JUDGMENT B.D. Agarwal, J. 1. This First appeal is at the instant of the plaintiffs. The appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 17.1.2006, passed By the learned Addl. District Judge (PIC), Manipur West in Judicial Misc. Case No. 47 of 2005. By the said order of the learned trial court has rejected the prayer of the temporary injunction of the plaintiffs. 2. I have heard Mr. N. Ibotombi, learned Counsel for the appellants and Shri T. Rajendra, learned Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7. The other respondents, i.e., respondent Nos. 6 and 8 to 10 did not appeared despite notice. 3. Without delving the facts at length, suffice is to mention here that the appellants have instituted a suit praying for a decree of partition of the ancestral landed property and other consequential reliefs Along with the suit an application under Order 39, Rules 1, 2 and 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure was also filed praying for restraining the defendant No. 1/O.P No. 1 from making any new construction on the suit land shown in the schedule 'C'. The trial court was not inclined to grant ex parte injunction. Hence, notices were given to the opposite parties. The prayer for temporary injunction has been refused by the impugned order nearly after 3 (three) years of filing of the application. 4. From the impugned judgment and order I find that the prayer for temporary injunction has been rejected on the ground that the petitioners have failed to made out a prima facie case. The learned trial judge has also observed that the petitioners have also failed to show the stage of new construction on the disputed plot of land. 5. Shri N. Ibotombi, learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that the term prima facie case should not be construed in a narrow sense. In other words, it was the submission of the learned Counsel that if there is prima facie case for maintainability of the suit. It is also to be presumed that the plaintiffs are also having a prima facie case for the injunction. According to the learned Counsel since other criteria for granting injunction were not considered, it has to be presumed that the injunction has been refused only on one criteria and it is also not tenable in the eye of law. It is also to be presumed that the plaintiffs are also having a prima facie case for the injunction. According to the learned Counsel since other criteria for granting injunction were not considered, it has to be presumed that the injunction has been refused only on one criteria and it is also not tenable in the eye of law. In support of his submission, the learned Counsel has referred to the judgment of Kerala High Court given in the case of Vellakutty v. Karthyayani and Anr. AIR 1968 Ker. 179 and Judgment passed by the Judicial Commissioner of Manipur in the case of Kongbrailatpam Benimadhob Sharma v. Kongbrailatpam Madhsudon Sarma AIR 1969 kar 21. 6. In the aforesaid 2(two) judgments the relevant factors of granting injunction have been discussed. In the case of Manipur in addition to the criteria, like prima facie title to the property, likelihood of suffering irreparable injury and balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiffs, an additional criterion that there is need to maintain status quo of the property, has also been added. 7. On other hand. Shri T. Rajendra, learned Counsel appearing for few respondents, submitted that all the legal heirs of the predecessor-in-interest of the suit property are possessing their respective land on the basis of the partition that effected in the year 1950. The learned Counsel also submitted that the alleged construction is not been done by the defendant No. 1 but it is being made by the opposite party No. 2, and that too on some other patta land. In this way, there are some factual disputes also regarding the site of construction. 8. The learned Counsel for the respondent also submitted that ordinarily injunction can be granted if the party, seeking such an older, is found in possession of the properly. In contrary situation, prayer of injunction is ordinarily refused. In support of his submission, the learned Counsel cited the judgment of hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Bruce v. Silva Raj and Ors.. 9. I would like to make it clear that while considering an application for injunction, the court has to find out if the plaintiffs have a prima facie case. In support of his submission, the learned Counsel cited the judgment of hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Bruce v. Silva Raj and Ors.. 9. I would like to make it clear that while considering an application for injunction, the court has to find out if the plaintiffs have a prima facie case. While making an observation that the petitioners have failed to made out a prima facie case it would mean that the petitioners have not been able to make out a prima facie case for temporary injunction. Any such observation should not be confused with the prima facie case for instituting the suit, which in common parlance is known as cause of action. Cause of action means bundle of facts indicating some lis/dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant, which can be decided after a trial. 10. In the case of Shiv Kumar Chandha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ors. [1993] 3 SCR 522, the hon'ble Supreme Court has held that for getting a prohibitory order, like injunction, the petitioners have to be made out a strong prima facie case. Hence, there is a fine distinction between the prima facie case for maintaining an application for temporary injunction and for the main suit. Prima facie case for entertaining the suit for trial need not necessarily mean that there is also prima facie case for granting injunction. The plaintiff has to establish a weighty and higher degree of prima facie case for getting temporary injunction than what is required to get his suit accepted for trial. 