Judgment :- This appeal is directed against the order passed by the Commissioner for Workmen Compensation-II, Chennai, in W.C.No.153 of 2000 on 27. 2001 in dismissing the claim of the deponents holding that the deceased person was not attracted under Section 2(n) (1) of the Workmens Compensation Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as on the date of accident viz., 13. 2000. 2. The deceased Rajesh aged 20 years at the time of the accident was employed as a Driver of the car TSI-5402 owned by the 1st Opposite Party and insured with the 2nd Opposite Party, on a monthly salary of Rs.3000/-. On 13. 2000, when the said Rajesh was driving the said car from Thirunindravur to Bangalore and near Mambakkam Village, a vehicle coming in the opposite direction hit against the car and in the accident, the deceased Rajesh sustained multiple head injures and died on the spot. The deceased was not a workman but he was a causual labourer and was not in connection with the trade or business of the 1st Opposite Party. 3. The learned counsel for the appellants/claimants of the deceased person would submit in his argument that the accident had happened on 13. 2000 when the deceased Rajesh was employed as a Car Driver with the 1st Opposite Party and was driving the car belonging to the 1st Opposite Party from Madras to Bangalore at Mambakkm Village, Sri Perambudur, a lorry dashed against the car and in the said accident, the deceased died on the spot. The learned counsel for the appellants would further submit that the Commissioner for Workmens Compensation had come to the conclusion of dismissing the application as not maintainable on the assumption that the claim of compensation under the provisions of Workmens Compensation Act, does not arise as the deceased Rajesh was not employed for the purpose of employers trade or business as mentioned in the definition of workman and the said decision is not correct. He would further submit in his argument that the said definition of workman under Section 2(n)(i) of the Act would include even casual labourers and the persons who are not connected with the trade or business of the employer since the said definition was amended as per Act 46/2000 and therefore, the Act being a beneficial Act, the said amendment should have been deemed to have come into force from the date of enactment and the cases pending on the date of amendment are benefitted by the said amendment and therefore, the Commissioner for Workmen Compensation is wrong in holding that the deceased Rajesh is not a workman under the definition of the Act, since he had not explained that he was appointed as a Driver for the purpose of trade or business of the First Opposite Party. 4. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent would submit in his argument that the deceased Rajesh was not a "workman" under the definition of Workmens Compensation Act, since he was not employed for the purpose of trade or business of the employer and on the date of accident viz., 13. 2000, the Workmens Compensation Act was not amended as per the Amendment Act 46/2000 since it had come into effect only on 12. 2000 and therefore, the previous definition of "workman" under Section 2(n)(i) of the Act is only applicable and the Commissioner for Workmens Compensation is quite right in holding that the deceased Rajesh was not a "workman" as defined under Section 2(n)(i) of the Act and the Commissioner for Workmens Compensation had rightly dismissed the petition. He has also further submitted that the appeal has been vexatiously filed and therefore, it has to be dismissed with costs. He would cite an authority in support of his contention reported in 2002 IV LLJ (Suppl) 332 (Galireddy P. v. C.R. Goud). 5. Considering the arguments advanced by either side, we have to find out whether the deceased Rajesh who drove the vehicle on the fateful day i.e 13. 2000 was attracted under the definition of workman as defined in Section 2(n)(i) of the Act. 5. Considering the arguments advanced by either side, we have to find out whether the deceased Rajesh who drove the vehicle on the fateful day i.e 13. 2000 was attracted under the definition of workman as defined in Section 2(n)(i) of the Act. For that purpose, we have to extract the definition of Section 2(n)(i) of the Act and it reads as follows: "2(n)(i) a railway servant as defined in (Clause (34) of section of the Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989), not permanently employed in any administrative, district or sub-divisional office of a railway and not employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II, or [(i) (a) a master, seaman or other member of the crew of a ship, .(b) a captain or other member of the crew of an aircraft, .(c) a person recruited as driver, helper, mechanic, cleaner or in any other capacity in connection with a motor vehicle, .(d) a person recruited for work abroad by a company, and who is employed outside India in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II and the ship, aircraft or motor vehicle, or company, as the case may be, is registered in India, or]" 6. On a careful perusal of the said provision, we could see that a driver recruited by the employer can easily be coming under the definition of "workman". But the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent would be that on the date of accident i.e 13. 2000, the definition of workman contains the words as follows: "workman means any person other than a person whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purpose of employers trade or business" Therefore, we have to see whether the unamended Section 2(1) of the Act as on 13. 2000 is applicable or the amended provision of Section 2(n) as amended by Act 46/2000 which came into effect from 12. 2000 is applicable. In the Amendment Act 46/2000, it is not mentioned whether the amendment has got retrospective effect. For that purpose we have to see the decision of the Honble Supreme Court as to the retrospective effectiveness of the amended act, in the judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench as reported in 2001 (8) SCC 24 (Shyam Sundar v. Ram Kumar). In the Amendment Act 46/2000, it is not mentioned whether the amendment has got retrospective effect. For that purpose we have to see the decision of the Honble Supreme Court as to the retrospective effectiveness of the amended act, in the judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench as reported in 2001 (8) SCC 24 (Shyam Sundar v. Ram Kumar). The relevant judgment and its proposition referred in the above judgment in paragraph – 42 runs as follows: "In Keshavlal Jethalal Shah v. Mohanlal Bhagwandas this Court while interpreting Section 29(2) of the amending Act, held thus: (AIR p.1339, para 8) "An explanatory Act is generally passed to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to the meaning of the previous Act. Section 29(2) before it was enacted was precise in its implication as well as in its expression; the meaning of the words was not in doubt, and there was no omission in its