Judgment :- S. Palanivelu, J. 1. The question posed before this Full Bench for determination is, as under: Whether the reference of a document to the Special Deputy Collector (Stamps) under Section 47-A (1) of the Indian Stamp Act is valid, if made after 21 days of registration of the document ? 2. A learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (MD) No.2731 of 2004, after going through the decisions of this Court on the subject, has raised the following questions: (i) Whether the Court, in exercising the power of judicial review, can fix a limitation for the exercise of a statutory duty under Section 47-A(1) of the Act ? (ii) Even if any guideline is introduced by a judgment, whether that can operate as a valid rule so as to nullify any order made within a reasonable period by the authorities, on allegations of undervaluation ? 3. The learned Single Judge, while opining, that in such matters, when a reference was pending for proper valuation by the Special Deputy Collector, the Court could only direct return of the registered document with proper endorsement, leaving the matter of undervaluation by proper adjudication by the Collector (stamps), referred the matter to a Division Bench. 4. Accordingly, when the matter was taken up by the Division Bench, it referred the matter to a Lager Bench. Hence, the matter is before this Full Bench. 5. In order to have a meticulous analysis of the matter, extraction of Section 47-A of the Act is indispensable, which reads as follows: “ 47-A Instruments of conveyance, etc., under-valued how to be dealt with. — (1) If the Registering Officer appointed under the India Registration Act, 1908 (Central Act XVI of 1908) while registering any instrument of conveyance, exchange, gift, release of benami right or settlement, has reason to believe that the market value of the property which is the subject matter of conveyance, exchange, gift, release of benami right or settlement, has not been truly set forth in the instrument, he may, after registering such instrument, refer the same to the Collector for determination of the market value of such property and the proper duty payable thereon. (2) On receipt of a reference under sub-section (1), the Collector shall, after giving the parties a reasonable opportunity of being heard and after holding an enquiry in such manner as may be prescribed by rules made under this Act, determine the market value of the property which is the subject matter of conveyance, exchange, gift, release of benami right or settlement and the duty as aforesaid. The difference if any, in the amount of duty, shall be payable by the person liable to pay the duty. (3) The Collector may, suo motu or otherwise, within five years from the date of registration of any instrument of conveyance, exchange, gift, release of benami right or settlement not already referred to him under sub-section (1), call for and examine the instrument for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the correctness of the market value of the property which is the subject matter of conveyance, exchange, gift, release of benami right or settlement and the duty payable thereon and if after such examination, he has reason to b elieve that the market value of the property has not been truly set forth in the instrument, he may determine the market value of such property and the duty as aforesaid in accordance with the procedure provided for in sub-section (2). The difference, if any in the amount of duty, shall be payable by the person liable to pay the duty.” 6. A careful reading of the above provision would show that if the Registering Officer has reason to believe that the market value of the property, which is the subject of conveyance, has not been truly set forth, he may, after registering such instrument, refer the same to the Collector for determination of proper market value of the property. The rationale behind the said Section is to neutralise the effect of undervaluation of the property, with a view to avoid evading stamp duty. 7. Registration of document is a sine qua non for referring the matter of the Collector, if the Registering Officer believes that the property is undervalued. No jurisdiction has been conferred on the Registering Officer to refuse registration, even if the document is undervalued. Besides, there is no authority for him to call upon he person concerned to pay additional stamp duty. No jurisdiction has been conferred on the Registering Officer to refuse registration, even if the document is undervalued. Besides, there is no authority for him to call upon he person concerned to pay additional stamp duty. Collector is the prescribed authority to determine the market value, after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing the parties. The Registering Officer cannot make a roving enquiry to ascertain the correct market value of the property by examining the parties. However, it is expected that he has to give reasons for his conclusion for undervaluation, however short they may be. He can neither delay nor refuse registration of the instrument, merely because the document does not reflect the real market value of the property. In order to reach a conclusion, there is no bar for the Registering Officer to gather information from other sources, including official or public record. Valuation guidelines, prepared by the revenue officials periodically, are intended with an avowed object of assisting the Registering Officer to find our prima face , whether the market value set out in the instrument has been set forth correctly. 