JUDGMENT :- These two matters have been assigned to me by the then Hon'ble Chief Justice on the difference of opinion between two Hon'ble Judges of this Court (Banerjee, J. and Tapan Kumar Mukherjee, J.) while deciding two mandamus-appeals preferred against a common order dated 31st October, 2006 passed by Dilip Kumar Seth, J. while hearing two writ-application analogously, one filed by the Calcutta Soft-Drinks Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter called Coca-Cola) and the other, by the Pepsico India Holding Limited (henceforth described as Pepsi) by which His Lordship dismissed both the writ-applications. 2. The Coca-Cola, one of the appellants before us, filed a writ-application before the learned single Judge being W.P. No. 1914 of 2000 thereby praying for a declaration that no advertisement-tax is payable in respect of any board or glow-sign erected by it at the request of its dealers, distributors or retailers on a place from which those persons carry on business of selling its products. The appellant further prayed for mandamus directing the respondent not to demand or realise any advertisement-tax in respect of any board or glow-sign erected by the appellant at the request of its dealers, distributors or retailers on the land or the building from which those retailers, distributors or dealers sell the products of the appellant. 3. The cause of action for filing of such writ-application was a letter dated 6th September, 1999 issued by the advertisement department of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Licence Department, by which the licence-officer brought to the notice of the appellant that it had displayed a good number of advertisements at different shops, restaurants, cinema-halls etc. displaying various items of its products, such as, Coca-Cola, Thumbs Up, Fanta etc. for which it was liable to pay advertisement-tax in terms of Section 204(1) of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). By the said letter, the Municipal Authority directed the appellant to furnish in details the measurement, location and display of all such advertisements within seven days, failing which, it threatened appropriate legal action against the appellant in terms of the Act. 4. The appellant replied the said letter contending that it was not liable to pay any advertisement-tax in terms of Section 204 of the Act for giving advertisement on the building or land of their dealers, retailers or distributors where the various items manufactured by the appellant were being sold. 5. 4. The appellant replied the said letter contending that it was not liable to pay any advertisement-tax in terms of Section 204 of the Act for giving advertisement on the building or land of their dealers, retailers or distributors where the various items manufactured by the appellant were being sold. 5. In answer to such letter given by the appellant, the Municipal Authority pointed out that in terms of Section 204(1) of the Act, it was entitled to realise the advertisement-tax from the appellant and in support of such contention, a decision of the Supreme Court published in a newspaper, viz. "Business standard" dated 19th October, 1995 was referred to. 6. In the writ application filed by the appellant, it maintained its stance taken in its letter written to the Municipal Authority and contended that it came within the exception indicated in Section 204(2)(c) of the Act. 7. The said writ application was opposed by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation thereby contending that the appellant was not entitled to get the benefit of exceptions provided in Section 204(2) of the Act as in the places where the advertisements were given by the appellant, not only the items manufactured by the appellants were being sold but also different items manufactured by other persons were available for sale. It was further contended that the advertisement were exhibited at the places which were not the business-place of the appellant. 8. The points involved inn the other writ-application filed by the Pepsi were similar to the ones involved in the other application and for that reason both the applications were heard together and I refrain from repeating the case made out by the Pepsi in the other application as those are substantially similar. 9. The learned single Judge accepted the contention of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation and held that the places over which advertisements were given being not dominantly used for the sale of the items produced by the appellants but were also being utilized for the sale of the goods of other manufacturers, the appellants were not entitled to get the benefit of sub-section (2) of Section 204 of the Act. 10. Being dissatisfied, the appellants preferred the present mandamus-appeals and as indicated earlier, there was difference of opinion between the two Judges of the Bench leading to the reference before the Hon'ble Chief Justice and consequently, the matter has been placed before me. 10. Being dissatisfied, the appellants preferred the present mandamus-appeals and as indicated earlier, there was difference of opinion between the two Judges of the