ORDER The petitioner has filed this writ petition, calling in question, the legality of the order of: (i) the third respondent, the Disciplinary Authority in and by which he has been imposed the major penalty of compulsory retirement, (ii) the second respondent, the Appellate Authority confirming the order of the third respondent, the Disciplinary Authority and (iii) the first respondent, the Reviewing Authority rejecting the Review Application. 2. The petitioner's case, in brief, as could be seen from his affidavit, is as under: a. The petitioner joined the services of the respondent bank in the year 1974 and was working as Branch Manager of the Kotturpuram Branch from 8.7.1993 to 31.3.1996. While was working as Branch Manager of the Kotturpuram Branch of Indian Bank in 1994, he was informed over telephone by the then Chairman and Managing Director (CMD) that one C.R. Viswanathan would get in touch with him regarding an International Women's Football Tournament in the name of the then Chief Minister J. Jayalalitha and accordingly, an account was opened in the name of “Dr. J. Jayalalitha Gold Cup International Women's Football Tournament - 1994” (“Football Tournament” for short) by the said C.R. Viswanathan, Organising Secretary of the Tournament. Based on the instruction from the CMD to allow Temporary Over Drafts (TODs) to the extent of Rs. 150 lakhs towards the Football Tournament Account as a temporary arrangement and that the same would be adjusted by Government grants and other collections and also based on his assurance that he would personally monitor such collections, TODs were allowed by the petitioner and the matter was also reported to the Regional Manager, Zonal Manager and the CMD and confirmation obtained. Though TODs were originally meant for a period of four months, as Government grants and collections did not materialise as expected and TODs remained unsettled, the petitioner wanted to meet the Chief Minister/Chief Secretary/any other Government officials for the purpose of recovery. But, the CMD had intervened stating that the matter was being dealt with at the top level and assured the petitioner that he would liaise with the Government officials for recovery of money and also advised the petitioner not to embarrass C.R. Viswanathan. But, the CMD had intervened stating that the matter was being dealt with at the top level and assured the petitioner that he would liaise with the Government officials for recovery of money and also advised the petitioner not to embarrass C.R. Viswanathan. b. While so, the petitioner received a show-cause notice dated 15.4.1996 from the Chief Manager, Vigilance stating that during his tenure as Branch Manager of the Kotturpuram Branch from 8.7.1993 to 31.3.1996, he had committed serious irregularities in respect of appraisal, disbursal and follow up of credit limits sanctioned to the Football Tournament because of which the bank was facing difficulties in recovering the liability of Rs. 194 lakhs as on 14.12.1996. The petitioner gave his reply stating that: i. he had obtained confirmation for the facilities allowed; ii. the letter dated 9.11.1994 from the Zonal Manager to the CMD contains the notings of the CMD himself; iii. he had taken all efforts in this regard and documents were available to prove his case; iv. the account was referred to him by his superiors, viz. , the Assistant General Manager, Regional Office, Madras (South), the Zonal Manager and the then CMD and v. C.R. Viswanathan, claiming that he was to be designated as the Organising Secretary and the Organising Committee under formation included high dignitaries like the Chief Secretary, Finance Secretary, Education Secretary, Director General of Police and several others, informed him that there are no separate constitution and by-laws as the Football Tournament being a one-time event; c. The respondent bank, not being convinced with the petitioner's explanation, issued a charge sheet dated 18.3.1997 which consisted of the following charges: i. that he had allowed huge TODs without verifying basic information of the borrower Association; ii. that he had allowed several overdrafts for which he had no powers and that he had not obtained confirmation for the same and thus misused his official position; iii. that though he permitted huge overdrafts, he had not cared to take documents and thus rendered the bank without recourse to proceed for recovery; and iv. that he had not taken follow up action in getting the documents or in recovery of TODs granted. that though he permitted huge overdrafts, he had not cared to take documents and thus rendered the bank without recourse to proceed for recovery; and iv. that he had not taken follow up action in getting the documents or in recovery of TODs granted. d. To the charge-sheet referred to above, the petitioner submitted his explanation dated 25.4.1997 reiterating his earlier stand that all his actions were based on the instructions of his superiors and that every TOD which he allowed was with the confirmation of his superiors. Ten documents were also enclosed with the petitioner's explanation to show that his actions were not based on mere telephonic instructions and that his explanation was genuine. e. Despite receipt of the petitioner's explanation dated 25.4.1997 together with enclosures, the bank, by its letter dated 17.5.1997, ordered a departmental enquiry on the petitioner in which he participated and marked 31 documents and was represented by a Defence Assistant, though no witness was examined on his behalf. For its part, the bank marked 40 documents and examined one Shyam Sundara Babu, senior Manager. f. In the enquiry, the petitioner was denied the opportunity to scrutinize the files and documents at the Regional Office/Zonal Office/ Head Office stating that his request for scrutiny of files was irrelevant on the ground that all the records relating to the transaction were available at the Branch Office. g. In the domestic enquiry, the Management Witness stated in his cross examination that: i. he had seen from DEX 4 that Chief Secretary of the State had written to the CMD that the tournament in question was approved by the Government and was sanctioned by the Football Association/Federation including (2008) 2 MLJ 84 at 88 FIFA and that the Chief Secretary had sought the help of the CMD to sponsor the expenses roughly estimated as Rs. 30 lakhs; ii. from DEX 5 and 7, it is clear that the opening of the account in question was brought to the notice