ORDER Appellant seeks to assail the conviction and sentence passed by the learned IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam convicting him under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing him to suffer R.I. for a period of 2 years and further sentencing him to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default to suffer S.I. for one month. 2. The gravamen of the charge against the appellant-accused was that on 06-09-2000 at about 10.30 p.m., at Poothivari street, he caused a knife injury on the left side stomach of one Pinnintla Ramireddy (P.W. 1) with an intention to kill him and thereby committed the offence punishable under Section 307 Indian Penal Code. The V Metropolitan Magistrate, Visakhapatnam committed the case to the Court of Sessions upon which, the Sessions Court took cognizance and made over this case to IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam. After framing the Charge, the learned Judge conducted the trial. During the course of trial, 7 witnesses were examined on the side of the prosecution and Exs. P-1 to P-4 and M.O. 1 were marked. None was examined on the side of the accused. 3. The case of the prosecution was, that P.W. 1 is a driver by profession and is a resident of Poothivari Street, Visakhapatnam. The youngsters of that street formed into an association under the name and style of 'Youngsters Association'. The Association performed Ganesh festival. There was immersion ceremony at about 8 p.m., and in connection therewith, all of them went to R.K. Beach for the said purpose. P.W.1 also followed them. After the immersion of Ganesh idol at about 10 p.m. they came back to their colony. The appellant-accused, who is an auto driver, is also a resident of Poothivari Street. He was also among the youngsters who went to R.K. Beach for the purpose of immersion. P.Ws.1,2, 3and one Ramanaand Ravi Kumar along with the accused, returned to the colony about 10 p.m. and therE?after, they assembled at Sainik Auto Stand. The accused abused P.W. 2 in the name of his caste. P.W. 2 then slapped the accused. Immediately, one D. Konda beat P.W. 2. There ensued a quarrel. P.W. 1 tried to pacify the matter. Atthat time, the appellant-accused beat P.W. 2. P.W. 1 intervened to rescue P.W. 2 and requested the appellant-accused and another person by name Konda not to beat P.W. 2. P.W. 2 then slapped the accused. Immediately, one D. Konda beat P.W. 2. There ensued a quarrel. P.W. 1 tried to pacify the matter. Atthat time, the appellant-accused beat P.W. 2. P.W. 1 intervened to rescue P.W. 2 and requested the appellant-accused and another person by name Konda not to beat P.W. 2. However, the accused warned P.W.1 not to interfere and pushed him aside. Despite the same. P.W. 1 separated the accused and P .W. 2. Thereafter, the accused rushed to his house, brought a knife and stabbed P.W.1 on the left side of his abdomen on account of which, P.W. 1 sustained bleeding injury. PW. 3 shifted PW.1 to Seven Hills Hospital in an auto. The accused left the knife at the scene of offence. P.W. 3 picked up the knife and brought the same to the Hospital. P.W.1 was admitted in the Hospital at about 11.35 p.m. on the same day. P.W. 5, Doctor, examined him and found the external injury of 1.2" x 1" sharp edged wound on the left side of middle of abdomen going deep into the abdominal cavity and omentum protruding out. According to PW. 5, the injury sustained by P.W.1 could have been caused with a knife like M.O. 1. On a message through VHF, from II Town Police Station, P.W. 6A.S.1. rushed to the Seven Hills Hospital. P .W. 6 recorded the statementofP.W.1 and obtained endorsement of the duty doctor on the same. In return, he informed P.W. 7 the Inspector of Police over phone from the Hospital about the incident. He then left the Hospital for police Station by which time, P.W. 7 the Inspector of Police registered the crime on Ex. P-1 statement under Section 307 Indian Penal Code at about 2 a.m., on 7-9-2000 and issued Ex. P-4 FIR. He then left the station for the scene of offence at about 5 a.m., examined the scene and got Ex. P-2 observation Report drafted there in the presence of P.W. 4 and another. He drew a rough sketch at the scene of offence and secured the presence of witnesses. He examined P.W.3 and others and recorded their statements. At the time P.W. 3 handed over the knife M.O.1 to him. On 11-9-2000, on a reliable information, P.W. 7 the Inspector of Police, arrested the accused and sent him to the Court for remand. He drew a rough sketch at the scene of offence and secured the presence of witnesses. He examined P.W.3 and others and recorded their statements. At the time P.W. 3 handed over the knife M.O.1 to him. On 11-9-2000, on a reliable information, P.W. 7 the Inspector of Police, arrested the accused and sent him to the Court for remand. Eventually, after completion of investigation, he laid the charge sheet. 4. The plea of appellant-accused was one of denial. 5. in support of the Charge, the prosecution seeks to rely upon the oral evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 and the material object M.O. 1, knife. P.W. 1 is no other than the injured witness. PW. 2 is witness who slapped the accused first; on account of which, a quarrel ensued. P.W. 3, who is no other than the brother of PW. 2, took the injured P.W. 1 to the Hospital and it is he who handed over the knife said to have been left by the accused at the scene of offence by picking it up to the police. P.W. 4 is the mediator. P.W. 5 is the doctor who examined P.W. 1 and found stab injury on the abdomen of P.W. 1. P.Ws. 6and 7 are the A.S.1. and Inspector of Police who recorded the statement of P.W. 1 and who conducted investigation respectively. 