Bench leading to the reference before the Hon'ble Chief Justice and consequently, the matter has been placed before me. 11. Justice Banerjee although did not accept all the reasons assigned by the learned single Judge, ultimately came to the conclusion that the writ applications filed by the appellants should be dismissed and that they are not entitled to the exemption mentioned in Section 204(2) of the Act. In other words, his Lordship was of the view that the cases came within the scope of Section 204(1) of the Act and thus, the appellants were liable to pay the advertisement-tax, Justice Tapan Kumar Mukherjee was, on the other hand, of the view that the cases of the appellants fall within the purview of Section 204(2) of the Act and as such, the Kolkata Municipal Corporation is not entitled to realise advertisement-tax from the appellants for giving advertisements on the various shops where their manufactured items are sold notwithstanding the fact that at those places, other items manufactured by others are also sold. 12. Mr. Gupta, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Pepsi, has strenuously contended before me that the Kolkata Municipal Corporation authority gets jurisdiction under the provision of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act (hereinafter referred to as CMC Act) to realise advertisement-tax if the circumstances mentioned in Section204(1) of the CMC Act are attracted, Mr. Gupta, at the same time, submits that if a given case falls within the purview of Section 204(2) of the CMC Act, the Corporation is deprived of its authority to realise advertisement-tax in such a situation. In other words, according to Mr. Gupta, at the same time, submits that if a given case falls within the purview of Section 204(2) of the CMC Act, the Corporation is deprived of its authority to realise advertisement-tax in such a situation. In other words, according to Mr. Gupta, Article 265 of the Constitution of India authorises the Corporation to realise tax if any statute gives authority to it to rezalise any tax and Section 170(1) of the CMC Act having permitted the Corporation to realise advertisement-tax only under the situations mentioned in the Section 204(1) of the CMC Act and having also specifically prohibited the Corporation from realising tax if the circumstances mentioned in Section 204(2) are present, the conjoint reading of those two provisions make it abundantly clear that even if the situations mentioned in Section 204(1) exist, if at the same time, sub-section (2) of Section 204 is attracted, the Corporation will not be entitled to demand advertisement-tax by taking aid of sub-section (1) of Section 204 of the CMC Act. Mr. Gupta submits that in the case before us, his client having admittedly raised advertisement on the building where the item manufactured by his client are being sold, the case clearly falls within the limit of Section 204(2) of the said Act. Mr. Gupta, therefore, prays for passing a mandamus prohibiting the Corporation from demanding advertisement-tax from his client on account of raising advertisement on the building where the items manufactured by his client are being sold even though in that place other items manufactured not by his client are also sold. 13. Mr. Jayanta Mitra, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Coca-Cola, the appellant in the other appeals, has virtually adopted the submissions advanced by Mr. Gupta and in addition to what Mr. Gupta submitted, relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of The Member-Secretary, Andhra Pradesh State Board for Prevention and Control of Water Pollution v. A. P. Rayons Ltd., reported in AIR 1989 SC 611 where the Apex Court reiterated the following well-settled principle which is required to be followed by the Court in the matter of interpreting a taxing statute in paragraph 6 of the said judgment : "It has to be borne in mind that this Act with which we are concerned is as Act imposing liability for cess. The Act is fiscal in nature. The Act is fiscal in nature. The Act must, therefore, be strictly construed in order to find out whether a liability is fastened on a particular industry. The subject is not to be taxed without clear words for that purpose; and also that every Act of Parliament must be read according to its natural construction of words. See the observations in Re Nicklethwait, (1885) 11 Ex 452 at p. 456. Also see the observations in Tenant v. Smith, (1892) AC 150 and Lord Halsbury's observations at page 154. See also the observations of Lord Simonds in St. Aubyn v. Att. Gen., (1951) 2 All ER 473 at p. 485. Justice Routlatt of England said a long time ago, that in a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One has to look fairly at the language used. See the observations in Cape Brandy Syndicate v. IRC, (1921-1 KB 64 at p. 71). This Court has also reiterated the same virtue in Gursahai Saigal v. CIT, Punjab, (1963) 3 SCR 893 : ( AIR 1963 SC 1062 ), CIT Madras v. V. M. P. Firm, Muar, (1965-1 SCR 815 : AIR 1965 SC 1216 ), Controller of Estate Duty, Gujarat v. Kantilal Trikamlal, (1977) 1 SCR 9 : AIR 1976 SC 1935 ). 