JUDGMENT T.V. Vaiphel, J. 1. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India filed by the Petitioners is directed against the order dated 10.9.2004 passed by the Chief Executive Member, Garo Hills Autonomous District Council in GDC-Revenue Appeal No. 8 (Misc.) 1993 refusing to interfere with the order dated 5.10.93 passed by the Executive Member in-charge Revenue of the same District Council in GDC/REV No. 88/A/C of 1989-90. 2. Bereft of unnecessary details, the facts material for disposal of the writ petition are that the late Mongnal Sangma, the predecessor in interest of the Petitioners was said to have purchased the Damalgre Akhing for a sum of Rs. 60/- only from (1) Badu Marak of Chinabatgre on 3.12.1926, where after the Nokmaship of Damalgre Akhing passed on to him and that on the death of the late Mongnal Sangma, the Nokmaship of the Akhing passed on to Shri Injang Sangma and his wife Jongme Marak which again passed on to Shri Theman Sangma and his wife Smti Jangme Marak. It is pleaded by the Petitioners that on 11.4.1990, the Nokmaship of the Akhing was again handed over to Smti. Sade Marak and Chengnang Sangma, who belong to Chambugong Wanang clan and who are the successor Nokma of the said Damalgre village, filed an application to the Executive Member in-charge Revenue GHADC on 30.4.90 praying for the appointment of the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 in place of (1) Mongnal Sangma and (1) Sorjomoni Marak, which was promptly objected by the Petitioners. On the basis of this petition, the dispute was taken up by the Executive Member, who framed as many as five issues and thereafter allowed the application for appointment of the respondent No. 5 and 6 as Nokma of Damalgre Akhing again vide the order dated 5.10.93 in connection with GDC Rev. No. 88 A/C of 1989-90. The Executive Member allowed the application on the basis of his finding that the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 are the rightful successor of the Nokmaship of (1) Mohen Sangma and his wife (1) Sorjomoni Marak. In reaching the aforesaid finding, the Executive Member relied on the order dated 15.2.49 passed by the learned Addl. No. 88 A/C of 1989-90. The Executive Member allowed the application on the basis of his finding that the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 are the rightful successor of the Nokmaship of (1) Mohen Sangma and his wife (1) Sorjomoni Marak. In reaching the aforesaid finding, the Executive Member relied on the order dated 15.2.49 passed by the learned Addl. Deputy Commissioner, Garo Hills District Counsel, Tura, in which there was no mention that the appointment of (1) Mohen Sangma and his wife (1) Sorjomoni Marak as Nokma of Damalgre Akhing was a temporary appointment. The Executive Member held that the appointment of the late Mohen Sangma and his wife (1) Sorjomoni Marak as Nokma of Damalgre Akhing was permanent, final and conclusive one and rejected the contentions of the Petitioners to the contrary. Aggrieved by this, the Petitioners approached the Chief Executive Member of the District Council by way of an appeal, which was registered as Revenue Appeal No. 8 (Misc.) of 1993. When the Chief Executive Member expressed his inability to hear the Appeal, the parties approached this Court for appropriate order. This Court vide order dated 2.5.2001 in Civil Rule No. 71(SH) of 97 directed the Chief Executive Member to dispose of the Appeal pending before him according to law. Thereafter, the Chief Executive Member heard the parties and disposed of the appeal by his order dated 10.9.2004 by confirming the order dated 5.10.1993 passed by the Executive Member. It maybe noted that in the said appeal, the Petitioners also filed supplementary memo of appeal on 26.11.93 and suggested therein as many as six additional issues to be framed and decided by the Chief Executive Member while disposing of the appeal. It is against the order dismissing the appeal, which is under challenge in this writ petition. 3. No counter affidavit is filed by the respondents, but they contested the writ petition through Mr. K.S. Kynjing, the learned senior counsel, by making oral submissions on the basis of the materials available on record. 4. Though a number of contentions involving disputed question of facts have been raised by Mr. R. Kar, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, I am of the view that the sole question which calls for consideration in this writ petition is whether the decision of the Chief Executive Member suffers from perversity or illegality. 4. Though a number of contentions involving disputed question of facts have been raised by Mr. R. Kar, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, I am of the view that the sole question which calls for consideration in this writ petition is whether the decision of the Chief Executive Member suffers from perversity or illegality. It is by now well-established that while exercising certiorari jurisdiction this Court cannot convert itself into a court of appeal and consider the question of sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a finding of fact arrived at by a competent tribunal. If the conclusion of the tribunal is based on some evidence, which may reasonably support the findings, this Court cannot interfere with such findings and substitute its findings for the findings reached by the tribunal. In this case, both the Chief Executive Member as well as the Executive Member in-charge Revenue are undoubtedly exercising quasi-judicial functions. The requirement that a person exercising quasi-judicial function must base his decision on evidence means no more than it must be based upon material which stands logically to show, the existence or non-existence of relevant facts, or to show the likelihood or unlikelihood of the occurrence some future events the occurrence of which would be relevant. It means that he must not spin a coin or consult an astrologer but he may take into account any material which, as a matter of reason, has some probative value in the sense mentioned above. In the words of Lord Diplock in R. v. Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner reported in (1965) 1 QB 456. if the evidence is capable of having any value, the weight to be attached to it is a matter for the person to whom parliament has entrusted the responsibility of deciding the issue. The supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court does not entitle it to usurp this responsibility and to substitute its own view for his. The legal position is succinctly explained by the Apex Court in Union of India v. H.C. Goel reported in AIR 1964 SC 364 as under: In exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 on such a plea, the High Court cannot consider the question about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular conclusion. The legal position is succinctly explained by the Apex Court in Union of India v. H.C. Goel reported in AIR 1964 SC 364 as under: In exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 on such a plea, the High Court cannot consider the question about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular conclusion. That is a matter which is within the competence of the authority which deals with the