JUDGMENT A. S. NAIDU, J. — Invoking jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner seeks to assail the order dtd.29th July, 1993 passed by Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Bhubaneswar in Industrial Dispute Misc. Case No.1/1989. 2. Bereft of unnecessary details, the short facts which are necessary for appreciating the dispute are that : Opposite Party No.2 was a helper in the Loco Maintenance Section, Traffic and Raw-material Department of Rourkela Steel Plant, Rourkela. It is alleged that on 9th August, 1988 he com¬mitted theft of two pieces of traction motor brass holders and one hammer from the company’s premises. He was caught red-handed by the Security staff present near the Gate and the stolen arti¬cles were recovered from his possession. Theft of Company’s property being a misconduct, he was issued with a charge sheet and was called upon to submit his show cause reply, if any. He submitted his show cause reply and the same being found unsatis¬factory, a domestic enquiry was directed to be initiated. The Enquiry Committee enquired into the allegations, gave reasonable opportunity to the workman of being heard, granted him time on various dates and after completion of enquiry submitted its report finding the workman guilty of the charge. The Disciplinary Authority thereupon made thorough scrutiny of the materials collected during enquiry and after confirming the finding record¬ed by the enquiry committee imposed the punishment of dismissal from service. The Management thereafter remitted one month’s wages to the workman and simultaneously filed a petition under Section 33 (2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947(hereinaf¬ter called the “Act”) seeking necessary approval as the workman-opposite party was a party to an earlier dispute pending adjudi¬cation before the Tribunal. 3. After receiving notice opposite party No.2-workman appeared and pleaded his innocence and took the stand that the enquiry was conducted without giving sufficient opportunity to him and the time petitions filed by him were rejected time and again without sufficient reasons. The workman challenged the fairness of the domestic enquiry on the grounds that (a) the names of the witnesses examined were not furnished, (b) the evidence adduced had not been properly appreciated, (c) the copy of the enquiry report was not supplied to him before the final order was passed and (d) the punishment imposed on him was shock¬ingly extreme disproportionate to the charges. 4. 4. The Industrial Tribunal heard both the parties at length, scrutinized the enquiry report and other documents and the records of the enquiry committee. It arrived at a conclusion that the enquiry committee was quite liberal in granting adjourn¬ment to the opposite party-workman, but despite that did not become diligent. It held that sufficient opportunity had been afforded to the workman-opposite party. It was further held that the enquiry proceeded in accordance with law and following the principles of natural justice and equity and the evidence which were available to establish the allegations levelled were cor¬rectly appreciated. Thus, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the enquiry was conducted properly, but then held that the punishment of dismissal imposed on the workman was quite dispro¬portionate which led to an inference that the management’s action was mala fide. On the basis of such conclusion the prayer to accord approval to the punishment imposed was rejected and the Misc. Case was dismissed. 5. After receiving notice a counter affidavit has been filed by opposite party No.2 reiterating the stand taken before the Tribunal and alleging that the Management took a vindictive attitude and consequently imposed the extreme punishment of dismissal though the offence alleged to have been committed was a minor one. A rejoinder affidavit has been filed by the petitioner-Management repudiating the averments made in the counter affida¬vit. In course of hearing another affidavit has been filed by the Management intimating this Court that opposite party No.2-workman was removed from service w.e.f. 1989. He had received his provi¬dent dues in February, 1998. He had vacated the company’s quar¬ters w.e.f. 31st August, 1999. In the alternative it was pleaded that even if the workman would not have been dismissed, by efflux of time he would have retired on 31st January, 1998 on attaining the age of superannuation and as such the writ application has become infructuous. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the materials annexed to the writ application. Ac¬cording to learned counsel for the petitioner the Tribunal was wholly unjustified in refusing to accord approval only on the ground that the punishment imposed was disproportionate and such order, it is submitted, is illegal, perverse, unreasonable and is also arbitrary. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the materials annexed to the writ application. Ac¬cording to learned counsel for the petitioner the Tribunal was wholly unjustified in refusing to accord approval only on the ground that the punishment imposed was disproportionate and such order, it is submitted, is illegal, perverse, unreasonable and is also arbitrary. It is stated that the workman had a right to challenge the order of termination under Section 33-A of the I.D. Act and while dealing with an application filed under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment imposed. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, opposite party No. 2-workman was involved in commission of similar type of offence earlier but a lenient view was taken by the Disciplinary Authority. In spite of such leniency, he did not mend himself and the authority after considering all these facts imposed the order of dismissal from service. Thus there is no infirmity or illegality in the order. 7. The submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner-Management are strongly repudiated by learned counsel for the opposite party-workman. It is stated that the workman is a poor man. The only allegation is that he committed theft of two pieces of traction motor brass holders and one hammer. Keeping in view the nature of the stand taken by the workman and the value of the property stolen, the Management ought to have awarded a reasona¬ble punishment and not extreme penalty of dismissal from serv¬ice. The punishment imposed being not called for, the Industrial Tribunal has rightly refused to grant permission under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act. 8. Keeping in view the nature of the stand taken by the workman and the value of the property stolen, the Management ought to have awarded a reasona¬ble punishment and not extreme penalty of dismissal from serv¬ice. The punishment imposed being not called for, the Industrial Tribunal has rightly refused to grant permission under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act. 8. Perusal of Section 33(2) (b) of the I.D. Act reveals that the jurisdiction of an Industrial Tribunal while dealing with a petition filed under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act is con¬fined to the enquiry as to; (a) whether proper domestic enquiry, in accordance with the relevant rules and/or standing order and principles of natural justice has been held, (b) whether prima facie case has been made out basing upon the legal evidence adduced before the Domestic enquiry committee, (c) whether the employer had come to a bona fide conclusion that the employee was guilty of the offences alleged to have been committed, (d) whether the employer has paid or offered to pay wages for one month to the employee, (e) whether the employer has simultaneously or within such reasonable short time is to form part of the same transaction applied to the authority before which the main industrial dispute case is pending for approval of the action taken by it and, (f) whether there was justification for imposing punishment and if, it so finds, it will grant approval of the order of punish¬ment provided the employer had paid or offered to pay wages for one month to the employee (in the case of dismissal) and had within time applied to the authority before which the main indus¬trial dispute is pending for approval of the action taken by him. It is no more res-integra that if these conditions are satisfied, the Industrial Tribunal would grant approval which would relate back to the date from which the employer had imposed punishment. If however according to the Industrial Tribunal, the domestic enquiry suffered from any defect or infirmity, it will make its own assessment of the evidence adduced and pass neces¬sary orders, either granting or refusing approval to the punish¬ment imposed. 9. In the case at hand, as would be evident from the facts narrated in the preceding paragraphs the Management after con¬ducting the domestic enquiry had imposed punishment of dismissal from service. 9. In the case at hand, as would be evident from the facts narrated in the preceding paragraphs the Management after con¬ducting the domestic enquiry had imposed punishment of dismissal from service. It also appears that one month’s salary as required was paid to the workman and application for approval as required under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act was filed within the time as an industrial dispute is pending. It is pertinent to mention here that the Industrial Tribunal, after scrutinizing the enquiry report and other materials produced before it and after going through the evidence arrived at a conclusion that the enquiry was conducted following the principles of natural justice and equity and there is no infirmity or illegality. It also arrived at a conclusion that non-supply of the enquiry report is not fatal to the present case as the same was not covered by the ratio of the decision of Ramzan Khan’s case (reported in AIR 1985 S.C. 1416 ) as the said ratio had no retrospective application. The only ground on which the Industrial Tribunal refused to accord approv¬al was that punishment imposed was disproportionate to the charge. Thus the question which needs to be examined