14. Mr. Anindya Mitra, the learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of the Corporation has, however, opposed the aforesaid contentions put forward on behalf of the appellants and has contended that the provisions contained in Section 204(2) of the CMC Act have not been attracted by the erection of the advertisement by the appellants and as such, his client had the right to proceed with the realisation of the advertisement-tax from the appellants when undisputedly the appellants took the responsibility of raising advertisement on the building of some other traders who are neither owners nor manufacturers of the items for which advertisements were given. He, therefore, contends that the learned single Judge in the fact of the present cases rightly dismissed the writ applications filed by the appellants and Banerjee J. was quite justified in approving the ultimate conclusion arrived at by the learned single Judge. 15. He, therefore, contends that the learned single Judge in the fact of the present cases rightly dismissed the writ applications filed by the appellants and Banerjee J. was quite justified in approving the ultimate conclusion arrived at by the learned single Judge. 15. Therefore, the only question that falls for determination in this reference is whether the provisions contained in Section 204(1) of the CMC Act authorised the Corporation to demand advertisement-tax from the appellants for giving advertisement of their products over the shop-rooms of other traders where the items manufactured by the appellants are being sold along with various other items which are not related to the business of the appellants. 16. In order to appreciate the aforesaid question, it will be profitable to refer to the provisions contained in Section 204 of the CMC Act which are quoted below : "204. Tax on advertisements, (1) Every person, who erects exhibits, fixes or retains upon or over any land, building wall, hoarding, frame, post, kiosk or structure any advertisement or, displays any advertisement to public view in any manner whatsoever, visible from a public street or public place (including any advertisement exhibited by means of cinematograph) shall pay for every advertisement which is so erected, exhibited, fixed or retained or so displayed to public view, a tax calculated at such rate as the Corporation may determine by Regulations or as the budget estimate shall state under sub-section (3) of Section 131 : Provided that a surcharge not exceeding fifty per cent, of the applicable rate may be imposed on any advertisement on display in temporary fairs, exhibitions, sports event or cultural or social programmes. (2) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-section(1), no tax shall be levied under this section on any advertisement which - (a) relates to a public meeting or to an election to Parliament or the State Legislature or the Corporation or to candidature in respect of such election; or (b) is exhibited within the window of any building if the advertisement relates to the trade, profession or business carried on in that building; or (c) relates to the trade, profession or business carried on within the land or building upon or over which such advertisement is exhibited or to any sale or letting of such land or building or any effects therein or to any sale, entertainment or meeting to be held on or upon in the same; or (d) relates to the name of the land or building upon or over which the advertisement is exhibited or to the name of the owner or occupier of such land or building; or (e) relates to the business of a railway administration and is exhibited within any railway station or upon any wall or other property of a railway administration; or (f) relates to any activity of the Government or the Corporation. (3) The tax on any advertisement leviable under the section shall be payable in advance in such number of instalments and in such manner as the Corporation may be Regulations determine or as the budget estimate shall state under sub-section (3) of Section 131 : Provided that the Corporation may under the terms and conditions of the licence under Section 203 require the licensee to collect and pay to the Corporation, subject to a deduction of five per cent to be kept by him as collection charges, the amount of tax in respect of such advertisements as are displayed on any site for which he is the licensee." 17. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after going through the provisions contained in the CMC Act I find that Section 170 of the said Act provides the legislative sanction to levy tax by the Corporation. Section 170(1) provides for various types of taxes which may be imposed by the Corporation. Section 170(2) enjoins that the levy, assessment and collection of taxes would be in accordance with the provision of the CMC Act and the Rules and Regulations made thereunder. Section 170(1) provides for various types of taxes which may be imposed by the Corporation. Section 170(2) enjoins that the levy, assessment and collection of taxes would be in accordance with the provision of the CMC Act and the Rules and Regulations made thereunder. Section 170(1)(c) clearly indicates that the tax can be levied on the