JUDGMENT Hon’ble Rakesh Tiwari, J.—This is landlord’s petition. The petitioner is owner of house No. 21 Nalband Crossing, Urvasi Road, Firozabad, which was purchased by him by a registered sale-deed dated 28.5.1984 from its erstwhile owner Sri Dayal. 2. The respondent-tenants were inducted as tenants by the erstwhile landlord on a monthly rent of Rs. 30/-. 3. The case of the petitioner-landlord is that the building in dispute is in dilapidated condition and requires demolition and reconstruction. As such, he filed release application, registered as P.A. Case No. 60 of 1992 under Section 21(1)(b) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as ‘U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972’) before the Prescribed Authority, Firozabad, which was decided in his favour vide judgment dated 11.3.1998 passed by the Prescribed Authority/Civil Judge (S.D.), Firozabad holding that the house is in dilapidated condition and it has been proved by the landlord that it is essential to demolish the accommodation in dispute as it is repairable. The Court has further held that it has not been denied by the tenant that the repairs are not possible and that the sanctioned map is in accordance with law. After holding that landlord had sufficient financial means, the Prescribed Authority directed to deliver vacant and actual possession of the accommodation otherwise the landlord would have right to get possession through Court in accordance with law. 4. Aggrieved by the judgment dated 11.3.1998, aforesaid, the tenants preferred Misc. Appeal No. 22 of 1998 which has been allowed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 1, Firozabad vide impugned judgment dated 5.10.2002. Challenging the same, the instant writ petition has been filed by the petitioner-landlord. 5. Contention of Counsel for the petitioner is that the landlord had offered accommodation on the ground floor of the house in dispute to the respondents after its demolition and reconstruction at the rate of rent chargeable according to law and despite clear finding of fact recorded by the Prescribed Authority that condition of Rule 17 of the Rules framed under U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 was fulfilled by the landlord, the lower appellate Court has erroneously held that no affidavit was filed by the Architect in support of his report. He urged that the map submitted by the landlord was duly sanctioned by the competent authority and was in accordance with U.P. Regulation of Buildings Operation Act, 1958 as such, the same could not be disbelieved unless and until is disbelieved by the competent appellate authority. 6. He further contended that if any repair was made by the tenant, he ought to have served mandatory notice to the landlord seeking his permission for repair as per mandate under Section 28 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972, as such, the alleged repair has no effect over the report of Architect. 7. He next urged that additional evidence of the tenant at the appellate stage was not admissible in law, particularly in view of the fact that the same was submitted before the Prescribed Authority who rejected the same on the ground that it was not duly stamped or verified. 8. Per contra, it has been urged by Counsel for the respondent-tenants that the landlord has not been able to prove that the house in dispute is in dilapidated condition and finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court cannot be interfered with in writ jurisdiction in view of settled law laid down in Smt. Chandra Devi v. VIIIth A.D.J., 1984 ARC 10. He submitted that the question of offer of part of reconstructed building arises only if the landlord makes out a case under Section 21(1)(b) and no order can be passed merely on the officer of landlord. 9. He also urged that the tenant has right to repair the accommodation even if an application under Section 21(1)(b) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 is pending. In support of this contention, he placed reliance on the decisions in Shree Niwas v. Xth A.D.J., 1994 A.LR 460; Mohan Lal v. A.D.J., 2004 (2) A.R.C. 853 and Satish Chandra Agarwal v. 1st A.D.J., .2005 (3) A.R.C. 484. 10. In support of this contention, he placed reliance on the decisions in Shree Niwas v. Xth A.D.J., 1994 A.LR 460; Mohan Lal v. A.D.J., 2004 (2) A.R.C. 853 and Satish Chandra Agarwal v. 1st A.D.J., .2005 (3) A.R.C. 484. 10. It appears from perusal of the appellate Court’s judgment that the case of the landlord was rejected on the ground that affidavit filed by him was not on General Stamp Paper as required by law; that house is not in dilapidated condition; that the evidence of the parties has not been properly appreciated by the Prescribed Authority; that the judgment of the Prescribed Authority is based on the report of Sri Om Mathur, Architect in favour of the landlord which is not in accordance with law as it has not been supported by an affidavit and that the report of the Architect Sri B.K. Sharma has wrongly been disbelieved by the Court below. The appellate Court held that after repairs have been carried out by the tenant, the report of Sri Om Mathur which is based on an inspection of the building about two years earlier looses its significance and as such the landlord has failed to prove before it that the building is in such a dilapidated condition that it now requires demolition and reconstruction as conditions of Rule 17(1) of the Rules framed under U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 are not fulfilled. It was also held that the landlord has proved that the map was prepared according to the bye-laws for construction of buildings hence map was rightly sanctioned according to Rule 17(1)(iii) of the aforesaid Rules. The findings of the Prescribed Authority was partly upheld on the ground that the landlord could not prove the factum that the accommodation in dispute was in dilapidated condition. The findings of the Prescribed Authority was partly upheld on the ground that the landlord could not prove the factum that the accommodation in dispute was in dilapidated condition. The relevant extract of the findings of the appellate Court are as under : ÞmDr leh{kk ds vk/kkj ij eSa ;g fu/kkZfjr djrk gw¡ fd vihykFkhZx.k dh vihy Lohdkj fd;s tkus ;ksX; gS D;ksafd HkwLokeh ;g lkfcr djus esa vlQy jgk gS fd Áuxr ifjlj th.kkZkh.kZ voLFkk esa fxjkm gkyr esa gSA vr% ;g vihy Lohdkj fd;s tkus ;ksX; gSA vknsk ;g vihy Lohdkj dh tkrh gS rFkk fo}ku fu;r Ákf/kdkjh@flfoy tt ¼lh0fM0½ fQjkstkckn ds }kjk ih-,-dsl ua0 60@92 vtey [kkW Áfr tqoSn csxe vkfn esa ikfjr fd;s x;s fu.kZ;knsk fnukafdr 11-3-1998 dks vkikLr fd;k tkrk gSA dsl dh ifjfLFkfr;ksa dks ns[krs gq, nksuksa i{kdkj viuk&viuk [kpkZ Lo;a ogu djsaA fnukad 5-10-2002 g0 vLi"V ¼;kn jke½ vij ftyk tt dksVZ ua0 1 fQjkstkcknÞ 11. After hearing the Counsels for the parties and going through the record, I find that the contention of Counsel for the respondents that finding of fact recorded by the appellate Court cannot be interferred in writ jurisdiction is misconceived. 