in this case is as to whether the Industrial Tribunal had jurisdiction and authority to refuse to accord approval to the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority, in a proceeding initiated under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act solely on the ground that the punishment imposed was disproportionate. In the case of Lords Krishna Textiles Mills v. Its Workmen reported in AIR 1961 SC 860 , the Supreme Court after referring to its earlier decision and explaining the distinction between “permission” and “approv¬al” observed: “Therefore, putting it negatively the jurisdiction of the appropriate industrial authority in holding an enquiry under Section 33(2)(b) cannot be wider and is, if at all, more limited, then that permitted under Section 33( 1), and in exercising its powers under Section 33(2) the appropriate authority must bear in mind the departure deliberately made by the Legislature in sepa¬rating the two classes of cases falling under the two sub-sec¬tions, and in providing for express permission in one case and only approval in the other. It is true that it would be competent to the authority in a proper case to refuse to give approval, for Section 33(5) expressly empowers the authority to pass such order in relation to the application made before it under the proviso to Section 33(2) (b) as it may deem fit, it may either approve or refuse to approve: it can, however, impose no conditions and pass no conditional order.” 10. While exercising power under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act the Tribunal is required to examine as to whether the domestic enquiry had been conducted fairly, without any bias and following the principles of natural justice and equity and as to whether the materials available in record prima facie establish the charges framed against the delinquent. On such scrutiny if the Industrial Tribunal comes to the conclusion that there was no unfair labour practice or victimization it has to grant approval to the punishment imposed. Section 33(2) of the Industrial Act provides for a remedy to assail the punishment and the same is beyond the scope of the enquiry under Section 33(2) (b) of the Act. It is needless to say that on scrutiny if the Industrial Tribunal arrives at a conclusion that the domestic enquiry was defective for any reason, it has the jurisdiction to consider the evidence adduced in enquiry and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. In the case of Central Bank of India Ltd. New Delhi v. Shri Prakash Chand Jain reported in 1969(1) SCR 735 , it was held that when an Industrial Tribunal is asked to give an approval to an order of dismissal under Section 33(2) (b) of the Act, it can disregard the findings given by the enquiry Officer only if the findings are perverse. The test of perversity is that the find¬ings may not be supported by any legal evidence at all or where the findings arrived at by the domestic enquiry is one which no reasonable person could have arrived at on the materials before it. 11. It is apparent from the facts that opposite party No.2-workman was found guilty on two earlier occasions where minor punishments were imposed. Theft of Company’s properties, as would be evident from the standing order, is a misconduct. Considering all these aspects and the conduct of the workman, the Discipli¬nary Authority had imposed the punishment of dismissal. 11. It is apparent from the facts that opposite party No.2-workman was found guilty on two earlier occasions where minor punishments were imposed. Theft of Company’s properties, as would be evident from the standing order, is a misconduct. Considering all these aspects and the conduct of the workman, the Discipli¬nary Authority had imposed the punishment of dismissal. The Industrial Tribunal in its judgment has not come to the conclu¬sion that the domestic enquiry suffered from any defect or in¬firmity or that it was perverse. In fact the Tribunal has as¬sessed the evidence and found that the order holding the workman guilty was justified. The Tribunal has not come to the conclusion that the punishment of dismissal imposed was excessive or too severe or intended to victimize the employee. In the absence of such conclusions the Tribunal had no option but to grant approval to the punishment imposed inasmuch as generally speaking the award of punishment for misconduct is a matter for the management to decide and the Tribunal is not required to consider the pro¬priety or adequacy of the punishment or whether it is excessive or too severe unless it amounts to unfair labour practice or meant to victimize the workman. In the absence of such finding and further the jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunal being limit¬ed, as stated above, and as all the essential requisites of Section 33(2)(b) of the Act are satisfied, in the instant case the Industrial Tribunal was not justified in refusing approval and the said order cannot be sustained. Consequently the Writ Application is allowed and Annexure-l is quashed. Parties to bear their own cost. Application allowed.