of the Government of Tamil Nadu; iii. from DEX 13, it was clear that the Zonal Manager had written a letter on 9.11.1994 to the CMD informing him about the TOD that was allowed on 11.10.1994 and was confirmed by the Assistant General Manager, Chennai (S) when the balance was Rs. 1,40,40,761.02 and that CMD's confirmation for Assistant General Manager's action was requested; iv. from DEX 13, it was clear that the Zonal Manager had written a letter on 9.11.1994 to the CMD informing him about the TOD that was allowed on 11.10.1994 and was confirmed by the Assistant General Manager, Chennai (S) when the balance was Rs. 1,40,40,761.02 and that CMD's confirmation for Assistant General Manager's action was requested; iv. it was seen from the various documents that all the disbursements were reported to the Regional Office and confirmation was obtained; and v. it was seen from DEX 9 that the Government of Tamil Nadu had made a budgetary provision for the expenditure of this Tournament and therefore, in his opinion, there was nothing to question the bona fides of the account. h. The defence, while cross-examining the Management Witness, also referred to Clause 15.4 of MEX 40, the Manual of Instructions relating to opening of accounts for Associations, Committees, Clubs and Societies which while dealing with accounts in which no regular rules are drawn up and which are held only temporarily states that an account may be opened for reliable persons of standing and status after the Manager satisfies himself about the bona fides of the party. In this connection, DEX 25 was put to the Management Witness in which the credentials of C.R. Viswanathan was mentioned. i. In his written brief to the Enquiry Officer, the petitioner referred to the various circumstances which led to his actions and requested that the entire case may be looked at taking into consideration the fact that he did whatever his superiors asked him to do in good faith. The bank never contended that the veracity of the document was in dispute nor was its case that the petitioner's actions were for his personal gain. Further, the Presenting Officer has stated that the second charge was not proved since the TODs had the confirmation of the Assistant General Manager / Zonal Manager / CMD. j. Despite such glaring evidence against the bank, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report finding the petitioner guilty of charges 1, 3 and 4 and holding the second charge as partly proved and partly not proved. k. The petitioner sent his representation to the findings of the Enquiry Officer on 31.7.1999 stating that: i. the Enquiry Officer failed to see the very unusual nature of the entire transaction; ii. k. The petitioner sent his representation to the findings of the Enquiry Officer on 31.7.1999 stating that: i. the Enquiry Officer failed to see the very unusual nature of the entire transaction; ii. the findings of the Enquiry Officer are perverse and biased inasmuch as the various documents marked both by the Management and the defence were not considered in a fair manner; and iii. the Enquiry Officer failed to consider the innumerable documents marked by both sides which would bring out his innocence clearly. l. Yet, the Disciplinary Authority, the third respondent, by his order dated 21.12.1999, concurred with the Enquiry Officer and imposed the punishment of compulsory retirement, questioning for the first time, the veracity of the correspondence between the Chief Secretary and the CMD. m. The appeal filed by the petitioner before the second respondent on 19.1.2000 stood rejected on 29.2.2000 pursuant to which, the petitioner preferred a Review before the first respondent on 17.4.2000 and it was also rejected on 29.7.2000. 3. Thus, being aggrieved by the three orders referred to above passed by each of the respondents, the present writ petition seeking to quash the same and to direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service with effect from 21.12.2000 with back-wages, continuity of service and all other attendant benefits. 4. 3. Thus, being aggrieved by the three orders referred to above passed by each of the respondents, the present writ petition seeking to quash the same and to direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service with effect from 21.12.2000 with back-wages, continuity of service and all other attendant benefits. 4. The respondents have filed their counter contending that: a. the petitioner did not possess clean record throughout his career and explanation was called for from him on four occasions for the irregularities committed in granting loans, non-execution of lease deed in favour of the bank and procedural lapses committed in the opening of account in the case of Jeppiar Farms and his reply was accepted in respect of two cases for which explanations were called and he was warned to be careful in future in respect of the remaining two cases and two more charge sheets were issued to him and kept in reserve in view of his compulsory retirement; b. the petitioner while working as Manager in the Kotturpuram Branch of Indian Bank from 8.7.1993 to 31.3.1996 committed serious irregularities in respect of TODs granted to the Football Tournament since the reply given by the petitioner was not found satisfactory, the Disciplinary Authority issued charge sheet to the petitioner on 18.3.1997 levelling four charges; c. As per Regulation No. 24 of the Indian Bank Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 1976 , a breach of any of the conduct regulations constitutes a misconduct that is punishable under Regulation 4 of the Indian Bank Officer Employees (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976 as amended; d. though the borrower is an association organised by Tamil Nadu Football Association, there is no record available regarding its constitution or the full particulars of the borrower and despite the same, the petitioner had allowed huge temporary overdrafts even without verifying the basic and essential information namely the constitution, members of the association, its by-laws, etc; e. even though the petitioner had permitted huge temporary overdrafts, he had not even cared to take any documents and thus, rendered the bank without recourse to proceed for recovery of its liability of Rs. 194.09 lakhs as on 14.2.1996; f. as the statement of defence submitted by the petitioner was not satisfactory, the preliminary sitting of the enquiry was held on 20.6.1997 and the regular enquiry