JUDGMENT M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J. 1. This case has got a chequered history. Diplal Singh, a watchman working under M/s. Bararee Coke Plant, was terminated by the management by the notice dated 12.10.1971 with effect from 19.10.1971. The said Coke Plant was taken over by the Central Government under the Emergency Provision Act through Gazette dated 23.12.1971 giving retrospective effect from 16.10.1971. A dispute was raised by the workman after about 9 years of termination. Consequently, the Central Government referred the dispute to the Tribunal. M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Limited, the present employer, contested the matter contending that Diplal Singh, the workman, was not the workman under them since the management of M/s. Bararee Coke Plant was taken over by the Central Government only on 27.12.1971 by a notification and in the meantime, the workman was terminated even as early as on 19.10 1971 and at the time of taking over of the management, the workman was not on the roll of the former employer, M/s. Bararee Coke Plant. It was also contended that M/s. Bararee Coke Company, the erstwhile employer, was not impleaded as a party and therefore, the reference is not maintainable. However, after enquiry, the Tribunal, by the award dated 12.1.1983, found in favour of the workman and held that the workman continued to be the employee of M/s. Bararee Coke Plant and further held that the order of termination was not passed in accordance with law and as such, it is illegal. The Tribunal also directed for the reinstatement of the workman, Diplal Singh, with back wages with effect from 1.5.1972, the date on which the Coking Coal Mines were placed under M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Limited under the Act, 1972. The appellant-management challenged the award before the Patna High Court in writ petition, being C.W.J.C No. 686/1983R. A Single Bench of this Court, vide its order dated 18.7.1989, allowed the writ petition, quashing the award mainly holding that the reference was invalid as the erstwhile employer who had terminated the service of the workman was not impleaded. Thus, the writ petition was allowed and the award dated 12.1.1983 passed by the Tribunal was quashed. 2. The workman represented by Rashtriya Colliery Mazdoor Sangh, challenging the order dated 18.7.1989 passed by the learned Single Judge, filed an appeal before the Division Bench in L.P.A No. 96/1989R. Thus, the writ petition was allowed and the award dated 12.1.1983 passed by the Tribunal was quashed. 2. The workman represented by Rashtriya Colliery Mazdoor Sangh, challenging the order dated 18.7.1989 passed by the learned Single Judge, filed an appeal before the Division Bench in L.P.A No. 96/1989R. The Division Bench of this Court, by its order dated 21.9.1998, allowed the appeal holding that M/s. Bararee Coke Company Ltd., the erstwhile employer, could not have terminated the service of the workman with effect from 19.10.1971 in its own right because it was divested of all its rights and powers of management even prior to the said date. The Division Bench gave a finding that the erstwhile employer, M/s. Bararee Coke Company Ltd. Was not a necessary party to the reference and therefore, the award of the Tribunal can be considered on merit by the learned Single Judge and thereby remanded the matter to the learned Single Judge for a decision on merit in accordance with law. 3. After remand, the case was heard by the learned Single Judge. Ultimately, learned Single Judge, by the order dated 7.10.1999, upheld the award passed by the Tribunal so far as it relates to termination of service of the concerned workman. However, the learned Single Judge held that since the workman raised the industrial dispute after more than 9 years, he would be entitled to back wages not from 1.5.1972, but from the date of the award, i.e. 12.1.1983. Thus, the award of the Tribunal was modified to the extent that besides reinstatement, the workman was allowed to be entitled to back wages with effect from the date of the award. With such modification, the writ petition, C.W.C.J No. 686/1983R, was allowed in part. 4. The appellant-management had challenged the said order dated 7.10 1999 and filed an appeal in L.P.A No. 498/99R before the Division Bench. The management in the appeal again raised the question of maintainability of the reference and the legality of the award passed by the Tribunal contending that the reference is invalid in the absence of impleading erstwhile employer, M/s. Bararee Coke Company Ltd., who had terminated the service of the workman, apart from other grounds. The management in the appeal again raised the question of maintainability of the reference and the legality of the award passed by the Tribunal contending that the reference is invalid in the absence of impleading erstwhile employer, M/s. Bararee Coke Company Ltd., who had terminated the service of the workman, apart from other grounds. The Division Bench felt that M/s. Bararee Coke Company Ltd., the erstwhile employer, had a right to act of their own till 22.12.1971 and as such, the termination would be considered to have been made by the erstwhile employer and not by the present employer and raising the said doubt, the Division Bench, by its order dated 11.7.2002, referred the matter to Full Bench to decide the issue and correctness of the finding of the earlier Division Bench rendered in L.P.A No. 96/1989R with reference to absence of the necessary party. The Full Bench, by the order dated 20.8.2003, allowed the appeal and quashed the award of the Tribunal, accepting the view of the Division Bench, which referred to Full Bench, and held that the award cannot be upheld in the absence of impleadment of necessary party. Aggrieved by this, the workman represented by Rashtriya Colliery Mazdoor Sangh filed an appeal in Civil Appeal No. 4589/2004 before the Supreme Court. The Honble Supreme Court, taking strong exception of the attitude of the Full Bench in deciding about the issue with reference to the impleadment of the necessary party, which has already attained finality in the order of the earlier Division Bench, set aside the said order passed by the Full Bench and remanded the matter to the Division Bench by the order dated 27.10.2005, asking this Division Bench to go into the other questions relating to the entitlement to the benefits under Section 17 etc. In the said order, it was specifically stated that there is no liberty to the parties to reagitate the points already decided. That is how, the matter has come before this Court on the basis of the remand order passed by the Supreme Court. 