advertisements other than the advertisements given in the newspapers. Sections 202 to 209 of the said Act deal with the levy, assessment and the manner of collection of advertisement-tax. It further appears that Section 204(1) imposes tax on advertisements erected on or over any land, building, structures etc. and the advertisement-tax, if at all payable, is recoverable from the person who erects, exhibits, fixes etc. such advertisement. Such advertisement-tax is, however, determined at the rate fixed by the Corporation by virtue of the Regulation. Sub-section (2) of Section 204, however, begins with a non-obstante clause, namely, "notwithstanding the provisions of sub-section (1)....." and thus, the effect of such a non-obstante clause is to exclude the operation of sub-section (1) of Section 204 in the situation contemplated by the said non-obstante provision. (See A. V. Fernandez v. State of Kerala, reported in AIR 657 SC 687 at page 662-663). 18. It is now settled by the Supreme Court in various decisions that if negative words are used after the non-obstante clause, it manifests the clear intention of the legislature that the provision is a prohibitory one and at the same time, the provision is imperative and mandatory. (See Mannalal Khetan v. Kedarnath Khetan reported in AIR 1977 SC 536 at paragraph 17, Bhagchand v. Secretary for the State, reported in AIR 1927 PC 176 at 184). 19. I, therefore, find substance in the contention of the learned advocate for the appellants that Section 204(2) of the CMC Act creates a statutory bar on the imposition of advertisement-tax in the circumstances specified in clauses (a) to (f) thereof. 20. The next question is whether the case before us really falls within the purview of Section 204(2) (c) of the CMC Act. 21. 20. The next question is whether the case before us really falls within the purview of Section 204(2) (c) of the CMC Act. 21. The appellants before us can get the benefit of prohibition of imposition of advertisement-tax only if the case can be brought within the purview of the expression "it relates to the trade, profession, or business carried on within the land or building upon or over which such advertisement is exhibited" as indicated in sub-section (c) of Section 204(2). 22. The word "relates to" is an expression of wide amplitude as laid down by the Supreme Court in the following cases. (1) Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Company, reported in AIR 1985 SC 1156 (para 25). (2) M/s. Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1988 SC 782 (paras 45 to 47). (3) Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Company Ltd., reported in AIR 1996 SC 646 (para 22 to 25). 23. Mr. Anindya Mitra, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the Corporation, however, tried to impress upon us that the expression "relates to" appearing in Section 204(2)(c) means that the advertisement must "wholly" relate to the business carried on the premises over which such advertisement has been given. According to Mr. Mitra, in the cases before us, the advertisements having been given by a person who does not carry on any trade or business on the land or building over which such advertisement has been given, the provisions contained in Section 204(2)(c) of the Act is not attracted. In other words, according to Mr. Mitra, in order to get the benefit of the aforesaid provision, the advertisement must be given by the person in whose name the trade-licence of carrying on trade or business on the disputed premises stands. Mr. Mitra contends that the words "trade, profession or business" appearing in the said section must have the similar meaning as appearing in other section of the Act by virtue of which a trade-licence is granted in favour of a trader. Mr. Mitra, thus, contends that none of the appellants having taken any trade-licence for carrying on business over the premises on which the advertisements have been given, they are not entitled to get the benefit of exemption from the liability of the advertisement-tax. 24. Mr. Mitra, thus, contends that none of the appellants having taken any trade-licence for carrying on business over the premises on which the advertisements have been given, they are not entitled to get the benefit of exemption from the liability of the advertisement-tax. 24. After going through the provisions contained in Section 204 of the CMC Act, I am, however, of the view that it is not necessary for the advertiser either to have a trade-licence for carrying on business in the premises over which the advertisement is given in order to get the benefit of Section 204(2)(c) of the Act or to have the ownership or any right to occupy the same. If the trade-licence-holder erects any advertisement of his own name or own trade-name over the premises where he carries on business, no advertisement-tax is necessary as would appear from the phrase "relates to the name of the land or building upon or over which the advertisement is exhibited or to the name of the owner or occupier of such land or building" contained in Section 204(2)(d) of the Act. It is needless to mention that the person who has a trade-licence to carry on business in a particular premises surely falls with the expression "occupier of such land or building" as only lawful occupier of a premises is given trade-licence to carry on a business in a premises. 