JUDGMENT Rule returnable forthwith. Heard finally with consent of parties. The petitioner has questioned the validity of the order dated 01.11.2003 below Ex. 1 passed by Civil Judge, Jr. Dn., Telhara, affirmed in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 19 of 2005 by the Additional District Judge, Akot. While dismissing the appeal the Additional District Judge directed the petitioner/plaintiff to make good the deficit Court-Fee of Rs. 3,215.00 within a period of fifteen days. The petitioner, who is original plaintiff, had filed a suit seeking the reliefs - (i) specific performance of contract; (ii) permanent injunction; and (iii) cancellation of sale-deed in favour of defendant No. 2. The sale-deed in favour of defendant No. 2 was valued at Rs. 97,000/-. The trial Court found that the valuation of the suit went to the extent of Rs. 01,18,000/- as the valuation swelled because of the sale-deed which was valued at Rs. 97,000/-. The trial Court, therefore, ordered return of the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. That order came to be challenged by filing Misc. Civil Appeal before the Additional District Judge, Akot. The Additional District Judge held that the value of the property which was transferred in favour of defendant No. 2, being Rs. 97,000/-, the total valuation had gone up to Rs. 1,18,000/- which is beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of Civil Judge, Jr. Dn., and therefore the plaint was directed to be returned by the trial Court for want of pecuniary jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Courts below erred in correctly applying the law and, therefore, the order directing return of the plaint is erroneous. In support of her submission, the learned counsel relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Dilip Bastimal Jain v. Baban Bhanudas Kamble reported in 2001 (3) Mh. L.J. 730 wherein in para 12 this Court has held as under : "Having heard the parties at length, it is necessary to note that in order to decide the question relating to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court, what is required to be seen is the allegations made, and relief claimed in the plaint. The allegations made in the plaint, if perused, it will be clear that the suit in question is nothing but a suit seeking substantive relief of specific performance of contract. The allegations made in the plaint, if perused, it will be clear that the suit in question is nothing but a suit seeking substantive relief of specific performance of contract. The declaration of the invalidity of the sale-deed in favour of the subsequent transferees, i.e. the relief against defendant Nos. 6, 13 and 14 is nothing but an ancillary relief. If the plaintiff is able to establish his case of the specific performance against the defendant No. 1 (Respondent No. 1) then it would be enough, if the defendants Nos. 6, 13 and 14 are joined as parties, to the suit because the only decree to be passed in the suit for specific performance against the subsequent transferees would be to ask them to join in conveyance with the defendant No. 1 - owner. In that sense, it was not necessary at all for the plaintiff to ask for any such declaration as he did. It would have been enough for the plaintiff to have joined them as co-defendants so as to contend that the subsequent sale-deeds were not binding on him. The argument of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the relief of declaration prayed for against the defendant Nos. 6, 13 and 14 was required to be valued in terms of money has, therefore, to be rejected." In view of the statement of law pronounced in paragraph 12 of the said judgment, it is clear that the impugned orders are erroneous. The trial Court has wrongly returned the plaint on the ground that it did not possess the pecuniary jurisdiction. Both the impugned orders are, therefore, quashed and set aside. The Court of Civil Judge, Jr. Dn., at Telhara will have the jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (1). No order as to costs.