Judgment :- P.K. Misra, J. For appreciating the questions now raised by the appellant, it is necessary to notice in brief the facts:- The Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959 (hereinafter called "the Rules") was framed by the State Government in exercise of the rule making power conferred by Section 15 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (Central Act 67 of 1957), hereinafter referred to as "the Act". By way of amendment, vide G.O.Ms.No.97 Industries (M.M.B.1), dated 3. 1993, Rule 39 was inserted in the Rules. The said Rule 39 is extracted hereunder :- "39. Powers of State Government to grant or renew quarry lease or permission, etc. in special cases.-Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, the State Government, if, in any case, are of opinion that in the interest of mineral development and in the public interest, it is necessary so to do they may, by order and for reasons to be recorded:- (a) grant or renew a lease or permission, to quarry any mineral; or (b) allow the working of any quarry for quarrying any mineral,or terms and conditions different from those laid down in these rules." Validity of such Rule 39 was challenged in the Madras High Court in a batch of writ petitions and the High Court in its judgment dated 16. 1993 in W.P.No.5793 of 1993 etc., struck down Rule 39 as ultra vires. However, in appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Madras High Court and upheld the validity of Rule 39 in its judgment reported in (1994) 2 SCC 691 (PREMIUM GRANITES & ANOTHER v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND OTHERS). The present appellant filed an application on 13. 1994 praying for grant of lease to quarry granite (ornamental stone) under Rule 39. While many such applications were pending, the High Court by judgment dated 13. 1995 in a batch of writ petitions directed the State Government to dispose of the applications filed under Rule 39 of the Rules within 12 weeks. The State Government, subsequently, rejected the application of the present appellant by order dated 19. 1995, which was challenged by the present appellant by filing W.P.No.4316 of 1996. During pendency of such writ petition, the State Government by further amendment, deleted Rule 39 with effect from 26. 1996. On 10. The State Government, subsequently, rejected the application of the present appellant by order dated 19. 1995, which was challenged by the present appellant by filing W.P.No.4316 of 1996. During pendency of such writ petition, the State Government by further amendment, deleted Rule 39 with effect from 26. 1996. On 10. 1999, the writ petition was dismissed by the learned single Judge under the following order :- "Considering the relief prayed for in the writ petition and of the fact that the very same rule has been deleted from the Tamil Nadu Mines and Mineral Concession Rules, 1959, nothing survives for adjudication as on date. 2. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed." The present appeal is filed against the aforesaid order. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that since the application for grant of lease was made at a time when Rule 39 of the Rules was in force and subsequently such application was rejected on untenable grounds and the writ petition was filed, notwithstanding the subsequent deletion of Rule 39, the learned single Judge should not have rejected the writ petition on the ground that the writ petition had become infructuous on deletion of Rule 39. Learned counsel has further submitted that when a provision of the statute or rule is challenged during pendency of any dispute, such dispute is required to be decided on the basis of substantive law applicable on the date of initiation of such judicial proceedings and the subsequent change in law cannot defeat the right of the litigant to get his matter adjudicated in accordance with the substantive law applicable at the time of initiation of such judicial proceedings. In the above connection, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon several decisions of the Supreme Court as well as the Madras High Court. Learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that under similar circumstances a Division Bench of Madras High Court, notwithstanding the deletion of Rule 39, had issued a direction to the Government in the decision reported in 1997(2) CTC 678 (TVL. SUNDARAM GRANITES v. IMPERIAL GRANITES LTD.,) and the ratio of such decision was bound to be followed by the learned single Judge. 3. SUNDARAM GRANITES v. IMPERIAL GRANITES LTD.,) and the ratio of such decision was bound to be followed by the learned single Judge. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the State, on the other hand, has placed reliance upon another Division Bench decision of this Court reported in 2006 (4) CTC 419 (S. TAMILARASI v. P. RAM MOHAN RAJA AND OTHERS) in support of his contention that on deletion of Rule 39 there was no further scope for considering the writ petition filed by the present appellant and, therefore, the order of the learned single Judge was justified. It is also pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the State that the aforesaid Division Bench decision has been subsequently confirmed by the Supreme Court in an unreported judgment dated 24. 