25. The word "name" appearing in the aforesaid Clause should be given plain dictionary meaning. According to the Oxford Talking Dictionary, the word "name" means a word or combination of words constituting the individual designation by which a person, animal, place or thing is known, spoken of etc. Similarly, according to the Webster's New World Dictionary and Thesaurus, the word "name", among others, means a word or phrase by which a person, thing, or class of things is known, called or spoken to or of, appellation, title. By applying the plain dictionary meaning, the advertisement of the trade name of a trade licence holder definitely comes within the purview of Clause (d) of Section 204(2) of the Act. By applying the plain dictionary meaning, the advertisement of the trade name of a trade licence holder definitely comes within the purview of Clause (d) of Section 204(2) of the Act. In spite of giving such benefit to the trade licence holder to give advertisement of his name or trade name without incurring any liability to pay advertisement-tax, the legislature having specifically incorporated the provision contained in Clause (c) of Section 204(2), its intention was clear that even if a person who is not the holder of trade licence for carrying on any trade over the premises in question by virtue of his right as the owner or lawful occupier of the land or premises in question, he will, nevertheless, be immune from the advertisement-tax for exhibiting an advertisement of his manufactured goods once it is established that the said lands or premises are in any way related to the business of the advertiser. It goes without saying that if the advertiser's manufactured goods are sold in particular premises, such premises must be held to be "related" to the business of the advertiser. Be that as it may, I am quite conscious that in interpreting a taxing provision, the intendment of the legislature is inconsequential and the Court should be guided by the plain language of the Statute. The object of my aforesaid observation by way of illustration of Clause (d) of Section 204(2) of the Act is to show that the contention of Mr. Mitra appearing for the Corporation that the intention of the legislature to give benefit of Clause (c) of Section 204(2) was limited only to the person having trade-licence to carry on business thereon is not tenable. The legislature, it is well known, should not be presumed to be inflicted with the vice of repetition. 26. I, thus, find substance in the contention of the learned advocates for the appellants that their clients manufacturer/advertiser having taken the responsibility of raising advertisement over the premises of a trader with his consent who also sells the goods manufactured by the advertisers they are not required to pay any advertisement-tax for exhibiting the advertisement of those products. 27. I am also not prepared to accept the contention of Mr. Mitra appearing on behalf of the Corporation that unless the premises in question are used "wholly" for the business of the advertiser, the advertisement-tax is payable by the advertiser. 27. I am also not prepared to accept the contention of Mr. Mitra appearing on behalf of the Corporation that unless the premises in question are used "wholly" for the business of the advertiser, the advertisement-tax is payable by the advertiser. I find substance in the contention of Mr. Gupta, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of Pepsi that the aforesaid submission of Mr. Mitra cannot be accepted because addition of any word in the language of the Statute is not permissible if the meaning is clear and unambiguous. (See : Union of India v. Hansoli reported in AIR 2002 SC 3240 ). 28. I now propose to deal with the decisions cited by Mr. Mitra, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the Corporation. 29. In the case of Kailas Chand v. Dharam Das reported in (2005) 5 SCC 375 : ( AIR 2005 SC 2362 ), all that has been decided is that the legislature is incapable of contemplating all possible situations which may arise in a future litigation and in a myriad circumstance and that the scope is always there for the Court to interpret the law with pragmatism and consistently with the demand of the varying situations. It may not be out of place to mention here that the said decision is not based on a taxing Statute but on the provision of the Rent Control Legislation and as such, the principle of construction of the Rent Control Legislation necessarily differs from that of construction of a taxing Statute. I, thus, find that the said decision does not help the Corporation in any way. 30. In the case of Novopan India Ltd. v. CCE and C reported in 1994 (Supp) 3 SCC 606 : (1994 AIR SCW 3976), an exemption notification issued by the executive was found to be ambiguous. In such a situation, it was contended that the benefit of ambiguity would go in favour of the assessee manufacturer. The Supreme Court did not accept such contention on the ground that that the exemption Clause must be strictly construed. However, in the self-same decision, the Supreme Court reiterated the well settled principle that in a taxing Statute, there is no room for any intendment and that the matter should be governed wholly by the language of the notification if those are clear. 