JUDGMENT 1. The solitary issue which crops up for consideration in the present first appeal filed at the instance of unsuccessful plaintiffs, viz., husband, sons and daughter of the deceased Basantidevi who died of electrocution, is whether the trial Court was justified in non-suiting them on the ground that the negligence of Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as "MPEB") was not proved in the suit for damages. 2. The relevant facts leading to aforesaid controversy is that on the fateful night of 10.7.1997 when the said Basantidevi came out of her house, came in contact with the live electric wire, in which the electricity was flowing and the electric shock received by Basantidevi, resulted in her death. A damage suit was filed in the Court of District Judge Bhind, registered as Civil Suit No. 9-N97 ED and a neighbour Naresh Soni and the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board were impleaded as the defendants. The averments were that Rajesh Soni had in clandestine monarch indulged in pilferage of the electricity and the wire which he used for siphoning the electricity has fallen down in the night and Basantidevi came in the contact unaware. It was also alleged before the trial Court that the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board was under an obligation to maintain properly the electric wires and to prevent it from any accidental fall, having failed in its statutory duty to maintain the same which resulted in the aforesaid accident. A total compensation of Rs.4,85,800/- was accordingly claimed against the respondents-defendants. The liability was denied by both the respondents. In the said suit, parties led the evidence. 3. The trial Court in its judgment rendered on 15.11.2000 held that under law of torts, the parties who claims damages is under an obligation to prove the negligence. It was held that since the appellants-plaintiffs have failed to discharge the aforesaid burden in proving the negligence of the respondents, the plaintiffs were non-suited. That being aggrieved of the aforesaid dismissal of suit, the plaintiffs have preferred the present appeal as indigent person. 4. The counsel for the appellants submitted that the trial Court committed a grave error by non-suiting the appellants on the ground that the negligence of the defendants-respondents was not proved by the appellants-plaintiffs. That being aggrieved of the aforesaid dismissal of suit, the plaintiffs have preferred the present appeal as indigent person. 4. The counsel for the appellants submitted that the trial Court committed a grave error by non-suiting the appellants on the ground that the negligence of the defendants-respondents was not proved by the appellants-plaintiffs. In furtherance of his argument it is contended that the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board being the statutory authority, under the Electricity Act, 1910 read with the Electric Supply Act, 1948, to transmit electric energy was negligent and omitted to use all reasonable care to keep the electricity harmless. It was urged that the standard of care required being high one owing to the dangerous nature of electricity and therefore the burden of proving that there was no negligence was on the M.P. Electricity Board and the appellants-plaintiffs were not under any obligation to prove the negligence of MPEB. It is, therefore, contended that the trial Court fell in patent error in shifting the burden to prove negligence on the appellants-plaintiffs. 5. The counsel for the appellants to bolster his submission placed reliance on the apex Court decision in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India [ AIR 1990 SC 1480 ]. While placing reliance on paragraph 134, it is urged that it is the strict liability of the MPEB to prove that they were not negligent in maintaining the electricity lines/wires and since the MPEB has failed to discharge its liability, the trial Court ought to have paid damages to the appellants. The appellants while relying upon the latest judgment of the apex Court rendered in M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari and others [ 2002(1) JLJ 240 = (2002)2 SCC 162 ], submitted that in India there is a mark departure from the conservative principles with regard to the liability of an enterprise carrying on hazardous or inherently dangerous activities. 6. Per contra, it is argued by the counsel for the MPEB that the appellants were under obligation to prove the negligence for the tortuous liability and since the appellants have failed to prove the same, no error is committed by the trial Court in dismissing claim for damages. 