11. Coming to the merit of the case, I find that the entire suit land originally belong to L. Tomba @ Tanjao Singh and the plaintiffs and defendants are his sons, grand-sons and great-grand children. It is also in the record that the predecessor-in-interest of the land died in the year 1942. There is also no dispute that all the legal heirs are occupying some area of the land. It is the case of the plaintiffs that in absence of any formal partition the legal heirs are not possessing equal area of the land and few legal heirs are also unduly benefited, who are occupying prime lands. Hence, the suit has been filed for partition of the entire land by meals and bounds. 12. It is the case of the plaintiffs that in absence of any formal partition the legal heirs are not possessing equal area of the land and few legal heirs are also unduly benefited, who are occupying prime lands. Hence, the suit has been filed for partition of the entire land by meals and bounds. 12. However, it is the ease of the defendants that the opposite parties are occupying their respective plot of land on the basis of partition that look place in the year 1950. Apparently, the suit for partition has been flied alter more than 50 (fifty) years of the death of their predecessor in interest. The immediate cause for Filing the suit is the alleged construction of a new house on one particular plot by the O.P. No. 1. Admittedly, the said O.P. No. 1 is possessing the plot of land, covered under Schedule 'C' since long time and his possession has not been disputed. 13. From the documents also I find that the majority of the legal heirs are on the defendants side and roughly only one third (l/3rd) of the legal heirs are the plaintiffs. In oilier words, a big group of legal heirs are still insisting that there was a family partition. In such a situation, it cannot be said that the observation of the trial court that the petitioners do not have a prima facie case for injunction is out of context and not based on materials. 14. It is true that the learned trial judge has not discussed other factors necessary to be established for obtaining a prohibitory order. I make it clear that even if it is held that the petitioners have a prima facie case both for the suit as well as injunction, still the petitioners were required to show that the balance of convenience was also in their favour and that they will suffer irreparable injury without an order of status quo. I have already mentioned earlier that majority of the legal heirs are in defendants side. It also appears from the record that all the legal heirs are possessing one portion of the suit land. In this way, it is not the case of the petitioners that they have been totally deprived of any share of the landed property by the defendants. Hence, the balance of convenience is certainly in favour of the appellants. 15. It also appears from the record that all the legal heirs are possessing one portion of the suit land. In this way, it is not the case of the petitioners that they have been totally deprived of any share of the landed property by the defendants. Hence, the balance of convenience is certainly in favour of the appellants. 15. Similarly, it is also difficult to hold that the petitioners/appellants would suffer irreparable injury inasmuch as the respondent Nos. 1 or 2 are making certain constructions on the part of the land, which is in their possessing since long besides this, the petitioners have not made out a prima facie case that in the eventuality of perfect partition they are likely to get the same plot of land, wherein some constructions have been undertaken by the O.P. No. 1. Above all in the eventuality of getting a decree of partition the plaintiffs would get their respective shares, including structures thereon. In other words, the third criterion for getting injunction also does not appear sound in the present case. 16. It is true that the learned trial judge has also observed in the impugned order that the petitioners have failed to show the stage of the construction. In my considered opinion, it was not a relevant factor for deciding an application for injunction. Hence, this observation can only be termed as a passing remark. 17. In the case of Shew Prasad Saha Kalwar and Ors. v. Chief Secretary, Govt. of Assam and Ors. 2002 (2) GLT 51 a Division Bench of the Gauahti High Court has observed that the appellate court should not interfere in the order of the trial court in absence of any manifest illegality. The relevant observations made in the aforesaid decision arc reproduced below: 8. Before we proceed further, though it is not necessary, yet, to make the grounds clear, we should hear in mind the power of the appellate court to interfere with the order of injunction. That matter now no longer is res integra in view of the Single Bench decision of this Court reported in 1997 (1) GLT 282 : (1997) 2 GLR 424 (Yumnam Yaima Singh and Anr. v. Ingoam Jugin Singh and Ors.) and [Wander Ltd. and Anr. v. Antox India (P.) Ltd.]. That matter now no longer is res integra in view of the Single Bench decision of this Court reported in 1997 (1) GLT 282 : (1997) 2 GLR 424 (Yumnam Yaima Singh and Anr. v. Ingoam Jugin Singh and Ors.) and [Wander Ltd. and Anr. v. Antox India (P.) Ltd.]. The Supreme Court pointed out that the appellate court will have the power to interfere with the decision of the trial court only when it can be shown that the trial court exercised the discretion arbitrarily or capriciously or perversely or where it can be shown that the trial court ignored the settled principle of law regulating grant to refusal of interlocutory injunctions. 18. After going through the impugned order and other documents annexed with the appeal, it is difficult on my part to hold that the learned trial judge has acted arbitrarily or that he has failed to exercise his discretion judiciously. 19. In the result, I do not find any merit in the appeal, the appeal is dismissed.