JUDGMENT B. P. DAS, J. : Berhampur Town House Building Cooperative Society Ltd. (in short, ‘Society’) represented by its Secretary has filed this writ application challenging the judgment passed by the Co-operative Tribunal, Orissa, Bhubaneswar in Service Dispute Case No.6/1996 (Annexure-1), directing the petitioner-Society to reinstate O.P.2- Susanta Kumar Dash in his original post as Secretary of the Society and pay his duty pay and leave salary as claimed by him subject to availability of leave at his credit and holding that O.P.2 is entitled to all consequential reliefs as Secretary of the Society. The impugned judgment was passed on 15.4.2000 and this writ application was filed on 14.2.2001. This Court by the interim order passed on 26.2.2001 in Misc. Case No.1682/2001 stayed operation of the impugned judgment (Annexure-1) and the said interim order is continuing. 2. The brief facts leading to this writ application are: O.P.2 as plaintiff filed Service Dispute Case No.6/96 before the Tribunal alleging that he was working as the Secretary of the Society and also as the Additional Secretary from 12.9.80 to 27.3.96, during which period he performed his duty to the satis¬faction of the authority. His grievance was that the Board of Directors of the Society arbitrarily and illegally terminated his service on 31.1.96, which fact was intimated to him by registered Letter dated 27.3.96. O.P.2 pleaded that on being selected in the interview, he was appointed as Secretary of the Society by its President by order dated 5.9.1980 and he joined the post on 12.9.80. After posting of one D.C. Senapati as regular Secretary, the plaintiff O.P.2 was assigned with the duty of the Additional Secretary on 23.3.1987, which he accepted with objection. O.P.2 further averred that during the period between 14.10.1987 and 26.8.1993 he was seriously ill for various ailments and remained on leave from time to time on medical grounds but his leave salary for the periods he was on leave was denied to him. Ulti¬mately, he joined on 26.8.1993 and was regularly attending the Office of the Society but he was not allotted with any work. Ultimately when he made a representation on 12.3.96 claiming his leave salary and duty pay, the petitioner-Society by letter dated 27.3.96 intimated O.P.2 that service had been terminated with effect from 27.3.1996, O.P.2 received the aforesaid letter on 29.3.1996. Ultimately when he made a representation on 12.3.96 claiming his leave salary and duty pay, the petitioner-Society by letter dated 27.3.96 intimated O.P.2 that service had been terminated with effect from 27.3.1996, O.P.2 received the aforesaid letter on 29.3.1996. Against the aforesaid decision, O.P.2 as plaintiff filed the aforesaid Dispute Case before the Tribunal under Sec¬tion 67-B of the Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1962, to quash the order of termination of his service and to allow him to continue as the Secretary of the Society. The petitioner-Society, which was defendant No.1 before the Tribunal, filed written statement contending, inter alia, that O.P.2 being a workman, the dispute raised by him under Section 67-B of the Act was not maintainable and the claim was barred by limitation. It was also contended that the appointment of O.P.2 as Secretary had not been approved by the Registrar of the Co-operative Society as required under Section 33-A of the Act and Rule-21(c) of the Bye-laws of the Society and he could have no claim for the post of Secretary and the termination was justi¬fied. The Tribunal after hearing the parties came to a find that (a) the proceeding was maintainable as plaintiff-O.P.2 was not a workman, (b) the claim was not barred by limitation and (c) the termination was not justified, and directed for reinstatement of O.P.2 with other consequential reliefs. This order is challenged in the present proceeding. 3. Mr. R. P. Mohapatra, learned counsel for the petition¬er-Society submitted that as neither the salary certificate nor was the job chart enclosed to the dispute case, the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal that O.P.2 was not a workman as he was employed mainly in supervisory capacity and was drawing salary of Rs.2585/-, is erroneous. According to Mr. Mohapatra, the observa¬tion of the Tribunal that plaintiff-O.P.2 would not be termed as a workman within the meaning of the Act, as he was employed mainly as Secretary of the Society was not tenable in the eye of law. The further argument of Mr. Mohapatra was that O.P.2 has abandoned his post of duty for a long period, i.e., from 14.10.1987 to 25.9.1995, without sufficient ground for his ab¬sence, for which the order of termination of his service was legal and justified. The further argument of Mr. Mohapatra was that O.P.2 has abandoned his post of duty for a long period, i.e., from 14.10.1987 to 25.9.1995, without sufficient ground for his ab¬sence, for which the order of termination of his service was legal and justified. It was further argued that as per the Bye-laws of the Society, the Secretary would be a paid Officer ap¬pointed by the Committee with the approval of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies.In the case at hand,as neither the ap¬pointment of O.P.2 as Secretary of the Society was approved as per the Bye-law by the Registrar nor was his appointment approved by the Registrar as required under Section 33-A of the Act, the appointment of O.P.2 as Secretary of the Society was an illegal appointment and termination of his service without giving ade¬quate opportunity of being heard was not bad in law. The termina¬tion of O.P.2 being simplicitor, observance of the principle of natural justice in terminating his service did not arise. Mr. Mohapatra, learned counsel for the petitioner, relied upon the decision of this Court in Secretary, Larambha Service Co-opera¬tive Society Ltd. v. Suresh Chandra Chhuria & another reported in (1999) II LLJ 419, wherein it was held as follows :- “xxx The reference to the designation for an employee would not by itself be sufficient to determine whether the said person was or was not a workman. What is to be seen is that de hors his designation what was the nature of duty that was assigned to the person in question and what was practically required to be done by him. Therefore, the true test would be to see the nature of the main duties of the employee or in other words,it will have to be seen what in substance the work he does or for what he was, in substance employed.xxx” The case cited above was a case of an Assistant Secretary and this Court found that though he was designated as Assistant Secretary, he ws virtually performing the duty of a Salesman all along. In order to substantiate the case of the present petitioner, Mr. In order to substantiate the case of the present petitioner, Mr. Mohapatra, learned counsel for the petitioner, also relied upon a decision of the Kerala High Court, copy of which has been given to me stated to have been down loaded from the Internet, i.e., in the case of K.M. Ulahannan v. Labour Court and Another (1997 (75) FLR 399), (1996) II LLJ 1140 Ker). 4. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of O.P.2. Mr. Rath, learned counsel for O.P.2, submitted that O.P.2 was not a workman as he was appointed as Secretary of the Society. There¬after, he was appointed as Additional Secretary of the said Society and it was also an admitted fact that O.P.2 had undertak¬en supervisor training in the Cooperative Training Institute, Baripada and passed the same in the year 1981-82. Due to his illness, he remained absent for the period from 14.10.1987 to 27.10.1987. Though O.P.2 joined in his duty on 28.10.1987, leave salary for the above period was denied to him. Again he became ill from 23.11.1987 to 20.12.1987. He resumed his duty as Addi¬tional Secretary on 21.12.1987, but his leave salary was also not sanctioned. After being fully cured he joined his duty on 26.08.1993. Though he was regularly attending the Office of the Society he was not allotted with any work and ultimately, he was intimated by a registered letter dated 27.3.1996 stating that his services were terminated since 27.3.1996. It was also stated therein that O.P.2. was appointed as Secretary, which is in administrative or managerial capacity, for which the nature of his work also does not show that he was a workman. According to Mr. Rath, learned counsel for O.P.2, the decision in Secretary, Larambha Service Cooperative Society Ltd (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. According to him, the order of termination was passed without framing any charge nor was there any allegation of misconduct against O.P.2 calling for termination of his service. That apart, O.P.2 had also made an effort to apprise the Management from time to time by extension of leave along with medical certificates, which were not taken into consideration. 5. In the aforesaid background, let us examine the im¬pugned judgment of the Tribunal, which is under challenge before this Court. That apart, O.P.2 had also made an effort to apprise the Management from time to time by extension of leave along with medical certificates, which were not taken into consideration. 5. In the aforesaid background, let us examine the im¬pugned judgment of the Tribunal, which is under challenge before this Court. In the said judgment, the Tribunal has framed four issues, which are as follows :- (a) Whether the dispute is maintainable; (b) Whether the termination of the plaintiff from service is legal and binding; (c) Whether the dispute is barred by limitation and (d) to what relief the plaintiff is entitled. In regard to the finding of the Tribunal on issue No.1 that the dispute was maintainable, I do not find any fault in the said finding because I am also satisfied that if I consider the case of the petitioner in the light of the decision in Secretary, Larambha Service Cooperative Society Ltd (supra), the nature of work shows that O.P.2 was never a workman; for which the finding on issue No.1 suffers from no infirmity. So far as the other issues are concerned, I find that the same have been rightly dealt with by the Tribunal, considering the evidence on record. Accordingly, I do not find any infirmity in the judgment dated 15.4.2000 passed by the Co-operative Tribunal, Orissa, Bhubanes¬war in Service Dispute Case No.6/1996 warranting inference in a proceeding under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. The writ application is accordingly dismissed. Consequently, the interim orders passed in the case stand vacated. There would be no order as to cost. Application dismissed.