Judgment :- The questions which have been raised in these writ petitions are similar and therefore, they have been heard together. They are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The earliest writ petition, which purported to challenge the validity of Section 9(2) of the Kerala Local Fund Audit Act (herein after referred to as the Audit Act), have been treated as the leading case. Certain questions of law have been raised in all the other writ petitions. For the sake of convenience, such questions have been considered together. 3. The petitioner in O.P.No.6979/2000 was the Secretary of the Kalpetta Municipality. While working as the Secretary of North Paravoor Municipality, he was transferred to Kalpetta Municipality by order dated 24.2.1999. He joined duty at Kalpetta on 6.3.1999. He contends that, when he joined the Kalpetta Municipality, the accounts of the previous financial years were yet to be submitted for audit. The accounts from 1994 – 1995 were remaining in default. Without completing the accounts of financial years 1994-1995, 1995-96, 1996-97 and 1997-98, accounting of the financial year 1998-99 could not be begun. 4. Exhibit.P4 show cause notice issued by the 2nd respondent, the Deputy Director of Local Fund Audit, Wayanad District requiring the petitioner to show cause why he should not be prosecuted for non presenting the accounts for the financial year 1998-99 before 1.8.1999. He submitted Ext.P5 reply pointing out the facts mentioned above. No orders were passed on Ext.P5. Thereafter, he was summoned in S.T.50/2000, a criminal prosecution launched under Section 9(2) of the Audit Act on the premise that he failed to submit for audit the accounts for the financial year 1998-99 within the time prescribed. In the wake of such prosecution, he approached this Court challenging the validity of Section 9(2) of the Act and also for consequential writ of certiorari quashing the criminal prosecution. 5. Almost similar facts are involved in all writ petitions as well. In all these cases, there is a challenge against Section 9(2) of the Audit Act. It is contended that, that provision is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is contended that, that provision does not afford any guidelines as to when non-submission of accounts could invite criminal prosecution. In all these cases, there is a challenge against Section 9(2) of the Audit Act. It is contended that, that provision is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is contended that, that provision does not afford any guidelines as to when non-submission of accounts could invite criminal prosecution. It is further contended that submission of accounts of a municipality for audit is a part of discharge of the official duties of the Secretary, and there cannot be a criminal prosecution for non submission of accounts within the time prescribed. There could be several factors, which prevents a Secretary of the Municipality from submitting the accounts within the time frame. Conviction of a Government servant for non submission of accounts within the time prescribed is a serious matter as the Statute does not offer any guidelines as to how and under what circumstances such prosecution should be launched. In the circumstances, the provision is violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, it is contended. 6. It is further contended that Section 9(3) of the Audit Act obliges the Director of Local Fund Audit (which would include any person empowered by the Government to perform all the functions of the Director as well) to take a decision as to whether the prosecution should be launched or not, only after giving effective opportunity of hearing to the person against whom proceedings are proposed to be launched. The Statute contemplates a notice of show cause, a reply, consideration of the same and a reasoned order, which is a product of application of mind as to whether prosecution should be launched. In the instant case, a notice of show cause was issued and objections were obtained but, the prosecution is launched without the Deputy Director taking a decision in terms of Section 9(3) of the Audit Act. There is a statutory pre-condition for initiating criminal prosecution. The same has not been complied with and the prosecution is therefore, bad in law. It is further contended that there is non-compliance with Section 548 of the Municipalities Act. The Secretary of a municipality can be prosecution for a criminal offence only after obtaining sanction from the Government. No such sanction has been applied for in the present case. The prosecution is bad on this aspect. 7. Certain additional contentions have been raised in the other writ petitions. The Secretary of a municipality can be prosecution for a criminal offence only after obtaining sanction from the Government. No such sanction has been applied for in the present case. The prosecution is bad on this aspect. 7. Certain additional contentions have been raised in the other writ petitions. I will deal with them at the appropriate stage. 8. The respondents have filed a counter affidavit resisting the contentions in all the writ petitions. It is contended that Audit Act was enacted to enable the Government to exercise effective supervisory control over the accounts of the municipality. There is a necessity to maintain true and proper accounts in a local authority. The functions of a local authority are getting more and more expansive. Default in the maintenance of accounts or a casual attitude in submission of the accounts is not in the interests of the municipality. The legislation is intended to convey a serious message to all the executive officers of all the local authorities as to the necessity to maintain true and proper accounts and to see that such accounts are submitted as early as possible from the closing of the financial year. Even in the matter of allocation of funds to the local authority, the Government is required to consider the audit report of the local authority before taking a decision in that regard. Section 9(2) of the Audit Act is within the legislative competence of the State Legislature. It is not arbitrary. It contemplates prosecution only when there is negligence. It subscribes to the due process of law. Section 9(3) does not provide for any order to be passed by the Director before launching the prosecution. 