V. JAGANNATHAN, J. ( 1 ) THE defendant in the trial Court is the appellant herein and he has come up in this second appeal being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed in O. S. No. 1147/1989 by the Trial Court in favour of the respondents herein, who were the plaintiffs in the said suit, and as the appeal preferred by the appellant herein also came to be dismissed by confirming the trial Court's judgment and decree passed in r. A. No. 87/1997. ( 2 ) AT the time of admission, the substantial questions of law Nos. 1 to 3 raised by the appellant in the appeal have been treated as the substantial questions of law that arise for consideration in this appeal, and they are as under:- (1) Whether the Courts below are right in assuming that the parties are governed by rules of inheritance laid down under vyavahar Mayutha and not under Mithakshara Law applicable to Bombay School especially Bombay Karnataka? (2) Having regard to the admitted facts that the parties are residents of Dharawad District namely Northern Kanara or north Karnataka area whether the rules of Vyavahar Mayutha are applicable or rules of Mithakshara School are applicable? (3) Even assuming that the parties to suit are governed by vyavahar Mayutha Law of Succession whether the daughters are entitled to inherit the property of their father who died in 1935 long prior to the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 came into force and commencement of Hindu Succession act,1956. ( 3 ) THE brief facts necessary for our purpose are to the effect that one gurappa, the original propositor, died in the year 1935 leaving behind him his wife Karewwa, son Siddappa and two daughters Danawwa and durgawwa. Karewwa died in the year 1952, her one daughter Danawwa died in the year 1978 and the other daughter Durgawwa died in 1958. Danawwa's children are the plaintiffs before the trial Court and the present appellant is the son of deceased Siddappa, whose wife Lakkawwa also died. Thus, the son of Siddappa and the children of deceased Danawwa are the contesting parties. Danawwa's children are the plaintiffs before the trial Court and the present appellant is the son of deceased Siddappa, whose wife Lakkawwa also died. Thus, the son of Siddappa and the children of deceased Danawwa are the contesting parties. ( 4 ) IT is the case of the plaintiffs before the trial Court that they, being the children of Danawwa, are entitled to the suit properties to the extent of 1/3 share each and secondly, the adoption deed dated 14-8-1978 in favour of the appellant herein is null and void. These were the main prayers in the suit filed by the respondents herein and it is their case that, after the death of Karewwa, her daughter Danawwa had 2/3 share in the suit properties and following the death of Danawwa, they, being the children of Danawwa, succeeded to the 2/3 share in the suit properties by stepping into the shoes of Danawwa. On the other hand, the stand taken by the appellant-defendant before the trial Court was that, it was after the death of the original propositor Gurappa, the names of his wife karewwa and adopted son Siddappa were entered in the revenue records and following the death of the above two persons viz. , Karewwa and siddappa, he (appellant herein) succeeded to the suit properties to the exclusion of the respondents (plaintiffs) because, his father Siddappa had succeeded to the suit properties on the death of Karewwa and neither. Danawwa nor Durgawwa had any right, title or interest in the suit properties. ( 5 ) BASED on the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court had framed as many as nine issues and held that the respondents had failed to prove that the adoption deed was a bogus one and answered issue No. 2 partly in the affirmative and partly in the negative. So far as the prayer of the plaintiffs for partition and possession of their 2/3 share in the suit properties is concerned, the said issue was also answered partly in the affirmative and partly in the negative and consequent to the said findings the trial Court, while declaring the adopting deed as a valid one, however held that the respondents herein are entitled to 2/8 share collectively in the suit properties. The suit was accordingly decreed in the said terms. The suit was accordingly decreed in the said terms. ( 6 ) AGGRIEVED by the aforesaid findings of the trial Court, the appellant preferred regular appeal and the same was dismissed in R. A. No. 87/1997 and the first appellate Court confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. It is against the said decision of the first appellate court, the appellant has preferred this second appeal. ( 7 ) I have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant and the respondents, though served, have remained absent. ( 8 ) THE submission of the appellant's Counsel is that, first of all, both the Courts below were totally in error in taking the view that the succession rules as per Vyavahara Mayukha were applicable to the case of the parties and basing on the said conclusion, both the Courts below took the view that