6. The oral testimonies of P.Ws. 1 to 3 remain to be appreciated by the Court. There has been no motive for perpetration of the crime. Even as per the case unfolded by the witnesses; the quarrel that ensued was in between P.W. 2 and the accused. P.W. 1 only wanted to pacify them and tried to separate them, despite the warning given by the accused. It is only at the stage, the accused is said to have rushed to the house and brought the knife and stabbed P.W. 1. This was spoken to by P Ws. 1,2 and 3 consistently. It was suggested to P.W. 1 in the cross-examination that he was in a drunken condition fell upon a knife and thereby sustained injury. The suggestion was emphatically denied. Nothing has been elicited in the cross-examination. No ill-will or motive has been suggested to any of these witnesses, which is said to have prompted them to speak falsehood against the appellant-accused. The suggestion was emphatically denied. Nothing has been elicited in the cross-examination. No ill-will or motive has been suggested to any of these witnesses, which is said to have prompted them to speak falsehood against the appellant-accused. No compellihg reasons have thus been elicited from the cross-examination of these witnesses so as to disbelieve their testimonies. The oral evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 therefore, remains unshaken in the cross-examination. 7. Learned Counsel for the appellant accused represents that there is a serious discrepancy in the evidence of P. W. 3 and the evidence of P.Ws. 6 and 7. P.W. 3 and 7. P. W. 3 admitted in the cross-examination that his statement was recorded by the police four days after the incident. However, in the chief examination, it was stated that he handed over the knife to the police at the Hospital. P.W. 7 on the other hand deposed that at about 5 a. m., he reached the scene of offence, prepared a crime detailed form under Ex. P-2 and then after having secured the presence of witnesses, he examined them including P.W. 3 who handed over the knife to him at the time of recording his statement. Therefore, from the evidence of P.W. 7, it is obvious that he examined P.W. 3atthesceneatabout5a.m., in the early hours of7 -9-2000 when he recovered M.O.1 knife from him. Whereas P.W. 3 stated in the evidence in the Chief that he handed over the knife to the police in the police station but in the cross-examination, he stated that his statement was recorded four days after the incident. This discrepancy emerges from the evidence of P.Ws. 3 and 7. One thing is obvious from the evidence of these two witnesses that M.O. 1 was recovered when P .W. 3 handing over the same to the police on the intervening night of 6/7-9-2000. Whether it was at the hospital or at the scene of offence is the next question to be considered. The statement said to have been made by P. W. 3 in the cross-examination at the end that his statement was recorded four days after the incident, cannot be given much credence having regard to the evidence of P.Ws. 6 and 7. P.W. 3 obviously accompanied the injured to the hospital and got him admitted. The statement said to have been made by P. W. 3 in the cross-examination at the end that his statement was recorded four days after the incident, cannot be given much credence having regard to the evidence of P.Ws. 6 and 7. P.W. 3 obviously accompanied the injured to the hospital and got him admitted. He was present when P. W. 6 recorded the statement of P. W. 1 and he was present when the Inspector of police visited the scene of offence and examined the witnesses. There was no point for the Investigating Officer to have postponed his examination when he recorded the statement of other witnesses. The admission on the part of P. W. 3 seems to have been made during the stress of the cross-examination. There are no compelling reasons as to why the evidence of P.W. 7 shall not be accepted in this regard. Therefore, much credence need not be attached to such a statement made by P.W. 4 in the cross-examination, particularly, when recovery of knife is made and when he handed over the same to the police is not in doubt, which was the consistent version of P.Ws. 3 and 7. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant-accused that this discrepancy goes to the root of the matter and makes the case doubt ful, merits no consideration. Barring this, nothing has been argued before me about the credibility of the witnesses P.Ws. 1 to 3 and on the factum of the incident. The testimonies of P.Ws. 1 to 3 are consistent. Therefore, the oral evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 inspires confidence of the Court. The learned IV Additional District and Sessions Judge appreciated their evidence in a right perspective and accepted the same. I see no compelling reason to differ with him. The oral testimony of P. Ws. 1 to 3 clearly brings home the guilty to the appellant-accused. 8. Coming to the recovery of M.O.1-knife, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant-accused that the knife-M.O. 1 contained no blood stains and therefore, it cannot be connected to any crime. Nothing has been elicited in the cross-examination of P.Ws. 3 and 7 about the bloodstains on the knife. P.W. 1 knife was not sent to Forensic Science Laboratory for chemical examination. That appears to be a lapse on the part of the Investigating Officer. Nothing has been elicited in the cross-examination of P.Ws. 3 and 7 about the bloodstains on the knife. P.W. 1 knife was not sent to Forensic Science Laboratory for chemical examination. That appears to be a lapse on the part of the Investigating Officer. But that does not mean that knife did not contain any blood stains. The circumstances of recovery of M.O. 1 knife which according to medical opinion of P.W. 4 is possible to have inflicted the injury on P.W.1 will lend any amount of support to the oral evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3. Therefore, it is a clear case that the prosecution is able to bring home the guilt to the appellant-accused. 