9. The Secretary of the municipality is specifically obliged under the Municipalities Act to maintain true and proper account and submit the same. Sections 294 and 295 are specific and unambiguous. If that be so, there cannot be any confusion as regards the person liable for prosecution under Section 9(2) of the Audit Act. The contentions raised by the petitioner in this regard are untenable, so contends the learned Special Government Pleader for Local Self Government. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners Sri, V.M. Kurian, Smt. I. Sheela Devi, Sri. P.V. Surendranath, Sri. Karthikeyan and the learned Special G.P for Local Self Government Sri. C.M. Suresh Babu. The contentions raised by the petitioner in this regard are untenable, so contends the learned Special Government Pleader for Local Self Government. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners Sri, V.M. Kurian, Smt. I. Sheela Devi, Sri. P.V. Surendranath, Sri. Karthikeyan and the learned Special G.P for Local Self Government Sri. C.M. Suresh Babu. The principal contentions raised in these writ petitions relate to the validity of Section 9(2) of the Audit Act. To consider the said contentions, it is also necessary to refer to certain other provisions in the Act. Sections 2(e) and (f) of the Audit Act are relevant and, therefore, extracted hereunder: “Section 2(e) ‘Executive authority’ means the principal executive officer of a local authority: Section 2(f) ‘local authority’ means – (i) a Municipal, Corporation constituted under the Kerala Municipal Corporation Act, 1961 (30 of 1961) or a Municipality constituted under the Kerala Municipalities Act, 1960 (14 of 1961) or Township specified in section 2 of the Guruvayur Township Act, 1961 (43 of 1961) or a Panchayats constituted or deemed to have been constituted for the local administration of a panchayat or a Municipality or a Metropolitan Planning Committee or a District Planning Committee constituted in the State in accordance with the provisions in Part IX and Part IXA respectively, of the Constitution of India; (ii) any other authority, body or institution established by or under any law or orders of the Government and responsible for the administration of a local fund: Section 9 of the Act, which is the subject matter of challenge, is extracted in its entirety. “9. Liability of local authorities to prepare and present accounts for audit:- (1) The accounts of a authority or a local fund included in the schedule relating to a financial year shall be prepared or caused to be prepared by the Executive authority, in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed, as presented for audit within four months of the close of that financial year. (2) Where an Executive authority makes default in the preparation and presentation of accounts for audit within the period specified under sub-section (1), he shall be punishable, on conviction, with fine which may extend to three thousand rupees but which shall not be less than one thousand rupees. (2) Where an Executive authority makes default in the preparation and presentation of accounts for audit within the period specified under sub-section (1), he shall be punishable, on conviction, with fine which may extend to three thousand rupees but which shall not be less than one thousand rupees. Provided that the court may, for any adequate and special reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a fine of less than one thousand rupees. (3) No proceedings under sub-section (2) shall be taken by the Director without giving the persons affected thereby an opportunity to show cause, within fifteen days, why such proceedings should not be taken against him.” Section 22 of the Audit Act provides that if any provision contained in any other law for the time being in force relating to the audit of accounts of a local authority or a local fund included in the Schedule in repugnant to the provisions of this Act, the latter shall prevail and the former be void to the extent of such repugnancy. The validity of Section 9(2) is challenged on the premise that an official function to be carried out by the Secretary of the municipality cannot be the subject matter of criminal prosecution even if there is delay in the preparation and submission of the accounts. Possibility of a criminal prosecution in the event of negligence or discharge of duties is also arbitrary as the provisions of the statute do not provide sufficient guidelines as to when prosecution could be launched and when it cannot be. 11. I am afraid that I am unable to accept the contention. Section 9(2) only makes it clear that an executive authority is to show expedition and diligence in the preparation and submission of accounts. Non-submission of accounts and non presentation of the same can lead to adverse consequences in so far as the entire local authority is concerned. It can affect proper functioning of the local authority. It can result in valuable funds, which are otherwise available to the local authority being dissipated for ever. It can invite difficult consequences for the municipality especially if the funds have been obtained from various financial institutions and agencies. It can pile up the interest burden on the municipality. It can