Judgment :- (Criminal Revision Case under Section. 397 of 401 of Cr.P.C. against the Judgment in Crl.M.P. No.1006 of 2006 in C.C.No.25 of 2002 dated 10-1-2007 on the file of the Court of the Principal Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases, City Civil Court Hyderabad.) This Revision Case is filed by A-2 against the order of the Principal Sessions Judge for SPE and ACB Cases, City Civil Court, Hyderabad in Crl.M.P.No.1006 of 2006 in C.C.No.25 of 2002, dated 10-01-2007. 2. C.C.No.25 of 2002 was filed against the accused under Section 7 and 13 (1) (d) read with 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short “the Act’). After framing of the charges, the prosecution examined PWs.1 to 5 and marked Exs.P-1 to P-15 and Ex.C-1 documents. Thereafter, the prosecution filed Crl.M.P.No.1006 of 2006 under Section 321 of Cr.P.C. requesting the Court to give consent for withdrawal of the case against the accused in pursuance of G.O.Ms.No.2055 of 2006 (Revenue VIG-I) Department, dated 16-09-2006. The learned Special Judge dismissed the said Application by observing that as the Application to withdraw the prosecution did not emanate from the Public Prosecutor, the petition is devoid of merits. Being aggrieved by the order of the Special Judge, dated 10-01-2007, the present Revision Case has been preferred. 3. The petitioner in the grounds of Revision contended that the lower Court should have accepted the Application filed by the Public Prosecutor by taking impliedly that the Public Prosecutor applied his mind to the record of the case and should have taken that the grounds mentioned in the G.O. were the grounds for withdrawal of the prosecution. The lower Court should have accepted the petition in view of the fact that the matter was directed to be entrusted to the Tribunal for Disciplinary proceedings, therefore, the prosecution is unwarranted. He further pleaded that the government sought for withdrawal of the prosecution, as there is no material on record connecting him with the alleged offence. 4. In the light of the contentions raised by the petitioner, the point for consideration is: “Whether the Public Prosecutor applied his mind in filing an Application to withdraw the prosecution against the petitioner and whether there are sufficient grounds to withdraw the prosecution against him?” 5. Section 321 of Cr.P.C. reads as follows: 321. 4. In the light of the contentions raised by the petitioner, the point for consideration is: “Whether the Public Prosecutor applied his mind in filing an Application to withdraw the prosecution against the petitioner and whether there are sufficient grounds to withdraw the prosecution against him?” 5. Section 321 of Cr.P.C. reads as follows: 321. Withdrawal from prosecution:- The Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of a case may, with the consent of the Court, at any time before the judgment is pronounced, withdraw from the prosecution of any person either generally or in respect of any one or more of the offences for which he is tried; and, upon such withdrawal,- (a) if it is made before a charge has been framed, the accused shall be discharged in respect of such offence or offences; (b) if it is made after a charge has been framed, or when under this Code no charge is required, he shall be acquitted in respect of such offence or offences. Provided that where such offence:- (i) was against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends; or (ii) was investigated by the Delhi Special Police establishment under the Delhi Special Police establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946); or (iii) involved the misappropriation or destruction of, or damage to, any property belonging to the Central Government; or (iv) was committed by a person in the service of the Central Government while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, And the Prosecutor in charge of the case has not been appointed by the Central Government, he shall not, unless he has been permitted by the Central Government to do so, move the Court for its consent to withdraw from the prosecution and the Court shall, before according consent, direct the Prosecutor to produce before it the permission granted by the Central Government to withdraw from the prosecution. As per the above Section, the Public Prosecutor may withdraw prosecution of any person with the consent of the Court. Further, the Court has to see whether the Public Prosecutor acted independently by applying his mind or at the behest of the Government. If so, whether the withdrawal can be accepted as proper. 6. As per the above Section, the Public Prosecutor may withdraw prosecution of any person with the consent of the Court. Further, the Court has to see whether the Public Prosecutor acted independently by applying his mind or at the behest of the Government. If so, whether the withdrawal can be accepted as proper. 