was conducted on 23.2.1999; the petitioner was given ample opportunity along with his Defence Assistant to inspect the documents relied on by the Bank Management and both the petitioner and his Defence Assistant confirmed that they had completed the inspection of listed documents and had no objection for these documents being marked; g. it is not open to the petitioner to make reference to documents imagined by him as if they are in existence in some other office and on that allegation plead that such imaginary documents were not made available to him without specifying what those documents are; h. it is in no manner established by the petitioner that C.R. Viswanathan was the organising Secretary of the Association and he has not established or shown proof as to the official constitution of the association, the constitution of the Organising Committee and the appointment of C.R. Viswanathan as its Organising Secretary; i. the petitioner's request for perusal of the files of Regional Office/Zonal Office/Head Office was in the nature of a roving inspection and he did not specify any particular document or correspondence and in the absence of any specific letters/correspondence, the Inquiring Authority rejected his request for making such roving perusal; j. DEXs 4, 5 and 7 have no evidentiary value since Bank is not a party to the same and in DEX 9 which is an extract of the Assembly proceedings, there was only a passing reference to the Tournament and there was no intent from the Education Minister for any budgetary provision for the tournament; k. when the petitioner allowed TODs and sought confirmation of the superiors, he had not brought to their knowledge that he had not obtained cover documents which would safeguard the interest of the bank and he had deliberately overlooked and ignored the legal implications while granting TODs; l. the petitioner's reckless omissions and commissions had led the bank to lose its case before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and also the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai resulting in a loss of Rs. 262.64 lakhs to the bank; m. each of the charges levelled against him is independent and just because, the second charge was partially proved, the petitioner is estopped from contending that he is absolved from other charges; n. the Inquiring Authority's findings that the petitioner should not have allowed the account to be overdrawn is perfectly justified as the account allowed to be opened by the petitioner is in respect of an Association which was never registered and thus not a legal entity; o. the repeated allegations of the petitioner that all his actions were at the instance of the CMD is not tenable since he had miserably failed in his duty to follow the due procedure contemplated under the Manual of Instructions connected with the opening of an account; p.his allegation that cheques were passed on various dates and therefore, he was not aware of as to how many cheques would go on any given date is nothing but mis-statement of facts and as a Branch Manager, it is not open to him to enable any customer having a current account to go on drawing amounts to any extent without any instructions; q. his allegation that the bank did not take action against others is not correct as departmental action has been taken against the superiors alleged by him resulting in imposition of appropriate punishments on them; r. the petitioner has been found guilty of the articles of charges and the misconduct committed by him falls under Regulation 3(3) of Indian Bank Officers‘ Employees (Conduct Regulations) read with Regulation 24 of the said Regulations; and s. the Disciplinary Authority has considered all the materials relating to the charge sheet issued to the petitioner and imposed the punishment on the petitioner by a well-considered order and the appellate authority also has given cogent reasons for rejecting the petitioner's appeal and so also the Reviewing Authority. 5. Mr. 5. Mr. R. Muthukumarasamy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, at the threshold, has contended that only based on the assurance from the CMD of the bank that he would ensure recovery of TODs from the Government which could make the repayment from its grants and other sources of income and upon his instructions and that of the Regional Manager/Zonal Manager, the petitioner had allowed TODs to be drawn in the Football Tournament account and as such, he cannot be singled out for the loss sustained by the bank, setting free all his superiors who had instructed him to do so and who had also confirmed such TODs granted. 6. On the point of procedural lapse in the process of conduct of enquiry, the learned senior counsel has vehemently contended that despite various explanations given by the petitioner to the bank, the petitioner was not allowed by the Enquiry Officer to scrutinise the vital records available at the Regional Office/Zonal Office/Head Office and his request was not acceded to by the bank by saying that those documents were not relevant and a perusal of those documents would have certainly enabled the petitioner to prove his innocence and brought to light, the culpability of his superiors and this action of the respondents in not allowing the petitioner to scrutinise the relevant documents amounts to violation of principles of natural justice. With regard to the first charge that the petitioner had opened the Football Tournament account in question even without any knowledge of the basic information such as constitution, members and by-laws of the Association, he has argued that the petitioner was under the obligation of carrying out the instructions of his superiors including the CMD of the bank and in this regard, he has pointed Regulation 3(3) of the Indian Bank Officer Employees‘ (Conduct) Regulations, 1976 which reads as under: “No office employee shall, in the performance of his official duties or in the exercise of powers conferred on him, act otherwise than in his best judgment except when he is acting under the direction of his official superior.” In this context, it is his further contention that as per Clause 15.4 of Manual for Deposit of Accounts, accounts of funds which have no regular rules drawn up and which are held only temporarily may be allowed to be opened in the names of reliable persons of standing and status suffixed by words “Sports Fund”, etc. and before opening of such accounts, the Manager must thoroughly satisfy himself with the bona fides of the respective parties and so also the circumstances under which the account is opened and in the instant case, since high ranking personalities such as the then Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, the Chief Secretary to Government, the CMD of the Bank were involved and the CMD also recommended grant of TODs to the Football Tournament and it was also announced in the Assembly session that budgetary provision was to be made for the conduct of the tournament, the petitioner cannot be found fault with for not having known the basic information and especially, when his superiors had confirmed the grant of TODs granted at various intervals. 