JUDGMENT By Court.-Sole appellant Rampreet Baraik stands convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to serve rigorous imprisonment for life, by the Additional Sessions Judge, Gumla in Sessions Trial No. 111 of 1995. 2. Brief facts leading to this appeal are that in the evening of 6th of December 1994, informant Phulmani @ Teresa Hurhuria was clearing her Khalihan along with deceased Roules Toppo situated in Mauza-Nowhatta, Police Station- Dumri, District-Gumla when the appellant entered in the Khalihan. Further stated, when the deceased asked the appellant to go to his house, all of a sudden, he took out a dagger from his waist and stabbed him twice. According to the informant, she raised alarms and tried to catch the appellant, but he could manage to flee away threatening her. The incident was seen by P.W. 5, P.W. 6, P.W. 7 and P.W. 8, her inlaws. Her husband died on the spot. The appellant had left his bicycle in the Khalihan itself. According to her version, the appellant has got grudge because he was earlier not allowed to assault a lady by the deceased, who hid herself in their house. 2A. The incident was reported to Dumri Police, which arrived at the spot next day in the morning and recorded the statement of P.W. 4 Phulmani, on the basis of which Dumri Police Station Case No. 39 of 1994 under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was registered against the appellant. Police arrested the appellant, prepared inquest report, and seized the bicycle from the place of occurrence as well as the dagger used in assault from the house of the appellant on his disclosure. Accordingly, charge sheet was submitted against him and he was put on trial after framing of charge on 1.9.1995. The appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed false prosecution and further that he was discharged from hospital on 6.12.1994. However, the learned trial court after examining the witnesses found and held him guilty for the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to serve rigorous imprisonment for life. 3. The present appeal has been preferred mainly on the grounds that the learned trial court has committed a mistake by placing reliance upon the interested witnesses.
3. The present appeal has been preferred mainly on the grounds that the learned trial court has committed a mistake by placing reliance upon the interested witnesses. It is also submitted that the confessional statement, on the basis of which weapon used in the offence is said to have been recovered from his house is not admissible in evidence as the seizure list witnesses have not supported the prosecution case. Mr. H.K. Shikarwar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, submitted that the weapon of assault was not sent for forensic examination. He criticized the first information report lodged after delay of nearly 18.00 hours, which according to him was the second information. Our attention was further drawn towards the contradictions in the manner in which the appellant is said to have been seen by witnesses fleeing from the place of occurrence. Therefore, the appellant, who has remained in custody from December 1994, may be acquitted of the charges. 4. We have gone through the materials on records to ascertain the submissions made on behalf of the appellant. The prosecution version depends upon testimony of the informant and her in-laws whose houses situated nearby. The informant has given details and the manner in which the appellant arrived at the place of occurrence and started to assault the deceased on advice that he should go back to his house. She has asserted that on her alarms, P.W. 5, P.W. 6, P.W. 7 and P.W. 8 arrived there who are natural and probable witnesses having their houses situated nearby as well as being the family members of the deceased. The informant has supported her version made in the fardbeyan next day. It has also come on record that the place of occurrence was situated at a distance of twenty kilometers from the Police Station and the incident is said to have taken place at 500 P.M.on 6th of December 1994. P.W. 11. Tarkeshwar Prasad Singh, A.S.1. had admitted that in absence of the officer-incharge Radhey Shyam Tiwari (P.W. 10) having received information about the murder, went to village Nowhatti and recorded the statement of the informant. He has proved the fardbeyan as Ext. 9. This witness has prepared the inquest report vide Ext. 10, seized bicycle from the place of occurrence vide Ext. 11 and bloodstained soil vide Ext. 4 in presence of witnesses.
