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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2007 DIGILAW 410 (MP)

Ramabhilsh Kori v. State of M. P.

2007-04-05

ABHAY M.NAIK

body2007
ORDER Abhay M. Naik, J. 1. Short facts involved in the petition are that the petitioner is a Tari contractor and was having licence for two Tari Shops of District Indore for the year 2006-07 granted by Respondent No. 3. Notice dated 29-1-2007 inviting tenders was published in the newspaper 'Dainik Bhaskar' (Indore Edition) on 6-2-2007 for the period 2007-08 with regard to auction of Tari shops etc. Auction was scheduled to be held on 22-2-2007. petitioner submitted bids for two Tari Shops of District Indore. Being the highest bidder, his bids were accepted for Rs. 37,21,000/- for the year 2007-08. He deposited the earnest money to the tune of Rs. 4,00,000/- on 22-2-2007. l/6th of the amount was also deposited by him on 22-2-2007. The petitioner further deposited l/12th amount along with the bank guarantee as required vide letter dated 21-3-2007 issued by Respondent No. 3. It is stated in the petition that after acceptance of the offer of the petitioner, he was forced to leave Indore under a threat by one Govind Jaiswal. Complaints were duly made with police. On 24-3-2007, Respondent No. 2 issued a letter to the petitioner informing him that auction of two Tari Shops in his favour has been cancelled by the Excise Commissioner on 23-3-2007 (Annex. P/l) and there will be re-auction of the same on 30-3-2007 at 10.00 A.M. An advertisement was also published to the aforesaid effect on 24-3-2007 (vide Annx. P/9). It has been contended that the order of the Excise Commissioner dated 23-3-2007 contained in Annx. P/l, is totally illegal being contrary to Clause Nos. 15 and 19 of the conditions contained in the tender notice dated 29-1-2007 marked as Annx. P/4. 2. Respondents submitted their return refuting thereby the allegations made in the writ petition. Main defence is that the Excise Commissioner has power to relax the condition mentioned in Clause 15 of Annx. P/4. In exercise of such power, the Respondent No. 4 was permitted to make compliance of Clause 15(2) of Annx. P/4 even after expiry of the period prescribed therein and the bids in favour of the petitioner have been rightly cancelled vide Annx. P/l. 3. Shri S.R. Saraf, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, Shri A.S. Kutumbale, learned Addl. P/4. In exercise of such power, the Respondent No. 4 was permitted to make compliance of Clause 15(2) of Annx. P/4 even after expiry of the period prescribed therein and the bids in favour of the petitioner have been rightly cancelled vide Annx. P/l. 3. Shri S.R. Saraf, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, Shri A.S. Kutumbale, learned Addl. Advocate General with Shri Umesh Gajankush, Government Advocate for Respondents No. 1 to 3 and Shri Manoj Soni, Advocate, for Respondent No. 4, made their respective submissions which have been considered in the light of the material on record and the provisions of law governing the situations. 4. It is an admitted position that the petitioner offered highest bids at Rs. 37,21,000/- in respect of two Tari Shops of District Indore (hereinafter referred to as Subject Shops) for the year 2007-08 which were duly accepted being the highest. In compliance of the other conditions, he deposited the earnest money, part of the amount and bank guarantee as required from time to time. Clause 15 of Annx. P/4 provides for re-auction in the following manner: 5. Sub-clause (2) of Clause 15, enables an applicant to submit an application for re-auction within three succeeding days from the date of auction. By virtue of Sub-clause (3), such an application would be liable to be considered only if the applicant offers at least 10% in excess of the highest bid. However, by virtue of Sub-clause (2) itself, such an application ought to have been accompanied by l/3rd amount of the highest bid in auction in cash or by bank draft, bankers cheque or bank's cash order. Sub-clause (6) binds the earlier highest bidder for a period of fifteen days on his bid despite re-auction. 6. In the case in hand, Respondent No. 4 submitted an application on 24-2- 2007 (Annx. R/l) for re-auction of the subject shops. He offered the bids at a total sum of Rs. 41,01,111/- (being 10% in excess of the earlier highest bid of Rs. 37,21,000/-). l/3rd of this amount was not deposited with Annx. R/l. On perusal, it may be seen that although the Respondent No. 4 expressed his preparedness to deposit the said amount, but the same was not, in fact, deposited as required by Sub-clause (2) of Clause 15 of Annx. P/4. 37,21,000/-). l/3rd of this amount was not deposited with Annx. R/l. On perusal, it may be seen that although the Respondent No. 4 expressed his preparedness to deposit the said amount, but the same was not, in fact, deposited as required by Sub-clause (2) of Clause 15 of Annx. P/4. On 24-3-2007, balance of l/3rd of the amount was deposited by the Respondent No. 4 vide Annx. R/2. 