6. The present case was filed against A-1 and A-2 for the offences under Sections 7 and 13 (1) (d) read with 13 (2) of the Act. The prosecution alleged that A-1 is the then Commercial Tax Officer-II at Karimnagar. He demanded and accepted bribe of Rs.70,000/- on 18-11-2000 at 9-55 AM from defacto complainant through A-2 as a motive or reward for doing official favour of not harassing and imposing heavy tax on the complainant. After framing of the charges, the prosecution examined PWs.1 to 5 and marked Exs.P-1 to P-15 and Ex.C-1 documents and M.Os.1 to 8. At that stage, the present application has been filed by the special Public Prosecutor contending that during the course of the trial, the prosecution witnesses supported the prosecution version about the demand and acceptance of bribe by A-1 through A-2. At that stage, the Government of A.P. issued G.O.Ms.No.2055 and 2056 of Revenue (VIG-I) Department, dated 16-09-2006 withdrawing the prosecution against A-1 and A-2. In pursuance of the G.O., the learned Special Public Prosecutor filed an Application before the lower Court requesting the Court to pass orders. 7. In the G.O. it is mentioned that A-2 made a representation before the Government stating that he never demanded and accepted any bribe from the complainant. The Commercial Tax Officer issued orders for payment of advance tax of Rs.76,132/- to the defacto complainant. He cannot influence the proceedings of the inspection as he is only a Junior Assistant. The complainant with a mala fide intention had come to his house and handed over the tax amount of Rs.70,000/- saying that treasury would not function that day due to clean and green programme, therefore, requested to withdraw the prosecution against him. It is further mentioned that the Government, after careful examination of the matter, ordered to withdraw prosecution against the petitioner and decided to entrust his case to the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings since the alleged bribe was found in his house and chemical test proved positive in his case. 8. It is further mentioned that the Government, after careful examination of the matter, ordered to withdraw prosecution against the petitioner and decided to entrust his case to the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings since the alleged bribe was found in his house and chemical test proved positive in his case. 8. In the G.O. no reasons were assigned for withdrawal of the case except that the Government have decided to entrust the case to the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings. In pursuance of the said G.O., the learned Special Public Prosecutor filed a Petition under Section 321 of Cr.P.C. mentioning as follows: “During the course of trial the prosecution has examined P.Ws.1 to 5. The trap laying officer and the Investigating Officer have to be examined to further the case of the prosecution. During the course of trial P.W.1 has succinctly stated about the demand and acceptance of bribe by A-1 and A-2 and his evidence is in tune with Ex.P4 (Complaint). While the matter stood thus, the Government of A.P. ordered to withdraw prosecution against A-1 and A-2 vide G.O.Ms.Nos.2055 and 2056 (Revenue VIG-I Department), dated 16-09-2006. Therefore, the prosecution prays that the Hon’ble Court may be pleased to pass orders as the Court deems fit and proper in the interest of justice.” In the said Application, there is no mention of any reasons for withdrawal of the prosecution and there is no mention whether the Public Prosecutor has gone through the entire material, whether he applied his mind and whether he satisfied that it is a fit case for withdrawal in the interest of justice. 9. Sri. P.V. Vidya Sagar, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that though the learned Special Public Prosecutor did not mention in the Application that he did not apply his mind, it can be inferred from the Application, which was filed along with the G.O., that the Public Prosecutor applied his mind, therefore, the Court cannot go into further details except according consent for withdrawal of the case, therefore, the learned Special Judge erred in dismissing the Application without granting consent for withdrawal of the case. 10. In this connection, it is essential to refer the case law, which discloses that in umpteen number of cases the Supreme Court repeatedly observed about the role of the public prosecutor and the role of the Court in cases for withdrawal. In Dy. Acctt. 10. In this connection, it is essential to refer the case law, which discloses that in umpteen number of cases the Supreme Court repeatedly observed about the role of the public prosecutor and the role of the Court in cases for withdrawal. In Dy. Acctt. General v. State (AIR 1970 Kerala 158 (FB)), the Full Bench of the Keralal High Court held: “The power to withdraw under S.494 of Criminal P.C. is conferred on the public prosecutor and on no one else; and, although this is an executive power, it is a power which he must exercise in the light of his own judgment and not at the dictation of some other authority, however high. The power of withdrawal conferred on the Public Prosecutor is not an absolute power. He can withdraw from the prosecution only with the consent of the Court and this curb is placed on his power in order to ensure that the power is not abused. In other words, it is not exercised for improper reasons or to serve improper ends. The court gives its consent in the exercise of its judicial discretion and before granting consent, it must be satisfied that the grounds stated for the withdrawal are proper grounds, grounds which, if true, would make the withdrawal a furtherance of, rather than an hindrance