6. Per contra, it is argued by the counsel for the MPEB that the appellants were under obligation to prove the negligence for the tortuous liability and since the appellants have failed to prove the same, no error is committed by the trial Court in dismissing claim for damages. The counsel for the MPEB place reliance on the case of W.B. State Electricity Board and others v. Sachin Banarjee and others [ (1999)9 SCC 21 ], Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. Sumati and others [ (2000)4 SCC 543 ], SDO Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. and others v. Timudu Oram [ (2005)6 SCC 156 ] and also took us through the commentary on negligence at page 493, Law of Torts, 25 Edn., to bring home the argument that the theory of strict compliance is not attracted and the burden to prove the negligence even in respect of MPEB is on the claimant. Shri Navnidhi Parhaya, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1, while placing on record the copy of order dated 8.4.2004 passed in Criminal Appeal No.25/04 by the Sessions Judge, Bhind has submitted that the respondent No.1 in respect of the aforesaid incident was charged and tried for an offence under section 304A IPC and though was convicted by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, but the appellate Court vide order supra has acquitted him from the charges. Even otherwise, it is urged, that since there is no evidence of any negligence against the respondent No.1, the trial Court did not commit any error in rejecting the claim. 7. We have heard the counsel for the parties. 8. The question as posed in the beginning is whether the trial Court while ignoring the aspect of theory of strict compliance was correct in non-suiting the appellants-plaintiffs on the ground that they have failed to discharge their burden in proving the negligence of respondents-defendants and more particularly the MPEB. 9. Before we dwell upon to answer the aforesaid issue it is necessary to note various judgments of the apex Court on the issue of strict liability. 10. In the case of Charan Lal Sahu (supra), the apex Court was examining the constitutional validity of Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985. 9. Before we dwell upon to answer the aforesaid issue it is necessary to note various judgments of the apex Court on the issue of strict liability. 10. In the case of Charan Lal Sahu (supra), the apex Court was examining the constitutional validity of Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985. The said Act dealt with the claims arising out or connected with the disaster for compensation of damages for loss of life or any personal injury, or damage to the property etc. The apex Court while relying upon the case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India [ (1987)1 SCC 395 ], held in para 91 : "The question of liability was highlighted by this Court in M. C. Mehta's case (supra), where a Constitution Bench of this Court had to deal with the rule of strict liability. This Court held that the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (supra) laid down a principle that if a person who brings on his land and collects and keep there anything likely to do harm and such thing escapes and does damage to another, he is liable to compensate for the damage caused. This rule applies only to non-natural user of the land and does not apply to things naturally on the land or where the escape is due to an act of God and an act of a stranger or the default of the person injured or where the things which escape are present by the consent of the person injured or in certain cases where there is a statutory authority. There, this Court observed that the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (supra), evolved in the 19th century at a time when all the developments of science and technology had not taken place, and the same cannot afford any guidance in evolving any standard of liability consistent with the constitutional norms and the needs of the present day economy and social structure. In a modem industrial society with highly developed scientific knowledge and technology, where hazardous or inherently dangerous industries are necessary to be carried on as part of the developmental process, Courts should not feel inhibited by this rule merely because the new law does not recognize the rule of strict and absolute liability in case of an enterprise engaged in hazardous and dangerous activity. This Court noted that law has to grow in order to satisfy the needs of the fast changing society and keep abreast with the economic developments taking place in the country. Law cannot afford to remain static. This Court reiterated there that if it is found necessary to construct a new principle of liability to deal with an unusual situation which has arisen and which is likely to arise in future on account of hazardous or inherently dangerous industries which are concomitant to an industrial economy, the Court should not hesitate to evolve such principle of liability merely because it has not been so done in England. According to this Court, an enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry which poses potential threat to the health and safety of the person working in the factory and residing in the surrounding areas owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm results to anyone. The enterprise must be held to be under an obligation to provide that the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity in which it is engaged must be conducted with the highest standards of safety and if any harm results to anyone on account of an accident in the operation of such activity resulting, for instance, in escape of toxic gas the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate all those who were affected by the accident as part of the social cost for carrying on such activity, regardless of whether it is carried on carefully or not. Such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which operate vis-a-vis the tortious principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Pletcher (supra)." In paragraph 134 of Charan Lal Sahu (supra), Singh, J. while concurring with the majority view opined that : "As the law stands to-day, affected persons have to approach civil Courts for obtaining compensation and damages. In civil Courts, the determination of amount of compensation or damages as well the liability of the enterprise has been bound by the shackles of conservative principles laid down by the House of Lords in Ryland v. Fletcher [(1868)3 HL 330]. The principles laid therein made it difficult to obtain adequate damages from the enterprise and that too only after the negligence of the enterprise was proved. The principles laid therein made it difficult to obtain adequate damages from the enterprise and that too only after the negligence of the enterprise was proved. This continued to be the position of law till a Constitution Bench of this Court in M. C. Mehta v. Union of India [ (1987)1 SCC 395 = AIR 1987 SC 1086 ], commonly known as Sriram Oleum Gas Leak case evolved principles and laid down new norms to deal adequately with the new problems arising in a highly industrialised economy. This Court made judicial innovation in laying down principles with regard to liability of enterprises carrying hazardous or inherently dangerous activities departing from the rule laid down in Rylands v. Fletcher. The law so laid down made a landmark departure from the conservative principles with regard to the liability of an enterprise carrying on hazardous or inherently dangerous activities." 11. In the case of Shail Kumari (supra), the apex Court in furtherance to the aforesaid principle laid down in M.C. Mehta's (supra) case held : "8. Even assuming that all such measures have been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertakings. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The liability cast on such person is known, in law, as "strict liability". It differs from the liability which arises on account of the negligence or fault in this way i.e., the concept of negligence comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. If the defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm he cannot be held liable when the action is based on any negligence attributed. But such consideration is not relevant in cases of strict liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking precautions." 12. The conspectus of judgments referred to above thus leaves no iota of doubt that the MPEB, not only on the ground of negligence but on the principle of strict liability is liable to pay compensation to the appellants. 13. The conspectus of judgments referred to above thus leaves no iota of doubt that the MPEB, not only on the ground of negligence but on the principle of strict liability is liable to pay compensation to the appellants. 13. In the instant case we find from the statements of PW2, PW5, PW6 and the statement of Doctors PW3 and PW4 that the said Basantidevi died on electric shock which she received from the loose electric wires lying on the ground. The respondent-defendant No.1 in his statement recorded on 26.9.2000 in paragraph categorically stated that prior to the aforesaid incident he has lodged several complaints about unauthorized/illegal siphoning of the electricity but no action was taken by the MPEB to stop the aforesaid unauthorized act. Though the statement was given in defence but the same reflected the state of affair which existed regarding spurious siphoning of the electricity and the inaction on the part of the MPEB and though an Assistant Engineer was examined by the MPEB in its defence, however, there was no whisper even as to the maintenance and regular checking to stop such illegal and unauthorized activities. 14. The provisions contained under rules 26, 29, 44 and 45 of the Rules framed under the Electricity Supply Act, 1948 obligate the MPEB to conduct periodical inspection of the lines maintained by them and to take all such safety measures to prevent such accident and maintain the lines in such a manner that the life and property of the general public is not put to peril. In the instant case we find that the MPEB has utterly failed to discharge its statutory obligation, it cannot claim exoneration from paying damages in case of a death arising out of the accident due to electric shock from loose live electricity wire. 15. For the aforesaid reasons in our considered opinion the trial Court has grossly erred in holding that the liability to prove negligence was on the appellants-defendants, we accordingly set aside the judgment. 16. The appellants claimed compensation of Rs.4,85,800/-. However, there are no cogent and admissible evidence of the income earned by the deceased is brought on record. The trial Court after considering the entire evidence on record has assessed the income of the deceased of Rs.1,000/- per month. The conclusion drawn by the trial Court regarding the income is just and proper and we do not intend to interfere. The trial Court after considering the entire evidence on record has assessed the income of the deceased of Rs.1,000/- per month. The conclusion drawn by the trial Court regarding the income is just and proper and we do not intend to interfere. We accordingly award a lump sum compensation of Rs.2,00,000/- and grant simple interest thereon @ 6% per annum from the date of filing of the suit. 17. The first appeal is allowed to the extent above. However, with no order as to costs.