JUDGMENT Hon'ble Rajesh Tandon, J. Heard Sri Alok Singh, Sr. Advocate, assisted by Sri Dharmendra Barthwal, counsel for the appellant. None appeared on behalf of the respondent though service has been affected through affixation on 24.11.2005. 2. By the present A.O. filed under Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, appellant has prayed for setting aside the award dated 8.8.2005 passed by Additional District Judge/I, Fast Track Court, Roorkee, Haridwar in Misc. Suit No. 64 of 1998 Precision Instrument Vs. Rajeshwar Prasad, whereby the application filed under Order 9 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure was rejected. 3. Briefly stated, a suit was filed by the plaintiff-appellant being Misc. Suit No. 58 of 1994 Precision Instrument Private Limited Vs. Rajeshwar Prasad Sharma praying to the following effect : ß¼v½ ;g fd fMxzh csn[kyh cgd oknh cj f[kykQ izfroknh lkfnj Qjek;h tkdj izfroknh dks fuEufyf[kr tk;nkn en ßcÞ ls csn[ky fd;k tkdj n[ky oknh dks okdbZ fnyk;k tk;sA ¼c½ ;g fd [kpkZ eqdnek o Qhl odhy oknh dks izfroknh ls fnyk;h tkosA ¼l½ ;g fd vU; vuqrks’k tks oknh U;k;ky; dh jk; esa ikus dk vf/kdkjh gks izfroknh ls fnyk;s tkosaAÞ 4. According to the plaint, the plaintiff is a company registered under the Companies Act and Mr. Fazalur Rehman is Managing Director of that company and also pairokar of that company. In the plaint, it has been stated that the plaintiff sold a triangle shape of land measuring 72 feet towards south, 60 towards west and 92 feet towards east to the defendant, which is situate at 53, Civil Lines, Roorkee, District Haridwar. Plaintiff also possesses other land as well at 53 Civil Lines, Roorkee. There is another plot shown by letter 'B' which is adjacent to the plot 'A' towards south. The area of that plot towards south and north is 72 feets and towards east and west is 30 feets, which has been shown as Plot No. 13 in the private map. The plaintiff vide sale deed delivered the possession of plot 'A'. Boundaries of both the plots touch to each other. After purchasing the plot 'A', the defendant made the boundary on the plot 'A' including plot 'B' illegally. The plaintiff vide sale deed delivered the possession of plot 'A'. Boundaries of both the plots touch to each other. After purchasing the plot 'A', the defendant made the boundary on the plot 'A' including plot 'B' illegally. Plaintiff requested him to remove his boundary from Plot 'B' and to deliver the possession of the same, but he gave only assurance for removal of the boundary, but he did not remove the said illegal encroachment from Plot 'B'. On 10.4.1994, he refused to give possession and removal of the boundary from Plot 'B'. Hence the present suit was filed. 5. The said suit was contested by the defendant by filing a written statement, where he has stated as under : ß¼2½ ;g fd izfroknh dks bl rF; dk Kku ugha gS fd dEiuht ,DV lu~ 1956 ds vuqlkj oknh ,d jftLVMZ dEiuh gS vkSj Qtywjgeku mDr dEiuh dk eSusftax Mk;jsDVj gS vkSj mls nkok nk;j djus dk vf/kdkj izfroknh dks tSlk ekywe gqvk gS ;g dEiuh cgqr le; iwoZ lekIr gks pqdh gSA ¼3½ ;g fd oknh us okni= ds lkFk tks uD”kk layXu fd;k gS og vLi’V gS rFkk ekSds ds f[kykQ gSA oknh us bl uD”ks dk dksbZ vk/kkj Hkh okni= esa of.kZr ugha fd;k gS rFkk okni= ds var esa of.kZr lEifÙk en ¼v½ o en ¼c½ esa nh x;h iSek;”k o gnwnjck ftl izdkj of.kZr gS og ekSds ds vuqlkj ugha gS vkSj Lohdkj ugha gSA 6. Without going into the merit of the controversy, the suit was dismissed on 3.9.1997 with the following order : "3.9.97 Called out. None respond for plffs. No counsel. For deft. Prosecuting. It is 2.20 p.m. Suit dismissed with costs." 7. On 4th July, 1998, an application was filed under Order 9 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure along with an application under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. None respond for plffs. No counsel. For deft. Prosecuting. It is 2.20 p.m. Suit dismissed with costs." 