JUDGMENT Kailash Gambhir, J. 1. This writ petition can be disposed of at this stage itself. The impugned order was passed as far as back on 22.1.2003 on an application moved by the petitioner under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act seeking approval of its action to remove the respondent from service on the alleged ground of misconduct of the respondent for remaining absent from duty for about 75 days. 2. The petitioner in support of his case has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of DTC v. Sardar Singh 2004 (6) 613. The petitioner in a very casual manner in para 8 of the petition has tried to explain as to why the said order could not be challenged after lapse of more than three years. Para 8 of the petition is reproduced below: That the present case was handed over to advocate Tayab Khan to file petition before this Honble Court against the order passed by Ld. Labour court. The advocate neither filed the petition nor returned the case file to the corporation. As a result, the petition could not be filed earlier. The case was handed over to advocate Sh. Ajay Shankar Sharma in month of May 2006. The petition however again could not be filed. Finally the case has been handed over to the counsel undersigned and the petition is being filed herewith. The delay in filing the petition is due to the circumstances narrated above. The order passed by Ld. Tribunal is not in consonance with law and accordingly deserves to be quashed. 3. The respondent in the present case has already expired. No sufficient reasons have been disclosed in the petition seeking condensation of delay in filing the present petition as well as no separate application has been filed giving the detailed reasons as to how the petitioner was prevented to file the present petition after such a delay of more than three years. 4. It is now well settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity" has its fullest application in the matter of grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. It is now well settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity" has its fullest application in the matter of grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is correct that no period of limitation is provided to invoke writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution but the same does not mean that the machinery of writ jurisdiction can be set in motion at any time at the whims and fancies of a party. It is also settled that there may be cases where even the delay of shorter period would be considered sufficient to decline relief under Article 226 of the Constitution while in certain cases the court may be persuaded to condone the long delay if sufficient reasons are disclosed by such party. 5. In various legal pronouncements the Supreme Court has taken the limitation period which is prescribed for filing a civil suit as a guiding factor even for filing the writ petitions. A reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and Anr. v. Shah Hyder Beige and Ors. : AIR 2000 SC 671 . The same is as under: The High Court has thus misplaced the factual details and misread the same. It is now a well-settled principle of law and we need not dilate on this score to the effect that while no period of limitation is fixed but in the normal course of events, the period the party is required for filing a civil proceeding ought to be the guiding factor. While it is true that this extraordinary jurisdiction is available to mitigate the sufferings of the people in general but it is not out of place to mention that this extraordinary jurisdiction has been conferred on to the law Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution on a very sound equitable principle. Hence, the equitable doctrine, namely, " delay defeats equity" has its fullest application in the matter of grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The discretionary relief can be had provided one has not by his act or conduct given a go-by to his rights. Hence, the equitable doctrine, namely, " delay defeats equity" has its fullest application in the matter of grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The discretionary relief can be had provided one has not by his act or conduct given a go-by to his rights. Equity favors a vigilant rather than an indolent litigation and this being the basic tenet of law, the question of grant of an order as has been passed in the matter as regards restoration of possession upon cancellation of the notification does not and cannot arise. 6. This Court in Smt. Krishna Chaubey v. Government of NCT of Delhi III AD (Delhi) 576, has held that if no satisfactory Explanationn given by the party for delay in approaching the Court, the remedy of invoking writ jurisdiction would not be available on the ground of delay and laches. Para 23 of the said judgment is reproduced below: A conspectus of the aforesaid judgments would show that ordinarily the period of limitation prescribed for filing a civil suit would be a guiding factor. This period was over long time ago in case the appellant would have preferred a civil suit. Even assuming that the petition ought to be entertained after that period of time, there has to be satisfactory Explanationn for the period of delay. Leave aside any satisfactory Explanationn, there is no Explanationn whatsoever other than saying that the appellant was approaching the Department from time to time and orally representing the matter. This is hardly a satisfactory Explanationn. 7. From the bare perusal of the aforesaid para 8 of the petition it is evident that the petitioner has failed to advance any reasons or any Explanationn much less any sufficient Explanationn for such a long delay in challenging the impugned order dated 22.1.2003. 8. Once any instrumentality of the State is aggrieved with the order, immediate and urgent steps are required to be taken to challenge such orders. 9. The present petition suffers from delay and laches. 10. Dismissed. Petition dismissed