8. The provision does not provide for any time limit for referring the instrument to the Collector, for determination of market value. However, the Section, while indicating the function of the Registering Officer, proceeds that after registering such instrument, he may refer the same to the Collector for determination of the market value of such property . It is conspicuous that the Section does not at all prescribe any time limit for referring the document to the Collector. (Emphasis supplied) 9. At this juncture, whether the Court can supplement a statute with regard to the time limit, enabling the Registering Officer to perform a statutory obligation within a stipulated period, is a conundrum, to be answered. 10. Before entering into the arena of well settled authoritative judicial pronouncements, it is profitable to have a study of the existing legal proposition on the subject, as decided by this Court. 11. 10. Before entering into the arena of well settled authoritative judicial pronouncements, it is profitable to have a study of the existing legal proposition on the subject, as decided by this Court. 11. A learned Single Judge of this Court, while dealing with this question in Ponnusamy M. and others v. The District Collector, Erode & others, 1998 (3) CTC 366 : 1999 (2) LW 231 , had arrived at a conclusion that the reference should be made immediately after registration or so sooner the registration is completed and, at any rate, within three weeks from the date of completion of registration of the document . The operative portion of the judgment has been culled out as under : (Emphasis supplied) “91. As the instruments have been registered without any reservation by the Registering Authority and as the Registering Authority had not entertained any reasonable belief with respect to the valuation of the property dealt under the instruments in question, as prescribed by sub-section (1) of the Section 47-A before completing the registration, there cannot be subsequent reference, much less after two years from the date of completion of registration. This Court hastens to add that a reference should be m ade immediately after registration or so sooner the registration is completed and at any rate within three weeks from the date of completion of registration of document to refer the instrument to the Collector under sub-section (1) of Section 47-A of the said Act, besides sending a communication to the person, who is liable to pay the stamp duty on the instrument in question.” 12. The above said decision was rendered on a batch of Writ Petitions. One of the Writ Petitions had preferred an Appeal before a Division Bench, which rendered a decision in The District Collector, Erode and others v. M. Ponnusamy, 2001 (2) CTC 449 : 2001 (2) MLJ 458 , concurring with the finding of the learned Single Judge with reference to the prescription of time limit, for the functions to be carried out by the Registering Officer after registration in referring the document to the Collector. Following is the finding of the Division Bench 32 For all the above reasons, we have no hesitation whatsoever in approving the view of the learned Jude that the document should be returned sooner its registration is complete, at any rate within three weeks from he date of completion of registration of the document or it must be referred within a period of three weeks to the Collector under sub-section (1) of Section 47-A of the Act.” Proceeding further, the Division bench also observed that it is not open to the authorities to say, that, since there is no time limit set out in the Act, they can withhold the document for an unlimited period and then refer it for its valuation at any time they choose; absence of any provision for time implies the reference follows registration and the plain language cannot be interpreted in any other manner; it is true that there is no outer limit prescribed for the disposal of a Reference by the Collector under sub-section (2) of Section 47-A; but there is no time left for the Registering Authority to refer under sub-section (1) of Section 47-A and that it is to follow registration subject to the time taken for the procedural formalities, but in any case, it shall not exceed three weeks from the date of registration . The Division Bench was definite in its view that three weeks time, after registration of the document may be availed by the Registering Officer, to refer the document to the Collector. But, as already stated, whether the Court is competent to supplement the statute with its view, is to be considered. (Emphasis supplied) 13. Another Division Bench of this Court in Division Electronics Ltd., Chennai v. Indian Bank, 2005 (3) CTC 513, to which one of us (F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.) was a party, held, following a decision of he Apex Court, that the Court can neither add nor delete words from the statute. The said observation is as follows : “23. It is a well settled principle of interpretation that the Court can neither add nor delete words from a statute. The said observation is as follows : “23. It is a well settled principle of interpretation that the Court can neither add nor delete words from a statute. As observed by the Supreme Court in Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, AIR 1952 SC 369 ( Page 377 ) per Patanjali Shastry, C.J.: “It is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplusage, if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivable within the contemplation of the statue.” 14. On another occasion, a Division Bench of this Court, in Southern Railways v. S. Palaniappan, 2005 (2) CTC 721 , has observed thus : “23. It is not possible for us to accept this contention, as it is well settled that merely because a law causes hardship, it cannot be interpreted in a manner so as to defeat its object. Moreover, the Courts are not concerned with he legislative policy or with the result, whether injurious or otherwise, by giving effect to the language used, nor is it the function of the Courts whether the meaning of a statue is clear not to give effect to it merely because it would lead to hardship vide , Easland Combines v. CCE, AIR 003 SC 843.” 