question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence illegally the impugned conclusion follows or not. 5. It is thus clear that the examination of the impugned order in this judicial review must necessarily be confined to the existence of arbitrariness, perversity or unreasonableness therein. At the same time, however, a person should not be condemned only on the basis of suspicion, surmises and conjunctures without there being any evidence worth the name. 6. In the instant case, the conclusion reached by both the Chief Executive Member and the Executive Member in-charge Revenue that respondent Nos. 5 and 6 are the son-in-law and Nokma daughter of (1) Mohen Sangma and his wife (1) Sorjomoni Marak who were not temporary Nokma but were permanent Nokma of Damalgre Akhing are based on the finding that there was nothing in the order dated 15.2.1949 passed by the learned Addl. Deputy Commissioner, Garo Hills District in Revenue Case No. 52/1948-49 which indicated that appointments of the said (1) Mohen Sangma and his wife as Nokma of the Akhing in question were temporary appointments and that the said (1) Mohen Sangma and his wife were appointed as the Nokma of the Akhing on regular basis. The existence or the genuineness of the said order dated 15.2.1949 is neither questioned nor denied by the Petitioners in this writ petition. The existence or the genuineness of the said order dated 15.2.1949 is neither questioned nor denied by the Petitioners in this writ petition. In my view, the view taken by both the Chief Executive Member and the Executive Member in-charge Revenue on this aspect of the matter cannot be said to be based on no evidence, but can be said to be passed on some evidence which reasonably supports their conclusion. In any case, the view taken by the Executive Member as well as the Executive Member in-charge Revenue are certainly not based on suspicion, surmises and conjunctures without their being any evidence worth the name. When the view taken by them is a possible view, this Court cannot substitute its opinion for that of the opinion on the ground that the other possible view taken would have been a better view. The legislature has entrusted the responsibility of deciding that issue to the Chief Executive Member and the Executive Member in-charge of Revenue and not to this Court. The sufficiency or adequacy of the evidence in support of the conclusion reached by them cannot be questioned by this Court. The supervisory jurisdiction of this Court does not entitle it to usurp this responsibility and to substitute its own views for theirs. 7. I am not unmindful of the various contentions advanced on behalf of the Petitioners through their learned Counsel. Their case is that the Damalgre Akhing was purchased by their predecessor in interest; namely; (1) Mongnal Sangma for a sum of Rs. 60/- from (1) Badu Marak of Chinabatgre Akhing on 3.12.1926, whereupon the Nokmaship of the Akhing in question was taken over by (1) Mongnal Sangma and that the Nokmaship of the said Akhing thereafter passed on to Shri Injang Sangma and His wife Smti. Jongme Marak which was again passed on to his son-in-law Shri Theman Sangma and his wife Jongme Marak and so on so forth. It is the specific case of the Petitioners that the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 who belong to Chambugong Bongal clan and not to Chambugong Wanang clan are never in the line of inheritance and that the Petitioners belong to Chambogong Wanang clan and further that just because the predecessor in interest of the respondent Nos. It is the specific case of the Petitioners that the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 who belong to Chambugong Bongal clan and not to Chambugong Wanang clan are never in the line of inheritance and that the Petitioners belong to Chambogong Wanang clan and further that just because the predecessor in interest of the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 i.e. (1) Mohen Sangma and his wife (1) Sorjomani Marak were at one time appointed by Injang Sangma and his wife as Nokmaofthe Akhing only for the purpose of looking after the criminal matters and cases during Injang Sangma life time could not clothe them with permanent Nokmaship of the Akhing inasmuch as, they belong to Chambogong Bengal clan. This contention of the Petitioners have been thoroughly discussed by the learned Chief Executive Member while concurring with the findings of the Executive Member in-charge Revenue. The Chief Executive Member as well as the Executive Member in relying upon the order dated 15.2.49 of the Deputy Commissioner, Garo Hills District Tura, could not be said to have acted perversely. 8. It is, however, contended by Mr. R. Kar, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners, that the Executive Member did not institute any inquiry by the Mouzadar as it is required by law when the Executive Member heard the parties himself and framed issues; no evidence was taken from the witnesses and their statements were also not recorded and that he summarily came to the conclusion that the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 were the rightful successors of Damalgre Akhing. Drawing my attention to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court is Dore Sangma v. The Chief Executive Member, Garo Hills District Council Tura reported in (1988) 2 GLR 120, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners contends that the Executive Member in-charge Revenue has not complied with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure such as framing of issues which has been regarded as necessary for the Court to get the brief of the case particularly to allow evidence on the issues framed and hearing of the parties themselves or through their lawyers, if engaged and omission to adhere to those rules vitiated the proceedings of the Executive Member in-charge of Revenue and that of the Chief Executive Member. I have carefully gone through the order passed by the Executive Member and I am of the view that the Executive Member did frame as many as five issues. Therefore, the submission of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners in this behalf is to be noted only to be rejected. As for opportunity to allow evidence this point was never raised by the Petitioners in their appeal and no grievance in connection there with appears to have been made by them in the memo of appeal. Moreover, both the orders of the Executive Member and the Chief Executive Member will show that the Petitioners never asked for an opportunity to allow evidence. In that view of the matter, it can be said that the Petitioners are deemed to have waived their right to lead evidence. 9. In the view that I have taken, I hold that the Petitioners have miserably failed to point out any infirmity in the impugned order which could persuade me to hold that the impugned order suffers from arbitrariness, rationality or illegality or procedural impropriety calling for the interference of this Court in exercise of its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The net result of the aforesaid discussion is that this writ petition has no merit and is liable to be dismissed, which I hereby do. However, on the facts and circumstances of the case, I pass no order as to costs. Petition dismissed