affect proper functioning of the local authority. It can result in valuable funds, which are otherwise available to the local authority being dissipated for ever. It can invite difficult consequences for the municipality especially if the funds have been obtained from various financial institutions and agencies. It can pile up the interest burden on the municipality. The persons, who are entrusted with the task of maintaining the accounts have to be impressed with the urgency involved in the preparation and submission of accounts of a municipality. Prescription of a time frame and possibility of penal consequences for non compliance of the same are all a perfectly legitimate part of a statutory scheme for auditing the accounts of the local authority. The power cannot be said to be arbitrary. It is tribe that possibility of excessive exercise of power conferred under the statute or even abuse of the same in given circumstances, is not sufficient to hold the provision itself as unconstitutional. Where there is excessive exercise of power or deviation or malafide exercise of power, it is always open to the aggrieved person to question the action before an appropriate forum, if necessary by invoking the remedy available under Article 226 of the Constitution. Supreme Court has, in various decisions, held that a plenary statute can be challenged only on the grounds of (i) legislative competence, (ii) violation of any constitutional provision and (iii) repugnancy within the meaning of Article 254 of the Constitution of India. Obviously, there is a statutory safeguard built into the section itself to deter such prosecutions from being indiscriminately launched in criminal courts as such. More on this aspect at a later stage. I should also remind myself of the fact that validity of a plenary statute can be challenged only on extremely limited grounds. Reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Public Services Tribunal Bar Association v. State of U.P. (2003 (4) SCC 104). “27. Power to enact a law is derived by the State Assembly from List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.. Entry 41 confers upon a State Legislature the power to make State Public Services, State Public Services Commission. Under this entry, a State Legislature has the power to constitute State Public Services and to regulate their service conditions, emoluments and provide for disciplinary matters etc. Entry 41 confers upon a State Legislature the power to make State Public Services, State Public Services Commission. Under this entry, a State Legislature has the power to constitute State Public Services and to regulate their service conditions, emoluments and provide for disciplinary matters etc. the State Legislature had enacted the U.P. Public Services Tribunals Act, 1976 in exercise of the power vested in it by Entry 41 of List II of the Seventh Schedule,. Power to enact would include the power to re-enact or validate any provision of law in the State Legislature provided the same falls in an entry of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution with the restriction that such enactment should not nullify a judgment of the competent court of law. The legislative competence of the State to enact the U.P. Public Services Tribunal has not been questioned in these appeals. The challenge put forth to various amendments made is that the same are violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution being arbitrary as they are onerous and work inequitably. In the present appeals legislative action of the State is under challenge. Judicial system has an important role to pay in our body politic and has a solemn obligation to fulfill. In such circumstances, it is imperative upon the courts while examining the scope of legislative action to be conscious to start with the presumption regarding the constitutional validity of the legislation. The burden of proof is upon the shoulders of the incumbent who challenge it. It is true that it is the duty of the constitutional courts under our Constitution to declare a law enacted by Parliament or the State Legislature as unconstitutional when parliament or the State Legislature had assumed to enact a law which is void, either from want of constitutional power to enact it or because the constitutional forms or conditions have not been observed or where the law infringes the fundamental rights enshrined and guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution. 28. In State of Bihar v. Bihar Distillery Ltd. This Court indicated the approach, which the Court should adopt while examining the validity/constitutionality of a legislation. It would be useful to remained ourselves of the principles laid down which read: SCC p.466. para 17). 28. In State of Bihar v. Bihar Distillery Ltd. This Court indicated the approach, which the Court should adopt while examining the validity/constitutionality of a legislation. It would be useful to remained ourselves of the principles laid down which read: SCC p.466. para 17). The approach of the court, while examining the challenge to the constitutionality of an enactment, is to start with the presumption of constitutionality. The court should try to sustain its validity to the extent possible. It should strike down the enactment only when it is not possible to sustain it. The court should not approach the enactment with a view to pick holes or to search for defects of drafting, much less inexactitude of language employed. Indeed, any such defects of drafting should be ironed out as part of the attempt to sustain the validity/constitutionality of the enactment. After all, an Act made by the legislature represents the will of the people and that cannot be lightly interfered with. The unconstitutionality must be plainly and clearly established before an enactment is declared as void. The same approach holds good while ascertaining the intent and purpose of an enactment or its scope and application. In the same para the Court further observed as follows: The Court must recognize the fundamental nature and importance of legislative process and accord due regard and deference to it, just as the legislature and the executive are expected to show due regard and a deference to the judiciary. It cannot also be forgotten that our Constitution recognizes and gives effect to the concept of equality between the three wings of the State and the concept of ‘checks and balances’ inherent in such scheme.” 