JUDGMENT : 1. This is a revision by applicant/accused against the order passed by Special Judge, whereby he refused to discharge the applicant/accused. 2. A few facts may be stated as under - The applicant/accused was working as an Assistant Engineer in Municipal Council, Akola. On 13/2/1991, a trap was laid by Anti-corruption Bureau, upon a complaint lodged by one Gajanan Gote. It is alleged that applicant/accused, was therefore, caught accepting bribe of Rs.2000/- for sanctioning bill for Rs.60,000/-. A crime was registered. Respondent no.2 – anti-corruption bureau sent a letter dated 15/11/1991 to the Municipal Council seeking sanction to prosecute the accused. Subject was placed before the Standing Committee. The Standing Committee in its meeting dated 7/12/1991 refused to grant sanction. As a result, writ petition No.307/1993 challenging this Resolution was filed in the High court. A Writ of Mandamus was issued by this court to the Municipal Council directing, it to accord sanction to prosecute. It is, therefore, that a sanction was given by the Municipal Council. 3. The applicant/accused then moved an application to the Special Judge to discharge him. The Sessions Judge/Special Judge rejected the application and being aggrieved by that, this revision is filed. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the revision-applicant and the Additional Public Prosecutor for the State. 5. Shri Daga, the learned counsel for the applicant/accused contended that the sanction was, in fact, refused by the Standing Committee by passing a Resolution. He submitted that the fact that the subject was discussed in the Meeting of the Standing Committee shows that the Members of the Standing Committee had applied their mind individually and collectively to the question of grant of sanction and they arrived at conclusion that the sanction need not be granted. The fact that the subject was placed before the Standing Committee and the Resolution in terms of decision the Committee was passed clearly shows that after application of mind the question of grant of sanction was decided. He submitted that the High Court had issued a Mandamus and, therefore, had left no choice to the authority granting sanction at all. He rightly submitted that the decision to grant the sanction has to be of the sanctioning Authority. Here when a Writ of Mandamus was issued to the Sanctioning Authority, it was really left with no alternative but to grant a sanction. He rightly submitted that the decision to grant the sanction has to be of the sanctioning Authority. Here when a Writ of Mandamus was issued to the Sanctioning Authority, it was really left with no alternative but to grant a sanction. The sanction, in such a case would certainly be mechanical. He submits that this is no sanction in the eye of law and he relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in 1997 AIR SC 3400 (Mansukhlal Chauhan .vs. State of Gujarat). The Apex court observed as follows - 19. Since the validity of “sanction” depends on the applicability of mind by the sanctioning authority to the facts of the case as also the material and evidence collected during investigation, it necessarily follows that the sanctioning authority has to apply its own independent mind for the generation of genuine satisfaction whether prosecution has to be sanctioned or not. The mind of the sanctioning authority should not be under pressure from any quarter nor should any external force be acting upon it to take a decision one way or the other. Since the discretion to grant or not to grant sanction vests absolutely in the sanctioning authority, its discretion should be shown to have not been affected by any extraneous consideration. If it is shown that the sanctioning authority was unable to apply its independent mind for any reason whatsoever or was under an obligation or compulsion or constraint to grant the sanction, the order will be bad for the reason that the discretion of the authority “not to sanction” was taken away and it was compelled to act mechanically to sanction the prosecution. 22. Mandamus which is a discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution is requested to be issued, iter alia, to compel performance of public duties which may be administrative, ministerial or statutory in nature. Statutory duty may be either directory or mandatory. Statutory duties, if they are intended to be mandatory in character, are indicated by the use of the words “shall” or “must”. But this is not conclusive as “shall” and “must” have, sometimes, been interpreted as “may”. What is determinative of the nature of duty, whether it is obligatory, mandatory or directory, is the scheme of the Statute in which the “duty” has been set out. But this is not conclusive as “shall” and “must” have, sometimes, been interpreted as “may”. What is determinative of the nature of duty, whether it is obligatory, mandatory or directory, is the scheme of the Statute in which the “duty” has been set out. Even if the “Duty” is not set out clearly and specifically in the Statute, it may be implied as correlative to a “Right”. 23. In the performance of this duty, if the authority in whom the discretion is vested under the Statute, does not act independently and passes an order under the instructions and orders of another authority, the court would intervene in the matter, quash the order and issue a mandamus to that authority to exercise its own discretion. 33. The High Court put the Secretary in a piquant situation. While the Act gave him the discretion to sanction or not to sanction the prosecution of the appellant, the judgment gave him no choice except to sanction the prosecution as any other decision would have exposed him to an action in contempt for not obeying the mandamus issued by the High Court. The High Court assumed the role of the sanctioning authority, considered the whole matter, formed an opinion that it was a fit case in which sanction should be granted and because it itself could not grant sanction under Section 6 of the Act, it directed the Secretary to sanction the prosecution so that the sanction order may be treated to be an order passed by the Secretary and not that of the High Court. This is a classic case where a Brand name is changed to give a new colour to the package without changing the contents thereof. In these circumstances, the sanction order cannot be held to be wholly erroneous having been passed mechanically at the instance of the High Court.” 6. The decision squarely applies to the case at hand. In the case at hand, no discretion was left to the Municipal Council. A decision granting such a sanction is certainly, therefore, vitiated and no prosecution could lay on the basis of such a sanction. The sanction order, to my mind, therefore is certainly bad. 7. The decision squarely applies to the case at hand. In the case at hand, no discretion was left to the Municipal Council. A decision granting such a sanction is certainly, therefore, vitiated and no prosecution could lay on the basis of such a sanction. The sanction order, to my mind, therefore is certainly bad. 7. Shri Daga, the learned counsel for the applicant/accused, contended that the incident in question had taken place in 1991 i.e. almost 15 years ago and the accused is now more than 70 years old, the court should not remand the matter back to pass afresh order in accordance with law. The incident in question had taken place in 1991 i.e. 15 years ago and Standing Committee Members had even objected to second sanction, which was granted on the order of the High Court by writing a letter to the Chairman of the Municipal Council, as can be seen from the letter annexed with the present petition. Thus, in fact, the Standing Committee and the Municipal Council is obviously reluctant to grant sanction. Considering this fact together with the fact that the accused is now more than 70 years old and a time of 15 long years has passed, it would not be, in my opinion, proper to direct to initiate proceedings afresh. The Apex Court has also made following observation in Mansuklal's case cited supra. 39. Normally when the sanction order is held to be bad, the case is remitted back to the authority for reconsideration of the matter and to pass a fresh order of sanction in accordance with law. But in the instant case, the incident is of 1983 and, therefore, after a lapse of fourteen years, it will not, in our opinion, be fair and just to direct that the proceedings may again be initiated from the stage of sanction so as to expose the appellant to another innings of litigation and keep him on trial for an indefinitely long period contrary to the mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution which, as part of right to life, philosophizes early end of criminal proceedings through a speedy trial. 40. The appeal is consequently allowed. The judgments passed by the trial court as also by the High Court are set aside and the appellant is acquitted. He is on bail. He need not surrender. His bail bonds are cancelled. 40. The appeal is consequently allowed. The judgments passed by the trial court as also by the High Court are set aside and the appellant is acquitted. He is on bail. He need not surrender. His bail bonds are cancelled. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court, since the facts are identical, the revision will have to be allowed and order of the trial court set aside and applicant/accused acquitted.