15. While dealing with an identical aspect, a Full Bench of this Court, in The Commissioner of Wealth-Tax v. Fagun Co. P. Ltd., 2007 (1) CTC 13 , held that when the statute is ambiguous, uncertain, clouded or more than one meaning, the external lights if any, which the statute was intended to remedy or of the circumstances that led to the passing of the statute, may be looked into, for the purposes of ascertaining the object which the legislature had in view in using the words of question and that a statutory provision must be construed, if possible, to see that absurdity and mischief should be avoided; where the plain literal interpretation of a statutory provision produces manifestly absurd and unjust result which could never have been intended by the legislature, the Court may modify the language used by the legislature or even do some violence to it, so as to achieve the obvious intention of the legislature and produce a rational construction. 16. 16. As per the said Full Bench, all the more necessary is, to find out the intention of the legislature and to act upon the statute so as to render guidance. However, the ratio enunciated by the Supreme Court, as followed by the Division Benches of this Court in the aforementioned case, has to be scrupulously followed. 17. A Larger Bench of the Apex Court, in Padmasundara Rao (Dead) & ors. v. State of T.N. & others, 2002 (2) CTC 55, held that it is a well settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous; a statue is an edict of the legislature; the language employed in a statue is the determinative factor of legislative intent; the first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislation must be found in the words used by the legislature itself and the that the question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. 18. It is the bounden duty of the Court to infer and gather the intention of the legislature, before proceeding to interpret a statute. The function of the Courts is only to expound and not to legislate. The Courts have to look essentially to the words of the statue. The legislative intention i.e., the true or legal meaning of an enactment is derived by considering the meaning of the words employed in the enactment in the light of any discernible purpose or object, which comprehends the mischief and its remedy, to which enactment is directed. This formulation later received approval of the Supreme Court in Ruma Aggarwal v. Anupam, 2004 (3) SCC 199 : AIR 2004 SC 1418 . The Courts cannot interpret a statute in the way they have developed the common law. Even though the Courts possess powers to lay down common law principles, they cannot exercise such powers in respect of statutes. 19. “Intention of the Legislature” is a common, but very slippery phrase, which, if popularly understood, may signify anything from the intention embodied in enactment to speculative opinion as to what the legislature would have meant, although there has been omission to enact it. 19. “Intention of the Legislature” is a common, but very slippery phrase, which, if popularly understood, may signify anything from the intention embodied in enactment to speculative opinion as to what the legislature would have meant, although there has been omission to enact it. A note of caution is also there, when the language of the legislation has only one meaning, considerations of harshness, injustice or inconvenience will not induce the Court to change he meaning by interpretation. The well known rule of interpretation of statue is that it is elementary that the primary duty of the Court is to give effect to the intention of the legislature, as expressed in he words used by it, and no outside consideration can be called in aid to find out the intention. 20. As far as the terms employed in sub-section (1) of Section 47-A are concerned, there is no ambiguity or obscurity with reference to the legal obligations on the part of the Registering Officer to refer the document to the Collector. If the words in a statute leave no doubt as to their meaning and import, it is the obvious duty of the Court to give effect to them. It is also settled that where the language is plain and admits of one meaning only, it is to be given effect to, even if it leads to apparent hardship. Also, if the language of the statute is clear and intelligible and does not admit two meanings, effect must be given to the words used and, thus, the intention of the legislature must be carried out. While discussing about the interpretation of statutes in Union of India v. Fillip Tiago De Gama, 1990 (1) SCC 277 , the Apex Court has observed as follows: “16. The paramount object in statutory interpretation is to discover what the legislature intended. This intention is primarily to be ascertained from the text of enactment in question. That does not mean the text is to be construed merely as a piece of prose, without reference to its nature or purpose. A statute is neither a literary text nor a divine revelation. “Words are certainly not crystals, transparent and unchanged” as Mr. Justice Holmes has wisely and properly warned. That does not mean the text is to be construed merely as a piece of prose, without reference to its nature or purpose. A statute is neither a literary text nor a divine revelation. “Words are certainly not crystals, transparent and unchanged” as Mr. Justice Holmes has wisely and properly warned. [ Towne v. Elisner, 245 US 418, 425 (1918)] Learned Hand, J., was equally emphatic when he said: “Statutes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid, but with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them.” ( Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 FR 547, 553). 