleged that after LPA No. 32/91 was filed and notices were issued an application dated 3.2.1997 was filed on behalf of the late Shankar Lal which bears the signature of Shankar Lal by his counsel Shri J.P. Sharma. In the application Shankar Lal's signature has been identified by Shri S.C. Goyal, Advocate. It as contended that the application does not bears signature of Shankar lal and there is forgery of signature. This Court found that Shri J.P. Sharma. Advocate who subsequently appeared in the case has not sought no objection from the previous counsel and filed the application for withdrawal of LPA. This Court also found that even -on perusal of other signatures on the memo of appeal as well as Vakalatnama and other applications there appears to the forgery in the signature of Shankarlal. Advocate who subsequently appeared in the case has not sought no objection from the previous counsel and filed the application for withdrawal of LPA. This Court also found that even -on perusal of other signatures on the memo of appeal as well as Vakalatnama and other applications there appears to the forgery in the signature of Shankarlal. Due to the aforesaid reasons the Division Bench of this Court condoned the delay and recalled the order dated 24.2.1997 passed in LPA No. 32/ 91. The Division Bench of this Court further directed the Registrar to file a complaint against Shri J.P. Sharma and Shri S.C. Goyal, Advocates and Dwarika Prasad appellant in this revision for initiating criminal proceedings. 4. Shri J.P. Sharma and Shri S.C. Goyal, Advocates challenged the order dated 10.1.2005 passed in MCC No. 371/95 by filing Special Leave Petition No. 1546/05. The Hon'ble Apex Court passed the following order while dismissing the Special Leave Petition: "Permission to file SLP is granted: We see no reason to interfere. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed save and except we clarify that the observations of the High Court shall not be taken into consideration in any proceedings." From the perusal of the order, it is crystal clear that the Hon'ble Supreme Court while upholding the order dated 10.1.2005 passed by the Division Bench directed, not to initiate any criminal proceedings against Shri J.P. Sharma and Shri S.C. Goyal, Advocates." 5. On 17.8.2005, LPA No. 32/91 was dismissed in the light of the judgment of apex Court in the case of Jamshed N. Guzdars v. State of Maharashtra [ 2005 (1) JLJ 358 = 2005 (2) SCC 591 ] by holding that now Letters Patent Appeal are not maintainable. The respondent No.1 thereafter filed SLP No. 1043/05 before the apex Court against the judgment and order dated 30th September 1991 passed in First Appeal No. 60/78. The apex Court by order dated 21.11.2005 dismissed the Special Leave Petition and directed for expediting the trial. After dismissal of SLP the order of remand dated 30.9.1991 passed in FA No. 60/78 is upheld. 6. The apex Court by order dated 21.11.2005 dismissed the Special Leave Petition and directed for expediting the trial. After dismissal of SLP the order of remand dated 30.9.1991 passed in FA No. 60/78 is upheld. 6. The respondent No. 1 on 17.9.1998 filed an application under section 151 of CPC for restoration of Civil Suit No. 3A/96 which was dismissed as withdrawn on 28.2.1997 on the ground that on 26.1.1997 her father sustained injuries in the Court premises and due to the aforesaid reasons he became mentally and physically weak and lost his memory. On 28.2.1997 application for withdrawal of suit was filed and similar application was filed on 24.2.1997 for withdrawal of LPA No. 32/91. She came to know about the withdrawal of suit on 27.8.1998 when she met earlier counsel of her father who was earlier prosecuting the civil suit and immediately on 2.9.1998 she filed an application for restoration of civil suit. On 23.8.2001 MJC No. 25/98 for restoration of suit was dismissed in default. On 22.9.2001 vide MJC No. 35/01, she filed an application under section 151 of CPC for setting aside the order dated 23.8.2001 and for restoration of MJC No. 25/98. On 16.12.2003 MJC No. 29/03 (old MJC No. 35/01) was also dismissed in default as respondent No.1 and her Advocate was not present when the case was called for hearing. On 10.2.2004 vide MJC No. 3/04, she filed an other application under Order 9 Rule 9 read with section 151 of CPC for setting aside the order dated 16.12.2003 passed in MJC No. 29/03 (old MJC No. 35/01). 