12. The High Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 can interfere in any decision of the Court below if it is arbitrary, perverse and not in accordance with law. The decision in Smt. Chandra Devi (supra) relied upon by him does not support his contention which is apparent from the following observations in the aforesaid decision : “….It is equally well established that a finding based either on misapprehension of fact or law or on irrelevant material or on incorrect report which is the foundation of finding is vitiated and is liable to be quashed.” 13. Likewise, the contention of Counsel for the respondent-tenants that even if application under Section 21(1)(b) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 is pending, the tenant has every right to repair the tenanted accommodation is also misconceived. In this regard the case laws relied upon by the Counsel for the respondents rendered in Shree Niwas (supra) Mohan Lal (supra) and Satish Chandra Agarwal (supra) are not applicable. It has been held in the aforesaid cases that the tenant can repair the tenanted accommodation even if application under Section 21(1)(b) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 is pending only after service of notice, in writing to the landlord. It has been held in the aforesaid cases that the tenant can repair the tenanted accommodation even if application under Section 21(1)(b) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 is pending only after service of notice, in writing to the landlord. Admittedly, in the instant case, no such notice was served upon the landlord as such the respondents cannot get benefit of the law laid down in the aforesaid cases. 14. In Zafar Hussain and another v. Fifth Additional District Judge, Hardoi and others, 1991 A.L.J. 168, it has been held that in the matter of release of premises on the ground that it is in a dilapidated condition and requires demolition and reconstruction and not repairs, is a question related to the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. 15. In the case on hand, petitioner-landlord has submitted architect’s report. Even if the same is not supported by affidavit of the Architect, the plan sanctioned by the competent authority strengthens the case of the petitioner that the accommodation in dispute is in dilapidated condition and requires demolition and reconstruction as it is sanctioned only after physical verification by competent authority. Bona fide intention of the landlord is also clear from the fact that he has offered the ground floor of the house in dispute after its reconstruction. 16. A large number of cases are coming before High Court where the tenants residing in the accommodations, which are in dilapidated condition, but are not agreeable to their demolition and reconstruction. They not only endanger their own lives but also the lives of members of their family, neighbours and other persons who may be affected in case of untoward happenings of falling down of such buildings. Such tenants obviously do so as tenanted accommodation available to them is on cheaper rent. Court has taken judicial notice of the recent cases where dilapidated buildings have fallen down resulting in death of so many innocent lives. Courts, therefore, have to ensure that lives of the countrymen are protected even if they have to take harsh decision that the tenants will have to pay higher rent after reconstruction of buildings. 17. It may also be seen that during the pendency of the litigation for years together cost of reconstruction of the buildings increases many-fold which may outsource the financial capacity of the landlord. 17. It may also be seen that during the pendency of the litigation for years together cost of reconstruction of the buildings increases many-fold which may outsource the financial capacity of the landlord. In these circumstances, he may not be able to reconstruct the house which will not be beneficial to either of the parties as the building being in dilapidated condition will certainly fall down at any time. Therefore, the Courts should take immaculate caution in passing interim orders where the landlord intend to reconstruct the building after demolition of old construction. Architects may have different opinions on the issue as to whether the building is in dilapidated condition or not, but in common prudence, whenever such buildings have lost their utility according to the material used in such constructions, same must be demolished for reconstruction if the landlords are agreeable to it. 18. More serious thought is to be given by the Courts as to the cases wherein the tenants intend to protract the proceedings for reconstruction after demolition of old accommodation. In such cases, the tenants must be directed to pay the cost on account of escalation of prices of building materials. No tenant should be permitted to deprive the landlord of the rent payable to him in accordance with law after reconstruction of old building merely on the ground that he wants to endanger his own life as well as lives of others by living in the house of dilapidated condition. Too technical view in such matters should not normally be taken by the Courts unless and until it is found that the case of the landlord is wholly false and has no basis. 19. In the instant case, the finding of the appellate Court that the building is not in dilapidated condition is merely on the basis that report of the Architect was not supported by an affidavit, which appears to be too technical. If re-construction is made and the tenant is accommodated in the ground floor after reconstruction, as has been offerred by the landlord, I do not see any difficulty in the matter. 20. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned judgment dated 5.10.2002 passed by respondent No. 1 is quashed. If re-construction is made and the tenant is accommodated in the ground floor after reconstruction, as has been offerred by the landlord, I do not see any difficulty in the matter. 20. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned judgment dated 5.10.2002 passed by respondent No. 1 is quashed. The petitioner is directed to give an undertaking before the Prescribed Authority that he will reconstruct the house in dispute within a year from the date of undertaking and shall accommodate the tenants on the ground floor of the reconstructed building after its reconstruction. No order as to costs. ————