17. The legislators do not always deal with specific controversies which the Courts decide. They incorporate general purpose behind the statutory words and it is for the Courts to decide specific cases. If a given case is well within the general purpose of the legislature but not within the literal meaning of the statute, then the Court must strike the balance.” 21. The intention of the legislature is primarily to be obtained from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction, which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless, has to be avoided. The Privy Council has stated “We cannot aid the Legislature’s defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend and, by construction make up defici encies which are left there. Speaking briefly, the Court cannot reframe the legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate. ( Principles of Statutory Interpretation , 10th Edition, 2006, page 60). 22. Casus omissus is an application of the principle that a matter which should have been, but has not been provided for in a statute cannot be supplied by Courts, as to do so will be legislation and not construction. The onus of performing the duty to avail legislation is always with the wisdom of the legislature and the Courts are not expected to usurp the law making function of the legislature and to enact the statute. It is, however, the duty of the Court to prefer construction and interpretation of the statutes, which would be better fitted to the intention of the legislature. It is, however, the duty of the Court to prefer construction and interpretation of the statutes, which would be better fitted to the intention of the legislature. The Courts cannot legislate for casus omissus and, at the same time, they shall not alter the intention and purpose of the subject involved in the Act for the purpose, to which it was woven. However, it can iron out the creases of ambiguities in the statutes, while entering into the function of interpreting them, so as to render real justice to the litigants. At the time of interpreting the statutes, care must be taken to ensure that no destructive analysis of statute happens. It is pertinent to mention that even though a Court could not supply casus omissus , it is candid that it should not so interpret a statute as to create the casus omissus , when there is really none. The settled position of law would clarify the subject and certain departures from general rules of interpretation have also been recommended. 23. Before interpreting a statute, the Court must be abundantly sure of three matters: (1) the intended purpose of the statute or provision in question; (2) that by inadvertence the draftsman and Parliament failed to given effect to that purpose in the provision in question; and (3) the substance of the provision Parliament would have made, although not necessarily the precise words Parliament would have used, had the error in the Bill been noticed. ( Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 10th Edition, 2006, page 73). 24. While the above said cardinal rules are considered towards Section 47-A, an analytical and comparative examination of the said provision is very much essential. So far as the rules (1) and (3) supra are concerned, the Court could not make a departure under the premise that the intended purpose was not served and there was no circumstance available to infer that any error had crept in, while the Bill or the Act was passed by the Parliament. Inasmuch as rule (2), we bestowed our careful consideration to discern the intention of the legislature as to whether there was any inadvertence on the part of the law makers to fix a time frame for the Registering Officer to refer the matter to the Collector. Inasmuch as rule (2), we bestowed our careful consideration to discern the intention of the legislature as to whether there was any inadvertence on the part of the law makers to fix a time frame for the Registering Officer to refer the matter to the Collector. An overhaul of the provision, namely, sub-sections (1) to (3) of Section 47-A, would pave way to secure a conclusion that there was no inadvertence on the part of the law makers. 25. Sub-section (3) to Section 47-A provides for a limitation of five years from the date of registration of any instrument of conveyance for the Collector to initiate either suo motu action or otherwise to determine the market value of the property. Earlier, the provision contained a time limit of two years and, by means of a subsequent amendment, the said time limit was enlarged as five years. At the two stages viz. , the time of passing the Act and of passing of the Amending Act, the legislature was more conscious about prescribing the time limit for exercise of powers by the Collector and, on both the occasions, the provision i.e., sub-section (1) was left untouched. Hence, it cannot be stated that there was inadvertence on the part of the legislature to provide time limit in sub-section (1). The intention of the legislature was to clothe the Collector with ample powers in two ways viz., firstly, allowing five year period for him to exercise his power to initiate action and, nextly, to determine the market value of the property after holding an enquiry as per the procedures stipulated in sub-section (2). 