7. The petitioner opposed the said application for restoration of MJC No. 29/03. She filed an application dated 18.1.2005 and prayed for restoration of Civil Suit No. 3A196 on the ground that in view of the order dated 10.1.2005 passed in MCC No. 37/98, the Division Bench of this Court has held that there appears to be forgery in the signature of Shankar Lal by the appellant in connivance with the subsequent counsels, who appeared subsequently in the LPA on behalf of her father Shankar Lal and filed an application for withdrawal of LPA without obtaining no objection certificate from earlier counsel. On identical circumstances, filed an application for withdrawal of civil suit on behalf of Shankar lal on 28.2.1997, therefore, no inquiry is necessary in view of the decision of the High Court and prayed for restoration of suit. The petitioner opposed the said application and filed its detailed reply on 28.1.2005. On 17.3.2005, the petitioner filed an application under section 151 of CPC in MJC No. 3/04 stating therein that without holding any inquiry by adducing oral evidence MJC cannot be decided and prayed for adducing the oral evidence and also prayed for cross-examination of respondent No.1. The trial Court fixed the case for 21.3.2005. On 21.3.2005, the learned trial Court heard the arguments in MJC No. 3/04 and fixed the case for order on 7.4.2005. On 7.4.2005, detailed affidavit on behalf of the petitioner was filed. The trial Court on 7.4.2005 directed the counsel for the petitioner to supply the copy of the affidavit to respondent No. 1 and heard the arguments of the parties and fixed for order on 13.4.2005. On 13.4.2005, petitioner filed his written arguments before the trial Court. On 21.4.2005, the respondent No. 1 filed his written arguments before the trial Court. The trial Court thereafter, on 5.5.2005 allowed the application of respondent No.1 and restored the Civil Suit No. 3N96, which was withdrawn on 28.2.1997. The trial Court while restoring the civil suit set aside the order dated 28.2.1997 passed in Civil Suit No. 3N96, dated 23.8.2001 passed in MJC No. 25/98, dated 16.12.2003 passed in MJC No. 29/03 (old MJC No. 35/01) and allowed the MJC No. 3/04. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that trial Court committed legal error in restoring MJC No. 25/98 and MJC No. 29/03 (old MJC No. 35/01). Whereas in MJC No. 3/04 respondent No.1 prayed for setting aside the order dated 16.12.2003 by which MJC No. 29/03 (old MJC No. 35/01) was dismissed in default, therefore, trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction in passing the impugned order in restoring the suit filed by father of respondent No.1. Whereas in MJC No. 3/04 respondent No.1 prayed for setting aside the order dated 16.12.2003 by which MJC No. 29/03 (old MJC No. 35/01) was dismissed in default, therefore, trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction in passing the impugned order in restoring the suit filed by father of respondent No.1. It is also submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the apex Court vide order dated 15.4.2005 clarified and diluted the effect of order dated 10.1.2005 passed in MCC No. 371/98, the trial Court without considering the observations made by the apex Court, influenced by order dated 10.1.2005 and drew an inference that petitioner fraudulently obtained the signature of Shankar Lal in the application dated 28.2.1997 by which suit for partition filed by respondent No. 1 Shankar Lal was withdrawn. Learned counsel' for the petitioner further submitted that respondent No. 1 was not party to the original proceedings before the civil Court and once the suit has been withdrawn by her father then the only remedy left for her to institute a fresh suit and the suit withdrawn by her father cannot be restored and application for restoration of civil suit is not maintainable and the trial Court committed error in restoring the suit. It is lastly submitted that application for restoration filed by respondent No. 1 was dismissed and no sufficient cause was shown by respondent No. 1 for not prosecuting the MJC filed before the trial Court and trial Court acted illegally in allowing the said MJC's and restoring the civil suit. 9. On the other hand learned counsel for respondent No.1 submitted that the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 10.1.2005 very specifically stated that subsequent counsel, who appeared in LPA No. 32/91 without obtaining no objection certificate from the earlier counsel filed an application for withdrawal of LPA and on perusal of the signatures on the memo of appeal as well as Vakalatnama and other applications, this Court found that there appears to be forgery in the signature of Shankar Lal and, therefore, condoned the delay and restored the LPA No. 32/91. This finding is upheld by the apex Court in its order dated 15.4.2005. The Hon'ble apex Court only expunged the observation by which it is directed to file complaint against Shri J.P. Sharma and Shri S.C. Goyal, Advocates for initiating criminal proceedings. This finding is upheld by the apex Court in its order dated 15.4.2005. The Hon'ble apex Court only expunged the observation by which it is directed to file complaint against Shri J.P. Sharma and Shri S.C. Goyal, Advocates for initiating criminal proceedings. Only this part of the order was set aside by the apex Court, therefore, learned trial Court has not committed any illegality or legal error in restoring the suit and setting aside the orders dated 28.2.1997, 23.8.2001 and 16.12.2003. 