Judgment 1. Claimants Opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 laid claim for grant of compensation under Sec.166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, inter alia, stating that they are the widow and children of one Ramashish Singh, the khalasi of tractor bearing registration No. BR-22-4339, who was crushed under its wheel and died. They further stated that the owner of the vehicle is Dhroov Rai @ Dhrup Rai and its driver Vijay Rai. 2. After the aforesaid claim was laid, claimants filed application for grant of ad-interim relief as provided under Sec.140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. By reason of the impugned order the Motor Vehicles Accident Claims Tribunal (5th Additional District Judge) West Champaran (Bettiah) by order dated 15.1.2007 passed in Claim Case No. 1 of 2005 directed the owner of the tractor to pay a compensation of Rs. 50,000.00 as ad-interim relief. 3. Owner of the vehicle, namely, Dhroov Rai @ Dhrup Rai aggrieved by the same has preferred this application. 4. The Stamp Reporter has objected to the maintainability of the Civil Revision application and opined that a Miscellaneous Appeal would lie under Sec.173 of the Act. 5. Petitioner contests the report. 6. Mr. Sanjeev Kumar, appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that order granting interim relief is not an award and thus appeal under Sec.173 of the Act would not lie. In support of his submission he has placed reliance on a judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Vidya Sagar Singh vs. Shanti Devi [1994(2) PUR 820] and my attention has been drawn to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the judgment which reads as follows:- "5. An objection was raised on behalf of the OP. about the maintainability of the revision application. Learned Counsel for the O.P. contended that no revision will lie against the order passed under Sec.140 of the M.V. Act rather appeal will lie. The contention of Shri Gupta is not well founded. 6. On a plain reading of Sec.140 of the M.V. Act it is manifest that the order passed thereunder is an interim order and not a final award. An appeal lies under Sec.173 of the M.V. Act against a final award and not against an order for payment of interim compensation passed u/s 140 of the M.V. Act. 6. On a plain reading of Sec.140 of the M.V. Act it is manifest that the order passed thereunder is an interim order and not a final award. An appeal lies under Sec.173 of the M.V. Act against a final award and not against an order for payment of interim compensation passed u/s 140 of the M.V. Act. The impugned order passed under Sec.140 of the M.V. Act, being an interim order is, therefore, not appealable rather it is amenable u/s 115, C.P.C". 7. My attention has also been drawn to another judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Chiteshwar Nath Dubey vs. Maheshwari Manjhian [2000(1) PLJR 257] in which it has been held as follows:- "4. In the Division Bench decision of this Court as reported in 1994(2) PLJR 79 their Lordships have held that an order passed under Sec.140 of the M.V. Act is also an Award, thus, an appeal will be maintainable but in the said decision no point was raised that a revision against the order passed under Sec.140 of the said Act would be maintainable or not. 5. In the particular facts and circumstances of the case their Lordships have no doubt held that, the order passed under Sec.140 of the M.V. Act is also an Award within the meaning of Sec.173 of the Act, but in the decision of this Court reported in 1994(2) PLJR 820 (Vidya Sagar Singh vs. Shanti Devi and others), it is manifest that a revision would lie against an order passed under Sec.140 of the M.V. Act. Therefore, relying upon the decision reported in the case of Vidya Sagar Singh (supra), I am of the view that a revision would lie against an order passed under Sec.140 of the M.V. Act specially in view of the fact that in the Division Bench decision referred to above, this point has not been specifically answered to." 8. Having given my anxious consideration to the submission advanced, I do not find any substance in his submission and the report of the Stamp Reporter deserves to be upheld. 9. This issue pointedly came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Mohjuddin Kureshi [1994(1) PLJR 79] but same was not brought to the notice of the Court deciding Shri Vidyasagar case (Supra). 9. This issue pointedly came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Mohjuddin Kureshi [1994(1) PLJR 79] but same was not brought to the notice of the Court deciding Shri Vidyasagar case (Supra). In the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (Supra) the Division Bench (presided over by S. B. Sinha, J. as he then was) has considered this question in great detail and held as follows:- "It is, therefore, clear that the prayer for compensation on the ground of "no fault liability can be made alongwith an application for compensation under Sec.165 of the said Act. It is thus clear that even for the purpose of filing an application under Sec.140, the period of limitation provided for under Sec.166 of the Act is applicable. Further, as noticed hereinbefore, the amount of compensation directed to be paid by a Claims Tribunal either under Sec.140 of the Act or Sec.173 thereof can only be realised by taking recourse to the provisions of Sec.174 of the said Act. Therefore, in my opinion it would lead to an anamolus position if it be held