7. The Excise Commissioner caused an inquiry wherein it was found that the Respondent No. 4 had visited the District Excise office on 24-2-2007, but the money could not be deposited on account of absence of the concerning employee. In the inquiry, it was further found that the contention of the Respondent No. 4 that on 26-2-2007, the money was not accepted by him in the office, was not found to be correct, because the Respondent No. 4 was not found to have visited the Excise office on 26-2-2007. However, the deposit made on 24-3-2007 was accepted by the Excise Commissioner in exercise of his power under Clause 19 and re-auction has been ordered vide the impugned order contained in Annx. P/l. 8. Shri Saraf, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the bids of the petitioner being the highest were duly accepted and re-auction of the subject shops could not be directed, because the application for re-auction was not accompanied by 10% of the amount of offered bids. The Excise Commissioner had no power to allow the Respondent No. 4 to deposit the l/3rd amount beyond three days from the date of auction as required under Sub-clause (2) of Clause 15 of Annx. P/4. Learned Counsel Shri Saraf, submitted that sub- Clause (2) of Clause 15 being mandatory in nature, could not have been relaxed by the Excise Commissioner and the same was not, in fact, relaxed. Even the Excise Commissioner has no power to accept an application for re-auction if it is not accompanied by deposit to the tune of l/3rd of the offered bids. 9. Shri Kutumbale, learned Additional Advocate General, contended that the Excise Commissioner was well within, his power to accept the deposit made by Respondent No. 4 on 24-3-2007. He referred to Clauses (a) and (e) of Section 7 of the M.P. Excise Act, 1915, which read as under: 7. 9. Shri Kutumbale, learned Additional Advocate General, contended that the Excise Commissioner was well within, his power to accept the deposit made by Respondent No. 4 on 24-3-2007. He referred to Clauses (a) and (e) of Section 7 of the M.P. Excise Act, 1915, which read as under: 7. Establishment and powers thereof.- The State Government may, by notification, for the whole or for any specified part of the [State]- (a) appoint an officer, hereinafter referred to as the Excise Commissioner who, subject to such control (if any) as the State Government may direct, shall superintend the administration of Excise Department and the collection of the excise revenue; (b)..... (c)..... (d)..... (e) delegate to the Chief Revenue authority or the Excise Commissioner all or any of its powers under this Act except the power conferred by Section 62 to make rules. Learned Addl. Advocate General Shri Kutumbale, further referred to rule making power contained in Section 62(2)(h) of the said Act, which reads as under: 62. Power to make rules.- (1)......... (2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the State Government may make rules - (a).... (b).... (c).... (d).... (e).... (f).... (g).... (h) prescribing the authority by, the form in which, and terms and conditions on and subject to which any licence, permit or pass shall be granted, any by such rules, among other matters, - (i) fix the period for which any licence, permit or pass shall continue in force, (ii) prescribe the scale of fees or the manner of fixing the fees payable in respect of any such licence, permit or pass, (iii) prescribe the amount of security to be deposited by holders of any licence, permit or pass for the performance of the conditions of the same, (iv) prescribe the accounts to be maintained and the returns to be submitted by licence-holders, and (v) prohibit or regulate the partnership in, or the transfer of, licences; It is further contended that in exercise of rule making powers, the following relevant rules have been made: XVIII. The powers conferred on the State Government by sections of the Act specified below are hereby delegated to the Excise Commissioner, viz.:- (a).... (b).... The powers conferred on the State Government by sections of the Act specified below are hereby delegated to the Excise Commissioner, viz.:- (a).... (b).... (c) Power to grant a lease of any right specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 18 provided that the previous sanction of the State Government be obtained to any lease of the right to manufacture liquor under the supply system. XXII. Disposal of licences.- (1) Licence for the manufacture or sale of intoxicants shall be disposed of by tender, auction, fixed licence fee or in such other manner as the State Government may, by general or special order, direct, Except where otherwise prescribed, licence shall be granted by the Collector or by an officer authorised by him in that behalf. [(1-a) The Officer holding the auction shall execute written agreement with the bidder that the latter has heard and/or otherwise understood the conditions of auction and that he accepts the auction conditions and in the event of his failure to stick to his bid he agrees for the forfeiture of the earnest money deposited by him and further binds himself to reimburse the loss caused in the event of re-auction which shall be recoverable from him as an arrear of land revenue]. (2) The right to demand security.