10. I have heard arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the case. 11. First I will deal with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner whether right to sue survives against the respondent No.1 who after death of her father filed an application for restoration of suit. As stated in the preceding paragraphs there are certain unusual circumstances in which the suit was withdrawn as also the manner in which the application was filed for withdrawal of suit. Application made by respondent No. 1 on the ground that the said withdrawal was without the knowledge of her father and was based on the forged signature of her father it is well settled that where the right to sue is personal to the deceased it does not survives. On the death of male Hindu after withdrawing a suit for partition the right to sue survives and his daughter being a legal heir under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is entitled to be substituted in his place and when she came to know that fraud has been played in withdrawing the suit for partition on 28.2.1997 she can very well file an application for restoration of the said and recalling the order by which suit was withdrawn and right to sue survives against her. Thus, the application filed by her for restoration of suit is very much maintainable and trial Court has not committed any error in holding so and deciding the application on merits. 12. Thus, the application filed by her for restoration of suit is very much maintainable and trial Court has not committed any error in holding so and deciding the application on merits. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision of the apex Court in the case of Dadu Dayal Mahasabha (Sri) v. Sukhdev Arya [1990 (1) MPWN 131] in which it is held by the apex Court that a Court has inherent power to correct its own proceeding when it is satisfied that in passing a particular order it was mislead by one of the parties. However, if the case of the party challenging the decree is that he was in fact a party to the compromise petition filed in this case, but his consent has been procured by fraud, the Court cannot investigate the matter in exercise of its inherent power and the only remedy to the party is to institute a suit. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bishambhardayal v. Virendra Singh [ 1958 JLJ 752 ], in which it was held that where a consent decree is sought to be assailed on the ground either of fraud or collusion or both said to have been committed by a party to the suit and appropriate remedy is that of a suit and not application under section 151 CPC. In the case of Jagdish Prasad v. Nathuram [1983 MPWN 422], this Court has held that the application under section 151 of CPC for setting aside the decree on the ground of fraud is not maintainable because the Court has become functus officio after passing the decree. The decision of this Court in the case of Vijay Kumar v. Madhavrao [1964 JLJ 388] will not be applicable in the present facts and circumstances of the case. Here in the present case there was forgery of signature of the father of respondent No. 1 in withdrawing the suit, therefore, the application filed by respondent No.1 for restoration of suit is very much maintainable and the said application' cannot be dismissed on the ground that respondent No.1 is having a remedy to file a fresh suit. 14. Here in the present case there was forgery of signature of the father of respondent No. 1 in withdrawing the suit, therefore, the application filed by respondent No.1 for restoration of suit is very much maintainable and the said application' cannot be dismissed on the ground that respondent No.1 is having a remedy to file a fresh suit. 14. The trial Court has not committed any legal error in holding that once it is held in LPA No. 32/92, that there was a forgery of signature of the father of respondent No. 1 in the application for withdrawal of LPA vide its order dated 10.1.2005 and in identical circumstances application for withdrawal of suit was filed, therefore, allowed the MJCs and restored the suit by passing the impugned order. He has not committed any material irregularity or exceeded his jurisdiction. Only it can be said that he committed procedural irregularity in restoring the MJC No. 25/98 and MJC No. 31/98 (MJC No. 29/03) while allowing the MJC No. 3/2004. In MJC No. 3/2004 the respondent No. 1 prayed for setting aside the order dated 16.12.2003 by which MJC No. 29/03 was dismissed. Similarly in MJC No. 29/03 the respondent No. 1 prayed for