to, the object of the law. Further, that there is material to substantiate the grounds alleged though not necessarily material gathered by the judicial method. One of the well-established grounds on which a withdrawal can properly be based is that there is no evidence in the case, which would warrant a conviction. In such a case it would certainly not further the object of the law to harass the accused and waste the time of the Court, the witness, the prosecution and the defence by going on with the case.” In Purushottam Vijay V. State (1982 CRI. L.J. 243 MP), the Madhya Pradesh High Court, while considering the consent under Section 494 of the Old Act equivalent to Section 321 of the New Act, held: “The consent is not to be lightly given on the application of the Public Prosecutor without a careful and proper scrutiny of the grounds on which the application for consent is made. L.J. 243 MP), the Madhya Pradesh High Court, while considering the consent under Section 494 of the Old Act equivalent to Section 321 of the New Act, held: “The consent is not to be lightly given on the application of the Public Prosecutor without a careful and proper scrutiny of the grounds on which the application for consent is made. What the Court has to determine, for the exercise of its discretion in granting or withholding consent, is not a triable issue on judicial evidence. It is not correct to say that where the application is on the ground of inadequacy of evidence requiring judicial consideration it would be manifestly improper for the Court to consent to withdrawal before recording the evidence and taking it into consideration. To hold so would be engrafting on the wide terms of Section 494, an exception or a proviso limited to such a case. This would not be a permissible construction of the section. But such evidence as may already have been recorded by the time the application is made can be looked into and considered in such cases, in order to determine the impropriety of the withdrawal is amounting to abuse or an improper interference with the normal course of justice. Hence where application for withdrawal under Section 491, is made on the ground of insufficiency or meagerness of a reliable evidence that is available it is not an improper exercise of discretion for the Court to grant consent before evidence is taken, if it was reasonably satisfied otherwise, that the evidence, if actually taken, is not likely to result in conviction.” In Balwant Singh V. State of Bihar ( AIR 1977 SC 2265 ), Krishan Iyer, J observed: “The court has to be vigilant when a case has been pending before it and not succumb to executive suggestion made in the form of application for withdrawal with a bunch of papers tacked on. The state should not stultify the court by first stating that there is a true case to be tried and then make a volte-face to the effect that on a second investigation the case has been discovered to be false.” He further observed: “In the interests of public justice being the paramount consideration they may transcend and overflow the legal justice of the particular litigation.” In Dwaraka Prasad V. State (1982 CRI. L.J. 713 Orissa), the Orissa High Court held: “While withdrawing from prosecution it is not sufficient for the Public Prosecutor merely to say that it is not expedient to proceed with the prosecution. He has to make out some ground which would show that the prosecution is sought: to be withdrawn because inter alia the prosecution may not be able to produce sufficient evidence to sustain the charge or that the prosecution does not appear to be well-founded or that there are other circumstances which clearly show that the object of administration of justice would not be advanced or furthered by going on with the prosecution.” In Awadesh Prasad V. State of Bihar (1989 CRI. L.J. 1029), the Orissa High Court while considering Section 321 of Cr.P.C. observed: "Interest of justice requires prosecution of the accused in as much as innocent shop-keepers were made the target of a ghastly attack by armed musclemen. The offences complained against involve individual acts of the culprits and no "State and Public Policy" is involved in the matter. Allowing the Public Prosecutor to withdrawn from the prosecution in a case of the type in hand would amount to interfering with the administration of justice, and the court of law is to refuse permission in such a case to the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution to prevent abuse.” In Madan Gopal v. State of Kerala ( 1989 (1) Crimes 583 Kerala, the Kerala High Court held: “The Public Prosecutor can apply for withdrawal only on the basis of certain legitimate grounds and the powers can be exercised only in furtherance of justice and in the interest of the administration of justice.” In Annamalai v. Govt. of T.N (1989 CRI. L.J. 2055 Madras High Court held: “It is the fundamental principle of Criminal Jurisprudence that the State has got authority to withdraw the prosecution in any case for the reasons stated by it, the aim of which is only to bring peace in the locality for the public good. Several reasons may be offered for withdrawing the prosecution after filing the charge-sheet into Court or even after sufficient progress has been made in the trial and the Government is at liberty to withdraw