JUDGMENT Honble Tarun Agarwala, J.—Heard Shri Shishadri Trivedi, the learned Counsel holding the brief of Sri Samir Sharma, the learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri B.N. Tripathi, the learned Counsel holding the brief of Sri A.K. Verma, the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. 2. The respondent No. 1 is a workman under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act and was working in the diesel room of the Central Workshop of the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and, while coming out from the security gate, was stopped and physically checked in presence of witnesses, and was caught taking out certain articles belonging to the Corporation, having a value. On the charge of an alleged theft, the workman was initially placed under suspension and thereafter charge-sheeted. 3. It has come on record that a First Information Report was also lodged against the workman. The workman denied the charge and, accordingly, the management decided to hold a domestic enquiry in the matter. It was contended that full opportunity was given to the workman to defend himself. The Inquiry Officer submitted a report holding that the charge of theft stood proved against him. On the basis of this report, a show-cause notice was given to the workman, and thereafter, the services of the workman was terminated by an order dated 29-4-1997. 4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of termination, the workman raised an industrial dispute and the matter was referred for adjudication to the Labour Court under Section 4-K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. 5. Before the Labour Court, the workman filed his written statement alleging that no proper opportunity was given to him to defend himself in the departmental proceedings and that in any case, the charge of theft was not proved. The management also filed a written statement contending that full opportunity was given to the workman to defend himself and that the enquiry officer found that the charge of theft stood proved against him. 6. The Labour Court after considering the evidence that was brought on the record, found that since the workman was acquitted in the criminal proceedings, consequently, he was liable to be exonerated in the domestic enquiry proceedings. 6. The Labour Court after considering the evidence that was brought on the record, found that since the workman was acquitted in the criminal proceedings, consequently, he was liable to be exonerated in the domestic enquiry proceedings. The Labour Court also found that the charge of theft was not proved and come to this conclusion on the ground that the witness of the employer EW2 was not present at the time when the workman was apprehended by the security guards. 7. In my view, the approach adopted by the Labour Court is patently erroneous. The award passed by the Labour Court cannot be sustained. The mere fact that the workman had been acquitted subsequently in a criminal proceedings would have no bearing on the punishment awarded by the management in the departmental proceedings. It is well-settled law, that the standard of proof while proving a charge of misconduct in a departmental proceedings is different and is not the same, as required to prove a criminal charge in a criminal proceedings. 8. The Supreme Court in the case of Govind Das v. State of Bihar and others, 1997 (11) SCC 361 , held that the acquittal of the appellant in the criminal case could not be made the basis for setting aside the order of termination of the services of the appellant passed in the disciplinary proceedings on the basis of evidence adduced in the departmental inquiry which was different from the standard of proof required in a criminal proceedings. 9. In Allahabad District Cooperative Bank Ltd., Allahabad v. Vidhya Varidh Mishra, 2004 (6) SCC 482 , the Supreme Court held : “Mr. Rao submitted that the respondent had been exonerated by the criminal Court. He submitted that the termination was only on the basis of his conviction. He submitted that as his conviction is set aside, the Courts below were right in reinstating the respondent. We are unable to accede to this submission. The termination was pursuant to a disciplinary inquiry. It is settled law that in a disciplinary inquiry a conclusion different from that arrived at by a criminal Court, may be arrived at. The strict burden of proof required to establish guilt in a criminal Court is not required in disciplinary proceeding. The respondent had not claimed that the disciplinary proceedings were not conducted fairly. It is settled law that in a disciplinary inquiry a conclusion different from that arrived at by a criminal Court, may be arrived at. The strict burden of proof required to establish guilt in a criminal Court is not required in disciplinary proceeding. The respondent had not claimed that the disciplinary proceedings were not conducted fairly. As the termination was based on findings of the Disciplinary Committee, the fact that the appellate Court exonerated the respondent was of no consequence.” In Management of Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh & Anr., 2004(4) ESC 597 (SC), the Supreme Court held : “From the above, it is seen that the approach and the objectives of the criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings are altogether distinct and different. The observations therein indicate that the Labour Court is not bound by the findings of the Criminal Court.” 11. A Division Bench of this Court in State of U.P. and others v. State Public Service Tribunal, Lucknow & Anr., 2003(2) ESC 1161 (All)(DB), held : “Thus, there can be no doubt regarding the settled legal proposition that as the standard of proof in both is quite different and the termination is not based on conviction of an employee in a criminal case, the acquittal of the employee in criminal case cannot be the basis of taking away the effect of departmental proceedings. Nor such an action of the department can be termed as double jeopardy. The submission made in this regard is preposterous. Therefore, the learned Tribunal has committed an error in holding that after being discharged from Criminal Court the employee had a right of reconsideration for reinstatement.” 12. In view of the aforesaid, the standard of proof in a departmental proceedings and in a criminal proceedings are entirely different. The standard of proof required to prove a charge of misconduct in a departmental proceedings is not the same as that required to prove a criminal charge in a criminal proceedings. Further, in the present case. The termination of the workman was not based upon the conviction of the workman in a criminal case, the services of the workman was terminated upon the charge of misconduct being proved by the Inquiry Officer in the departmental proceedings. Further, in the present case. The termination of the workman was not based upon the conviction of the workman in a criminal case, the services of the workman was terminated upon the charge of misconduct being proved by the Inquiry Officer in the departmental proceedings. Consequently, the acquittal of the workman in a criminal case cannot be made the basis for dispensing with the misconduct in a departmental proceedings nor can the acquittal in a criminal case be made a sole ground for his reinstatement. 13. From a perusal of the order of the criminal Court acquitting the workman, I find, that the workman had not been acquitted honourably but was acquitted after being given a benefit of doubt. This in my opinion, is another factor which distinguishes a domestic proceedings with that from a criminal proceedings. In a departmental enquiry, a finding can be recorded in preponderance of probability and it is not necessary that the charge is proved to the hilt, whereas in a criminal trial, the standard of proof is different and the charge is required to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. It is well-settled law, that the degree of proof required in a departmental inquiry is different than the degree of proof required in a criminal proceedings. They operate in different fields and have diggerent objectives. The material or the evidence in the two proceedings may or may not be the same and it is immaterial whether the charge was identical or the witnesses were the same, so long as the power exercised by the Criminal Court and the enquiry under the relevant law and the service law was distinct and separate. 14. The Supreme Court in State of Karnataka & Anr. v. T. Venkataramanappa, 1996 (6) SCC 455 , held that an acquittal in a criminal case cannot be held to be a bar to hold a departmental enquiry for the same misconduct for the reason that in a criminal trial, the standard of proof is different as the case is required to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas in the departmental proceedings, such strict proof of misconduct is not required. Similar view was again reiterated by the Supreme Court in Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Pathanamthitta & Ors. Similar view was again reiterated by the Supreme Court in Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Pathanamthitta & Ors. v. A. Gopalan, 1997(11) SCC 239 , where the Supreme Court held that : “In a criminal case, the charge has been proved by the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt while in a departmental proceedings, the standard of proof for approving the charge is preponderance of probability.” 15. The labour Court in its award has given a categorical finding that the articles were recovered from the pocket of the workman in the presence of EW2. In view of this finding, the observation made by the labour Court that the workman was not apprehended in his presence was immaterial. It is sufficient that the articles were recovered in the presence of a witness, especially when there is no allegation that the security guards had placed the articles in the pocket of the workman. 16. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the opinion that the award of the labour Court is manifestly erroneous in law and is accordingly quashed. The writ petition is allowed. ———