that although for the purpose of recovery of the amount directed to be paid as compensation in exercise of powers under Sec.140 of the Act by the Tribunal the order would be, an award for the purpose of Sec.174, but the same shall not be an award for the purpose of -preferring an appeal as contemplated under Sec.173 thereof. In that view of the matter, the order passed under Sec.140 of the Act could also be an award for the purpose of preferring an appeal by an aggrieved person. Further in a case of this nature where two interpretations are possible with regard to the right of a person to prefer an appeal, a construction which upholds the said right, in my opinion, should be preferred. It is now. known that an "organic interpretation" should be preferred to a mechanical interpretation. Further in a case of this nature where two interpretations are possible with regard to the right of a person to prefer an appeal, a construction which upholds the said right, in my opinion, should be preferred. It is now. known that an "organic interpretation" should be preferred to a mechanical interpretation. This aspect of the matter has also been considered by a Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in United India Insurance Company Limited vs. Imam Aminasab Nadaf and others reported in 1990(2) ACJ page 757." (underlining mine) 10 In view of what has been said by the Division Bench, I do not have the slightest hesitation in holding that the order for grant of interim compensation under Sec.140 of the Act is an award and the natural corollary of the same is that an appeal would lie against such order. 11. There is yet another reason to come to the said conclusion. Sec.173 of the Act although confers right to prefer appeal against an award of a Claims Tribunal but the first proviso thereto makes it clear that no appeal by the person which is required to pay any amount in terms of the award shall be entertained by the High Court unless he has deposited with it Rs. 25,000.00 or 50% of the amount so awarded whichever is less in the manner provided by the court. In case a civil Revision is entertained against an award this legislative object of deposit of the specified amount shall also be defeated. This is an additional reason to hold that appeal shall lie against an order granting interim compensation under Sec.140 of the Act. 12. True it is that in the case of Sri Vidyasagar Singh case (supra) a learned single Judge of this Court has held that an order passed under Sec.140 of the Act is an interim order and not a final award, and an appeal would lie under Sec.173 of the Act, only against a final award and not an order for payment of interim compensation passed under Sec.140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 13. 13. The decisions of this Court in the case of Vidya Sagar Singh (supra) and Chiteshwar Nath Dubey (Supra), both rendered by a learned single Judge of this court support the contention of the petitioner and the view which I have taken is not in conformity thereof and hence ordinarily, I would had referred the matter to a Division Bench but finding that ratio of the aforesaid cases (supra) run counter to the judgment of the Division Bench, I am not taking recourse to that. The judgment in Vidya Sagar Singh was rendered without considering the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd (supra) because it was not brought to the notice of this Court hearing Vidya Sagar Singh. 14. In the case of Chiteshwar Nath Dubey (supra), the learned single Judge held the revision to be maintainable following the decision in Vidya Sagar Singh (supra), ignoring the Division bench judgment in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd (supra) on the plea that though the Division Bench had held that appeal would lie but has not held that revision shall not lie. 15. The Division Bench in the case of Oriental Insurance Co Ltd. (supra) had clearly held that an order passed under Sec.140 of the Act is an award for the purpose of preferring an appeal by the aggrieved person. Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers revisional power to this Court and makes it clear that this Court can exercise its revisional power only against an order in which no appeal lies. In view of the Division Bench judgment of this Court an appeal lies against an order for grant of interim compensation under Sec.140 of the Act and in the face of the provisions of Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which clearly stipulates that revision would lie against such an order against which no appeal lies, the judgment of this Court in the case of Chiteshwar nath Dubey with great respect is clearly erroneous and in teeth of the Division Bench judgment of this Court referred to above. 16. 16. For the reasons stated above I am of the opinion that the judgment of this Court in Vidya Sagar Singh (Supra) and Chiteshwar Nath Dubey do not lay down the law correctly and are in conflict with the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra). 17. Accordingly I conclude that an appeal lies against the order granting interim compensation under Sec.140 of the Act. 18. For the reasons aforesaid the objection of the Stamp Reporter is upheld. 19. After I dictated the order, Mr. Singh, appearing on behalf of the petitioner prays for converting this revision application into a Miscellaneous Appeal. 20. Prayer granted. 21. Let him do so within three weeks. 22. Let this order be circulated to the Stamp Reporter.