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2007 DIGILAW 430 (PNJ)

Azad And Another v. State Of Haryana

2007-03-13

VIRENDER SINGH

body2007
Judgment Virender Singh, J. 1. The instant revision petition has been filed by Azad Singh son of Mange Ram and his daughter Parveen against the order dated 29.7.2006 vide which both the petitioners who were initially kept in column No. 2 are directed to be summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to face trial along with their co-accused Sandeep son of Azad and Bedo wife of Azad in case FIR No. 35 dated 16.2.2006, registered at Police Station Rai (Sonepat) under Sections 304-B/406/34 IPC. Azad petitioner is father-in-law of the deceased Geeta whereas petitioner No. 2 is married sister-in-law. 2. Record reveals that further proceedings qua both the petitioners before the trial Court are stayed. Pursuant to notice, Mr. Dinesh Arora, AAG, Haryana has put appearance on behalf of respondent State. He is assisted by Mr. Rajbir Sehrawat, Advocate, learned counsel for the complainant. 3. I have heard learned counsel for both the sides and gone through the main petition and the other documents attached thereto. 4. Mr. Dhankar submits that no doubt Geeta died just after one year of her marriage, but in fact she could not pull on well with her husband (Sandeep) and ultimately she died an unnatural death. The complainant side has made an attempt to involve the entire family of the husband which also includes a married sister-in-law (petitioner No. 2) who in fact, had married way back in 1998 i.e. seven years prior to the marriage of her brother Sandeep and was residing separately with her in-laws. She cannot be connected even remotely with the commission of the alleged offences as she had no concern with the affairs of the deceased and her husband Sandeep. In support of his submissions Mr. Dhankar relies upon Annexure P-3, the ration-card. 5. Mr. Dhankar then submits that so far as Azad Singh petitioner (father-in- law) is concerned, he had brought Geeta to the hospital and his conduct exonerates him. The matter was thoroughly investigated by the prosecution agency and both the petitioners were found innocent. This was the reason that they were not challaned and kept in column No. 2. 6. Mr. Dhankar goes on to submits that the impugned order has been passed mechanically without recording reasons and considering the entire material on record and, therefore, the same deserves to be set-aside. 7. This was the reason that they were not challaned and kept in column No. 2. 6. Mr. Dhankar goes on to submits that the impugned order has been passed mechanically without recording reasons and considering the entire material on record and, therefore, the same deserves to be set-aside. 7. The learned State counsel, however, supports the view of the learned trial Court and submits that while discussing the statement of Padam Singh (PW-1) along with the other attending circumstances, the learned trial Court prima facie found that there were sufficient material to summon both the petitioners and, therefore, the impugned order deserves to be upheld. 8. Mr. Rajbir Sehrawat adopts the arguments of the learned State Counsel. 9. It is well settled legal proposition that while considering an application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. for summoning an additional accused, the trial Court is required to record a reasonable satisfaction that the evidence on record is sufficient to warrant a finding that the accused to be summoned, must be arraigned along with the other accused, already facing trial. `Reasonable satisfaction in fact is `judicial satisfaction and the powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C. are not to be exercised just on demand. In Michael Machado v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2000(2) RCR(Criminal) 75 (SC), their Lordships while dealing with the scope of Section 319 Cr.P.C. elaborately observed in para 11 as under :- "11. The basic requirement for invoking the above section is that it should appear to the Court from the evidence collected during trial or in the inquiry that some other person, who is not arraigned as an accused in that case, has committed an offence for which that person could be tried together with the accused already arraigned. It is not enough that the court entertained some doubt, from the evidence, about the involvement of another person in the offence. In other words, the court must have reasonable satisfaction from the evidence already collected regarding two aspects. First is that the other person has committed an offence. Second is that for such offence that other person could as well as tried along with the already arraigned accused." 10. In other words, the court must have reasonable satisfaction from the evidence already collected regarding two aspects. First is that the other person has committed an offence. Second is that for such offence that other person could as well as tried along with the already arraigned accused." 10. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi and others, 1983(1) RCR(Criminal) 73 : 1983(1) SCC 1, their Lordships held that power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. conferred on the Court is really an extra-ordinary power and should be used very sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist for taking cognizance against the other persons against whom action has not been taken. 11. Adverting to the facts of the case in hand, the conceded position is that Parveen (petitioner No. 2) is married sister-in-law. Mr. Sehrawat admits that she was married in 1998 and was staying with her in-laws. In the two statements Annexure P-4 and P-5 of Azad Singh the uncle of the deceased and Nafe Singh the other relative of the deceased, the general allegations are that all the family members including Parveen, the sister-in-law were harassing Geeta for bringing more dowry. Geeta was also having a son aged about three month at the time of her death. When Padam Singh, the real brother of deceased appeared in the witness-box, he stated that after the marriage father-in-law Azad Singh, sister-in-law Parveen, mother-in-law Bedo and husband Sandeep used to beat his sister and harass her on the pretext of bringing insufficient dowry. He also stated that all the aforesaid four persons were regularly beating his sister and used to taunt her by saying that she had come from a baggers family. He then stated that all the four had also made a demand for a motor-cycle in `Pilia (occasion after the birth of a child). This witness was not cross-examined from the defence side as the State had moved an application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. A perusal of Annexures P-4 and P-5, the statements of other relatives of the deceased, shows that there is no mentioning of beating or demand of any vehicle from the side of the present two petitioners. This witness was not cross-examined from the defence side as the State had moved an application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. A perusal of Annexures P-4 and P-5, the statements of other relatives of the deceased, shows that there is no mentioning of beating or demand of any vehicle from the side of the present two petitioners. From this it can comfortably be inferred that the learned trial Court has just mechanically passed the order of summoning without satisfying itself judicially that Parveen, the married sister-in-law who was staying separately much prior to the marriage of deceased, could not possibly go to the extent of beating his (her ?) sister-in-law regularly. This indicates that the learned trial Court has not considered the material on record in the right perspective for its judicial satisfaction. The statement of Padam Singh has been taken as gospel truth. No doubt, in para 10 of the impugned order, the learned trial Court has considered Michael Machados case (supra) but in my considered view, the applicability of Section 319 Cr.P.C. has not been invoked in the right perspective qua Parveen and she has been summoned on just asking. The observation of the learned trial Court is that beside the substantive statement of Padam Singh, mother and uncle of the deceased had also made statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. involving Azad and Parveen the present petitioners. In my view, the approach adopted by the learned trial Court is not a judicious one. The attempt made by the complainant side during the trial to implicate Parveen at least by invoking the provisions of Section 319 of Code of Criminal Procedure cannot stand the test of judicial scrutiny and with bald statement of Padam Singh alone would not justify her summoning. 12. So far as Azad Singh petitioner (father-in-law) is concerned, may be that he had taken Geeta, his daughter-in-law to the hospital but the said conduct by itself does not exonerate him of his liability. Para 3 of the impugned order indicates that beside Section 304-B IPC charge under Section 302/34 IPC was also framed. Admittedly Sandeep the husband, Bedi the mother-in-law and Azad Singh the father-in-law were staying under one roof. From the totality of facts and circumstances, it cannot be said that his summoning by the trial Court while invoking provisions under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is bad in the eyes of law. 13. Admittedly Sandeep the husband, Bedi the mother-in-law and Azad Singh the father-in-law were staying under one roof. From the totality of facts and circumstances, it cannot be said that his summoning by the trial Court while invoking provisions under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is bad in the eyes of law. 13. As a sequel to the aforesaid discussion, the net result is that the instant revision petition is partly allowed and the impugned order dated 29.7.2006 is set aside qua petitioner No. 2 Parveen (sister-in-law) whereas it is upheld qua petitioner No. 1 Azad Singh (father-in-law). 14. Since the proceedings were stayed qua the petitioners by this Court vide order dated September 26, 2006, the trial Court is directed to start with the trial qua Sandeep the husband, Bedo the mother-in-law and Azad Singh the father-in-law and shall make all its sincere efforts to conclude the trial as early as possible preferably within four months from the next date fixed before it. Office is directed to send the copy of the judgment to the Court concerned without any delay.