7. 7. With regard to the third charge that the petitioner had not obtained cover documents, it is the contention of the learned senior counsel that even in the case of regular sanction limits, during routine follow-up process, the higher authorities would ask the Branch to confirm the documentation process and when no such issue was raised in this matter involving several lakhs of rupees, it naturally goes to show that the petitioner's superiors including the CMD of the Bank were aware that no documents were given as security by the account-holder and above all, since the CMD of the bank himself was actively involved in this transaction, there was no reason for the petitioner to doubt the bona fides of the account-holder. While attacking the allegation in the third charge that the bank was without recourse for recovery since cover documents were not obtained by the petitioner, the learned senior counsel has contended that while the Debts Recovery Tribunal had admitted the cheques drawn by the Tournament Committee through which the payments were made and which had not become time-barred, the respondents are estopped from alleging so and above all, had the Government grants and sufficient collection from the sponsors come in time, the issue of cover documents would not at all have arisen and the Enquiry Officer ought to have taken into consideration all these relevant factors before framing such a charge against the petitioner. 8. While attacking the fourth charge, the learned senior counsel has brought to the notice of this Court that the letters dated 15.2.1996 and 17.4.1996 from C.R. Viswanathan to the then Chief Minister and the then Chief Secretary respectively and the letters dated 14.8.1995, 9.9.1995 and 17.10.1995 from the Regional Office to the petitioner would throw light on the efforts taken by the petitioner in the process of recovery of TODs and the Enquiry Officer has not at all taken cognizance of these correspondences. 9. In support of his contentions, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has relied on: a. a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Reliance Airport Developers (P) Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India (2006) 10 SCC 1 : “ 57. The present trend of judicial opinion is to restrict the doctrine of immunity from judicial review to those class of cases which relate to deployment of troops entering into international treaties, etc. The present trend of judicial opinion is to restrict the doctrine of immunity from judicial review to those class of cases which relate to deployment of troops entering into international treaties, etc. The distinctive features of some of these recent cases signify the willingness of the Courts to assert their power to scrutinise the factual basis upon which discretionary powers have been exercised. One can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground is “illegality”, the second “irrationality” and the third “procedural impropriety”. These principles were highlighted by LORD DIPLOCK in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service (commonly known as CCSU case). If the power has been exercised on a non-consideration or non-application of mind to relevant factors, the exercise of power will be regarded as manifestly erroneous. If a power (whether legislative or administrative) is exercised on the basis of facts which do not exist and which are patently erroneous, such exercise of power will stand vitiated. (See CIT v. Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd..) The effect of several decisions on the question of jurisdiction have been summed up by Grahame Aldous and John Alder in their book Applications for Judicial Review, Law and Practice thus: “There is a general presumption against ousting the jurisdiction of the Courts, so that statutory provisions which purport to exclude judicial review are construed restrictively. There are, however, certain areas of governmental activity, national security being the paradigm, which the Courts regard themselves as incompetent to investigate, beyond an initial decision as to whether the Government's claim is bona fide. In this kind of non-justiciable area judicial review is not entirely excluded, but very limited. It has also been said that powers conferred by the Royal Prerogative are inherently unreviewable but since the speeches of the House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service 26 this is doubtful. LORDS DIPLOCK, SCAMAN and ROSKILI appeared to agree that there is no general distinction between powers, based upon whether their source is statutory or prerogative but that judicial review can be limited by the subject-matter of a particular power, in that case national security. LORDS DIPLOCK, SCAMAN and ROSKILI appeared to agree that there is no general distinction between powers, based upon whether their source is statutory or prerogative but that judicial review can be limited by the subject-matter of a particular power, in that case national security. Many prerogative powers are in fact concerned with sensitive, non-justiciable areas, for example, foreign affairs, but some are reviewable in principle, including the prerogatives relating to the civil service where national security is not involved. Another non-justiciable power is the Attorney General's prerogative to decide whether to institute legal proceedings on behalf of the public interest.” 