31. However, in the self-same decision, the Supreme Court reiterated the well settled principle that in a taxing Statute, there is no room for any intendment and that the matter should be governed wholly by the language of the notification if those are clear. 31. In the case before us, in my opinion, sub-section (2) of Section 204 of the C. M.C. Act cannot be said to be an exemption Clause in that sense where some discretion is left to the Revenue to consider whether the assessee has fulfiled the conditions of exemption but in reality, it creates a bar or prohibition upon the Corporation to realise tax in the circumstances mentioned therein. In other words, the circumstances mentioned therein excludes the jurisdiction of the Corporation to impose advertisement-tax and once it is established by the plain meaning of the language employed therein that the legislature has prohibited the Corporation from imposing tax in the circumstances mentioned therein, by adding words into the section, the Corporation cannot usurp jurisdiction to impose tax. In this connection reliance may be placed on the following passage in the judgment of the Supreme Court in A. V. Fernandez v. State of Kerala reported in ( AIR 1957 SC 657 at p. 663) : "There is a broad distinction between the provisions contained in the statute in regard to the exemptions of tax or refund or rebate of tax on the one hand and in regard to the non-liability to tax or non-imposition of tax on the other. In the former case, but for the provisions as regards the exemptions or refund or rebate of tax, the sales or purchases would have to be included in the gross turnover of the dealer because they are prima facie liable to tax and the only thing which the dealer is entitled to in respect thereof is the deduction from the gross turnover in order to arrive at the net turnover on which the tax can be imposed. In the latter case, the sales or purchases are exempted from taxation altogether. The Legislature cannot enact a law imposing or authorising the imposition of a tax there- upon and they are not liable to any such imposition of tax. If they are thus not liable to tax, no tax can be levied or imposed on them, and they do not come within the purview of the Act at all. The Legislature cannot enact a law imposing or authorising the imposition of a tax there- upon and they are not liable to any such imposition of tax. If they are thus not liable to tax, no tax can be levied or imposed on them, and they do not come within the purview of the Act at all. The very fact of their non-liability to tax is sufficient to exclude them from the calculation of the gross turnover as well as the net turnover on which sales tax can be levied or imposed." 32. The decision given in the case of Novopan India Ltd., (1994 AIR SCW 3976) (supra) relied upon by Mr. Mitra, therefore, does not help the Corporation in any way. 33. In the case of State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cement reported in (2005)1 SCC 368 : ( AIR 2005 SC 4168 ), the Supreme Court was dealing with the case where an exemption was granted by notification and it was held that the notification should be strictly construed and the conditions for exemptions have to be complied with in order to get the benefit of exemption. That is a well settled proposition of law but, in my view, in the case before us, Section 204(2) of the C. M.C. Act is a prohibitory Clause and once it is established that a particular case comes within such provision, the Corporation loses its jurisdiction to impose tax in those circumstances. In the case before us, the appellants having successfully brought their cases within the purview of Sub-section (2) of Section 204 of the Act, they are entitled to resist the claim of the Corporation towards advertisement-tax for erecting advertisement of their goods over the premises occupied by the trader who sells the goods manufactured by them. The said decision is, thus, of no avail to the Corporation. 34. In view of what have been stated above I am of the view that if the advertisement on a building or land has a relationship with the business which is carried on within such land or building, no advertisement-tax is payable and it is of no consequence that the manufacturer of the item who actually has advertised for the goods has no trade-licence for carrying on business over the said premises. 35. 35. I, therefore, find that the learned single Judge erred in law in refusing the relief claimed by the appellants in the writ applications and consequently, I respectfully disagree with the view taken by Banerjee, J. and accordingly, agree with the conclusion arrived at by Tapan Kumar Mukherjee, J. for the reasons stated above. 36. The matter may be sent back to the Division Bench which referred the matter before the then Chief Justice with my aforesaid answer as a third Judge. Order accordingly.