12. Reference may also be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. State of Punjab – (2004 (12) SCC 672) wherein the same principle has been laid down. It is the settled position that the court must strive to sustain the validity of an enactment to the extent possible. An Act passed by the legislature reflects the will of the people and it cannot be likely interfered with. The legislative competence is not a matter in dispute. Circumscribed by the parameters mentioned above, I am of the view that Section 9(2) of the Audit Act cannot be considered as arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. An Act passed by the legislature reflects the will of the people and it cannot be likely interfered with. The legislative competence is not a matter in dispute. Circumscribed by the parameters mentioned above, I am of the view that Section 9(2) of the Audit Act cannot be considered as arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It only provides the consequence of an omission in the discharge of an official function, which is vital to the functioning of the local authority as such. It is intended to give teeth to the provisions of the Act relating to supervision, control and audit of the accounts of the municipality. It is not in contravention of any specific constitutional provision. In the result, I repell the challenge to the validity of Section 9(2) of the Audit Act. 13. The next contention raised by the petitioners is in relation to Section 548 of the Municipalities Act. Section 548 of the Act reads as follows: “548. Sanction for prosecution of Chairperson, Secretary or Councilor:- Where the Chairperson, any Councilor or the Secretary of a Municipality is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction of the Government. No doubt, the section specifically refers to the Secretary of a municipality as such and it contemplates the sanction of the Government, if the secretary is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in discharge of his duty. He is an officer of the Government as well. The Secretary of municipality is appointed by the Government and he is an officer of the Government, bome on such cadre as prescribed, and shall be the executive officer of a municipality (refer to Section 14 of the Municipalities Act). The contention seems to be that infraction of Section 9(1) of the Audit Act will constitute an offence under Section 9(2) of the said Act and therefore, the prosecution under Section 9(2) of the Act must be preceded by a sanction of the Government under Section 548 of the Municipalities Act. I am afraid that, I am no in a position to accept that contention as well. I am afraid that, I am no in a position to accept that contention as well. Section 548 of the Municipalities Act refers to Secretary of a municipality as well as other persons. Obviously a Councilor is not a person who is responsible for the maintenance and submission of the accounts of a municipality. Thus even if the provisions of the Audit Act is stretched for argument’s sake, as to comprehend the chair person of a municipality, obviously, Audit Act cannot have any application to others who are otherwise comprehended by Section 548 of the Municipality Act. The sanction contemplated by Section 548 of the Municipalities Act must relate to certain other areas. It refers to persons “accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duty.” There could be several acts of commission and omissions, under the general law, which could constitute itself as an offence. But where the act of commission of an offence is in relation to the discharge of official duty by a Chairperson, Councilor or Secretary of a municipality, previous sanction of the Government is required for the prosecution. 14. Question is whether it takes in an offence under the Audit Act. In my opinion, it does not. The sanction contemplated under Section 548 of the Municipalities Act is related to acts of commission or omission, which are considered as offences under the Municipalities Act (refer to Section 513 and 517D of the Municipalities Act). Prosecution for the aforementioned offences (or any other act of commission or omission which is considered as offence under the Municipalities Act or the Rules framed thereunder) requires previous sanction of the Government under Section 548 of the Municipalities Act. In my opinion, any other view as regards the scope of Section 548 of the Municipalities Act in such a manner as to encompass contravention under any other law would be fraught with unforeseen consequences. Apart from a Government servant like Secretary of the Municipality, the Chairperson of a Municipality or even a Councilor is given a protection from frivolous or vexatious prosecutions, under Section 548 of the Municipalities Act. Apart from a Government servant like Secretary of the Municipality, the Chairperson of a Municipality or even a Councilor is given a protection from frivolous or vexatious prosecutions, under Section 548 of the Municipalities Act. If protection under Section 548 of the Municipalities Act, vis-à-vis, such persons is extended to offences under other enactments as well, then it brings about a situation where legitimate action that could be taken under other enactments could be hindered merely because one of the accused is the Chairperson of the Municipality or even a Councilor. Obviously this cannot be the intention of the Legislature. It is also relevant to note that a separate statutory safeguard is provided in the matter of launching a prosecution against the Secretary of the Municipality, under the Audit Act. To import the protection under Section 548 of the Municipalities Act, into the provisions of the Audit Act would be an unnecessary interference with the statutory scheme under the Audit Act. The second contention raised on behalf of the petitioners with reference to Section 548 of the municipalities Act is also rejected. 