phraseology which was required to be supplied by the amendment."" Yet another passage referred by in the judgment of the Supreme Court cited above viz., [ 2001 (8) SCC 24 ] is from 1995 (2) SCC 630 (R.Rajagopal Reddy v. Padmini Chandrasekharan) which reads as follows: "In R. Rajagopal Reddy v. Padmini Chandrasekharan it was held thus: (SCC Headnote) "Declaratory enactment declares and clarifies the real intention of the legislature in connection with an earlier existing transaction or enactment, it does not create new rights or obligations. If a statute is curative or merely declaratory of the previous law retrospective operation is general intended. .. A clarificatory amendment of this nature will have retrospective effect and, therefore, if the principal Act was existing law when the Constitution came into force the amending Act also will be part of the existing law. If a new Act is to explain an earlier Act, it would be without object unless construed retrospective. .. A clarificatory amendment of this nature will have retrospective effect and, therefore, if the principal Act was existing law when the Constitution came into force the amending Act also will be part of the existing law. If a new Act is to explain an earlier Act, it would be without object unless construed retrospective. An explanatory Act is generally passed to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to the meaning of the previous Act"" After discussing those judgments, it has been held by the Honble Supreme Court as follows in para-44: "From the aforesaid decisions, the legal principle that emerges is that the function of a declaratory or explanatory Act is to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to meaning of the previous Act and such an Act comes into effect from the date of passing of the previous Act." .7. On a careful perusal of the aforesaid proposition of the Constitution Bench of the Honble Supreme Court of India, we have to see whether the amendment sought to be introduced in the Amendment Act is clarificatory amendment or explanatory one. In the amending Act, the explanation of "workman" has been clarified by the omission of the words "workman means any person other than a person whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purpose of employers trade or business" for the purpose of including the actual workers as well as the workmen who are connected with trade or business and therefore, it is a clarificatory amendment. The clarificatory amendment of this nature will have retrospective effect and therefore, if the principal Act was existing law when the Constitution came into force, the amending Act will also be part of the existing law. Therefore, the amending Act 46/2000 was even though mentioned as came into force on 12. 2000, it has got retrospective effect from the date of the Principal Act viz., the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923, as per the dictum laid down in the aforesaid judgment of our Supreme Court. .8. Apart from the above judgment, the High Court of Kerala in a case reported in 1997 II LLJ 546 (Oriental Ins. Co. 2000, it has got retrospective effect from the date of the Principal Act viz., the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923, as per the dictum laid down in the aforesaid judgment of our Supreme Court. .8. Apart from the above judgment, the High Court of Kerala in a case reported in 1997 II LLJ 546 (Oriental Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Asokan) held that the benefit conferred on Workman under Section 4 of the Workmens Compensation Act as amended by Act 30 of 1995 is available on the date when the case is finally adjudicated. In the said judgment the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in C.A.NO.16904 to 16909 of 1996 to the effect that if any benefit was conferred on workman (by an amendemnt of the Act) and was available on the date when the case was finally adjudicated, the said benefits should be extended, was followed and the benefits of the Amended At was made available to the workman in pending case and the Court also held that it was just and proper. The relevant passage from the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court, which the Kerala High Court quoted in its judgment run as follows: ."We are finally determining the rights of the workmen today. The Act is a special legislation for the benefit of the labour. Keeping in view the scheme of the Act we are of the view that the only interpretation which can be given to the amendment is that if any benefit is conferred on the workman and the said benefit is available on the date when the case is finally adjudicated, the said benefit should be extended to the workmen. We, therefore, hold that the compensation to be paid to the heirs of the workmen has to be calculated on the basis of the actual wages-Rs.1800/- drawn by them." .9. So far as this case is concerned, the deceased Rajesh met with an accident as the Driver of the 1st Opposite Party on 13. 2000 and on that date, the amendment Act 46/2000 was even though not introduced, but was in force due to its retrospectiveness effect and he would come under the definition of workman after the amendment of the said provision. Therefore, the learned Commissioner for Workmen Compensation ought to have considered the deceased Rajesh as Workman of the 1st Opposite Party and dealt with the case for the grant of compensation. Therefore, the learned Commissioner for Workmen Compensation ought to have considered the deceased Rajesh as Workman of the 1st Opposite Party and dealt with the case for the grant of compensation. The Commissioner, Workmen Compensation has not even found the quantum of compensation payable to the dependents of the deceased Rajesh, the appellants herein, but had simply dismissed the petition on ground of maintainability. The dismissal of the petition for compensation before the Commissioner for Workmen Compensation filed by the appellants herein is erroneous and therefore, the order passed by the Commissioner, Workmen Compensation– II, Chennai made in W.C.No.153 of 2000 is liable to be set aside and the appeal is liable to be allowed. Since the Commissioner for Workmen Compensation has not found any quantum of compensation payable to the appellants herein, the matter has necessarily to be remanded back to the Commissioner, Workmen Compensation for fresh disposal after giving opportunity to both parties to adduce evidence and to find out the quantum of compensation payable to the appellants/claimants and to dispose of the case in accordance with law. 10. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the order made in W.C.No.153 of 2000 by the Commissioner, Workmen Compensation is set aside and the Commissioner, Workmen Compensation -II, Chennai is directed to give notice to both the parties to appear before him immediately after the receipt of this order and to dispose of the case after giving opportunity for both parties within one month from the date of their appearance. With the aforesaid direction, the appeal is allowed with costs.