- At any time during the currency of a licence the Collector may in his discretion call upon the licensee to give security for the due performance of the conditions thereof. 10. It has been contended by Shri Kutumbale, learned Addl. Advocate General that the impugned order has been passed with an object of earning more revenue. This apart, rights of the petitioner have been protected, inasmuch as, he, too is free to participate in the proceedings of the re-auction and will not suffer any prejudice on account of the same. The powers having been exercised by the Excise Commissioner in accordance with Clause 19 of Annx. P/4, the impugned order Annx. P/l does not suffer from any arbitrariness, irrationality or mala fide. Reliance for this purpose is placed on the Supreme Court decision in the case of State ofMadhya Pradesh and Ors. The powers having been exercised by the Excise Commissioner in accordance with Clause 19 of Annx. P/4, the impugned order Annx. P/l does not suffer from any arbitrariness, irrationality or mala fide. Reliance for this purpose is placed on the Supreme Court decision in the case of State ofMadhya Pradesh and Ors. v. Nandlal Jaiswal and others, 1987 MPU (SC) 250: AIR 1987 SC 251 wherein it has been held: But, while considering the applicability of Article 14 in such a case, we must bear in mind that, having regard to the nature of the trade or business, the Court would be slow to interfere with the policy laid down by the State Government for grant of licences for manufacture and sale of liquor. The Court would, in view of the inherently pernicious nature of the commodity allow a large measure of latitude to the State Government in determining its policy of regulating, manufacture and trade in liquor. Moreover, the grant of licences for manufacture and sale of liquor would essentially be a matter of economic policy where the Court would hesitate to intervene and strike down what the State Government had done, unless it appears to be plainly arbitrary, irrational or mala fide. We had occasion to consider the scope of interference by the Court under Article 14 while dealing with laws relating to economic activities in R.K. Garg v. Union of India, (1982)1 SCR 947: AIR 1981 SC 2138 . We pointed out in that case that laws relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as freedom of speech, religion, etc. We observed that the legislature should be allowed some play in the joints because it has to deal with complex problems which do not admit of solution through any doctrinaire or strait jacket formula and this is particularly true in case of legislation dealing with economic matters, where, having regard to the nature of the problems required to be dealt with, greater play in the joints has to be allowed to the legislature. 11. Relying upon another Apex Court decision in the case of Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. and Ors. (2000)2 SCC 617 , Shri Kutumbale, learned Addl. Advocate General, contended that the matter in hand is not open to judicial scrutiny. He relied upon the following portion of paragraph 7: 7. 11. Relying upon another Apex Court decision in the case of Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. and Ors. (2000)2 SCC 617 , Shri Kutumbale, learned Addl. Advocate General, contended that the matter in hand is not open to judicial scrutiny. He relied upon the following portion of paragraph 7: 7. The law relating to award of a contract by the State, its corporations and bodies acting as instrumentalities and agencies of the Government has been settled by the decision of this Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union (Regd.) v. Union of India, CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd., Tata Cellular v. Union of India, Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra and Raunaq International Ltd. v. I.V.R. Construction Ltd. The award of a contract, whether it is by a private party or by a public body or the State, is essentially a commercial transaction. In arriving at a commercial decision considerations which are paramount are commercial considerations. The State can choose its own method to arrive at a decision. It can fix its own terms of invitation to tender and that is not open to judicial scrutiny. It can enter into negotiations before finally deciding to accept one of the offers made to it. Price need not always be the sole criterion for awarding a contract. It is free to grant any relaxation, for bona fide reasons, if the tender conditions permit such a relaxation. It may not accept the offer even though it happens to be the highest or the lowest. 12. Shri Manoj Soni, learned Counsel for Respondent No. 4 contended that his client was not at fault when he visited the office of Excise Commissioner on 24-2-2007. The Respondent No. 4 had visited the office of Excise Commissioner on the aforesaid date when the balance of l/3rd amount was not accepted in the office due to the absence of the concerning employee. Shri Soni, virtually adopted the arguments made by the learned Addl. Advocate General. However, in the alternative, he contended that in case, if, the re-auction is not permitted, the l/3rd amount of Respondent No. 4 deposited in pursuance of his application for re-auction may be refunded. 