JUDGMENT In this appeal, the parents of the deceased child are seeking enhancement of compensation. 2. The parents having sought for compensation on the death of a minor child who was aged 21/2 years at the time of accident, the Tribunal has arrived at Rs. 83,000/- as the just compensation. This is on the basis of the judgment of this Court in Ramesh Lal alias Ramesh v National Insurance Company Limited, Bangalore and Another1, wherein it was laid down that the multiplier method has to be adopted even in the case of death of a minor instead of taking into account the structured formula of global compensation prescribed under the Schedule and has proceeded to assess the compensation payable. It is this, which is under question in this appeal. 3. The Counsel for the appellant would contend that insofar as the death of a child is concerned, going by the trend of judgments resting with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of New India Assurance Company Limited v Satender, wherein it was held that in cases of children of tender age, in view of uncertainties that abound, neither their income at the time of death nor the prospects of the future increase in their income nor chances of advancement of their career are capable of proper determination on an estimated basis. The reason is that at such an early age, the uncertainties in regard to their academic pursuits, achievements in career and thereafter advancement in life are so many that nothing can be assumed with reasonable certainty.• Therefore, neither the income of the deceased child is capable of assessment on estimated basis nor the financial loss suffered by the parents is capable of mathematical computation and proceeded to adapt the reasoning in the case of State of Haryana and Another v Jasbir Kaur and Others, wherein it is held that it has to be kept in view that the Tribunal constituted under the Act as provided in Section 168 is required to make an award determining the amount of compensation which is to be in the real sense “damages” which in turn appears to it to be “just and reasonable”. It has to be borne in mind that compensation for loss of limb or life can hardly be weighed in golden scales. It has to be borne in mind that compensation for loss of limb or life can hardly be weighed in golden scales. But at the same time it has to be borne in mind that the compensation is not expected to be a windfall for the victim. Statutory provisions clearly indicate that the compensation must be "just" and it cannot be a bonanza; nor a source of profit; but the same should not be a pittance. The Court and the Tribunals have a duty to weigh the various factors and quantify the amount of compensation, which should be just. What would be “just” compensation is a vexed question. There can be no golden rule applicable to all cases for measuring the value of human life or a limb. Measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations. It would depend upon the particular facts and circumstances, and attendant, peculiar or special features, if any. Every method or mode adopted for assessing compensation has to be considered in the background of "just" compensation, which is the pivotal consideration. Though by use of the expression "which appears to it to be “just” a wide discretion is vested in the Tribunal, the determination has to be rational, to be done by a judicious approach and not the outcome of whims, wild guesses and arbitrariness. The expression “just” denotes equitability, fairness and reasonableness, and non-arbitrary. If it is not so, it cannot be just. The Court has also observed that there are some aspects of human life which are capable of monetary measurement, but the totality of human life is like the beauty of sunrise or the splendor of the stars, beyond the reach of monetary tape-measure. The determination of damages for loss of human life is an extremely difficult task and it becomes all the more baffling when the deceased is a child and/or a non-earning person. The future of a child is uncertain. Where the deceased was a child, he was earning nothing but had a prospect to earn. The question of assessment of compensation, therefore, becomes stiffer. The figure of compensation in such cases involves a good deal of guesswork. In cases, where parents are claimants, the relevant factor would be the age of the parents. 4. Where the deceased was a child, he was earning nothing but had a prospect to earn. The question of assessment of compensation, therefore, becomes stiffer. The figure of compensation in such cases involves a good deal of guesswork. In cases, where parents are claimants, the relevant factor would be the age of the parents. 4. The Counsel would submit that in yet another decision in the case of Manju Deui and Another v Masafir Paswan and Another, the award of compensation in a sum of Rs. 2,25,000/- in respect of the death of a boy aged 13 years was affirmed. Hence, it is possible to hold that the parents could claim compensation even amounting to Rs. 2,25,000/- and therefore, there is wide discretion insofar as the award of compensation towards the death of a minor child is concerned. 5. Per contra, the Counsel for respondent would submit that a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Puttamma and Another v D.V. Krishnappa and Another, has opined, after referring to the judgment of the Apex Court wherein the Supreme Court had awarded Rs. 1,50,000/- in the case of death of a boy aged 14 years as being the conventional amount in awarding compensation for non-earning members, that this view would be supported by the figures adopted in Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which provides that the notional income for the purpose of compensation to those who had no income can be taken to be Rs. 15,000/- per annum out of which 1/3rd has to be deducted for notional personal expenses and thereafter on application of the appropriate multiplier, the compensation can be ascertained. The multiplier for the children aged upto 15 years has been set out as ‘15’. On applying the same, the compensation payable in case of death of a child, will come to Rs. 1,50,000/-. The Counsel would submit that the said decision would bind this Court and notwithstanding the judgments of the Supreme Court to the contrary, the compensation cannot exceed Rs. 1,50,000/-. 6. On these rival contentions, the Division Bench of this Court having adopted the Schedule as the guiding factor in awarding compensation may be one method of possibly arriving at the just amount of compensation. 1,50,000/-. 6. On these rival contentions, the Division Bench of this Court having adopted the Schedule as the guiding factor in awarding compensation may be one method of possibly arriving at the just amount of compensation. However, it is to be noted that Second Schedule has to be read with Section 163-A of the Act which provides for awarding of compensation on a structured formula. Section 163-A is incorporated in order to provide speedy remedy to the section of a society whose income is less than Rs. 40,000/-. In this view of the matter, it is also possible' that the income of a non-earning member of a family with income of less than Rs. 40,000/- was kept in view in adopting the figure of Rs. 15,000/-. Hence, the same cannot be said to be an accurate measure in the light of the judgments of the Supreme Court which has held that there is no hard and fast rule and it would be an extremely difficult task to assess the loss on account of the loss of child who is yet to embark in life as an earning member. Hence, it is possible in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court which have held that even an amount of Rs. 2,25,000/- is capable of being awarded for the death of a child to strike the mean and to hold that the appellant is entitled to a sum of Rs. 1,80,000/- which is the amount that has been adopted in the latest judgment of the Supreme Court as being the adequate measure of compensation in respect of the death of a minor. 7. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The award of compensation stands enhanced to Rs. 1,80,000/- instead of Rs. 83,000/-.