15. Sri. P.V. Surendranath, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in O.P.Nos.29280 of 2000 and 31184 of 2001 raised a contention to the effect that the provisions of the Audit Act will have to yield to Sections 294 and 295 of the Municipalities Act. The said two provisions in so far as they are relevant are extracted hereunder: “294. Annual Financial Statement:- (1) The Secretary shall publish, not later than the first week of June, an annual financial statement of the preceding year approved by the Council, in such form as may be prescribed embodying a classified abstract of receipts and payments of the Municipality under Revenue, Capital and Debt heads, a demand, collection of the general financial position of the Municipality. (2) As soon as may be, after the publication of the financial statement under sub-section (1), the Secretary shall forward a copy thereof to the auditors. “295. Accounts and Audit:- (1) The Municipality shall maintain its accounts and other books connected with the accounts in the manner and form as prescribed and shall enter the receipt and expenditure accounts forthwith in such books. “295. Accounts and Audit:- (1) The Municipality shall maintain its accounts and other books connected with the accounts in the manner and form as prescribed and shall enter the receipt and expenditure accounts forthwith in such books. (2) The responsibility to maintain or cause to maintain the accounts and the connected books of the Municipality in the manner and form as prescribed and to submit or cause to submit such accounts to the Local Fund Examiner for conducting audit in the time shall west with the Secretary. (3) The Examiner of Local Fund Accounts and his nominees shall be the auditors of the Municipality.” 16. Contention seems to be that Sections 294 and 295 of the Municipalities Act deal with the preparation of the financial statement and submission of accounts of the Municipality and its audit. Same have to be sourced to Article 243 of the Constitution of India. Contention is that the Audit Act will have to be treated as a general legislation providing a control to be exercised by the Director of Local Fund Audits, over the Municipalities and other Organisations mentioned in the Schedule to the Act. It is further contended that Sections 294 and 295 of the Municipalities Act will have to be treated as special law relating to the subject. Consequently, general law will have to yield to the special law in the case of conflict between the two. Reference is made to the maxim – Generalia specialibus non derogant (general provision derogates from the special one). 17. I am afraid that the aforementioned contention is rested on certain assumptions, which are not capable of easy acceptance. Firstly, one cannot undertake an interpretative process, by culling out two provisions from a comprehensive enactment like the Municipalities Act and then treat them as special law relating to Municipalities. Question as to whether law should be treated as a general law or a special law, in the context of resolving any conflict between two separate legislations will have to be resolved by taking the statute as a whole and not merely with reference to two particular provisions in a comprehensive enactment. Kerala Municipalities Act, 1999 is a law relating to Municipalities in the State. It could be sourced to Entry 5 of List 2 of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution. It was introduced in the wake of the 74th amendment to the Constitution. Kerala Municipalities Act, 1999 is a law relating to Municipalities in the State. It could be sourced to Entry 5 of List 2 of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution. It was introduced in the wake of the 74th amendment to the Constitution. The Municipalities Act, 1994 is obviously the general law relating to Municipalities in the State. Sections 294 and 295 in the said Act are only two provisions relating to one aspect in the functioning of the Municipality. Once this principle is accepted and I do not find any reason not to, then it could be seen that if at all, it is the Audit Act that will have to the treated as special law dealing with the audit of accounts of the Municipality. Therefore, if one is required to undertake a task of reconciling the provisions of the Municipalities Act on one hand and the Audit Act on the other and one is also required to give a label of general law or special law to each one of them, then it is quite clear that it is the Audit Act which is to be treated as special law relating to the subject of submission of accounts and its audit. Section 22 of the Audit Act, which provides for over-riding effect, would also stand in the way of accepting an interpretation that will result in making the provisions of the Audit Act yield to the provisions of the Municipalities Act. 18. Further, it may not be necessary to undertake an interpretative exercise for resolving a perceived conflict between two enactments. In my view, there is no inconsistency between the provisions of the two