2007 in Civil Appeal No.2138 of 2007. Incidentally it may be pointed out that the later Division Bench decision and the decision of the Supreme Court were between the present appellant and the State of Tamil Nadu in respect of another application and a different site. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant has sought to distinguish the Division Bench decision of the Madras High Court reported in 2006(4) CTC 419 (cited supra), confirmed by the Supreme Court, by contending that in the said case the application of the applicant for grant of lease was rejected by the State Government on 10. 1996, after deletion of Rule 39 on 26. 1996, whereas, in the present case, the application of the applicant for grant of lease was rejected on erroneous grounds on 19. 1995, while Rule 39 was still in force and thereafter the writ petition was filed and deletion of Rule 39 came only during pendency of such writ petition and, therefore, the right of the applicant cannot be defeated by such subsequent deletion of Rule 39. It is also further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that in the matter which was taken to the Supreme Court, one of the main ground for rejection of the writ petition was laches on the part of the applicant in filing the writ petition after a lapse of about 7 years. 5. Rule 39 has already been extracted. 5. Rule 39 has already been extracted. Such rule, while it was in force, only gave a discretionary power to the State Government to grant lease to quarry any mineral, if the State Government is of the opinion that in the interest of mineral development and in the public interest, it is necessary to do so. In the writ petition, the appellant had challenged the legality of the order passed by the State Government, which had rejected such application under Rule 39. It is no doubt true that the main contention in the writ petition is to the effect that such rejection was arbitrary. But the fact remains that even assuming that such contention would have been accepted even before deletion of the Rule, in normal course, the Court would have given a fresh direction to the State Government to consider such application for grant of lease afresh under Rule 39. In other words, if the writ petition would be allowed on merits now, in normal course, the matter would be remitted to the State Government for fresh consideration. Such a scenario is very much akin to the scenario in the decision of the Division Bench in 2006 (4) CTC 419 (cited supra) as confirmed in the unreported decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.2138 of 2007 dated 24. 2007. In the said matter, while Rule 39 was still in vogue, the High Court had given a direction to the State Government to consider the application under Rule 39. Subsequently, before any further order could be passed by the State Government, Rule 39 itself was deleted and thereafter the State Government has rejected the application on the ground that the application is to be rejected as the Rule has been deleted. In such a background, the Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that since there was no vested right to consider the application in accordance with a particular rule, rejection of the application by the State Government was correct and such decision was upheld by the Supreme Court by observing as follows :- "Now, coming to the merits of the writ petition we find that the rule was already repealed on 26. 1996 and the ground reality had also changed. So far as grant of mining and mineral lease is concerned, no person has a vested right in it. 1996 and the ground reality had also changed. So far as grant of mining and mineral lease is concerned, no person has a vested right in it. There is no quarrel on the legal proposition that if certain rights have been decided on the basis of the law which was obtaining at that time, that will not nullify the judicial decision, unless the bases are taken out. In the present case, the rue under which the writ petitioner sought direction for consideration of his application has already been repealed within the time frame directed by the High Court. Therefore, the basis on which the order was passed has been totally knocked out. Rule 39 on the basis of which direction was given was not in existence. Therefore, it could not have been possible for the authorities to have acceded to the request of the writ petitioner. More so, no one has a vested right in mineral lease. . . ." 6. In our considered opinion, the ratio of the aforesaid Supreme Court decision, which has confirmed the decision of the Division Bench of this High Court reported in 2006(4) CTC 419 (cited supra) is squarely applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Since the aforesaid decision is directly applicable (and was between the very same parties, though in respect of another application), we hardly see any scope to interfere with the order passed by the learned single Judge. The decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, rendered on a completely different background of facts, cannot be made applicable. 7. For the aforesaid reasons, the writ appeal is dismissed. There would be no order as to costs.