63. The principles of judicial review of administrative action were further summarised in 1985 by LORD DIPLOCK in CCSU case as illegality, procedural impropriety and irrationality. He said more grounds could in future become available, including the doctrine of proportionality which was a principle followed by certain other members of the European Economic Community. LORD DIPLOCK observed in that case as follows: “Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call ‘illegality‘, the second ‘irrationality‘ and the third ‘procedural impropriety‘. That is not to say that further development on a case-by-case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of ‘proportionality‘ which is recognised in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community;” 64. LORD DIPLOCK explained “irrationality” as follows: “By ‘irrationality‘ I mean what can by now be succinctly referred to as ‘WEDNESBURY unreasonableness‘. It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it.” 65. In other words, to characterise a decision of the administrator as “irrational” the Court has to hold, on material, that it is a decision “so outrageous” as to be in total defiance of logic or moral standards. Adoption of “proportionality” into administrative law was left for the future. 66. In other words, to characterise a decision of the administrator as “irrational” the Court has to hold, on material, that it is a decision “so outrageous” as to be in total defiance of logic or moral standards. Adoption of “proportionality” into administrative law was left for the future. 66. In essence, the test is to see whether there is any infirmity in the decision-making process and not in the decision itself. (See Indian Rly. Construction Co. Ltd. v..) 67. WEDNESBURY principles of reasonableness to which reference has been made in almost all the decisions referred to hereinabove is contained in WEDNESBURY case. In that case LORD GREENE, M.R. has held that a decision of a public authority will be liable to be quashed in judicial review proceeding where the Court concludes that the decision is such that no authority properly directing itself on the relevant law and acting reasonably could have arrived at it. 68. The standards of judicial review in terms of WEDNESBURY are now considered to be “traditional” in England in contrast to higher standards under the common law of human rights. LORD COOKE in R. v. Secy. of State for the Home Deptt., ex parte Daly, observed: “And I think that the day will come when it will be more widely recognised that WEDNESBURY case 29 was an unfortunately retrogressive decision in English administrative law, insofar as it suggested that there are degrees of unreasonableness and that only a very extreme degree can bring an administrative decision within the legitimate scope of judicial invalidation. The depth of judicial review and the deference due to administrative discretion vary with the subject-matter. It may well be, however, that the law can never be satisfied in any administrative field merely by a finding that the decision under review is not capricious or absurd.” 102. H.W.R. WADE and C.F. FORSYTH in their book Administrative Law, 7th Edn., (1994) discuss the subject regarding the jurisdiction of superior Courts over subordinate Courts and Tribunals under the head “Jurisdiction over fact and law” in Chapter 9, pp. 284-320. The decisions before Anisminic 2 and those in the post- Anisminic 42 period have been discussed in detail. At pp. H.W.R. WADE and C.F. FORSYTH in their book Administrative Law, 7th Edn., (1994) discuss the subject regarding the jurisdiction of superior Courts over subordinate Courts and Tribunals under the head “Jurisdiction over fact and law” in Chapter 9, pp. 284-320. The decisions before Anisminic 2 and those in the post- Anisminic 42 period have been discussed in detail. At pp. 319-20, the authors give the Summary of Rules thus: “Jurisdiction over fact and law: summary At the end of a chapter which is top-heavy with obsolescent material it may be useful to summarise the position as shortly as possible. The overall picture is of an expanding system struggling to free itself from the trammels of classical doctrines laid down in the past. It is not safe to say that the classical doctrines are wholly obsolete and that the broad and simple principles of review, which clearly now commend themselves to the judiciary, will entirely supplant them. A summary can therefore only state the long-established rules together with the simpler and broader rules which have now superseded them, much for the benefit of the law. Together they are as follows: Errors of fact Old rule: The Court would quash only if the erroneous fact was jurisdictional. New rule: The Court will quash if an erroneous and decisive fact was (a) jurisdictional; (b) found on the basis of no evidence; or (c) wrong, misunderstood or ignored. Errors of law Old rule: The Court would quash only if the error was (a) jurisdictional; or (b) on the face of the record. New rule: The Court will quash for any decisive error, because all errors of law are now jurisdictional.” (emphasis supplied) The above position was highlighted by this Court in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India 57, SCC pp. 736-37, para 337.” b. another judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Kailash Nath Gupta v. Enquiry Officer AIR 2003 SC 1377 : (2003) 9 SCC 480 : 2003-II-LLJ-367at p. 372 of LLJ: “ 10. In the background of what has been stated above, one thing is clear that the power of interference with the quantum of punishment is extremely limited. In the background of what has been stated above, one thing is clear that the power of interference with the quantum of punishment is extremely limited. But when relevant factors are not taken note of, which have some bearing on the quantum of punishment, certainly the Court can direct re-reconsideration or in an appropriate case to shorten litigation, indicate the punishment to be awarded. It is stated that there was no occasion in the long past service indicating either irregularity or misconduct of the appellant except the charges which were the subject-matter of his removal from service. The stand of the appellant as indicated above is that though small advances may have become irrecoverable, there is nothing to indicate that the appellant had misappropriated any money or had committed any act of fraud. If any loss has been caused to the Bank (which he quantifies at about Rs. 46,000) that can be recovered from the appellant. As the reading of the various articles of charges go to show, at the most there is some procedural irregularity which cannot be termed to be negligence to warrant the extreme punishment of dismissal from service.” c. yet another judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Dy. Inspector General of Police v. K. S. Swaminathan (1996) 11 SCC 498 : 