the prosecution. This process is recognized by the representation on behalf of the State that the State has decided to withdraw the prosecution with respect to the case. This process is recognized by the representation on behalf of the State that the State has decided to withdraw the prosecution with respect to the case. Even the Advocate-General of the State has got power to enter nolle prosqui and stop even the trial by disclosing to the Court that the prosecution launched against the accused is withdrawn or against the entire lot. The same procedure is also applicable when the new criminal procedure has came into existence. So when the State is interested in stopping the prosecution against some or all the accused, there cannot be any obstruction for withdrawing the prosecution or for an order being issued for stopping the further prosecution in the criminal case by the police or for directing the police to stop the investigation for certain time so as to see that such an action taken does help in creating an atmosphere avoiding tension in the locality. There are the basic feature underlying the above concepts involved in both the substantial and procedural law relating to crimes.” In Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (1977 CRI. L.J. 2022 Bombay), the Bombay High Court observed that in Ramasaran v. Emperor (AIR 1945 Nagpur 72), the High Court held that the withdrawal of the case is an executive and not a judicial act and it is not even necessary for the Magistrate to assign any reasons for giving his consent to the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution. But in State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh ( AIR 1957 SC 389 ), the Supreme Court held that the function of the Court in granting its consent to withdrawal from the prosecution may well be taken to be judicial function and further held: “The judicial function, therefore, implicit in the exercise of the judicial, discretion for granting the consent would normally mean that the Court has to satisfy itself that the executive function of the public prosecutor has not been improperly exercised, or that it is not an attempt to interfere with the normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons or purposes. In this context it is right to remember that the Public Prosecutor though an executive officer is, in a larger sense, also an officer of the Court and that he is bound to assist the Court with his fairly considered view and the Court is entitled to have the benefit of the fair exercise of his function.” In M.N. Sankaranarayana Nair v. P.V. Balakrishnan ( AIR 1972 SC 496 ), the Supreme Court held: "A reading of Sec. 494 would show that it is the Public Prosecutor who is in charge of the case that must ask for permission of the Court to withdraw from the prosecution of any person either generally or in respect of one or more of the offences for which he is tried. This permission can be sought by him at any stage either during the enquiry or after committal or even before the judgment is pronounced. The section does not, however, indicate the reasons, which should weigh with the Public Prosecutor to move the Court for permission not the grounds on which the Court will grant or refuse permission. Though the section is in general terms and does not circumscribe the powers from the Public Prosecutor to seek permission to withdraw from the prosecution the essential consideration which is implicit in the grant of the power is that it should be in the interest of administration of justice which may be either that it will not be able to produce sufficient evidence to sustain the charge or that subsequent information before prosecuting agency would falsify the prosecution evidence or any other similar circumstances which it is difficult to predicate as they are dependent entirely on the facts and circumstances of each case. Nonetheless it is the duty of the court also to see in furtherance of justice that the permission is not sought on grounds extraneous to the interest of justice or that offences which are offences against the State go unpunished merely because the Government as a matter of general policy or expediency unconnected with its duty to prosecute offenders under the law, directs the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution and the Public Prosecutor merely does so at its behest.” The position was confirmed in Bansi Lal V. Chandan Lal ( AIR 1976 Sc 370 ), and Balwant Singh's case (3 supra). The law is thus well-settled and its application is all that calls for caution. In the special situation of this case, two principles must be hammered home. The decision to withdraw must be of the Public Prosecutor, not of other authorities, even of those whose displeasure may affect his continuance in office. The court is monitor, not servitor, and must check to see if the essentials of the law are not breached, without, of course, crippling or usurping the power of the Public Prosecutor. The two matters which are significant are (a) whether the considerations are germane, and (b) whether the actual decision was made or only obeyed by the Public Prosecutor. In State of Orissa v. Chandrika Mohapatra ( AIR 1977 SC 903 ), the Supreme Court held: “It is not sufficient for the Public Prosecutor merely to say that it is