9. The question that falls for determination at this juncture is as to what exactly the offence has been made out. P.W. 1 sustained a stab injury on his abdomen. According to the evidence of P.W. 4, it was a grievous injury. As a mater of fact, the medical evidence is always in the nature of opinion. Section 320 of Indian Penal Code postulates the types of injuries which can be considered as grievous. Clause 8 thereof says that, if the injured , suffers pain for a period of 20 days on account of the injury sustained; notwithstanding the fact that it was not covered by clauses 1 to 7; it can be considered as grievous. Obviously, the type of injuries sustained by P.W. 1 has not been covered by any of the clauses 1 to 7. Although P.W.1 was admitted into the hospital as inpatient, he was discharged from the hospital after 13 days. No evidence has been adduced on the side of the prosecution to show that he suffered pain on account of the injury for a period of 20 days or the injury is such that, it endangers the life. Therefore, even clause 8 has been attracted in the instant case. It is not known as to how P.W. 4- the Doctor could have opined that the injury sustainedbyP.W.1 was grievous. No reasons were shown to have been assigned by him in support of his opinion. Therefore, that opinion cannot be considered so as to reach the conclusion that the injury sustained by P.W.1 is grievous in nature. It is not known as to how P.W. 4- the Doctor could have opined that the injury sustainedbyP.W.1 was grievous. No reasons were shown to have been assigned by him in support of his opinion. Therefore, that opinion cannot be considered so as to reach the conclusion that the injury sustained by P.W.1 is grievous in nature. The Court below convicted the appellant-accused for the offence punishable under Section 326 of Indian Penal Code instead of Section 307 of the said Code. 10. In view of the above discussion, even Section 326 does not attract. The facts clearly attract and show that it is a case of Section 324 Indian Penal Code but not 326 of the Code. Therefore, the conviction of the appellant-accused shall be altered to one punishable under Section 324 Indian Penal Code instead of Section 326 of Indian Penal Code. 11. The limitation prescribed for taking cognizance under Section 426 of the Criminal Procedure Code is a period not exceeding 3 years. Having regard to the facts of this case and the fact that the appellant was charged initially under Section 307 of Indian Penal Code and the trial Court converted the same into one under' Section 326 of Indian Penal Code, this Court is of the view that it is an offence under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code. The facts rarely warrant the invocation of Section 473 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The delay can be properly explained on account of passage of time during which the case was transferred from trial Court to the appellate Court. The interest of justice and the interest of society shall have to be considered. For the above reasons, the period of limitation can be extended under Section 473 of Criminal Procedure Code. 12. The Appeal is allowed in part and the appellant-accused is convicted for the offence punishable under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code instead of 326 of the Indian Penal code. 13. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant-accused on the quantum of sentence to be imposed. Sentence shall be always commensurate with the gravity of offence. 12. The Appeal is allowed in part and the appellant-accused is convicted for the offence punishable under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code instead of 326 of the Indian Penal code. 13. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant-accused on the quantum of sentence to be imposed. Sentence shall be always commensurate with the gravity of offence. Having regard to the background of the case under which the offence is said to have been perpetrated, the antecedents of the appellant and the nature of the injury sustained by the victim and as the facts disclose that the victim in this case tried to interfere in between the appellant-accused and P.W. 2 so as to separate them for the purpose of ensuring peace, and it is at that stage, the appellant is said to have gone into his house and brought the knife and stabbed the victim and the manner in which the offence is perpetrated all cumulatively do not warrant any lenient view and the provisions of Section 360 of the Cr. P .C. and Sections 3 and 4 of Probation of Offenders Act cannot be invoked. No other evidence is available on record to show any bad antecedents or previous conviction on the side of the appellant-accused. The appellant accused is an auto driver. Even P. W. 1 is also a driver. All of them belong to one locality. In that view of the matter, the sentence to suffer one year imprisonment, in my considered view, would meet the ends of justice. 14. The appellant-accused is, therefore, sentenced to suffer R.1. for one year besides confirming the sentence of line imposed by the trial Court. The bail bonds of the appellant accused shall stand cancelled and he shall surrender to see the rest of the sentence after giving credit to the period as already undergone and under trial-prisoner and as a convict hit her to.