1997-II-LLJ-1011at pp. 1011 and 1012 of LLJ: “ 3. It is settled law by a catena of decisions of this Court that if the charge memo is totally vague and does not disclose any misconduct for which the charges have been framed, the Tribunal or the Court would not be justified at that stage to go into whether the charges are true and could be gone into, for it would be a matter on production of the evidence for consideration at the enquiry by the enquiry officer. At the stage of framing of the charge, the statement of facts and the charge-sheet supplied are required to be looked into by the Court or the Tribunal as to the nature of the charges, i. e., whether the statement of facts and material in support thereof supplied to the delinquent officer would disclose the alleged misconduct. The Tribunal, therefore, was totally unjustified in going into the charges at that stage. It is not the case that the charge memo and the statement of facts do not disclose any misconduct alleged against the delinquent officer. The Tribunal, therefore, was totally unjustified in going into the charges at that stage. It is not the case that the charge memo and the statement of facts do not disclose any misconduct alleged against the delinquent officer. Therefore, the Tribunal was totally wrong in quashing the charge memo. In similar circumstances, in respect of other persons involved in the same transactions, this Court in appeals arising out of SLPs (C) Nos. 19453-63 of 1995 had on 9.2.1996 allowed the appeals, set aside the order passed by the Tribunal and remitted the matter holding that: “This is not the stage at which the truth or otherwise of the charges ought to be looked into. This is the uniform view taken by this Court in such matters.” d. a judgment of the High Court of Karnataka AIR 1964 Mysore 221 (V 51 C 57) (para 18 to 20) “ 18. It is in my opinion plain that the only charge into which a Board of Enquiry appointed under Rule II(4) of the Mysore Civil Services (Classifications, Control and appeal) Rules, 1957, may make an enquiry would be the charge framed under Rule II(2) by the disciplinary authority or by the authority specially empowered in that behalf. It is not within the competence of the Board of Enquiry to frame fresh charges when it is appointed to enquire into a charge already framed under sub-rule (2). But, if it nevertheless proceeds to do so, it would be clearly acting without the authority of law and any finding recorded by the Board of Enquiry into a charge framed by it not already included in the charge framed under sub-rule (2) would be a finding which has no existence in the eye of law and cannot properly form the foundation for the imposition of a punishment on the delinquent Government servant. 19. This is not all that has to be said about this matter. In paragraph 16(c) of the report of the Board of Enquiry, it recorded a finding that the Sub-Engineer was guilty of certain charges which had not been framed against him by anyone at any stage and not even by the Board of Enquiry. This is what it stated: “He has failed to suggest the deduction of the value of materials and has on one occasion specially recommended the passing of an item deferred by the Assistant Engineer. This is what it stated: “He has failed to suggest the deduction of the value of materials and has on one occasion specially recommended the passing of an item deferred by the Assistant Engineer. Hence he cannot be considered to be innocent in any measure. According to his own defence, he was making use of the vehicle of a contractor in his journeys to and from Kyathedevaragudi. This indicates that he did not scruple to place himself under the obligation of contractors. He is, therefore, responsible for all bad works, i. e. (A) (1) for use of bad or under burnt bricks (2) admixture of inferior lime and sand (3) weak mixture of cement concrete (4) inadequate reinforcement in RCC work (5) casting R.C. joists rectangular (6) bad spongy weathering coat over roof (7) providing inadequate bearing or joists on walls and (8) bad flooring work. (B) He is also responsible for classifying verandah lintels under the head “Beams”. (C) he is responsible for submitting bills for bad work done; (D) In submitting bills, he should have noted the issue of materials on works which he has neglected thereby causing loss to the Government.” It is manifest that not all the sub-items under the heading (A) were within the charge framed by the Board of Enquiry and much less in the charge framed by the Government. It is equally clear that none of the maters referred to in items (B) (C) and (D) was included either in the charge framed by the Board of Enquiry or in the charge framed by the Government, and, that this is so, is not disputed by Mr. Government Pleader. 20. The position therefore with respect to the Sub-Engineer is that the Board of Enquiry exceeded its power in first framing charges against him in addition to those which had been framed by the Government which was entirely beyond its competence; and again in finding him guilty of charges which he had no opportunity to meet at any stage and which were never framed even by the Board of Enquiry at any material point of time. This is therefore a case in which the impugned order of dismissal suffers from more than one defect, preceded as it was by the transgression of the provisions of Article 3 II of the Constitution, and the contravention of the clear provisions of Rule II(4) of the Mysore Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957. A punishment imposed in that way cannot, it is clear, be defended.” e. a judgment of the Gauhati High Court in the matter of Rajdeo Rai v. Assam Administrative Tribunal, Gauhati and Others Rajdeo Rai v. Assam Administrative Tribunal, Gauhati and Others Rajdeo Rai v. Assam Administrative Tribunal, Gauhati and Others 1995 (6) SLR 557: “A bare perusal of the impugned judgment dated 19.11.1988 passed by the Tribunal will show that the Tribunal committed grave error lf law inasmuch as it failed to appreciate that the appeal and the review petition filed by the petitioner to the Government of Assam against the order of dismissal having been entertained and dismissal, the Chairman of the Tribunal who was the Chief Secretary to the Government of Assam and had occasion in that capacity to deal with the petitioner's case and as such, he was biased against the petitioner and should not have decided the appeal of the petitioner. The Tribunal committed manifest error of law in