not expedient to proceed with the prosecution. He has to make out some ground which would show that the prosecution is sought to be withdrawn because inter alia the prosecution may not be able to produce sufficient evidence to sustain the charge or that the prosecution does appear to be well founded or that there are other circumstance which clearly show that the object of administration of justice would not be advanced or furthered by going on with the prosecution. The ultimate guiding consideration must always be the interest of administration of justice and that is the touch-stone on which the question must be determined whether the prosecution should be allowed to be withdrawn.” In Pichan Cheerath v. A.P.P. Malappuram (1980 CRI. L.J. 901 Kerala), the Supreme Court held: “Though Section 321 Cr.P.C. is in general terms and does not circumscribe the powers of the Public Prosecutor to seek permission to withdraw from the prosecution, the essential consideration which is implicit in the grant of the power is that it should be in the interest of administration of justice which may be either that it will not be able to produce sufficient evidence to sustain the charge or that subsequent information before the prosecuting agency would falsify the prosecution evidence or any other similar circumstances which it is difficult to predicate as they are dependent entirely on the facts and circumstances of each case. The Court has a duty to see in furtherance of justice that the permission is not sought on grounds extraneous to the interest of justice. The Public Prosecutor has to exercise the wide and general powers under the section in furtherance of justice, rather than as a hindrance to the object of law, and the exercise of such power should be justified on the materials in the case which substantiate the grounds alleged, not necessarily that gathered by the judicial method, but on the materials which may not be strictly legal or admissible in evidence. The court also is not supposed to act mechanically in the sense that permission would automatically follow when an application under the section is made by the Public Prosecutor. The consent ought not to be granted unless the court is satisfied on the materials placed before it that the grant of it would subserve administration of justice and that permission was not being sought covertly with an ulterior purpose unconnected with the vindication of the law, which the executive organs are in duty bound to further and maintain. The Public Prosecutors will do well to bear in mind that to allow the continuation to reach its normal end is the rule and withdrawal is an exception to that rule which could be restored to very sparingly, lest the confidence of the public in the efficacy of the administration of justice be shaken. If some policy consideration bearing on the administration of justice justifies the withdrawal, the court may accord permission; not if no public policy bearing on the administration of justice is involved.” In the above case, the Court below has considered the question whether the Assistant Public Prosecutor has made out a case for the withdrawal and has given good reasons for withholding its consent. Except a vague statement that it was a fit case for permission to withdraw the accused from prosecution, the Assistant Public Prosecutor did not give any basis for his opinion, either factual or legal. The defacto complainant expressed his apprehension that the granting of permission to withdraw the case from prosecution would amount to an encouragement to the accused to commit similar offences against the complainant who is a Harijan agricultural labourer. The Assistant Public Prosecutor has not stated how public justice would suffer or the prosecution prove to be inexpedient. The defacto complainant expressed his apprehension that the granting of permission to withdraw the case from prosecution would amount to an encouragement to the accused to commit similar offences against the complainant who is a Harijan agricultural labourer. The Assistant Public Prosecutor has not stated how public justice would suffer or the prosecution prove to be inexpedient. In Subhash Chandra v. State ( AIR 1980 SC 423 ), the Supreme Court while dealing with Section 321 of Cr.P.C. held: “5. Once a prosecution is launched, its relentless course cannot be halted except on sound considerations germane to public justice. All public power is a public trust, and the Public Prosecutor cannot act save in discharge of that public trust, a public trust geared to public justice. The consent of the court under S.321 as a condition for withdrawal is imposed as a check on the exercise of that power. Consent will be given only if public justice in the larger sense is promoted rather than subverted by such withdrawal. That is the essence of the nolle prosequi jurisprudence. 6. We wish to stress, since impermissible influences occasionally infiltrate into this forbidden ground, that court justice is out of bounds for masters and minions elsewhere. We do not truncate the amplitude of the public policy behind S.494, Cr.P.C. but warn off tempting adulteration of this policy, taking the public prosecutor for granted. Maybe, the executive, for plural concerns and diverse reasons, may rightfully desire a criminal case to be scotched. The fact that broader considerations of public peace, larger considerations of public justice and even deeper considerations of promotion of long-lasting security in a locality, of order in a disorderly situation or harmony in a faction milieu, or halting a false and vexatious prosecution in a court, persuades the Executive, probono publico, sacrifice a pending case for a wider benefit, is not ruled out although the power must be sparingly exercised and the statutory agency to be satisfied is the public prosecutor, not the District Magistrate of Minister. The concurrence of the court is necessary. The subsequent discovery of a hoax behind the prosecution or false basis for the criminal proceeding as is alleged in this case, may well be a relevant ground for withdrawal. For the court should not be misused to continue a case conclusively proved to be a counterfeit. The concurrence of the court is necessary. The subsequent discovery of a hoax behind the prosecution or false basis for the criminal proceeding as is alleged in this case, may well be a relevant ground for withdrawal. For the court should not be misused to continue a case conclusively proved to be a counterfeit. This statement of the law is not exhaustive but is enough for the present purpose and, indeed, is well-grounded on precedents.” In Rajender Kumar v. State ( Air 1980 SC 1510 ), the Supreme Court, while dealing with Section 321 of Cr.P.C., enumerated as to what are the duties of a Public Prosecutor in a case of withdrawal from prosecution and the scope of jurisdiction of the Court and held as follows: “It shall be the duty of the Public Prosecutor to inform the Court and it shall be the duty of the Court to appraise itself of the reasons which prompt the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution. The Court has a responsibility and a stake in the administration of criminal justice and so has the Public Prosecutor, its “Minister of Justice”. Both have a duty to protect the administration of criminal justice against possible abuse or misuse by the Executive by resort to the provisions of S.321, Criminal Procedure Code. The Courts when moved for permission for withdrawal from prosecution must be vigilant and inform themselves fully before granting consent. While it would be obnoxious and objectionable for a Public Prosecutor to allow himself to be ordered about, he should appraise himself from the Government and thereafter appraise the Court the host of factors relevant to the question of withdrawal from the cases, but under no circumstances should he allow himself to become anyone’s stooge.” The Supreme Court in para 13 of the Judgment listed out the factors to justify withdrawal of prosecution, which reads as follows: 1. Under the scheme of the Code prosecution of an offender for a serious offence is primarily the responsibility of the Executive. 2. The withdrawal from the prosecution is an executive function of the Public Prosecutor. 3. The discretion to withdraw from the prosecution is that of the Public Prosecutor and none else, and so, he cannot surrender that discretion to someone else. 4. 2. The withdrawal from the prosecution is an executive function of the Public Prosecutor. 3. The discretion to withdraw from the prosecution is that of the Public Prosecutor and none else, and so, he cannot surrender that discretion to someone else. 4. The Government may suggest to the Public Prosecutor that he may withdraw from the prosecution but none can compel him to do so. 5. The Public Prosecutor may withdraw from the prosecution not merely on the ground of paucity of evidence but on other relevant grounds as well in order to further the broad ends of public justice, public order and peace. The broad ends of public justice will certainly include appropriate social, economic and, we add, political purposes sans Tammany Hall enterprises. 6. The Public Prosecutor is an officer of the Court and responsible to the Court. 7. The Court performs a supervisory function in granting its consent to the withdrawal. 8. The Court’s duty is not to reappreciate the grounds which led the Public Prosecutor to request withdrawal from the prosecution but to consider whether the Public Prosecutor applied his mind as a free agent, uninfluenced by irrelevant and extraneous consideration. The Court has a special duty in this regard as it is the ultimate repository of legislative confidence in granting or withholding its consent to withdrawal from the prosecution.” In Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1983 SC 194 ), the Supreme Court, while dealing with a case of withdrawal from the prosecution, considered the scope and powers of the Public Prosecutor under Section 321 of Cr.P.C. and held as follows: “Though withdrawal from prosecution is an executive function of the Public Prosecutor for which statutory discretion is vested in him, the discretion is neither absolute nor unreviewable but it is subject to the Court’s supervisory function. In fact being an executive function it would be subject to a judicial review on certain limited grounds like any other executive action, the authority with whom the discretion is vested “must genuinely address itself to the matter before it, must not act under the dictates of another body, must not do what it has been forbidden to