He has proved the fardbeyan as Ext. 9. This witness has prepared the inquest report vide Ext. 10, seized bicycle from the place of occurrence vide Ext. 11 and bloodstained soil vide Ext. 4 in presence of witnesses. He further arrested the accused and brought him to Police Station. P.W. 10, the investigation officer took charge of the case when he returned in the evening of 17th of December 1994 and thereafter started investigating the case. He further recovered the dagger from the house of appellant in presence of P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 on his disclosure from the box of the appellant vide Ext. 2. He has admitted that he has not sent the said dagger for forensic examination. P.W. 9 has simply submitted charge sheet. 5. P.W. 1 is the doctor, who conducted the post-mortem examination on the dead body of Roules Toppo and found two deep stab wounds on the lower side on chest and abdomen resulting in his death. P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 have been witnessed on seizure list of the dagger Ext. 2 though they admitted in the cross-examination that their signatures were obtained by the police. 6. Eyewitnesses of the occurrence, P.W. 4 the informant, P.W. 5, P.W. 6, P.W. 7 and P.W. 8 have supported the prosecution case in details. P.W. 5, P.W. 6, P.W. 7 and P.W. 8 have seen the appellant fleeing from the place of occurrence. All of them have named the appellant as the assailant and having seen him fleeing from the place of occurrence. They have been cross-examined at length, but nowhere it could be brought on record that the appellant was being implicated falsely by these witnesses in absence of any apparent reason in false implication. P.W. 5 is the sister-in-law of the informant and the deceased. She was fetching water when she heard alarms arrived at the place of occurrence to see the appellant fleeing away. She admitted that village Chowkldar arrived at the place of occurrence immediately afterwards. P.W. 6 is the witness of the inquest report, seizure of the bloodstained soil and the bicycle vide Ext. 3, 4 and 5. He admitted that when he arrived at the place of occurrence, he was informed by P.W. 4 that the appellant has assaulted the deceased. According to him, all the persons present there were informed by P.W. 4 that appellant has stabbed the deceased.
3, 4 and 5. He admitted that when he arrived at the place of occurrence, he was informed by P.W. 4 that the appellant has assaulted the deceased. According to him, all the persons present there were informed by P.W. 4 that appellant has stabbed the deceased. P.W. 7 Stephen Toppo, is own brother of the deceased and he arrives at the place of occurrence on hulla raised by the informant. He further asserted that he has chased the appellant, who could manage to flee. During cross-examination, this witness has admitted that P.W. 6 has arrived after him. The defence has tried to question the identity of the appellant• by these witnesses which is apparently not tenable because of the fact that the appellant is also resident of same village and the incident took place at about 5.00 P.M. in December at this time darkness is not expected. P.W. 8 is the father of the informant, who admitted that he could not identify the assailant having been seen him, this shows that the witnesses are truthful and not tutored. 7. Having gone through the materials on record, we are of the view that the prosecution in the facts of the present case has been able to prove beyond doubts that appellant Rampreet Baraik stabbed the deceased Roules Toppo in the evening of 6.12.1994 resulting in his death. The learned trial court has considered all these facts and circumstances in the impugned judgment vide paragraphs- 5, 6, 7 and 9. We do not find any material reason to disagree with the view taken by the learned trial court. Accordingly, we find that the• appellant has been rightly found and held guilty for causing death of Roules Toppo. 8. At this stage, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant as per evidence on record, has assaulted the deceased without having made preparation in sudden fit of anger. In such circumstances, the appellant having remained in custody for more than twelve years, may be held guilty under Section 304 Part-I of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced accordingly. We have already discussed the circumstances in which the appellant stabbed the deceased. We find that the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant has got merit. The appellant having stabbed the deceased only on his request to go out of the Khalihan shows that he acted in sudden fits of anger.
We have already discussed the circumstances in which the appellant stabbed the deceased. We find that the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant has got merit. The appellant having stabbed the deceased only on his request to go out of the Khalihan shows that he acted in sudden fits of anger. Accordingly, we find that the ends of justice would be served adequately if the conviction of the appellant be altered to Section 304 Part-I of the Indian Penal Code and, accordingly, sentence of the appellant may be modified to rigorous imprisonment for ten years. 9. In the result, the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentence to serve rigorous imprisonment for life recorded by the learned Court below is hereby altered to one under Section 304 Part-I of the Indian Penal Code and he is sentenced to serve rigorous imprisonment for ten years, i.e. the period already undergone by him in custody. With the modification aforesaid the appeal is hereby dismissed. Let the appellant, who is in jail, be released from custody forthwith, if not wanted in any other case.