26. When the Collector exercises powers under sub-sections (2) and (3), he shall be deemed to be a quasi-judicial authority, as the detailed procedure prescribed in the relevant rules evidently portrays that the Collector’s decision is relatable and verifiable by the materials of evidence, which he brings into record, on making an enquiry after hearing the parties concerned. The Collector has been conferred with such powers by the statute, whereas the Registering Authority is not. The powers of the Registe ring Officer are remarkably limited i.e., to say, he cannot at all hold any enquiry to ascertain the quantum of Stamp Duty payable on an instrument. As adverted to supra, he shall not undertake a detailed enquiry by examining the parties, which powers are exercisable by the Collector alone. The powers of the Registe ring Officer are remarkably limited i.e., to say, he cannot at all hold any enquiry to ascertain the quantum of Stamp Duty payable on an instrument. As adverted to supra, he shall not undertake a detailed enquiry by examining the parties, which powers are exercisable by the Collector alone. The relevant rules would indicate that the procedures have to be adopted for an enquiry by the Collector. A detailed procedure has been formulated in Rule (4) for the Collector to act on receipt of reference under Section 47-A, in Tamil Nadu Stamp (Prevention of Undervaluation of Instrument) Rules, 1968. It does not lay down any procedure as to what are the duties to be performed by a Registering Officer, while ascertaining the market value of the property. The necessary upshot would be, the legislature thought it appropriate to curtail the powers of the Registering Officer, probably for the reason that allowing the Registering Officer to make a roving enquiry would lead to loss of time for registration, resulting in accumulation of documents for registration with him. Further, prescribing an authority for the special purpose of conducting enquiry is very much essential, who shall not be the Registering Authority. 27. It is discernible from the aforesaid discussion that the Parliament had been cautious enough on all the occasions to leave or omit to stipulate the time limit for the Registering Officer to refer the document to the Collector and the conduct of the legislature in this regard is not indicative of any inadvertence. The necessary corollary would be, there is no basis for the Court to make a departure from the general rule, in view of the cautious attitude of the legislature in not prescribing the time limit for the legal obligation of the Registering Officer to refer the instrument to the Collector. As such, it is not warranted for this Court to supplement or suffix any suggestion to the already existing provision. 28. The dictums laid down by the Supreme Court and the principles by this Court, as stated above, would indisputably indicate that the Court is not competent to add or supplement anything to a statute and, while interpreting the same, the intention of the legislature at the time of passing it, has to be collected, to render justice to the parties. The dictums laid down by the Supreme Court and the principles by this Court, as stated above, would indisputably indicate that the Court is not competent to add or supplement anything to a statute and, while interpreting the same, the intention of the legislature at the time of passing it, has to be collected, to render justice to the parties. If statutory silence is persisting to a particular circumstance or point, the Court cannot supplement its view by embarking upon the duty of supplying some more suggestions to it. In other words, when the statute contains plain language in unambiguous terms, the Court ought not to interpret it in such a way to infer that it has annexed something. In the teeth of the law propounded by the Apex Court, the answer to the question would be, the Court cannot prescribe any time limit for the Registering Officer to refer the document to the Collector . (Emphasis supplied) 29. If no time limit has been prescribed in the statute, what would be the remedy available for the parties, who expect the fruits of performance of legal obligations of the Registering Officer to refer the document to the Collector. Solely because there is no incorporation of time limit in the statute and the statute is significantly silent in this regard, it cannot be said that the Registering Officer may retain the document indefinitely or delay the further process. 30. In this context, how could the parties to the document get redressal as per law, is another important query, to be answered. 31. Mr. A.L. Somayaji, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, while highlighting the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in various decisions, would contend that the time limit prescribed the learned Single Judge of this Court, as approved by the Division Bench, to the effect that reference shall be made to the Collector not later than three weeks, is quite proper and the “reasonable time”, as considered by the Supreme Court, could be extendable to the period of three weeks. In other words, his contenti on is that the reasonable period can be construed to be three weeks. He also placed reliance upon various decisions of the Apex Court and this Court, wherein the ratio has been enunciated as regards this proposition of law. In other words, his contenti on is that the reasonable period can be construed to be three weeks. He also placed reliance upon various decisions of the Apex Court and this Court, wherein the ratio has been enunciated as regards this proposition of law. The said decisions are as under: (i) Ram Chand and Others v. Union of India and other, 1994 (1) SCC 44 ; T. Vijayalakshmi and others v. Town Planning Member and another, 2006 (8) SCC 502 and Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin v. Fatmabai Ibrahim, 1997 (6) SCC 71 : “Where no time limit has been prescribed for exercise of power under a statute, it should be exercised within a reasonable time.” (ii) Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy and others, 2003 (7) SCC 667 : “Where the expression “at any time” is available in a statute, it would imply that the duty shall be performed within a reasonable time, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case and it has to be construed contextually and reasonably and not in an unguided or arbitrary manner.” (iii) Govt. of India v. Citedal Fine Pharmaceuticals, AIR 1989 SC 1771 : “In the absence of any period of limitation, it is settled that every authority is to exercise the power within a reasonable period.” (iv) XL Visions v. The National Highways, 2005 (1) MLJ 650 (DB) : “It is well settled where a statute or a rule is silent about the time limit for doing an act or complying with certain formality, then such act or formality should be done within a reasonable time.” 32. The observation in (iv) above has been rendered by this Court, after following the decisions of the Apex Court in R.P.F. Commissioner v. M/s. K.T. Rolling Mills Private Limited, AIR 1995 SC 943 and Corporation Bank v. Navin J. Shah, JT 2000 (1) SC 317. 