setting aside the order dated 28.3.2001 by which MJC No. 25/98 was dismissed in default and in MJC No. 25/98 the respondent No.1 prayed for restoration of Civil Suit No. 3A/96 which was dismissed as withdrawn on 28.2.1997. It must be bear in the mind of the trial Court that suit was filed by the father of the respondent No. 1 in the year 1955 arid till today the matter is pending after a period of 52 years and the same has not been decided finally, looking to the exceptional facts and circumstances of the case and the conduct of the appellant who played forgery with the signature of the father of respondent No. 1 in filing an application for withdrawal of civil suit. Therefore, I do not find any legal error in restoring the suit. 15. The respondent No.1 during the pendency of MJC No. 3/2004 filed an application for consolidation of all the MJCs and deciding it simultaneously along with the case and for analogous hearing. Therefore, I do not find any legal error in restoring the suit. 15. The respondent No.1 during the pendency of MJC No. 3/2004 filed an application for consolidation of all the MJCs and deciding it simultaneously along with the case and for analogous hearing. The copy of the said application was supplied to the petitioner and petitioner submitted its reply and thereafter the learned trial Court considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case restored the suit by deciding all the MJCs vide impugned order dated 5.5.2005. By the impugned order no substantive right of the parties have been decided by the trial Court, only suit was restored and the technical objection rasied by the petitioner is not maintainable. He can contest the suit on merit which is pending since 1955. 16. The exercise of jurisdiction under section 115 CPC is not a matter of course. Even where an error of jurisdiction is committed by the Court below, but the action taken by it is not proved to have resulted in injustice, this Court be loath to interfere with it. The supervisory jurisdiction contained in section 115 CPC is intended to ensure that justice is done between the parties. The absence of substantial injury to the petitioner, irrespective of an error in procedure, or in exercise of jurisdiction by the Court below should be enough to decline relief to him in the proceedings I under section 115 CPC. This is what has been held by the Division Benches of the Allahabad High Court in the cases of Fatah Lal v. Sheresingh [AIR 1925 All. 264] and Mahavir Prasad v. Raghunath Saran [AIR 1934 All. 430] while dealing with matters arising out of execution proceedings in respect of exercise of jurisdiction under section 115 CPC. The Single Bench of this Court in the case of Rajan Shanna v. Rambabu Civil Revision No. 587/2000 vide order dated 20.11.2002 has observed the following: "As regards the question of jurisdiction is concerned, even though the order is without jurisdiction the power under section 115 CPC, cannot be exercise in this case. The powers under section 115 CPC are intended to be exercise with a view to sub-serve and not to defeat the ends of justice. The powers under section 115 CPC are intended to be exercise with a view to sub-serve and not to defeat the ends of justice. Where the order of the Court below is in the interest of justice, the High Court can refuse to interfere under section 115 CPC even if the Court below has no jurisdiction to pass such an order. The interference in revision is discretion and should be exercised only in the interest of justice and not in a case where interference is against the interest of justice. The order even if not regular may not be interfered with in revision if it is made irregularity or even improperly unless grave injustice or hardship would result from a failure to do so. Where the interference is likely to work not in the interest of justice but rather against it, the High Court will not interfere in its revisional jurisdiction. For this purpose reliance is placed on a judgment in the case of Ramswaroop Raghuwardayal and others v. Mataprasad Prabhudayal, reported in AIR 1952 Madhya Bharat 8. In the light of the said judgment this Court is not bound to interfere in each cases in which it is found that the subordinate Court has acted without jurisdiction. 17. The petitioner who is the beneficiary in the case played fraud upon the Court, therefore, the Division Bench of this Court directed for initiating criminal proceedings vide order dated 10.1.2005 which is upheld by the apex Court. Civil suit is of 1955 pending from last 52 years, therefore, the trial Court is directed to expedite the trial and decide it expeditiously as directed by the apex Court vide order dated 21.11.2005. 18. In view of the above, the revision filed by the petitioner has no merit and is accordingly dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.