the respondents herein are entitled to share in the suit properties. The learned Counsel submitted that the succession rules as per Vyavahara mayukha are not applicable to the case on hand because, the properties are situated in Dharawad and not in Maharashtra, Gujarath, Island of bombay or North Konkan and, therefore, both the Courts committed serious error in applying the succession law as per Vyavahara Mayukha. The second submission is, even under Vyavahara Mayukha sub-school, the daughter does not succeed to the property when there is a co-parcener in existence and, in the instant case, it is clear from the facts which are not in dispute that following the death of Gurappa and Karewwa, among the survivors, only Siddappa was the sole co-parcener in existence and after his death, his son i. e, the appellant herein, succeeded to the suit properties. It was also submitted that as for as Karewwa, wife of Gurappa is concerned, it is clear from a bare perusal of Section 4 of the Hindu women's Right to Property Act, 1937 that the said Act is not applicable to the property of any Hindu dying intestate before the commencement of the said Act. As Gurappa died in the year 1935 much before the passing of the above Act, the question of Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 becoming applicable does not arise. As Gurappa died in the year 1935 much before the passing of the above Act, the question of Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937 becoming applicable does not arise. As far as Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is concerned, it is submitted that even under the said Act, the question of the daughters getting rights in the property as co-parceners did not arise. Therefore, looked from any angle, the finding of the first appellate Court as well as that of the trial Court cannot be sustained in law as the said finding is contrary to the provisions of law. ( 9 ) IN the light of the above submissions and after going through the entire record of this case including the paper book that is produced, I am of the considered opinion that the Courts below committed serious error in not taking note of the position in law as regards succession to the properties of a Hindu dying intestate before the 1956 Succession Act came into force. As already stated, the facts are not in dispute concerning the relationship between the parties and also the date of death of Gurappa, karewwa, Siddappa and Danawwa is concerned. As far as the applicability of Vyavahara Mayukha rules of succession is concerned, it is observed by the learned author Mulla in his Hindu Law thus: "12. Sub-divisions of Mitakshara School - (1) Mitakshara school is sub-divided into four minor schools; these differ between themselves in some matters of detail relating particularly to adoption and inheritance. All these schools acknowledge the supreme authority of Mitakshara, but they give preference to certain treatises and to commentaries which control certain passages of Mitakshara. This accounts for the differences between those schools. The sub-schools and the principal works which supplement mitakshara in each sub-school are as below:-Benares school viramitrodaya. Nirnayasindhu. Mithila School vivada Chintamani. Vivada Ratnakara. Madana Parijata. Vyavahara Mayukha. Viramitrodaya. Maharashtra or Bombay School (Western India)Nirnayasindhu. Smriti Chandrika. Dravida or Madras School parashara Madhaviya. (Southern India)Saraswati Vilasa. Vyavahara Nirnaya. (2) As regards authorities in Western India, Mitakshara ranks first and paramount in the Maharashtra; Northern Kanara and the ratnagiri District. In Gujarat, the Island of Bombay and the North; konkan, the Mayukha is considered as the overruling authority where there is a difference of opinion between it and Mitakshara. (Southern India)Saraswati Vilasa. Vyavahara Nirnaya. (2) As regards authorities in Western India, Mitakshara ranks first and paramount in the Maharashtra; Northern Kanara and the ratnagiri District. In Gujarat, the Island of Bombay and the North; konkan, the Mayukha is considered as the overruling authority where there is a difference of opinion between it and Mitakshara. " It is, therefore, clear from the above observations of the learned author that it is only in Gujarath, Island of Bombay and North Konkan that vyavahara Mahuka is considered as the overruling authority where there is a difference of opinion between it and Mithakshara. It is nobody's case that the suit properties or for that matter, the parties to the suit come within any of the areas mentioned herein above i. e. , Gujarath, Island of bombay and North Konkan, but, on the other hand, the parties hail from dharawad District. Therefore, the Courts below committed error in observing that Vyavahara Mayukha is applicable to the instant case. ( 10 ) AS far as devolution of properties according to the Hindu Law is concerned, in paragraph 34 of the Hindu Law by Mulla (17th Edition), the following commentary is made: "34. Devolution of property according to mitakshara law -In determining the mode in which the property