enactments. Sections 294 and 295 the Municipalities Act provide for submission of accounts and audit of the same. Section 9(2) of the Audit Act inter alia provides for prosecution in cases where there is negligence or default on the part of the Secretary in facilitating the audit of accounts of the Municipality. Essentially, the Audit Act only provides for statutory consequences including criminal prosecution in cases where there is negligence on the part of the Authority, which is entrusted with the task of carrying out of the important function in the Municipality. Duties in this regard are in a way imposed under the Municipalities Act. Compliance with the provisions of one enactment obviously does not entail violation of the provisions of the other enactment. Duties in this regard are in a way imposed under the Municipalities Act. Compliance with the provisions of one enactment obviously does not entail violation of the provisions of the other enactment. Inconsistency between the two enactments is neither explicit nor latent. 19. Sri. Surendranath makes reference to three decisions of the Supreme Court, dealing with the application of the maxim, which provides that general law will always yields to the special law. They are Ashoka Marketing Ltd. v. Punjab, National Bank – (A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 855), Gobind Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Bihar – (A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 3097) and Collector of Central Excise, Jaipur v. M/s. Raghuvar (India) Ltd. – (A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 2027). In Ashoka Marketing Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank – (A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 855), the Constitution Bench dealt with the provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 and the Delhi Rent Control Act. Both the legislations were enacted by the Parliament (Delhi Rent Control Act was enacted at a time when Delhi was a Union Territory). The Supreme Court held that where there is general law dealing with the subject and special law dealing with the same, then obviously the special law should prevail. Construing, both Public Premises Act and the Rent Control Act as a special law the Supreme Court held that the later special law will have to prevail, if there is inconsistency between the provisions of two enactments, both of which could qualify as special law on the subject. 20. In my view, as stated above, the Municipalities Act is the general law dealing with the subject of Municipality and the Audit Act is a special law which deals with audit of accounts of the Municipality and other bodies mentioned in the Schedule to the Act. Assuming that there is inconsistency, provisions of the Audit Act will prevail. But as stated above, there is no inconsistency between the two enactments. They do not collide with each other in any area. Compliance with the provisions of the Municipalities Act within the time frame mentioned in the Audit Act would result in compliance with the provisions of the Audit Act as well. This is a sure best of absence of conflict between the two. They do not collide with each other in any area. Compliance with the provisions of the Municipalities Act within the time frame mentioned in the Audit Act would result in compliance with the provisions of the Audit Act as well. This is a sure best of absence of conflict between the two. The dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. Case and the other two judgments can hardly have any application to the present case. 21. Yet another contention raised by the petitioners centers around the word “Principal” contained in Section 2(e) of the Audit Act, which defines an Executive Authority. Contention is that Section 9(2) of the Audit Act merely mentions an Executive Authority and does not refer to the Principal Executive Officer. In my view, the contention is misconceived. Firstly, we are in the instant case concerned with the preparation of financial statement and submission of accounts of the Municipality for audit. Municipalities Act squarely imposes an obligation in this regard on the Secretary. It clearly shows that the Secretary is the Executive Authority of the Municipality. The word “Principal” used in conjunction with the words “Executive Officer” in the Municipalities Act is only descriptive of the power and functions of a Secretary. Obligation in the matter of submission of accounts and preparation of financial statement, under Sections 294 and 295 of the Municipalities Act read with the relevant Rules is squarely cast on the Secretary. It is also relevant in this context to note various provisions of the Municipalities Act referred to by Sri. Suresh Babu, the learned Special Government Pleader, namely, Sections 48, 49H, 50, 51(7), 56(5), 228, 285 and 295(2) of the Municipalities Act. A perusal of the said provisions would support the contention of the Government that it is the Secretary who is treated as Executive Authority of the Municipality and Section 9(2) of the Audit Act therefore comprehends the Secretary of the Municipality. Of course, if the powers of the Secretary in the matter of submission of accounts for audit is delegated to any other officer of the Municipality, in accordance with law, then the delegate would be comprehended by the provisions of the Audit Act. This is essentially a question of fact that may have to be borne in mind by the Director or Deputy Director while exercising the powers under Section 9(3) of the Audit Act. 22. This is essentially a question of fact that may have to be borne in mind by the Director or Deputy Director while exercising the powers under Section 9(3) of the Audit Act. 22. Petitioners in all these writ petitions very vehemently contended that the prosecution which have