13. It is true that no citizen of this country has a fundamental right to carry on trade or business in liquor. Advocate General. However, in the alternative, he contended that in case, if, the re-auction is not permitted, the l/3rd amount of Respondent No. 4 deposited in pursuance of his application for re-auction may be refunded. 13. It is true that no citizen of this country has a fundamental right to carry on trade or business in liquor. Under its regulatory power, the State has power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants. Manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession of an intoxicant may be prohibited absolutely. No right may be claimed against the State to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. However, it has been observed by the Apex Court in the case of State of M. P. v. Nandlal (supra) that "when the State decides to grant such right or privilege to others, the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14'. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor". It has been further held by the Apex Court that grant of licences for manufacture and sale of liquor would essentially be a matter of economic policy where the Court would hesitate to intervene and strike down what the State Government has done, unless it appears to be plainly arbitrary, irrational or mala fide-," Apex Court further in the case of Air India Ltd. (supra) has clearly observed that "the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies are bound to adhere to the norms,- standards and procedures laid down by them and cannot depart from them arbitrarily. Though that decision is not amenable to judicial review, the Court can examine the decision-making process and interfere if it is found vitiated by mala, fides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. The State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned. Even when some defect is found in the decision-making process the Court must exercise its discretionary- power under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. Even when some defect is found in the decision-making process the Court must exercise its discretionary- power under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The Court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the Court should intervene." 14. Per contra, Shri Saraf, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, contended that the conditions of re-auction published in Annx. P/4 are in the exercise of powers under Section 62(2)(h) of the M. P. Excise Act, 1915. Though, they are administrative instructions, the authorities are bound to follow them and officers are expected to act in accordance with the conditions laid down by the State Government and the conditions advertised. None of the powers conferred under Section 7 of the M. P. Excise Act, 1915 or the Rules framed in exercise of the powers under Section 62(2)(h), empowers the Excise Commissioner to violate the conditions of auction and re-auction contained in Annx. P/4. Clause 15 of Annx. P/4 provides for re-auction which may be ordered in case, if, a participant of the auction seeks re-auction by submitting an application to the Collector within three days from the date of auction accompanied by l/3rd of the highest offered amount provided he offers a bid in excess of at least 10% of the highest bid received in the auction. Earnest money deposited by such applicant in the auction proceedings, is liable to be taken into account in the l/3rd amount liable to be deposited with the application for re-auction. In case, if, the application for re-auction if granted, the Collector would declare the date of re-auction which would be at least after five days. It is further mentioned in Clause 15 of Annx. P/4 that the highest bidder of the first auction would be bound by his bid for 15 days despite re-auction. 15. The entire reliance of the respondents is on Clause 19 of Annx. P/4 which is reproduced below: In view of the aforesaid Clause 19, it Jnay be seen that the Excise Commissioner subject to Clause 15 of Annx. P/4 that the highest bidder of the first auction would be bound by his bid for 15 days despite re-auction. 15. The entire reliance of the respondents is on Clause 19 of Annx. P/4 which is reproduced below: In view of the aforesaid Clause 19, it Jnay be seen that the Excise Commissioner subject to Clause 15 of Annx. P/4'is empowered to pass an order for re-auction within a period of seven days from fmalisation of the auction or as he thinks proper in case, if, violation of auction Conditions is found or the re-auction is in the interest of revenue. Thus, in - case of violation of auction conditions or in case of interest of revenue, re-auction may be directed subject to the conditions contained in Clause 15. Such reduction shall have to take place within a period of 7 days from the fmalisation of initial auction or within a period which is thought proper by the Excise Commissioner. 