JUDGMENT Hon’ble Rajesh Tandon, J. 1. Heard Sri Vinod Sharma, counsel for the applicant and A.G.A. for the respondents. 2. By the present application under section 482 Cr.P.C. the petitioner has prayed for quashing the proceedings of criminal case no. 4 of 2004 under section 2/3 (1) of Gangster & Anti Social Activities (Prevention) Act, pending before the Special Judge, Gangster Act, Dehradun. 3. According to the applicant on 9.11.2003 at 8.20 PM F.I.R. was lodged against Sri Mahmood, Furkan and Dilsad for the offence punishable under section 4/10 of U.P. Protection of Trees in Rural and Hill Areas Act, 1976, with the allegations that they uprooted Saal and Kapis trees from their own land by operating Dozer (heavy earth mover). In that F.I.R. of case crime no. 123 of 2004 the present applicant is not named. The allegations made by the Police against the applicant in the Gang chart annexure-3 to the application are as under : egksn;] fuosnu gS fd vfHk;qDrx.k us ,d fxjksg cukdj taxy esa djhc 18 ch?kk esa djhc 200 lky ds o`{kksa dk voS/k :i ls dVku fd;k rFkk ydM+h dh pksjh dh ftlls ou foHkkx dks yk[kksa #i;s dh gkfu gqbZ rFkk bldk i;kZoj.k ij cqjk izHkko iM+kA budk ;g ÑR; 2@3 xSaxsLVj ,DV ds vUrxZr vkrk gS vr% 2@3 ,DV dk eqdnek iathÑr djus gsrq vuqeksfnr djus dh Ñik djsaA 4. According to the applicant, no case under Gangster Act is made out against him and the Police levelled charge under the Gangster Act against the applicant to harass him and it is a case of abuse of process of law. 5. Several opportunities were given to the respondents for filing counter affidavit but no counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents. 6. Section 2 of the U.P. Protection of Trees in Rural and Hill Areas Act, 1976 provides for application of the Act in certain areas only, which reads as under :- This Act shall not apply to – (a) trees situate in reserved and protected forests. (b) Trees situate in a forest or forest land in respect of which any notification under the Indian Forest Act, 1927 as amended in its application of Uttar Pradesh is in force. (c) Trees situate in urban areas; (d) Trees situate in a Government garden or on land held by the Government. 7. (b) Trees situate in a forest or forest land in respect of which any notification under the Indian Forest Act, 1927 as amended in its application of Uttar Pradesh is in force. (c) Trees situate in urban areas; (d) Trees situate in a Government garden or on land held by the Government. 7. Section 4 of the Act, provides for restriction on felling and removal of trees, which reads as under : Except as provided in this Act or the rules made thereunder, no person shall – (a) fell any tree standing on any land, whether included in a holding or not; (b) cut, remove or otherwise dispose of any tree other than a tree which is completely dead and has fallen without the aid or human agency on any such land. 8. Penalty for felling or removal of trees in contravention of section 4 has been provided under section 10 of the Act, which reads as under : Whoever fells or causes to be felled any standing trees, or cuts, removes or otherwise disposes of any fallen tree, in contravention of the provisions of sec. 4, or contravenes any condition of any permission granted under this Act, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both. 9. Definition of hill areas provided under section 3(vii) of the Act, reads as under : “hill area” means the district of Almora, Pithoragarh, Garhwal, Chamoli, Tehri Garhwal and Uttarkashi and the hill patties of district Nainital and areas of Chakarata Tehsil and Mussoorie Municipal Board of Dehradun district but does not include and cantonment area : 10. According to the counsel for the petitioner the alleged trees were cut by the petitioner in Raipur area of Dehradun and this area does not include in the hill area nor this area is a rural area. 11. According to the counsel for the petitioner the alleged trees were cut by the petitioner in Raipur area of Dehradun and this area does not include in the hill area nor this area is a rural area. 11. Section 2(b) of the U.P. Gangsters and Anti-social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 defines Gang and application of the Act, as under : “Gang” means a group of persons, who acting either singly or collectively, by violence, or threat or show of violence, or intimidation, or coercion, or otherwise with the object of disturbing public order or of gaining any undue temporal, pecuniary, material or other advantage of himself of any other person, indulge in anti-social activities, namely : (i) offences punishable under Chapter XVI, or chapter XVII or chapter XXII of the Indian Penal Code (Act No. 45 of 1860) or (ii) distilling or manufacturing or storing or transporting or importing or exporting or selling or distributing any liquor, or intoxicating or dangerous drugs, or other intoxicants or narcotics or cultivating any plant in contravention of any of the provisions of the U.P. Excise Act, 1910 or the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (Act No. 61 of 1985) or any other law for the time being in force, or (iii) Occupying or taking possession of immovable property otherwise than in accordance with law or setting up false claims for title or possession of immovable property whether in himself or any other person, or (iv) Preventing or attempting to prevent any public servant or any witness from discharging his lawful duties, or (v) Offences punishable under the Suppression of immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 (Act No. 104 of 1965) or (vi) Offences punishable under Section 3 of the Public Gambling Act, 1876 (Act No. 3 of 1867) or (vii) Preventing any person from offering bids in auction lawfully conducted or tender, lawfully invited by or on behalf of any Government department, local body or public or private undertaking for any lease or rights or supply of goods or work to be done, or (viii) Preventing or disturbing the smooth running by any person of his lawful business, profession, trade or employment or any other lawful activity connected therewith or, (ix) Offences punishable under Section 171-E of the Indian Penal Code (Act No. 45 of 1860) or in preventing or obstructing any public election being lawfully held, by physically preventing the voter from exercising his electoral rights, or (x) Inciting others to resort to violence to disturb communal harmony, or (xi) Creating panic, alarm or terror in public or (xii) Terrorising or assaulting employees or owners or occupiers of public or private undertakings or factories and causing mischief in respect of their properties. (xiii) Inducing or attempting to induce any person to got to foreign countries on false representation that any employment, trade or profession shall be provided to him in such foreign country or, (xiv) Kidnapping or abducting any person with intent to extort ransom, or (xv) Diverting or otherwise preventing any aircraft or public transport vehicle from following its scheduled course : Counsel for the applicant has placed on the case M/s Pepsi Foods Ltd. & another vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and others 1997(2) Supreme (Cr.) 498, in this case the Apex Court has observed as under : “2. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to being only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complainant and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. Magistrate has to carefully scrutinize the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused.” 12. From a perusal of Section 2(b)(i) to xv as above, it is evident that no offence under U.P. Protection of Trees in Rural and Hill Areas Act 1976, is covered under the definition of Section 2(b)(i) to xv of the U.P. Gangsters and Anti-social Activities (Prevention) Act, therefore, no case against the petitioner under the Act, is made out. 13. From a perusal of Section 2(b)(i) to xv as above, it is evident that no offence under U.P. Protection of Trees in Rural and Hill Areas Act 1976, is covered under the definition of Section 2(b)(i) to xv of the U.P. Gangsters and Anti-social Activities (Prevention) Act, therefore, no case against the petitioner under the Act, is made out. 13. In the case State of Haryana vs. Bhajanlal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Apex Court has mentioned the following categories by way of illustration for quashing of the F.I.R., wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent the abuse of the process of law or otherwise to secure the ends of justice under section 482 Cr.P.C. as well as under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Apex court has observed as under : 102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 14. Counsel for the applicant has also placed reliance on the case of Union of India vs. Prakash P. Hinduja (2003) 6 SCC 195. 9. Section 482 CrPC saves inherent powers of the High Court and such a power can be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The power can therefore be exercised to quash the criminal proceedings. The grounds on which the prosecution initiated proceedings against an accused can be quashed by the High Court in exercise of power conferred by Section 482 CrPC has been settled by a catena of decisions of this Court rendered in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, Municipal Corpn. The grounds on which the prosecution initiated proceedings against an accused can be quashed by the High Court in exercise of power conferred by Section 482 CrPC has been settled by a catena of decisions of this Court rendered in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, Municipal Corpn. Of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi and Raj Kapoor v. State. The matter was examined in considerable detail in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and after review of practically all the earlier decisions, the Court in para 108 of the Report laid down the grounds on which power under Section 482 CrPC can be exercised to quash the criminal proceedings and basically they are : (1) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, (2) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused, (3) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Act concerned to the institution and continuance of the proceedings. But this power has to be exercised in a rare case and with great circumspection. There are some statutes which create a bar on the power of the court in taking cognizance of an offence in absence of a sanction by the competent authority like Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 or Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Similar provision is contained in Section 196 CrPC which mandates that no court shall take cognizance of the offences enumerated in the section except with the previous sanction of the Central Government or of the State Government. Section 197 CrPC also creates an embargo on the power of the court to take cognizance of an offence alleged to have been committed by any person who is or was a Judge or a Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government. But the proceedings in the present case have not been quashed on any one of the abovementioned grounds. But the proceedings in the present case have not been quashed on any one of the abovementioned grounds. The High Court has not examined the nature of the allegations made in the FIR or the evidence by which the prosecution seeks to establish the charge against the accused during the trial. There is not even a whisper in the impugned order of the High Court that the FIR does not disclose a cognizable offence. Similarly, there is no reference to any statutory bar like want of valid sanction etc. to the taking of the cognizance of the offence. In fact the respondent Prakash Hinduja is not a public servant and consequently no sanction is required form any authority for his prosecution. The only ground on which the High Court has proceeded and has quashed the cognizance taken by the learned Special Judge and all consequential proceedings is that CBI had filed the charge-sheet without placing the same before CVC and therefore an illegality had been committed in the course of investigation which entitled the High Court to quash the cognizance taken by the Special Judge and all proceedings of the case. 15. No previous criminal history has been alleged against the applicant. The mere allegations in the F.I.R. are that the accused persons have cut down the trees standing on their own land without permission and thus committed offence under the U.P. Protection of Trees in Rural and Hill Areas Act, 1976. 16. The applicant has been released on bail by the trial Court and the trial of the accused for the offences under U.P. Protection of Trees in rural and Hill Areas Act, 1976 has to be proceeded against the petitioner. If the charges against the applicant are to be taken as true on its face value, even then no case under Gangster and Anti Social Activities Prevention Act, 1986 is made out against the applicant. Thus the case against the applicant under Gangster and Anti Social Activities Prevention Act, is liable to be quashed. 17. Accordingly, application under section 482 Cr.P.C. is allowed. Proceedings of Criminal case No. 4/2004 under Section 2/3(1) of Gangster & Anti Social Activities (Prevention) Act, against the applicant Sanjay Vasudev are quashed.