33. The ratio laid down by the Supreme Court would go to the effect that any power conferred upon any statutory authority shall be exercised to advance the cause of justice and not to upset the settled rights of the parties concerned. 34. Applying the above ratio decidendi to the facts of the present case, since the provision viz. 33. The ratio laid down by the Supreme Court would go to the effect that any power conferred upon any statutory authority shall be exercised to advance the cause of justice and not to upset the settled rights of the parties concerned. 34. Applying the above ratio decidendi to the facts of the present case, since the provision viz. , sub-section (1) of Section 47-A is quiet as regards the time limit, reference shall be made by the Registering Officer within a reasonable time, which should not be viewed as a one, that has deprived the rights of the parties, thereby causing injustice to them. In other terms, it can very well be stated that the conscience of the Registering Officer itself shall indicate that the time consumed by him would be an unreasonable one. The expression ‘conscience’ may be construed to be an inclination of the Registering Officer to perform the legal obligations imposed on him by a statute, which could be gathered by the Courts from the circumstances under which he acts subsequent to registration of the document, as mentioned in sub-section (1). If the said intention or inclination to execute the legal obligations on his part would tend to prejudice the valuable rights of the parties concerned to the document, it could unhesitatingly be termed to be unreasonable. The parties to a document shall not entertain suspicion over the attitude of the Registering Officer, in the process of his referring the document to the Collector. Such a view in the minds of the parties would lead to a conclusion that there is unreasonableness on the part of the Registering Officer. 35. We are of the considered view that no additions could be made to a statute by the Court, if it passes three tests, as adumbrated above in this order. In our opinion, sub-section (1) of Section 47-A has passed through the said tests and there is no need for the Court to supplement or suggest its view, as a suffix to it. In this respect, we could not subscribe our accent to the view taken by the learned Single Judge in his decision in M. Krishnan and 44 others v. The District Collector, Erode, 1998 (3) CTC 366 , as approved by the Division Bench in The District Collector, Erode v. M. Ponnusamy, 2001 (2) CTC 449 : 2001 (2) MLJ 458 . 36. 36. At the close of the arguments of both sides, Mr. S. Ramasamy, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the Department, would draw attention of this Court to a proposal of the State Government to pass a Bill to amend The Indian Stamp Act, 1989, and The Registration Act, 1908, and their Application in the State of Tamil Nadu, which Bill is yet to be passed. 37. According to the proposed amendment to the aforesaid Acts, the Registering Officer, while registering any instrument, shall estimate the market value of the property as per the market value guidelines of properties prepared by the “Valuation Committee”, constituted under Section 47-A, and communicate the said estimated value to the parties concerned and, unless the parties pay the duty on the basis of such valuation, he shall keep pending the process of registration of such instrument and refer the mat ter within a month along with a copy of such instrument to the Collector for determination of the market value of such property and the proper duty payable thereon. Some other amendments have also been proposed therein, which do not pertain to the issue in question. The primordial object of the said proposed Amendment Act is to prescribe a period of one month for the Registering Officer to refer the document to the Collector. As for the intention of the State Government, it is open for the State to add, alter or delete anything in the statute within its power conferred by the Constitution of India and, presently, we are not entering into the discussion of validity of the amendment as regards the above said feature, since the legislature, as law maker, is always at liberty to exercise such a power. 38. On a conspectus of the facts and circumstances of the matter and following the ratio laid down by the Apex Court, we answer the questions (i) and (ii) as follows: (i) The Court cannot fix or suggest a time frame to a statute in the normal course, if the statute is silent with regard to it. (ii) No guideline, in this regard, shall be introduced by the Court. However, it is mandatory on the part of the statutory authority, namely, Registering Officer, to perform his statutory obligations within a reasonable time, which should not be viewed as a one, that has deprived the rights of the parties to the document, causing injustice. (ii) No guideline, in this regard, shall be introduced by the Court. However, it is mandatory on the part of the statutory authority, namely, Registering Officer, to perform his statutory obligations within a reasonable time, which should not be viewed as a one, that has deprived the rights of the parties to the document, causing injustice. 39. Registry is directed to place the Writ Petitions before appropriate Bench, for further proceedings.