been impugned in these writ petitions are bad in law. Reference in this regard is made to Section 9(2) and 9(3) of the Audit Act. In all these cases, notices of show cause were issued, replys were filed. Thereafter the complaint is filed and the petitioners are arrayed as accused. The Director did not apply his mind as to whether proceedings under Section 9(2) of the Act should be launched or not. The Director thought that issuance of notice and the facility to file objection is an empty formality. It is a statutory safeguard against frivolous and vexatious prosecutions. I am inclined to accept the submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in this regard. One has to remember that preparation of the financial statement and submission of accounts of the municipality is one of the main functions of the municipality to be discharged by the Secretary of a municipality and other subordinate officers. There can be several reasons which delayed submission of the accounts for a particular financial period. The Secretary of a municipality may not be responsible for the same. On the other hand, he may be responsible if he is negligent. Elaborate explanation is offered by the petitioner in OP.6979/2000 on this situation. He points out in Ext.P5 that he joined as secretary of the Kalpetta Municipality on 6.3.1999. He found that accounts for the year 1992 were yet to be submitted, He contended that unless accounts of the previous years have been prepared and submitted, it would not possible to submit that accounts for the year in question 1998-99. He therefore, points out that he should not be proceeded under the Act. The question here is not whether explanation offered in Ext.P5 is acceptable or not. It may be. There could be other explanations as well. But criminal prosecution against a Government servant for non submission of the accounts of municipality as such is a not matter to be dealt with in a cavalier fashion. The question here is not whether explanation offered in Ext.P5 is acceptable or not. It may be. There could be other explanations as well. But criminal prosecution against a Government servant for non submission of the accounts of municipality as such is a not matter to be dealt with in a cavalier fashion. In all these cases, criminal prosecution has been launched without the Director or the Deputy Director having satisfied himself under Section 9(3) of the Audit Act that there is negligence on the part of the accused in non submission of the accounts within the time frame prescribed under the statute. 23. The dispute raised in some other cases is that whether objections were actually filed by the diligent officials to the notice of show cause issued by the Director. Objections are stated to have been filed in all these cases. I am inclined to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that there is no reason why a responsible official like Secretary of a municipality should ignore a serious matter like notice of show cause under Section 9(2) of the Act. At any rate, the law on this subject was not very clear. There were several assumptions, made by several persons, as regards obligation under the Municipalities Act and the Audit Act. It would be in the fitness of things that the objections which are produced along with the writ petitions are treated as the objections to the notices of show cause issued by the Deputy Director in each one of the cases. It would also be appropriate that the petitioners are given an opportunity to file such objections raising any additional contentions in the light of the scope of the statutory provisions of the Act as delineated above. I am of the view that reasoned orders are necessary in terms of Section 9(3) of the Act. Such orders have to be passed in all these cases. 24. For all these reasons, the writ petitions are disposed of with the following directions: (i) Challenge raised by the petitioners against Section 9 (2) of the Kerala Local Fund Audit Act, 1994 is repelled. (ii) The provisions of the Local Fund Audit Act, 1994 in so far as they relate to Municipalities do not stand repealed impliedly or otherwise by reason of Sections 294 or 295 of the Municipalities Act, 1994. (ii) The provisions of the Local Fund Audit Act, 1994 in so far as they relate to Municipalities do not stand repealed impliedly or otherwise by reason of Sections 294 or 295 of the Municipalities Act, 1994. (iii) It is the Secretary of every municipality, who is the executive officer, as comprehended by Section 9(2) of the Local Fund Audit Act and it is Secretary who can be made an accused for a prosecution under the provisions of the said Act. If the duties of the Secretary, in a particular case, has been duly delegated in accordance with law, then the Director may look into the said aspect in such cases. (iv) The petitioners in all these cases may file their objections to the respective show cause notices, in addition to any reply that they have already filed, within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment before the concerned Deputy Director or Director or Director as the case may be. (v) The Deputy Director or the Director, as the case may be, shall consider the objections which are to be filed as mentioned above, hear the petitioners and pass an order as to whether he is satisfied that a criminal prosecution under Section 9(2) of the Act should be launched. The criminal prosecution launched against the petitioners will be kept in abeyance until the Director or the Deputy Director takes a decision as directed above. The criminal prosecution will continue if the concerned Deputy Director takes a decision to the effect that criminal prosecution is necessary in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. All the writ petitions are disposed of with the above terms. No costs.