5. As indicated above by the Supreme Court order, we are not deciding the issue with reference to the impleadment of the necessary party, which has been raised as a main question in this appeal. That is how, the matter has come before this Court on the basis of the remand order passed by the Supreme Court. 5. As indicated above by the Supreme Court order, we are not deciding the issue with reference to the impleadment of the necessary party, which has been raised as a main question in this appeal. As it has attained finality in the earlier order passed by the earlier Division Bench, we are only concerned with other points including the point of entitlement to the benefits under Section 17 of the Act. 6. Counsel for the appellant, though referred to the points relating to Section 17 of the Act, would mainly contend that the finding of the learned Single Judge confirming the award is not justified in view of the fact that the learned Single Judge has failed to consider the evidence available that the workman immediately after retrenchment, accepting the same, has received the retrenchment compensation and on the other hand, learned Single Judge found that there is no such evidence available. Counsel for the appellant also pointed out the various depositions given by the witnesses. 7. We have gone through the depositions as well as the finding of the Tribunal. 8. On going through the depositions, it is clear that no sufficient material was placed by the management to establish that the retrenchment compensation had been paid and the same has been received by the workman. As a matter of fact, the stand of the management through its witnesses with reference to the same is not consistent. Therefore, the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal, which has been confirmed by the learned Single Judge, in our view, cannot be said to be unjustified. 9. As pointed out by the learned Single Judge, the Coking Plant was taken over on 7.12.1971 by virtue of the Emergency Provisions Act but the said Act was made effective with effect from 17.10.1971. Admittedly, M/s. Bararee Coke Company Ltd. retrenched the workman, Diplal Singh, only with effect from 19.10.1971 through the notice dated 12.10.1971. There is no dispute in the fact that Coking Coal Mines (Emergency Provision) Ordinance was given effect from 17.10.1971, i.e before the termination notice became effective. Therefore, the learned Single Judge has correctly concluded that the crucial date of termination must be considered to be 19.10.1971, i.e. after the Coking Coal Mines (Emergency Provision) Ordinance came into effect. There is no dispute in the fact that Coking Coal Mines (Emergency Provision) Ordinance was given effect from 17.10.1971, i.e before the termination notice became effective. Therefore, the learned Single Judge has correctly concluded that the crucial date of termination must be considered to be 19.10.1971, i.e. after the Coking Coal Mines (Emergency Provision) Ordinance came into effect. So, these things would make it clear that as referred to in Section 17 of the Act, on and from the appointed date every person, who was in the employment of the Plant, became an employee of the Central Government or the Government Company, on the same terms and conditions of service. Therefore, the finding given by the learned Single Judge that the retrenchment was not justified and as such, he is entitled for reinstatement with back wages from the date of the award is perfectly legal and justified. As indicated above, learned Single Judge has correctly modified the award to the extent that the workman is entitled to back wages not from 1972 but only from 1983, the date of the award as he has not raised the dispute within a reasonable time. 10. Counsel for the appellant would ultimately request this Court to modify the said award further to the extent that the workman would not be entitled to back wages from the date of the award but utmost he would be entitled to 50% of the back wages from the date of the award. 11. We find force in the said contention, as the similar submission was made before the Supreme Court. While dealing with the said question, the Supreme Court in the case of Management of Madurantakam COOP. Sugar Mills Ltd. v. S. Viswanathan , accepted the said submission and ordered for 50% back wages. The relevant portions of the observations made by the Supreme Court are as follows: 17. This takes us to the consideration of the next argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant who submitted that the direction of the Tribunal granting full back wages is highly onerous, in the background of the fact that the appellant management is in a state of financial crisis. He submitted that there is material to show that the respondent workman during his period of non-employment with the appellant management was gainfully employed elsewhere. He submitted that there is material to show that the respondent workman during his period of non-employment with the appellant management was gainfully employed elsewhere. Therefore, now that the respondent workman is entitled to his gratuity and other retrial benefits, the direction to pay the full back wages may be modified. 19. We have anxiously considered the argument addressed by both sides in regard to the quantum of back wages to be paid to the workman. It is an undisputed fact that the workman had since attained the age of superannuation and the question of reinstatement does not arise. Because of the award, the respondent workman will be entitled to his retiral benefits like gratuity etc. and accepting the statement of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant Mills that it is undergoing a financial crisis, on the facts of this case, we think it appropriate that the full back wages granted by the Labour Court be reduced to 50% of the back wages. In addition the respondent workman will also be entitled to all other retiral benefits as if he was in service throughout the period when his services were discharged. 12. The aforesaid two paragraphs, in our view, would apply to the present facts of the case in all fours. Accordingly, the order passed by the learned Single Judge is modified to the extent that the respondent-workman is entitled to 50% of the back wages from the date of the award, apart from other benefits including retiral benefits. With these observations, this appeal is disposed of.