framing separate charge though the earlier charge was vague on the face of it. Such a vague charge was not maintainable in view of Rule 9(2) of the Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964 which clearly provides for framing definite charge. The Tribunal after the acquittal of the petitioner by the Sessions Judge could not have come to a different conclusion so as to inflict the extreme penalty of removal from service upon the petitioner. The Tribunal even after holding “it is true that to a total stranger reading this charge and accompanied statement of allegations, the matter may appear to be impressive and vague, “came to the erroneous conclusion on extraneous consideration such as the petitioner participate in the criminal proceeding and after elapse of time, the petitioner allegedly got the expert legal advice both in criminal and departmental proceedings, etc. which were not borne out of records. which were not borne out of records. The Tribunal also failed to appreciate that the witnesses were not examined in presence of the petitioner, his signature were not obtained in the deposition and the enquiry officer himself assumed the role of the presenting officer and he himself cross-examined the witnesses. This aspect of the matter has been simply brushed aside by the Tribunal holding that signature of the petitioner were not required to be taken in the deposition and the proceedings. On this score alone, the judgment of the Tribunal is liable to be set aside. The Tribunal also misread the verdict given by the Apex Court in Bhagatram case, AIR 1983 SC 454 . The Tribunal also committed manifest error of law by repeatedly observing that the petitioner had to his credit expert legal advice with both in criminal and departmental proceedings which is based on inference only and not on face. The Tribunal has come to altogether a different finding having no nexus with the original charge no. 2 “on which the petitioner was acquitted by the Sessions Judge” and erroneously held that “our findings have a strong nexus with the original charge and are not extraneous. For these reasons, we hold that charge no. 2 has been proved against the appellant to the extent of our finding noted above.” Thus apparently the Tribunal has brought into a new charge to the original charge of the defence of which the petitioner was not afforded with any opportunity whatsoever. By such framing of a new charge altogether different from the original charge, the Tribunal committed grave error of law to give definiteness to a charge otherwise vague on its mere perusal and violated the principles of natural justice.” 9. Mr. G. Venkataraman, learned counsel for the respondents, per contra, while countering the contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was not allowed to examine the documents, has argued that the petitioner, along with his Defence Assistant, was given ample opportunity to inspect the documents at the Kotturpuram Branch Office which were relied on by the bank Management and the petitioner also had confirmed inspection of documents and since the petitioner failed to specify as to which document he wanted to examine at the Regional Office/Zonal Office/Head Office, his request for roving inspection was rejected. As regards the petitioner's apprehension that the officers would not depose truthfully and that was the reason for non-examination of any witness, the learned counsel for the respondents has remarked that the petitioner's apprehension is only irrelevant and self-serving. 10. The next contention put forward by the learned counsel for the respondents is that though the petitioner claimed that C.R. Viswanathan is the Organising Secretary of the Association, he has not shown any proof to that effect nor the Constitution or by-laws of the Association, thus deviating from the procedure contemplated in this regard. 11. With regard to the reliance placed by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner on DEXs 5 and 7, letters sent by C.R. Viswanathan to the then Secretary and the then Chief Minister respectively, the learned counsel for the respondents has raised a point that those exhibits do not have any evidentiary value since they do not meet with any acceptance or approval of the Government and that above all, the bank is not a party in the same. 12. Assailing the contention of the learned senior counsel that the grant of TODs was confirmed by the petitioner's superiors, the learned counsel for the respondents has pointed out that the petitioner, while seeking confirmation from his superiors, had not disclosed the fact that he had not obtained cover documents and his superiors would have only confirmed grant of TODs on the assumption that cover documents would have been secured by the petitioner and thus, when the petitioner had skipped from his primary responsibility of complying with the documentation facilities for the lending transactions of the Branch, he cannot escape from the clutches by saying that his superiors were fully aware of grant of TODs in question. In reply to the explanation given by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the Debts Recovery Tribunal had admitted the cheques drawn by the Tournament Committee and that the bank was not without any recourse for recovering its liability, the learned counsel for the respondents brought to the attention of this Court that the former's explanation cannot be sustained since the bank lost its case before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and also before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal even before the commencement of regular enquiry. 13. 