7. On 4th July, 1998, an application was filed under Order 9 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure along with an application under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. In the application it has been stated as under: ß2- ;g fd okn mijksDr ds fnukad 3-9-97 eqdjZj Fkh vkSj QtyqjZgeku Mk;jsDVj oknh chekj gks x;s Fks vkSj okn fnukad 3-9-97 dks xSjgkftjh oknh esa [kkfjt gks x;kA 3- ;g fd eqdnesa ds reke dkxtkr o tkudkjh QtyqjZgeku Mk;jsDVj oknh dEiuh dks jgh vkSj QtyqjZgeku fnukad 3-9-97 ls 3-7-98 rd chekj jgs blfy, gkftj vnkyr ugha gks ldsA 4- ;g fd QtyqjZgeku fnukad 3-7-98 dks LoLFk gq;s vkSj fnukad 4-7-98 dks mUgksaus ekywekr okn dh Fkh rFkk irk pyk fd okn fnukad 3-9-97 dks xSj gkftjh oknh esa [kkfjt gks x;k gS fnukad 5-7-98 dks jfookj dk vodk”k jgk] blfy;s fnukad 6-7-98 dks cj[kkLr jsLVksjs”ku iS”k dh tk jgh gS oknh us tkucw>dj nsjh dh gS nsjh gkykr mijksDr dkfcys oknh gS rFkk oknh /kkjk 5 dkuwu fe;kn dk ykHk ikus dk vf/kdkjh gSAÞ 8. The aforesaid application was objected by the defendant on the ground that it is highly belated. In paragraphs 2 and 3, it has been stated as under : ß2- ;g fd jkts”oj izlkn okn mijksDr esa izkFkhZ ds izkFkZuk i= jsLVksjs”ku ,oa izkFkZuk i= vUrxZr /kkjk 5 dkuwu fe;kn ds fo#) vkifÙk igys ls nkf[ky dj pqdk gS blfy;s vc mls izkFkZuk i= ds lkFk vkifÙk nkf[ky fd;k tkuk U;k;laxr ugha gSA 3- ;g fd jkts”oj izlkn us viuh mtjnkjh fnukad 17-8-04 o mlds lkFk c;kugyQh nkf[ky fd;k gSA 4- ;g fd ekStwnk vkifÙk ,oa c;kugyQh jkts”oj izlkn us u;s rF; izLrqr fd;s gS tks mldh iwoZ mtjnkjh ls fHké gSAÞ 9. The application was admitted and thereafter, the same was listed on a number of times. On 8th August, 2005 Presiding Officer has rejected the said application on the ground that illness has not been stated and further there was no ground for not appearing in the case. 10. Counsel for the appellant has referred Madanpal Vs. VIth Additional District Judge, Meerut and others 1995(1) AIR 432, the observations are quoted below : "4. It may be noticed that the current judicial thinking is that Section 5, Limitation Act, should receive a liberal interpretation. 10. Counsel for the appellant has referred Madanpal Vs. VIth Additional District Judge, Meerut and others 1995(1) AIR 432, the observations are quoted below : "4. It may be noticed that the current judicial thinking is that Section 5, Limitation Act, should receive a liberal interpretation. In Collector Land Acquisition v. Mst. Kadiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353, the Supreme Court has said that "every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that pedentio approach should be made and the doctrine must be applied in a rational, common sense and pragmatic manner. Similarly in G-Rame Gowda v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1988 SC 897, it has been held that the expression 'sufficient cause' must receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. In my opinion, the learned District Judge has taken a too technical view of the matter and has wrongly rejected the ground of illness set up by the petitioner or hypothetical reasons that a specialist was not consulted. The impugned order deserved to be quashed." 11. The Apex Court has held in M.S. Grewal Vs. Deep Chand Sood (2001) 8 SCC 151, as under :- "Law courts will lose their efficacy if they cannot possibly respond to the need of the society-technicalities there might be many but the justice - oriented approach ought not to be thwarted on the basis of such technicality since technicality cannot and ought not to outweigh the course of justice." 12. In N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthi, 1998 S.C.F.B. and Rent Cases Pages 427, it has been held that law of limitation is founded in Public policy on the maxim of interest reipublicae up sit finis litium' i.e. fal the general welfare, it has been held as under :- "The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. Time limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because of the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause". "Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy of right of parties. Time limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because of the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause". "Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy of right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the Courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. "It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put-forth as part of a dilatory strategy the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation." 13. In view of the aforesaid, matter is sent back for consideration of the application under Order 9 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure in accordance with the judgment of the Apex Court. 14. Appeal is allowed. No order as to costs.