Research › Search › Judgment

Punjab High Court · body

2007 DIGILAW 379 (PNJ)

Puran Singh v. Raghbeer Machinery Pvt. Ltd.

2007-03-08

RAJIVE BHALLA, VIJENDER JAIN

body2007
JUDGMENT (ORAL) Vijender Jain, J.- This letters patent appeal has been filed by the appellant workman aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Single Judge on 16.10.2002 in CWP No.6063 of 1987. The appellant joined the respondent -management as Milling Man on 12.9.1981. It has been further alleged that on 13.9.1982, he was detained in the office and threatened to submit his resignation. On his refusal he was removed from the job on 13.9.1982 and was not allowed to join the duties from 14.9.1982. On conciliation proceedings having failed, the industrial dispute regarding termination of the services of the workman was referred to the Labour Court for adjudication by the State Government. The Labour Court passed an award on 23.4.1987 holding that the workman was entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages. Aggrieved by the said award, the management filed the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, inter alia praying for setting aside the award. 2. After hearing counsel for the parties and perusing the record the learned Single Judge held that the Labour Court award could not be sustained. However, in view of the fact that the workman-respondent No.1 had been working with the petitioner for more than ten years it was held that it would not be fair to remove the workman. Consequently, it was directed that the workman would not be entitled to any benefit under the award of the Labour Court. Learned counsel for the workman has relied upon para 7 of the Full Bench judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Syed Yakoob v. Radhakrishanan and others, AIR 1964 Supreme Court 477, which reads as follows:- “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art.226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction , or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction , or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmisible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art.226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishque, 1955-1 SCR 1104:(S) AIR 1955 SC 233): Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 (AIR 1958 SC 398) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168”. 3. On the basis of the aforesaid judgment, it was contended before us that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, without returning a finding that the award of the Labour Court suffers from perversity, the learned Single Judge could not have set aside the award of the Labour Court. 4. We have heard the arguments at length advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. An order is said to be perverse or illegal if it fails to disclose a judicial application of mind, ignores the law etc. The mere absence of the word “perverse” in an order would not lead to an inference that the order set aside is not perverse. If an order, narrates the facts, the arguments advanced and the conclusions recorded therein, are sufficient to conclude non application of mind, disregard to the law etc. the mere absence of the word “perverse” or “perversity” would be immaterial. The learned Single Judge, took into consideration the interim orders passed by the trial Court on 10th of February 1983 and 27th of February 1983, which read as under: “10.2.1983: Written statement is not ready. Date is prayed at the stage. Representative of respondent states that the management is ready to take the worker on duty with continuity of the service with full back wages. The Court go into the matter. The worker agreed with the proposal of the management. So, he is directed to join the duty tomorrow i.e. 11.2.1983 at 9.00 A.M. Now to come up to report about duty by the workman on 21.2.1983 at Gurgaon.” “22.2.1983” On 10.2.1983, the worker was directed to join the duty as offered by the management. The Court go into the matter. The worker agreed with the proposal of the management. So, he is directed to join the duty tomorrow i.e. 11.2.1983 at 9.00 A.M. Now to come up to report about duty by the workman on 21.2.1983 at Gurgaon.” “22.2.1983” On 10.2.1983, the worker was directed to join the duty as offered by the management. The worker send letter to me that the respondent was not giving the job on 21.2.1983. The worker states inability to join because they are not offering any job to me and gets sits at the gate of the factory which he does not want. I also put a suggestion to accompany the L.I. But that to it was not accepted by the workman. Now to come up on 28.2.283 at Faridabad for rejoinder and issue.” From the aforesaid orders, it is manifestly clear that on 10.2.1983 the management was ready to take the workman on duty with continuity of service and full back wages. The workman also agreed to the proposal of the management. He was consequently directed to join duty. However, instead of joining duty the workman sent a letter that the management, instead of giving him a job, directed him to sit at the gate of the factory. The aforementioned order also records that the Labour Court offered to direct that the appellant be accompanied by a Labour Inspector. The appellant however, declined to accept the aforementioned offer. A workman cannot dictate terms, conditions and the nature of his duties. A workman cannot compel the management to assign duties as per his desire. We do not propose to dilate, on this subject any further. While passing its orders, workman’s conduct, as noticed hereinabove, ought to have weighed with the Labour Court. The Labour Court however, proceeded to pass orders without, giving due weightage to the aforementioned orders. Reliance by counsel for the appellant upon the findings returned by the Labour court are, therefore, misplaced. The observations made by the Labour Court, were not based on any material before it. In view of the fact, that the management had made an offer to the workman to resume his duties, the findings of the Labour Court were perverse and were rightly set aside by the learned Single Judge. Therefore, we do not find any illegality in the impugned judgment dated 16.10.1982 of the learned Single Judge. Dismissed. ———————