13. The learned counsel for the respondents has further contended that the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner cannot say that the petitioner has been singled out for the lapses of his superiors since departmental action had been taken against them resulting in imposition of appropriate punishments on them. He has assailed the contention made by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that in the extract of the Assembly proceedings, there is no mention about the budgetary allocation for the Football Tournament and it was merely announced in the Assembly session that an international football tournament in the name of the then Chief Minister is to be held in Jawarharlal Nehur Indoor Stadium. While concluding his arguments, he has contended that the orders passed by the respondents are very much speaking in nature and are made after a careful analysis of all the materials on record and the entire facts and circumstances of the case and as such, they do not warrant any sort of interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 14. The learned counsel for the respondents in support his contentions has placed reliance on the following judgments of the Supreme Court: a In the matter of Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A. K. Chopra AIR 1999 SC 625 : (1999) 1 SCC 759 : 1999-I-LLJ-962at pp. 968 and 969 of LLJ: “ 17. Judicial review, not being an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was arrived at, the Court, while exercising the power of judicial review, must remain conscious of the fact that if the decision has been arrived at by the administrative authority after following the principles established by law and the rules of natural justice and the individual has received a fair treatment to meet the case against him, the Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the administrative authority on a matter which fell squarely within the sphere of jurisdiction of that authority. 18. 18. It is useful to note the following observations of this Court in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur: “Where there are some relevant materials which the authority has accepted and which materials may reasonably support the conclusion that the officer is guilty, it is not the function of the High Court, exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226, to review the materials and to arrive at an independent finding on the materials. If the enquiry has been properly held, the question of adequacy or reliability of the evidence cannot be canvassed before the High Court.” 19. After a detailed review of the law on the subject, this Court, while dealing with the jurisdiction of the High Court or Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters and punishment in Union of India v. Parma Nanda opined: “We must unequivocally state that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters or punishment cannot be equated with an appellate jurisdiction. The Tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of the enquiry officer or competent authority where they are not arbitrary or utterly perverse. It is appropriate to remember that the power to impose penalty on a delinquent officer is conferred on the competent authority either by an Act of legislature or rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. If there has been an enquiry consistent with the rules and in accordance with principles of natural justice, what punishment would meet the ends of justice is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. If the penalty can lawfully be imposed and is imposed on the proved misconduct, the Tribunal has no power to substitute its own discretion for that of the authority.” In B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, this Court opined: “ The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to re-appreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary enquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal.” Further it was held: “A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal, the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities, have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal.” Further it was held: “A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal, the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities, have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.” b. In the matter of Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank AIR 2003 SC 1795: (2003) 3 SCC 583 : “ 18. In B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India the scope of judicial review was indicated by stating that review by the Court is of decision-making process and where the findings of the disciplinary authority are based on some evidence, the Court or the Tribunal cannot re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding.” c. In the matter of Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur v. State Bank of India AIR 2005 SC 314 : (2005) 1 SCC 13 : 2005-I-LLJ-188at p. 199 of LLJ: “ 32. The bank manager/officer and employees of any bank, nationalised/or non-nationalised, are expected to act and discharge their functions in accordance with the rules and regulations of the bank. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and trust and a misconduct. In the instant case Charge 5 framed against the appellant is very serious and grave in nature. We have already extracted the relevant Rule which prohibits the bank manager to sanction a loan to his wife or his relative or to any partner. While sanctioning the loan the appellant did not appear to have kept this aspect in mind and acted illegally and sanctioned the loan. We have already extracted the relevant Rule which prohibits the bank manager to sanction a loan to his wife or his relative or to any partner. While sanctioning the loan the appellant did not appear to have kept this aspect in mind and acted illegally and sanctioned the loan. He realised the mistake later and tried to salvage the same by not encashing the draft issued in the maiden name of his wife though the draft was issued but not encashed. The decision to sanction a loan is not an honest decision. Rule 34(3)(1) is a rule of integrity and, therefore, as rightly pointed out by Mr. Salve, the respondent Bank cannot afford to have the appellant as bank manager. The punishment of removal awarded by the appellate authority is just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. Before concluding, we may usefully rely on the judgment Regional Manager, U. P. SRTC v. Hoti Lal Regional Manager, U. P. SRTC v. Hoti Lal Regional Manager, U. P. SRTC v. Hoti Lal 2003-II-LLJ-267 wherein this Court has held as under at p. 272 of LLJ: “If the charged employee holds a position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. Where the person deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is a must and unexceptionable. Judged in that background, conclusions of the Division Bench of the High Court do not appear to be proper. We set aside the same and restore order of the learned Single Judge upholding the order of dismissal.” 33. We entirely agree with the above observations made in the above judgment.” d. In the matter of Disciplinary Authority-cum- Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik (1996) 9 SCC 69 : 1996-II-LLJ-379at pp. 381 and 382 of LLJ: