ORDER Dipak Misra, J. 1. Invoking the jurisdiction of intra Court appeal engrafted under Section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalay (Khand Nyaypeeth ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 (for brevity 'the Act') the appellant has called in question the impassibility of the order dated 15-12-2006 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 14005/2006. 2. The facts which are imperative and inescapable to be adumbrated for appreciation of the factual scenario in proper perspective are that the appellant entered into contract with the M. P. State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as 'the Board'), Respondent No. 1 herein, for supply of LT Switched Type Capacitor Banks (LSTCB) on lease basis valued for about Rs. 7 crores. The claimant-appellant supplied equipments as per terms of the order and were receiving payment through letter of credit from the bank as per the terms of the contract. As pleaded, the letter of credit established by the respondents lapsed and was not revalidated despite repeated requests. Because of this situation Rs. 2 crores inclusive of interest became outstanding against the respondent. Vide letter dated 31-5-2002 the respondent unilaterally amended the payment Clause No. 5(c) of the contract. Being aggrieved by such unilateral amendment the appellant preferred W.P. No. 3522/2003 questioning the said action. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition as per order dated 29-3-2004 and lanceted the said condition. Despite axing of the said clause in the writ petition the respondent did not pay the amount to the appellant in spite of repeated reminders. It is contended that the respondent-Board had awarded a contract for installation and commissioning of bank panels. The appellant had installed and commissioned the panels as per the work orders issued but no money was paid to him in spite of repeated demands. Rs. 10,80,058/- was claimed in respect of the work of installation. As disputes arose between the parties the arbitration clause was invoked by issuing notice to the respondents and the respondent in its turn, nominated arbitrators and eventually an Arbitral Tribunal consisting of Mr. Justice P.C. Naik, Presiding Arbitrator; Mr. Justice S.C. Pandey and Mr. R. K. Tiwari was constituted. Before the learned arbitrators a statement of claim was filed on 15-11-2005 on four heads. They read as under: (a) Rs. 1,25,66,256/- being the outstanding amount of the supply of Switched Type Capacitor Bank. (b) Rs. Justice P.C. Naik, Presiding Arbitrator; Mr. Justice S.C. Pandey and Mr. R. K. Tiwari was constituted. Before the learned arbitrators a statement of claim was filed on 15-11-2005 on four heads. They read as under: (a) Rs. 1,25,66,256/- being the outstanding amount of the supply of Switched Type Capacitor Bank. (b) Rs. 10,80,059/- being the outstanding amount of invoices raised for the work of installation, commissioning and monitoring of the Capacitor Banks at various Divisions of the respondent. (c) Interest @ 18% per annum as permissible under Section 31(7) of the Act. (d) Rs. 10 lacs being the amount spent by the petitioner in forced litigation against the respondent. 3. The respondent-Board filed its written statement denying the liability and putting forth a counter-claim of Rs. 77,019, 46/- towards value of 873 defective LSTCB panels and Rs. 1,16,82,209/- towards the loss suffered by it on account of LSTCB unit remaining inoperative due to non-requisition of the claim in time. The respondent-Board led further claim of Rs. 11,68,750/- on account of LSTCB panels. 4. Before the Arbitral Tribunal an application was submitted by the claimant-appellant under Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') wherein in paragraph Nos. 2 and 3 it was stated as under: 2. That for the reasons aforesaid, it is necessary and expedient in the interest of justice and fair play that respondent Board be commanded to release payment of at least Rs. 1 crore pending the arbitration proceedings. 3. That a bare perusal of the return filed by the respondent Board before the High Court would reveal that they had claimed discount of 10% in lieu of the alleged defective panels alleged to be worth Rs. 35 lakhs. The claim of discount has been quashed by the High Court. However, in all fairness, the respondent Board ought to have paid the amount payable to the claimant after withholding Rs. 35 lakhs. 5. A reply was filed before the joint arbitrators. The essence of it are in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5. The same read as under: 3. At the very outset, it is most humbly submitted that the application filed by the claimant is misconceived, devoid of any merit and deserves dismissal. 4. 35 lakhs. 5. A reply was filed before the joint arbitrators. The essence of it are in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5. The same read as under: 3. At the very outset, it is most humbly submitted that the application filed by the claimant is misconceived, devoid of any merit and deserves dismissal. 4. The provision of Section 17 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 are reproduced as under: Interim measures ordered by Arbitral Tribunal:- (i) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the Arbitral Tribunal may, at the request of a party, order a party to take any interim measure of protection as the Arbitral Tribunal may consider necessary in respect of the subject-matter of dispute. The Arbitral Tribunal may require a party to provide appropriate security in connection with a measure ordered under Sub-section (i). A bare perusal of it would demonstrate that the law does not contemplates of making any part payments before the claim of the parties can be adjudicated on merit. The provision of Section 17 are not meant for passing any order allowing the claim of the claimant before the same has been proved by the claimant. The law contemplates an interim measure of protection in respect of the subject-matter of the dispute. It is, therefore, submitted that the application filed by the claimant purportedly under Section 17 of the Act is misconceived. There is no such provision which entitled the claimant to move such an application claiming part payment of the total amount claimed before the liability of the respondent is proved. Merely filing of claim petition does not prove the claim of a claimant. The Hon'ble Tribunal has to come to a conclusion that certain amount is due to the claimant that can be done only after the claim of petitioner has been proved. 5. It is further submitted that the claim of the petitioner has not been admitted by the respondent. It is also categorically stated that the nonperformance of the terms of the guarantee by the claimants have caused great loss to the respondent and it is the respondent who is liable to be compensated by the claimant.. Therefore, no question of making any payment to the claimant ever arises much less paying Rs. 1 crore as interim measure as there is serious dispute in respect of supply of defected goods between the parties. 6. Therefore, no question of making any payment to the claimant ever arises much less paying Rs. 1 crore as interim measure as there is serious dispute in respect of supply of defected goods between the parties. 6. The Arbitral Tribunal vide order dated 6-5-2006 stated the backgrounds facts in paragraph Nos. 3 and 4 and thereafter proceeded to state in detail the stand of the claimant and the stance put forth by the Board. After so stating the Tribunal in paragraph 10 analysed the anatomy of Section 17 of the 1996 Act and referred to certain decisions cited by the parties and expressed the opinion that the Tribunal is required to see if justice can be done to the claimant by ordering payment of an amount, which should be paid to him by an upright person. The Tribunal had earlier observed that it has not granted any final relief. It was contended that a final relief cannot be granted in the garb of interim relief. After so observing the Tribunal proceeded to revert to the facts whether the claimant was entitled to any interim relief. Thereafter the Arbitral Tribunal in paragraphs 15, 16, 17 and 18 expressed the opinion as under: 15. Having held that we have power to grant interim relief as prayed, we must now examine whether the claimant is entitled to any interim relief. We make it clear that we are not entering into the merits of the controversy in the sense of recording any final finding. Prima facie it appears to us from the terms of agreement for supply of LSTCB Panels Annexure P-l dated 13-10-1995 as per Clause (5) that initially 25% of down payment of ex factory price through letter of credit was to be made in accordance with Sub-clause (a) thereof. This amount was treated as security for deposit by the respondent for supply of LSTCB Panels. It was so agreed that balance of 75% ex-factory price as detailed in subclause 5(c) was to be paid through letter of credit in 12 quarterly instalments. In this clause it is made clear that this amount paid by the respondent to the claimant shall be treated a lease rent charges. The payment was to be made from time to time against the supply of material. In this clause it is made clear that this amount paid by the respondent to the claimant shall be treated a lease rent charges. The payment was to be made from time to time against the supply of material. It was stated that after three years the security amount paid by respondent shall be adjusted towards the rent during the next 4 years, as per Sub-clause (d); Sub-clause (e) majtes it clear that after 7 years the respondent shall become the owner of the LSTCB Panels by paying Rs. 1 per panel to the claimant. Thus, it is clear that initially each unit of LSTCB Panels supplied to respondent was leased for 7 years subject to Sub-clause (e). There is no material on record to suggest that the respondent had at any point of time invoked the option of paying Rs. 1 in respect of any panel and making any unit its own property. The parties have hot disputed any of the documents on record. 16. The documents on record establish prima facie that the claimant has not been paid any amount after the decision of W.P. No. 3522/2003 dated 17-2-2004. Initially in the writ petition the respondent took the stand that 418 LSTCB Panels were found defective causing loss of Rs. 35 lakhs to the respondent. Now the respondent has stated that in July, 2003 actually 873 LSTCB Panels were found defective. It appears from Annexure-P/19 that the claim of Rs. 1,24,49,611/- is the amount outstanding excluding the interest towards the material supplied and it is supported by the bills annexed to the statement. Now, even if we assume that 873 units of LSTCB Panels were found to be defective, then the loss comes to Rs. 77,01,946/- as per Annexure P-19. The respondent has not given any specific reply to Annexure P-19 filed by the claimant. Therefore, we assume it to be correct. If we deduct Rs. 77,01,946/- from Rs. 1,24,49,611/- then, there is an unexplained gap of Rs. 47,47,665/-. We do not consider it proper to include the amount claimed by respondent by way of counter claim as they are in nature of claim made by the respondent against the claimant. These claims are not directly related to the lease rent of the LSTCB Panels supplied. The gap of Rs. 47,47,665/- is not explained by the respondent. 47,47,665/-. We do not consider it proper to include the amount claimed by respondent by way of counter claim as they are in nature of claim made by the respondent against the claimant. These claims are not directly related to the lease rent of the LSTCB Panels supplied. The gap of Rs. 47,47,665/- is not explained by the respondent. Therefore, we find a prima facie case in favour of the claimant. We further find balance of convenience in favour of the claimant. Looking to the time gap involved in the payment of bills of the claimant, we are of the view that the claimant is entitled to relief of protection by way of interim measure. 17. Looking to the facts and the circumstances of the case, we scale down the gap of Rs. 47,47,665.00 to Rs. 22,00,000.00 in the interest of justice to hold that by way of interim relief, the claimant is entitled to Rs. 22,00,000.00 against the bills Annexure-P/17 of the statement of claim. It is, however, clarified that this is an interim relief and does in no way conclude the claim of the claimant or the respondent either way. 18. There is another item/claim made by the claimant amounting to Rs. 10,80,059.00 as per Annexure-P/20 towards the work of installation and commissioning of panels done by it. The respondent has not denied that this amount was not due. The work of installation, which has already been done independently of the contract supply, has to be re-compensated by the respondent. Since the claim is not related to the contract of supply of material as such, therefore, it would be just to grant the entire amount of Rs. 10,80,059.00 in favour of the claimant in addition to Rs. 22,00,000.00 under Section 17 of the Act. We therefore, direct that the aforesaid amount i.e. Rs. 32,80,059.00 be paid by the respondent to the claimant within six weeks from today on furnishing solvent security and on furnishing an undertaking that this amount shall be refunded if this Tribunal so directs at the time of passing of the final award. 7. After the said order came to be passed the respondent-Board preferred an appeal MCA No. 81/2006 challenging the same before the learned District Judge. 7. After the said order came to be passed the respondent-Board preferred an appeal MCA No. 81/2006 challenging the same before the learned District Judge. Before the learned District Judge a preliminary objection was taken by the claimant that the appeal was not maintainable since the order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal tantamounts to an interim award. The learned District Judge placing reliance on the decision rendered in the case of Deepak Mitra v. District Judge, Allahabad, AIR 2000 All 9 came to hold that it was interim order passed under Section 17 of the Act and could not be construed as an interim award under Section 31(6) of the Act inasmuch as a decision has been rendered in respect of a part of the claim. The learned District Judge further observed that as there is grant of interim relief under Section 17 of the Act the appeal was maintainable under Section 37(2) of the Act. 8. Being dissatisfied with and aggrieved by the aforesaid order the claimant preferred a writ petition wherein the learned Single Judge scanned the order passed by the Tribunal arid relying on certain lines which find mention in paragraph Nos. 15 and 17 of the award expressed the opinion that in the absence of any adjudication of the lis the order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal cannot be legally treated as an interim award. The learned Single Judge further held that the appeal was maintainable. It is worth noting a contention was raised before the learned Single Judge that the appeal should have been preferred before this Court and not before the District Court. The learned Single Judge negatived the said contention placing reliance on the decision rendered in Pandy and Co. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Bihar and another, Civil Appeal No. 4780/06 that the appeal was maintainable in the District Court. Being of this view he dismissed the writ petition. 9. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order the claimant-appellant has preferred the present appeal. 10. As far as the appeal before this Court is concerned, we have carefully perused the analysis made by the learned Single Judge which is based on the law laid down in Pandy and Co. Builders Pvt. Ltd. (supra). 9. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order the claimant-appellant has preferred the present appeal. 10. As far as the appeal before this Court is concerned, we have carefully perused the analysis made by the learned Single Judge which is based on the law laid down in Pandy and Co. Builders Pvt. Ltd. (supra). In the aforesaid case the Apex Court has taken note of the fact that the Patna High Court did not exercise any original civil jurisdiction and the definition of 'Court' means Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, and if a High Court does not exercise original civil jurisdiction it would not be a Court within the meaning of the said provisions. Their Lordships of the Apex Court referred to Sections 37, 42 and the decision rendered in the case of SBP and Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd. and another, (2005) 8 SCC 618 and expressed the opinion that seven-Judge decision rendered in Patel Engineering (supra) does not wipe out of the appellate jurisdiction exercised by the Court under Section 37(2) of the 1996 Act. High Court of M. P. does not have the original civil jurisdiction. That pcing the position the view expressed by the learned Single Judge that the decision of the Apex Court rendered in Pandy and Co. Builders Pvt. Ltd. squarely covers the issue involved in the case at hand cannot be regarded as faulty and erroneous. Hence, we concur with the said finding. 11. The next aspect and the significant one which requires to be adverted to is whether the order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal is an interim award or an order passed under Section 17 of the Act. There is no cavil that the application was filed under Section 17 of the Act. The Arbitral Tribunal has expressed the order to be one under Section 17 of the Act but, an. eloquent and futile one, the real question that emanates for consideration is whether the said order would tantamount to an order under Section 17 of the Act or an order under Section 31(6) of the Act. 12. In this context we may refer with profit to Section 2(c) of the Act which defines 'arbitral award'. An 'arbitral award' includes an 'interim award'. Section 17 of the Act deals with interim measures ordered by Arbitral Tribunal. It reads as under: 17. 12. In this context we may refer with profit to Section 2(c) of the Act which defines 'arbitral award'. An 'arbitral award' includes an 'interim award'. Section 17 of the Act deals with interim measures ordered by Arbitral Tribunal. It reads as under: 17. Interim measures ordered by Arbitral Tribunal - (1) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the Arbitral Tribunal may, at the request of a party, order a party to take any interim measure of protection as the Arbitral Tribunal may consider necessary in respect of the subject-matter of the dispute. (2) The Arbitral Tribunal may require a party to provide appropriate security in connection with a measure ordered under Sub-section (I). 13. Section 37 of the Act which deals with 'appealable order'. It reads as under: 37. Appealable order - (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders (and from no others) to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the Court passing the order, namely:- (a) granting or refusing to grant any measure under Section 9; (b) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34. (2) Appeal shall also lie to a Court from an order of Arbitral Tribunal- (a) accepting the plea referred to in Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (3) of Section 16; or (b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under Section 17. (3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court. 14. Submission of Mr. H.K. Upadhyay, learned counsel for the respondent is that the present one is an order passed under Section 17 of the Act by which an interim arrangement has been made and, therefore, the appeal before the Principal Civil Court is maintainable. The distinction between Section 9 and Section 17 of the Act fundamentally is that Section 9 of the Act provides for making order of interim measures by the Court in respect of arbitration. Section 17 confers the power on Arbitral Tribunal to order a party to reference to take interim measure of protection in respect of the subject-matter of the dispute. Sub-section (1) of Section 17 provides that the parties are at liberty by agreement to exclude exercise of power under this section by Arbitral Tribunal. Section 17 confers the power on Arbitral Tribunal to order a party to reference to take interim measure of protection in respect of the subject-matter of the dispute. Sub-section (1) of Section 17 provides that the parties are at liberty by agreement to exclude exercise of power under this section by Arbitral Tribunal. If there is no exclusionary clause the Arbitral Tribunal can direct or pass orders as regard interim measures. The purpose of passing an order relating to any kind of interim measure as the language of the section postulates for protection and of the subject-matter of the dispute, as felt necessary by the Tribunal. Sub-section (2) empowers the Arbitral Tribunal to provide appropriate security in connection with a measure ordered under Sub-section (1). The interim measures of protection are the essential features of Section 17 of the Act. The two conditions that come into play for passing an interim measure or protection are (i) there should not be an exclusion by mutual agreement between the parties and such an order of protection must have nexus with the subject-matter of the dispute; and (ii) a condition can be is attached to the said order and such a direction is discretionary. The same is perceivable from the language in which Sub-section (2) has been couched. The Tribunal may require a party to provide appropriate security in connection with the passing of an order under Sub-section (1). The term 'interim measure of protection' can have a wide canvas and greater contour. It is worth-noting that Section 9(2) uses the same phraseology. The interim measure of protection has been clarified by, namely, the preservation, interim custody or sale of any goods which are the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement, securing the amount in dispute in the arbitration; the detention, preservation or inspection of any property or thing which is the subject-matter of the dispute in arbitration and to pass such mandatory orders. A Court has the power to secure the amount of dispute, interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver. This section also confers power on the Court to pass such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient. A Court has the power to secure the amount of dispute, interim injunction or the appointment of a receiver. This section also confers power on the Court to pass such other interim measure of protection as may appear to the Court to be just and convenient. The said orders of interim measure of protection have not been exactly provided but basically purpose of such an order would be to prevent disadvantage which may be caused during the arbitral proceeding and also striking of balance and for mitigation of immediate grievance and to bring in stability relating to the subject-matter of dispute. 15. Section 31 deals with form and contents, of arbitral award. Sub-section (6) of Section 31 reads as under: 31. Form and contents of arbitral award. - (1) XX XX XX (2) xx xx xx (3) xx xx xx (4) xx xx xx (5) xx xx xx (6) The Arbitral Tribunal may, at any time during the arbitral proceedings, make an interim arbitral award on any matter with respect to which it may make a final arbitral award. Submission of Mr. J.P. Sanghi, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant is that the order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal partakes the character of interim arbitral award as engrafted under Section 31(6) of the, Act whereas Mr. Upadhyay would submit that this is an interim measure of protection in respect of the subject-matter of dispute. The learned counsel for the respondent would further submit that an application was filed under Section 17,of the Act and the Tribunal has dealt with the same under Section 17 of the Act The learned counsel also submitted that a condition has been attached to provide solvent security and this has to be treated as an order under Section 17. He has placed heavy reliance on the decision rendered in the case of Deepak Mitra (supra). In the said case the learned Single Judge has held as under: "In view of the definition given under Section 2(1)(c) of the Act, an interim arbitral award is also an award and. Hias, therefore, to be made in the same way as an award after hearing the parties, and on consideration of the evidence adduced. In the said case the learned Single Judge has held as under: "In view of the definition given under Section 2(1)(c) of the Act, an interim arbitral award is also an award and. Hias, therefore, to be made in the same way as an award after hearing the parties, and on consideration of the evidence adduced. In Anand Prakashvs. Assistant Registrar, Cooperative Societies, AIR 1968 All 22 , it was made clear that by an interim award, the Arbitrator has to decide some of the issues or some of the claims. He may determine the issue of liability by leaving the question of the amount or damages to be dealt with later. In order to be an interim award, Arbitral Tribunal must determine some part of the disputes referred to it. 16. It is worth noting in the said case the learned Single Judge has taken stock of the facts which read as under: "In the instant case, various suggestions came to be made by the parties before the Arbitral Tribunal. It, in its wisdom, thought it proper to convene the extraordinary General Meetings of the shareholders of the two companies to ascertain their wishes about the proposal of division/partition of the properties. At the time of the convention of the meetings two respondents had made a prayer that no person be permitted to exercise his voting rights on the strength of the shares devolved upon him or her as successor of owner of company. Therefore, by the impugned order, the Arbitral Tribunal had simply declared the result of the opinion-poll, i.e. Majority of the shareholders was against the partition or division of the properties of the two companies and consequently, the suggestion for division of the properties, which came from the side of one or the other party, was ignored. Thus, the impugned order does not decide any matter except that it recorded the fact that the exploratory mission with regard to the division of the properties of the two companies had failed. The Arbitral Tribunal has simply recorded a finding of fact that the majority of the shareholders does not want division of the properties. By no stretch of imagination, the said order can be termed to be an interim award as it does not decide the rights of the parties or determines their liability. The Arbitral Tribunal has simply recorded a finding of fact that the majority of the shareholders does not want division of the properties. By no stretch of imagination, the said order can be termed to be an interim award as it does not decide the rights of the parties or determines their liability. Thus, the order could not be challenged by means of an application under Section 34 of the Act." The said order in our considered opinion has to be restricted to the case of the facts in that case. In fact, the learned Judge has rightly opined that arbitral tribunal had simply recorded a finding a fact on majority of shareholders does not want division of the property and the same should not be regarded as determination of the liability and hence, not an interim award. 17. The learned Single Judge as is manifest has placed reliance on the decision rendered in the case of M/s Uttam Singh Dugal and Co. Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi v. M/s Hindustan Steel Ltd., Bhilai Steel Project, Bhilai, 1992 MPU 598: AIR 1982 M. P. 206 wherein the Division Bench has expressed the opinion that order of arbitrator as regards issue of jurisdiction does not amount to an interim award and hence, no appeal lies against the said order of arbitrator. 18. In the case at hand factual scenario is quite different. We have reproduced the order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal. It has, in fact, expressed an opinion by stating that work of installation has already been done independent of contract of supply and the same has to be recompensated by the respondent. The Arbitral Tribunal has further opined as the claim was not related to a contract of supply of material and hence, it would be just to grant the entire amount of Rs. 10,80,059.00 in favour of the claimant in addition to Rs. 22,00,000.00 under Section 17 of the Act. While so awarding the Tribunal, as is evincible, has directed for furnishing solvent security. True it is, the Tribunal has used the nomenclature of Section 17 and imposed a condition. It is also true that the Tribunal has required the claimant to provide appropriate security. It is well settled in law the nomenclature of mentioning of a particular provision does not necessarily mean that the order has been passed under the said provision. True it is, the Tribunal has used the nomenclature of Section 17 and imposed a condition. It is also true that the Tribunal has required the claimant to provide appropriate security. It is well settled in law the nomenclature of mentioning of a particular provision does not necessarily mean that the order has been passed under the said provision. Nomenclature is not the real governing factor. The nature and the tenor of the order has to be appositely and soundly understood. Section 17 of the Act deals with interim measures. It has a nexus with protection. That apart it has to have, as the language of the section would unambiguously suggest would have connection with the subject-matter of dispute. For grant of protective measure appropriate security may be directed to be provided by the party at the discretion of the Tribunal. As is luminescent from the order passed by the Tribunal a definite opinion has been expressed for grant of amount. There has been some kind of determination of the lis and on that basis the amount has been directed to be paid. It is a mandatory direction in terms of money. It partakes character of an interim award. It cannot lose its inherent and basic nature because of mentioning of Section 17 or imposing of a condition relating to security. It cannot be regarded as an interim measure of protection. Hence, we have no trace of doubt it is an interim arbitral award in terms of Section 31(6) of the award. 19. In view of the aforesaid the appeal under Section 37 of the Act is not maintainable before the learned trial Judge. The learned Single Judge has erred by affirming the said order and hence, we have to set aside the said order passed by the learned Single Judge. 20. The matter does not rest here. An appeal was filed by the respondent because there was a confusion in the obtaining factual matrix. It has to be regarded as an erroneous approach to a wrong formation. In the case of State of Goa v. Western Builders, (2006) 6 SCC 239 a two Judge Bench of the Apex Court have held as under: "The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 does not expressly exclude the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The prohibitory provision has to be construed strictly. In the case of State of Goa v. Western Builders, (2006) 6 SCC 239 a two Judge Bench of the Apex Court have held as under: "The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 does not expressly exclude the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The prohibitory provision has to be construed strictly. It is true that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 intended to expedite commercial issues. It is also clear in the Statement of Objects and Reasons that in order to recognise economic reforms the settlement of both domestic and international commercial disputes should be disposed of quickly so that the country's economic progress be expedited. The Statement of Objects and Reasons also nowhere indicates that Section 14 of the Limitation Act shall be excluded. (quoted from the placitum) After so holding their Lordships expressed the opinion that Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to the proceedings under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 21. In view of the aforesaid we permit the respondent to challenge the arbitral award before the appropriate Court in accordance with law with the provision contained under Section 34 of the Act. 22. Resultantly, the writ appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. Writ appeal allowed.