do, must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant considerations and must not be swayed by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the latter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. A bare perusal of Section 321 shows that it does not prescribe any ground nor does it put any embargo or fetter on the power of the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from prosecution a particular criminal case pending in any Court. All that it requires is that he can do so only with the consent of the Court where the case is pending. The function of the Court in this respect is a limited one and intended only to prevent the abuse. The function of the Court in according its consent to withdrawal is, however, a judicial function. It, therefore, becomes necessary for the Court before whom the application for withdrawal is filed by the Public Prosecutor to apply its mind so that the appellate Court may examine and be satisfied that the Court has not accorded its consent as a matter of course but has applied its mind to the grounds taken in the application for withdrawal by Public Prosecutor.” In Abdul Karim v. State of Karnataka (AIR 2001 SC 116), the Supreme Court held as follows: “The law, is that though the Government may have ordered, directed or asked a Public Prosecutor to withdraw from a prosecution, it is for the Public Prosecutor to apply his mind to all the relevant material and, in good faith, to be satisfied thereon that the public interest will be served by his withdrawal from the prosecution. In turn, the Court has to be satisfied, after considering all that material, that the Public Prosecutor has applied his mind independently thereto, that the Public Prosecutor, acting in good faith, is of the opinion that his withdrawal from the prosecution is in the public interest, and that such withdrawal will not stifle or thwart the process of law or cause manifest injustice. It must therefore follow that the application under S.321 must aver that the Public Prosecutor is, in good faith, satisfied, on consideration of all relevant material, that his withdrawal from the prosecution is in the public interest and it will not stifle or thwart the process of law or cause injustice. The material that the Public Prosecutor has considered must be set out, briefly but concisely, in the application or in an affidavit annexed to the application or, in a given case, placed before the Court, with its permission, in a sealed envelope. The Court has to give an informed consent. It must be satisfied that this material can reasonably lead to the conclusion that the withdrawal of the Public Prosecutor from the prosecution will serve the public interest; but it is not for the Court to weigh the material. The Court must be satisfied that the Public Prosecutor has considered the material and, in good faith, reached the conclusion that his withdrawal from the prosecution will serve the public interest. The Court must also consider whether the grant of consent may thwart or stifle the course of law or result in manifest injustice. If, upon such consideration, the Court accords consent, it must make such order on the application as will indicate to a higher Court that it has done all that the law requires it to do before granting consent.” In Raghul Agarwal v. Rakesh Jain, ( (2005) 2 SCC 377 ), the Supreme Court considered as to when can the Court allow withdrawal of the prosecution under Section 321 of Cr.P.C. and what are the necessary conditions. In the case covered by the above decision, reasons given by the High Court for allowing the withdrawal of the case were found to be not correct. The Supreme Court observed that when the case was about to be over, the same should not have been allowed to be withdrawn by holding that the trial has been pending for over seven years. The Supreme Court observed that when the case was about to be over, the same should not have been allowed to be withdrawn by holding that the trial has been pending for over seven years. While holding that the High Court’s order is not legally sustainable, the Supreme Court observed as follows: “Withdrawal of prosecution can be allowed only when valid reasons are made out for the same and in the interest of justice. The court has to consider all relevant circumstances and find out whether the withdrawal of prosecution would advance the cause of justice. The discretion under Section 321 should not be exercised to stifle the prosecution. Withdrawal can be permitted if the case is likely to end in an acquittal and the continuance of the case is only causing severe harassment to the accused. It can be allowed if it is likely to bury the dispute and bring about harmony between the parties.” In S.K. Shukla v. State of U.P. ( (2006) 1 SCC 314 ), the Supreme Court held: “Unlike the Judge, the Public Prosecutor is not an absolutely independent officer. He is appointed by the government for conducting in court any prosecution or other proceedings on behalf of the Government concerned. So there is the relationship of counsel and client between the public Prosecutor and the Government. If the Government gives instructions to a public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution of a case, the latter after applying his mind to the facts of the case may either agree with instructions and file a petition stating grounds of withdrawal or disagree therewith having found a good case for prosecution and refuse to file the withdrawal petition. In the latter event the Public prosecutor will have to return the brief and perhaps to resign, for, it is the Government, not the Public Prosecutor, who is in the know of larger interest of the State. The pubic Prosecutor cannot act like a post box or act on the dictate of the State Governments. He has to act objectively as he is also an officer of the Court. At the same time court is also not bound by that. The courts are also free to assess whether the prima facie case is made or not. The court, if satisfied, can also reject the prayer.” 