16. Sub-clause (2) of Clause 15 makes it mandatory that l/3rd of the highest offered amount is to be deposited with the application containing prayer for re-auction and such an application ought to"be-submitted to the Collector within three days from the date of auction. Clause-'!9 has been made dependent of Clause 15. The Excise Commissioner is merety "empowered to pass an order for re-auction fixing thereby a date within 7 days from finalisation of the auction or as he thinks proper. Thus, the power conferred on the Excise Commissioner under Clause 19 empowers him to fix a date for re-auction on a day even after expiry of 7 days. It does not empower him to direct re-auction in violation of Clause 15. Conditions contained in Annx. P/4, are stated to have been prescribed by the State Government. Excise Commissioner cannot be legally permitted to relax the mandatory requirement of Clause 15 and order for re-auction despite non-compliance of Sub-clause (2) of Clause 15. This view is strengthened by certain observations made by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of S. S. Bhatia and Co. v. State of M. P. and others, 1984 MPU 353. In Bhatia's case (supra), a writ petition was filed for cancellation of the acceptance of bid of Respondent No. 7 and in substance the relief of re-auction was sought. v. State of M. P. and others, 1984 MPU 353. In Bhatia's case (supra), a writ petition was filed for cancellation of the acceptance of bid of Respondent No. 7 and in substance the relief of re-auction was sought. The application for re-auction was not accompanied by l/3rd of the amount as required in the present case by virtue of Clause 15(2) of Annx. P/4. Submissions in the present case on behalf of State Government have been virtually made in 'U' turn manner which is evident from paragraph 11 of the order in Bhatia's case (supra) which is reproduced below: It was contended by the learned Government Advocate that so far as the question of re-auction is concerned, in the conditions of auction published in the Gazette. Rule 12 pertains to re-auction and the first requirement of a person who applied for re-auction is that he must be a person who had offered the bids. As the petitioner firm or Surjit Singh Bhatia were not entitled to offer the bids and as the bids were not offered, neither the petitioner firm nor Surjit Singh Bhatia were entitled to claim a re-auction as has been provided in Rule 12. It was contended that the second condition which is incorporated in Rule 12(b) is that the person who claims re-auction has to deposit l/3rd of the amount of proposed bid along with the application. According to the learned Government Advocate admittedly when the prayer for re-auction was made to the Commissioner, l/3rd of the proposed bid was not deposited. It was not even deposited when in response to the letter of the Commissioner dated 30th January, 1984 the petitioner although expressed his willingness but in fact the l/3rd amount was never deposited and in such a situation the petitioner was not entitled to claim re-auction as the conditions required under Rule 12 or instructions issued by the State Government were not fulfilled. Learned Government Advocate, therefore, contended that even if these instructions are not statutory rules, still it could not be disputed that they are administrative instructions and were notified long before and the petitioner knew them and. Learned Government Advocate, therefore, contended that even if these instructions are not statutory rules, still it could not be disputed that they are administrative instructions and were notified long before and the petitioner knew them and. therefore, the authorities were bound to act in accordance with these instructions, and could not give a go-by to these conditions advertised and in support of his contention the learned Government Advocate placed reliance on the decision of Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ramana v. I.A. Authority of India where Their Lordships have at length considered the question of the consideration or requirement following the conditions laid down in the notice of auction or tender even though they may not be statutory and have ruled that the authorities are bound to follow them. Learned Government Advocate also placed reliance on the Division Bench decisions in Nanhelal Sahu v. State of Madhya Pradesh and another and Pradeep Rajdeep and Company, Gadarwara v. State of M.P. and four others. In paragraph 14, the learned Division Bench observed: It is also clear that so far as the conditions of re-auction are concerned as have been stated clearly in Rule 12 of the notification issued by the State Government, the conditions were not satisfied as the petitioner was not the person who offered the bid as he was not eligible and that l/3rd amount was not deposited as is contemplated under Rule 12(b). 