of a Hindu male governed by Mitakshara law devolves on his death, the following propositions are to be noted: (1) Where the deceased was, at the time of his death, a member of joint and undivided family, technically called coparcenary, his undivided interest in the coparcenary property devolves on his coparceners by survivorship (see Act XVIII of 1937 and para 35 ). (2) (i) Even if the deceased was joint at the time of his death, he might have left self acquired or separate property. Such property goes to his heirs by succession according to the order given in para 43, and not to his coparcencers. (ii) If the deceased was at the time of his death the sole surviving members of a coparcenary property, the whole of his property, including the coparcenary property, will pass to his heirs by succession according to the order given in para 43. (iii) If the deceased was separate at the time of his death from his coparceners, the whole of his property, however acquired, will pass to his heirs by succession according to the order given in para 43. (iii) If the deceased was separate at the time of his death from his coparceners, the whole of his property, however acquired, will pass to his heirs by succession according to the order given in para 43. (3) If the deceased was re-united at the time of his death, his property will pass to his heirs by succession according to the rule laid down in para 60 below. " In paragraph 43 of the very same work, the order of succession among sapindas is mentioned as under: "43. Order of succession among sapindas - The sapindas succeed in the following order:-1-3 Son, grandson (son's son) and great-grandson (son's son's son), and after 14th April 1937) widow, predeceased son's widow, and predeceased son's predeceased son's widow. " In the very same work, as regards females being entitled as coparceners is concerned, the following is the view expressed by the learned author: "217. Females cannot be coparceners - No female can be a coparcener under Mitakshara law. Even a wife, though she is entitled to maintenance out of her husband's property and has to that extent an interest in his property, is not her husband's coparcener. Nor is a mother a coparcener with her sons neither a mother-in-law with her daughter-in-law. There can be no coparcenary between a mother and daughter among devadasees. Nor could a widow succeeding under the Hindu Women's Rights to property Act to her husband's share in a joint family be a coparcener. Also see Section 6 of the Hindu succession Act 1956. " Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, prior to the recent amendment, read thus: "6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary property.- When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not in accordance with this Act: provided that, if the deceased had left him surviving a female relative specified in Class I of the Schedule or a male relative specified in that class who claims through such female relative, the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under ' this Act and not by survivorship. Explanation I - For the purpose of this section, the interest of a hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. Explanation II.- Nothing contained in the proviso to this section shall be construed as enabling a person who had separated himself from the coparcenary before the death of the deceased or any his heirs to claim on intestacy a share in the interest referred to therein. " ( 11 ) FROM a careful reading of all the above provisions of law in the light of the view expressed by the learned author Mulla, in the instant case, the respondents herein could not have inherited the suit properties from Danawwa, their mother, because, she herself had no right over the suit properties as she was not a coparcener either at the time of commencement of 1956 Act or for that matter, she could not have got the property even under the Vyavahara Mayukha succession rule, which is applicable only to the three areas mentioned herein above and, even under the said sub-school also, the daughters sharing the property in question will arise only in the absence of a son being there. ( 12 ) THUS, viewed from every angle, the position becomes clear and that is it was only Siddappa, who inherited the suit properties as a coparcener and following his death, it is his wife Lakkawwa and the appellant herein, who succeeded to the suit properties and as Lakkawwa also died, the only person, who is entitled to the suit properties is the appellant and none else. ( 13 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, the conclusion arrived at by the first appellate Court cannot be sustained in law either on facts or in law and consequently, the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court is liable to be set aside and so also judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. ( 14 ) IN the result, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court in R. A. No. 87/1997 and also the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court in O. S. No. 1147/1989 are set aside. No costs.