11. He has to act objectively as he is also an officer of the Court. At the same time court is also not bound by that. The courts are also free to assess whether the prima facie case is made or not. The court, if satisfied, can also reject the prayer.” 11. The above decisions rendered by the Supreme Court clearly indicate that the Public Prosecutor has to apply his mind independently without allowing himself to become the government’s stooge. Wherever issues involve the emotions and there is a surcharge of violence in the atmosphere it has often been found necessary to withdraw from prosecutions in order to restore peace, to free the atmosphere from the surcharge of violence to bring about a peaceful settlement of issues and to preserve the calm, which may follow the storm. While withdrawing the case, the Government should decide, in the first instance, whether it should be baneful or beneficial to launch or continue the prosecution. If the Government decides that it should be in the public interest to withdraw from the prosecution, the government may order withdrawal of the case. Criminal justice is not a plaything and a Criminal Court is not a play ground for politicking. The political fervour should not convert prosecution into persecution, nor political favour reward wrongdoer by withdrawal from prosecution. If political fortunes are allowed to be reflected in the processes of the Court very soon the credibility of rule of law will be lost. Therefore, the courts when moved for permission for withdrawal from prosecution, must be vigilant and inform themselves fully before granting consent. While it would be obnoxious and objectionable for a Public Prosecutor to allow himself to be ordered about, he should apprise himself from the government and thereafter apprise the Court the host of factors relevant for withdrawal from the cases. 12. In the present case, the Public Prosecutor did not file any letter addressed by the Government to him to file an Application along with the G.O. before the Court to enable the Court to give the consent. The Public Prosecutor did not assign any reasons whether in the interest of public the prosecution has to be withdrawn. This is a case where there is an allegation of acceptance of bribe under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Public Prosecutor did not assign any reasons whether in the interest of public the prosecution has to be withdrawn. This is a case where there is an allegation of acceptance of bribe under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Public Prosecutor did not mention in the Application that there is no likelihood of conviction of the accused from the evidence so far adduced. Neither the Government nor the Public Prosecutor assigned any reasons and there is no indication in the application whether the public prosecutor has applied his mind. There is an allegation of demanding and accepting bribe against the accused. There is no public interest involved in it. The Government deciding to refer the matter to the Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings by itself is not a ground for withdrawal of the case. The Public Prosecutor did not mention how the withdrawal meets the ends of justice social, economic and political. He also did not mention wither there is any public policy involved in this case and broader public interest like maintenance of law and order, maintenance of public peace and harmony. He also did not mention that the withdrawal of the case against the accused will not stifle or thwart the process of law or cause manifest injustice. There is no indication that the Public Prosecutor considered the material and in good faith reached the conclusion that the withdrawal from the prosecution will serve the public interest. By withdrawing the case, the prosecution should not reward the wrongdoer and if the withdrawal is made on irrelevant considerations, the credibility of the Rule of Law will be lost. The withdrawal can be allowed only in the interest of justice. There are no sufficient circumstances for the Court that the withdrawal of the prosecution against the accused would advance the cause of justice. 13. After going through the order of the lower Court, I am convinced that the lower Court rightly came to a conclusion that there is no indication in the application filed by the Public Prosecutor that he has applied his mind before filing the application for withdrawal of the case. In the light of the above discussion, I do not find any merits in the Revision Case. 14. In the result, the Revision case is dismissed as devoid of merits.