17. In the present case, it is not disputed that the Respondent No. 4 had offered the bid in the original auction and was, thus, eligible for making an application for re-auction. However, he admittedly, did not deposit the l/3rd amount along with the application for re-auction. 18. After discussion, the learned Division Bench in Bhatia 's case (supra) has clearly observed in paragraph 15: Therefore, if the authorities have followed the conditions of auction notified by the State Government in the Gazette and also published in the auction notice long in advance, the petitioner could not make any grievance that the authorities committed any wrong. In fact, the authorities were expected to act in accordance with the conditions laid down by the State Government and the conditions advertised. In fact, the authorities were expected to act in accordance with the conditions laid down by the State Government and the conditions advertised. It also could not be doubted that as the conditions for re-auction as are stated in Rule 12(a) and (b) are not satisfied, the prayer of the petitioner for re-auction could not be granted either by the Excise Commissioner or by the State Government. 19. In Bhatia's case (supra), there was a loss of revenue to the tune of Rs. 11 lacs, yet this Court did not allow the re-auction. In the case in hand, there would be question of hardly a loss of revenue to the tune of Rs. 3,72,100/-. However, securing interest of revenue would not mean that the respondents may be permitted to act in contravention of the conditions which were obviously binding on them. Thus, the contention of the learned Additional Advocate General that the State authorities have a right to secure more revenue, cannot be accepted at the cost of illegality and arbitrariness. Moreover, there is no iota on record to establish that the Excise Commissioner has, in fact, exercised the power under Clause 19 of Annex. P/4 on consideration of interest of revenue. Such exercise of power, obviously, must be in black and white and the respondents have failed to place on record any such document containing consideration of factor of interest of revenue while directing re-auction by the impugned order. They have been unable to show prima facie that the power under Clause 19 of Annx. P/4 was, in fact, exercised in order to secure more revenue. In the order dated 23-3-2007, there is absolutely no mention that the interest of revenue was taken into consideration while directing the re-auction. There is virtually no discussion in Annx. P/l (order dated 24-3-2007 of the Collector as well as the order dated 23-3-2007 of the Excise Commissioner) that the factor of revenue was taken into consideration and the impugned orders are passed in the interest of Revenue. The shelter of interest of revenue appears to be an eye wash and the Excise Commissioner is found to have acted with arbitrariness that, too, in contravention of Sub-clause (2) of Clause 15 of Annx. P/4. The shelter of interest of revenue appears to be an eye wash and the Excise Commissioner is found to have acted with arbitrariness that, too, in contravention of Sub-clause (2) of Clause 15 of Annx. P/4. Consequently, the order of the Excise Commissioner bearing No. Abka/Theka/247 dated 23-3-2007 and the letter of communication issued by the office of the Collector (Excise) Indore bearing No. Abka/Theka/1114 dated 24-3-2007 (both contained in Annx. P/l) are, hereby quashed. Consequently, notice of re-auction published vide Annx. P/9 also stands quashed. 20. It has been contended by the respondents that the State Government which have delegated the powers to various authorities can ultimately take a decision in the interests of revenue to order re-auction. On this point, I may reproduce paragraph 16 of Bhatia's case (supra) as under: It was contended that the State Government is the ultimate authority for granting the licence for sale of liquor and it was vigorously contended by learned Counsel for the petitioner that the State Government which have delegated the powers to various authorities can ultimately take a decision in the interests of revenue to order re-auction. It is, however, open to the State Government in its wisdom to do as they choose although we will like to quote from P.N. Kaushal v. Union of India the following observations: We have reasoned enough to justify the ways of the Constitution and the law to the consumers of social justice and spirituous portions. The challenge falls and the Writ Petition Nos. 4108-4109 etc., of 1978 are hereby dismissed with costs (one hearing fee). May we hopefully expect the State to bear true faith and allegiance to that constitutional orphan, Article 47? Accordingly, I observe that it would be open to the State Government to act further in its own wisdom in accordance with law. 21. As regards the alternative prayer of Respondent No. 4, it is made clear that he would be entitled to refund of the money deposited by him in pursuance of the application for re-auction Submitted on 24-2-2007 (Annx. R/l). 22. In the result, petition stands allowed in the aforesaid manner. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.